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ABSTRACT 
 
An original model is presented for describing, analysing, and predicting soldiers’ behaviour in 
current regular combat arms units in the British Army.  It was derived, using social 
anthropological techniques, during participant observation by a serving British Army officer, 
and provides more coherent insights than other models of unit life.  Its central principle, 
created for this study, is a plurality of >social structures’.  These >social structures’ are 
separate bodies of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour which inform groups of people 
or individuals how to organise and conduct themselves vis-à-vis each other.  One >social 
structure’ operates at any single moment, according to context.  Such an approach has not 
previously been applied to British Soldiers. 
 
The model’s top level (low resolution), comprises: the formal command structure, 
consisting in the unit organisation, the apparatus of rank and discipline, and the framework of 
official accountability; the informal structure, comprising the conventions of behaviour in the 
absence of formal constraints; the functional structure, concerning >soldierly’ activity, 
attitudes, and expectations; and the loyalty/identity structure, encompassing the conventions 
involved in embracing and expressing membership of the formal hierarchy of groups within 
and above the unit.  Lower levels provide higher resolution, including a typology of informal 
relationships which encompasses different degrees of closeness and differences or equality in 
rank.   
 
The model’s rigour is established by testing its sensitivity at high resolution to the different 
conditions of life in historical British armies.  The top level, however, and the typology of 
informal relationships, are found potentially to provide a unifying framework for historical 
analysis of unit life in the British Army throughout its history. 
 
The model’s ability to illuminate current issues in the Army is demonstrated by its application 
to leadership training for officer cadets and the integration of women into regular combat arms 
units.  
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
SECTION ONE - BACKGROUND 
 
 
An army can be said to have many necessary ingredients - such things as equipment, 
command and staff structures, fighting doctrine and procedures1 - but probably the most basic 
of all are the fighting soldier and the human group in which that soldier fights, ‘soldier’ in this 
context (and throughout this thesis) meaning any serving member of a military unit, regardless 
of rank or position in that unit. 
Military groups can be considered special in many ways because of the unique 
requirement that they should operate effectively under extreme stress, and indeed continue to 
do so even after suffering sudden and traumatic reduction through casualties and unanticipated 
member change through the arrival of reinforcements and battle casualty replacements.  It is 
this unique and special nature of military groups and the social bonds that define and sustain 
them that led to the choice of subject area for this PhD study: social structures in the regular 
combat arms units of the British Army. 
The term ‘combat arms’ is used throughout this thesis to cover the regular units of the 
Household Cavalry and the Royal Armoured Corps, the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, 
the Infantry, the Royal Signals and the Army Air Corps.  These are the elements of the Army 
that can be expected to be deployed in war as formed units whose prime role lies in the 
forward battle area.  Whilst in reality soldiers from the supporting services (the Royal 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the Royal Logistic Corps, the Intelligence Corps, the 
Adjutant General’s Corps, the Royal Pioneer Corps, the Royal Army Medical Corps and the 
Royal Army Chaplain’ Department) may confidently expect to spend part of their time in the 
forward battle area, the significant distinction between them and what I have called the 
‘combat arms’ lies in the fact that they would not deploy there as part of formed units of their 
own corps. 
The Territorial Army (‘the TA’) contains a number of units that fit the description of 
‘combat arms’.  However, TA units have been excluded from this study because of the 
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significant time that their members spend outside the context of their units, and indeed outside 
the milieu of the British Army, as they pursue parallel lives as civilians fully embedded in the 
wider British society.  Regular soldiers present an analytically tighter case. 
Another important group that was not included in this study is Special Forces.  Their 
exclusion was a pragmatic measure as access to Special Forces units is difficult, and any 
conclusion that might have been drawn from research among them might have been subject to 
problematic security considerations.  The small number of individuals with a Special Forces 
background that were included in the study were all serving at the time in conventional military 
units. 
Although the starting point of this study was interest in the various groupings observed 
within combat units, the resulting research has a wider scope than the examination only of 
groups.  To draw an analogy from the everyday industrialized world, it is possible to liken the 
research area to the metro or underground transport system in a large town: at street level, the 
only visible manifestations of the system are the station entrances and the occasional glimpses 
of the railway, but there are large and complex systems (systems of control, of ventilation, of 
maintenance, of passenger management, and so on), which are hidden from view below 
ground.  In the same way, the observed behaviour of soldiers, individually and in military 
groups, is only the obvious and external manifestation (‘the stations’) of a complex and 
interwoven web of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour (the ‘hidden systems’).  This 
research seeks to reach beyond the obvious - military groups and the observed behaviour of 
soldiers - into the hidden area, comprising the web of conventions, attitudes, and expectations 
that underlie the everyday life of British soldiers in combat units. 
The academic discipline in which the research has been centred is Social 
Anthropology, a social science conventionally directed towards the study of small scale 
human groups of a few hundred individuals2 rather than the larger societies that are generally 
the province of Sociology3.  It is highly suitable for a study of this kind because military units 
comprise groups of exactly the sort of scale that it was developed to deal with.  It is a many-
stranded discipline, and the selection of the appropriate strands for this study is dealt with 
below. 
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However, the roots of this thesis go into other disciplines as well.  These include those 
strands of Sociology that inform our views of the concept of social structure and give insights 
into military social systems, Modelling insofar as it is related to social systems, and those 
aspects of History that address the British Army. 
This study has its importance in the insight that it can potentially give into the lives of a 
distinct and identifiable element in British Society, a body that attracts a considerable amount 
of public attention and support4 and interest in the media and at Government level, but one 
that is sparsely researched and appears somewhat arcane to outsiders5.  Furthermore, it is an 
element of British society which is becoming less and less well known as the number of 
people with experience of membership of the Army declines following the ending of National 
Service in the early 1960s and the further reductions in the numerical strength of the Army 
which have continued after that. 
 
SECTION TWO - AIM OF THE THESIS 
 
The aim of this thesis is to present a model generated using social anthropological techniques, 
which can be used with a degree of confidence to describe, analyse and predict the behaviour 
of British soldiers in regular combat arms units in the current British Army. 
 
SECTION THREE - STAGES IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AIM 
 
This thesis will achieve this purpose in the following steps: 
 
- Presentation of the model6, and demonstration of its utility as a tool for examining 
the behaviour of contemporary British soldiers in their units7. 
 
- Explanation of how the model has been tested by exploring its limits.  This was 
achieved by applying it to the examination of British soldiers’ first hand accounts in 
selected periods over the past 300 years, exploiting Bellamy’s principle that history is 
the ‘database’8, to see whether it fits their behaviour and attitudes and whether it 
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yields any insight into their lives.  Material was chosen from the mid seventeenth 
century, mid eighteenth century, late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the mid 
nineteenth century, and the early and the mid twentieth century. 
 
- Exploration of options for further implementation of the model to address historical 
and contemporary issues in the British Army. 
 
SECTION FOUR - ‘MODELLING’ IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE CONTEXT 
 
It will be clear from the preceding passage that a central element in the study is the concept of 
a ‘model’.  The use of this term, however, in the words of Giddens and Turner, ‘is highly 
ambiguous in the social sciences’9 so the purpose of this short section is to remove the 
ambiguity in this context. 
‘Model’ can be used to cover a spectrum of possible meanings, from a simple 
analogy such as the structure of a metro system used on page 2 above, to complex 
mathematical devices such as the Janus wargame used for training and operational analysis in 
land warfare10.  Interim positions along this spectrum are illustrated in these three quotations: 
 
- For Giddens and Turner the term means ‘theorizing in which concepts and their 
relations are presented as a visual picture that maps properties of the social universe 
and their interrelations’.11  
 
- For Loomba a model is ‘a particular representation of a system, which, in turn, 
represents specified aspects of reality’, and the purpose of a model is ‘to describe, 
explain, and predict the behavior of a system’.  He adds that ‘If a model proves to 
be a reliable predictor of system behavior, it can also be used to prescribe preferred 
courses of action’12.   
 
- Chapman says that ‘models are heuristic devices - essential aids in the process of 
analysis.  The fact that subsequent researchers prove them to be faulty doesn’t [sic] 
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matter.  What is important is that they provide us with first approximations which we 
can test and out of which we can build theories which have more powerful 
explanatory value.’13  
 
In the absence of an externally valid definition, a social ‘model’ will be taken here to 
mean any epistemological device that can be used to describe, analyse, and predict the 
behaviour of human beings, or to explain it in retrospect.  In the context of this study, 
therefore, a model must demonstrably be capable of carrying out all these three functions.  
An important consideration is the language in which a model is to be expressed.  
Wilson describes the range of options as another spectrum, 
 
‘This spectrum extends from the well defined (hard) problems, in which the modelling 
language may be mathematically oriented, to soft, ill structured problems in which a 
modelling language is required which is capable of a richer description of the real 
world than mathematics can provide.’14 
 
Because the sort of human interaction with which this thesis is concerned falls towards the ‘ill 
structured’ end of the range of modelling problems, a textual rather than mathematical 
presentation will be required.  The choice of language in the model is therefore no trivial 
matter, and is a profound element in its shape and utility. 
Another fundamental element in modelling is the need for the limits of any particular 
model to be explored by some form of testing before it can be accepted as useful.  As Withey 
has succinctly stated in the field of human physiological modelling, 
 
‘As with all analytical modelling techniques, the validity of the model is crucially 
dependent on the underlying assumptions and on the extent to which validation is 
possible.’15 
 
It is necessary, therefore, to test the model at the heart of this thesis to ensure that it has a 
degree of rigour and to explore the limits inherent in its assumptions and simplifications.  If it 
cannot be shown to have any limits at all then it is vulnerable to the criticism that by apparently 
explaining everything it might indeed be explaining nothing, or if its assumptions and 
simplifications are found significantly to distort the data then its usefulness would be limited.  
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However, if once it has been tested it is found to give convincing and useful insights, it may 
then be considered to be a suitable tool to exploit those insights, both in examining situations 
to which it is relevant and in prescribing preferred courses of action. 
Finally, before we turn specifically to the uses of models in social science, it is as well 
to bear in mind in constructing, testing, and using a model that, in the words of Wilson, whose 
considerable expertise is in soft systems modelling, ‘Models (of any kind) are not descriptions 
of the real world [;]16 they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real world’17. 
There is a long history of the use of models in social science, though few if any models 
survive unchanged to have any permanence in the literature.  One particular example was 
prevalent for many years, seeming almost to achieve the status of a permanent background 
assumption, but even this one fell out of favour in the end.  This was the biological model or 
the organic metaphor, which likened a society to an organism with an internal structure and a 
set of processes that were all in balance - the concept of ‘homeostasis’ in biology.  Coined in 
the late nineteenth century18, it remained current until the 1960s, when it began to suffer 
challenge by such critics as Leach: 
 
‘But as soon as we ask such questions as[,] Is society really an ‘organism’? Where 
do we discern the boundary between one society and the next? How do we 
distinguish between a society that is in good health and one that is in a pathological 
condition?, the extreme artificiality of the model becomes apparent.’19 
 
and it still had some currency in the 1980s, because Giddens felt it necessary to make a point 
of reacting strongly against it, calling it a ‘noxious presumption’.  He continues, 
 
 ‘There are few today who, as Durkheim, Spencer and many others in 
nineteenth-century thought were prone to do, use direct organic analogies in 
describing social systems.  But implicit parallels remain very common, even among 
those, for instance, who talk of societies as ‘open systems’.  A second factor is the 
prevalence of what I call ‘endogenous’ or ‘unfolding models’  in the social sciences.  
Such models presume that the main structural features of a society, governing both 
stability and change, are internal to that society.  It is fairly evident why this is 
frequently connected to the first type of view: societies are imagined to have 
properties analogous to those which control the form and development of an 
organism.’20  
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Giddens is not, however, against the use of models per se: only inappropriate ones.  Indeed, 
his concept of ‘Structuration’21, introduced below (see page 13 below), is itself an important 
model in the field of social science. 
The use of models in Social Anthropology in particular was considered to be an 
important enough subject to be chosen as one of the three most immediate topics for 
consideration by the then newly formed Association of Social Anthropologists of the 
Commonwealth (the ASA) in 1965, as Gluckman and Eggan make clear in their Introduction 
to the series of ASA Monographs22.  Four significant points that emerged from this important 
work on social anthropological models are of relevance to this thesis.   
First, Goodenough shows that appropriately constructed social models can be used 
to investigate intangible aspects that are hard to get at any other way, providing    
 
‘Methods that allow us objectively to measure such things as anger, insult, flattery, 
and the gravity of offenses [sic], and that help us to appreciate the poetic justice of 
events in alien cultural contexts, such methods, I submit, are not exercises in sterile 
formalism.  They promise to be powerful analytical tools.  They encourage me to 
great optimism about the possibility of developing considerable precision in the 
science of social behavior.’23 
 
Secondly, Schneider produces a well timed warning against constructing a model and 
then treating it as if it tells the whole truth about the social system or subsystem that it is 
supposed to be portraying.  For example,    
 
‘There has been a tendency to erect a typology and to defend it to the death against 
all comers; even against the facts where these prove stubborn.’24 
and 
‘Let me be very clear on this problem.  The model which is a total-system model, 
which yields a typology, and where there is no specific aim or purpose for which that 
typology is constructed is, I think, demonstrably a mistake.  Too much time, effort, 
and energy are spent in mending the model, in protecting it from new data, in insuring 
[sic] its survival against attacks.’25 
 
Thirdly, in examining the conventional anthropological ideas of ‘patrilineal’ and 
‘matrilineal’ descent Lewis points out that there is a danger that anthropologists can be guilty 
of forcing their data to fit a particular model, and thus to make unwarranted assumptions.  In 
particular, he shows that anthropologists had frequently taken the ‘Roman gens organization 
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and patria potestas as the paradigm [or definitive model] of patrilineal descent’26 whereas it 
was in fact only one manifestation of a wide variety of possible arrangements for the passing 
down of property through the male line. 
Finally, Ward shows that different, and perhaps contradictory, models can exist 
simultaneously in the minds of the same people, and these models can be fundamental in their 
culture, even to the extent that they concern the governing principles of their own society, 
 
‘The people of Kau Sau appear to have three different kinds of model of Chinese 
social arrangements in their consciousness.  First there is their own notion of their own 
social and cultural system; this ... we called the ‘home-made’ model; ... .  Second, 
there is their version of what they believe to have been the traditional literati system; 
this we named the ‘believed-in traditional model’ ... .  Then, third, there are the 
various models they have constructed of the socio-cultural arrangements of other 
Chinese groups.  These we called ‘internal observers’ models’.  As a type they differ 
from observers’ models proper (i.e. the models constructed by outsiders, including 
social scientists) only in that they are held by people who consider themselves 
members of the same wider society with [sic] those whom they are observing.27 
 
These important papers therefore provide a set of encouragements and warnings to anyone 
seeking to use a model in social science: encouragement that models can reveal the intangible, 
but warnings against treating a model as fact and forcing data to fit it, against making 
unwarranted assumptions that bias the structure of the models to be used, and against thinking 
that there can be only one definitive model in any social study.  
 
SECTION FIVE - APPROPRIATE STRANDS IN SOCIAL THEORY 
 
This section sets out what is perforce a brief review of the strands in social theory that are 
applicable to this thesis.  The main emphasis is on Social Anthropology, as that is the central 
discipline from which this thesis has been constructed, but we will also visit particular areas of 
Sociology. 
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The concept of ‘culture’ 
 
Because it is a central feature of social science in general, and Social Anthropology in 
particular, it is important to have a working definition of the term ‘culture’.  The term is used 
here, as is normal in social science, to refer to knowledge that is not acquired or passed on 
genetically: behaviour, attitudes, and thought processes that are consciously or unconsciously 
learned rather than innate28.  Hence, each social group has its own body of culture, and, of 
particular relevance to this thesis, organisations have ‘organisational culture’29.  The model 
which this thesis presents, therefore, could accurately be described as a representation of the 
organisational culture of the British Army, at least as far as the regular combat arms units are 
concerned. 
 
The development of Social Anthropology 
 
Social Anthropology has its origins in late nineteenth century Sociology and has been 
developed in a number of different ‘schools’ to its current position30.  It departed from 
Sociology early in its development by preoccupying itself with groups of what were then 
called ‘primitive’ people, as distinct from Sociology’s preoccupation with industrialised 
societies31.  Thus, for example, Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), one of the leading 
personalities of the so-called ‘British School’ of Social Anthropology considered the 
discipline to be ‘the comparative sociology’ of ‘primitive or backward peoples’32.   
Like all academic disciplines, Social Anthropology as it is today is a child of its 
history.  Useful summaries of the various stages in the development of social anthropological 
theory up to the early 1960s are given by Mair33 and Beattie34 in their seminal introductions to 
the discipline.  Grimshaw and Hart35 provide a more recent (1993) complementary if 
politically informed review which is a useful counterbalance to the essentially colonially based 
establishment stance of Mair and Beattie.  The common threads in virtually all descriptions of 
Social Anthropology are that it is concerned with the study of small groups (a few hundred or 
less), that extended participant observation (‘fieldwork’) is a vital ingredient, that 
anthropologists attempt to study a society holistically (in contrast to the sociologist’s frequent 
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preoccupation with social themes), and that there is an underlying desire for comparative 
studies between different societies.  The British School tended to concentrate on social 
structure and the bonding functions of social institutions, brought together under the name 
‘Structural-Functionalism’36. 
From the 1960s, the discipline began to become fragmented.  As Asad put it in 1979, 
 
  ‘For a long time now anthropology has ceased to constitute a coherent field of 
intellectual enquiry and its present unity is institutional and not theoretical.  My 
comments relate therefore to particular strands within social anthropology which seem 
to me to hang together in significant ways, forming a recognisable pattern that has 
become an obstacle to further development, and one which it would be worth 
examining more closely.  I repeat, this pattern does not define the unity of 
anthropology because it relates to a number of assumptions and tendencies that are 
neither exclusive to it, nor for that matter shared by all texts which would be called 
anthropological.’37  
 
and Grimshaw and Hart,  
 
‘For a time during the 1960s and early 1970s, when the world was shaken by 
popular movements, British anthropologists flirted with stronger notions of 
universality, involving the human mind and world history; but of late they have 
returned to a narrow particularism, embodied in subdisciplines whose sole aim is to 
colonise a fresh segment of human experience, often one carved out by neighbouring 
professions (medicine, development, literature).’38 
 
Ortner provides an account of the state of the discipline in the mid-1980s39 in a 
valuable paper which summarises the main theoretical schools, insofar as they can be teased 
out of the flux and mixture of ideas that were current at the time.  For all practical purposes 
her paper describes the current situation reasonably well, except that there has been an 
increasing emphasis, as elsewhere in the social sciences, on postmodernist ideas that call into 
question the existence of any form of disinterested or neutral social science research.  
Postmodernism will be considered later in this chapter. 
It is clear from all these accounts that, because Social Anthropology has evolved in 
several different strands, there is no single current authoritative definition of the discipline, nor 
one single authoritative custodian institution of social anthropological standards.  Rather, there 
is a common interest between various schools and mutually recognisable subdisciplines within 
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Social Anthropology, and this common interest is centred upon the lives of human beings in 
small groups.  
It is also clear that, because there is no central methodological authority for Social 
Anthropology, the discipline has been, and will continue to be, blessed (and occasionally 
cursed) by varied sets of approaches and resources for tackling similar problems and issues.   
 
The concepts of ‘social structure ’ and ‘agency’ 
 
The concept of social structure is fundamental to this thesis, as the title makes clear.  This 
concept consists in what was a long standing assumption that treats a society in Mair’s words 
from the 1960s as, 
 
‘an orderly arrangement of parts, and [the social anthropologist’s] business is to 
detect and explain this order.  It consists in relationships between persons which are 
regulated by a common body of recognized rights and obligations.’40  
 
This structure is in essence a framework of rules for everyday life to which all integrated 
members of the society or human group in question subscribe.  It is expressed in the 
regularities of the day to day activity of those people where, as Gluckman and Eggan have put 
it, 
 
‘the events which comprise human behaviour exhibit regularities whose forms are 
mutually interdependent, over and above their interdependence in the 
personality-behaviour systems of each individual actor.’41 
 
An important part of the idea of social structure is that it is at least partially invisible to 
the individuals in the group.  Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), one of the nineteenth century 
giants of Sociology, explained this idea with an analogy, 
 
‘The hardness of bronze lies neither in the copper, nor the tin, nor the lead which have 
been used to form it, which are all soft and malleable bodies.  The hardness arises 
from the mixing of them.  The liquidity of water, its sustaining and other properties, are 
not in the two gases of which it is composed, but in the complex substance which they 
form by coming together.  Let us apply this principle to sociology.  If, as is granted to 
us, this synthesis sui generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new 
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phenomena, different from those which occur in consciousness in isolation, one is 
forced to admit that these specific facts reside in the society itself that produces them 
and not in its parts - namely its members.  In this sense therefore they lie outside the 
consciousness of individuals as such, in the same way as the distinctive features of life 
lie outside the chemical substances that make up a living organism.’42 
 
This idea of an unconscious ordered regularity of rules of everyday life has persisted 
as an undercurrent in social science up to the present day, mainly because it seems to reflect 
the observed facts.  People do behave as if they are subscribing to a common set of rules of 
conduct, there are ordered regularities in everyday life, and few (except social scientists) see 
any need to articulate or codify them. 
However, the concept of ‘social structure’ has come under attack as new strands of 
social theory have emerged.  First, it is now accepted that ‘society’ and ‘structure’ can no 
longer be considered as empirical realities, as Durkheim and his followers appeared to 
consider them.  Rather they are best treated as models that are useful in explaining social 
phenomena.  Second, it has been considered that these models give too little room for 
considering the freedom of individuals to choose courses of action in the practical business of 
every day life43.  Such individuals’ attitudes and expectations appear in the model of ‘social 
structure’ as secondary to, and formed by, the rules and conventions in their particular 
society.  In contrast, as we shall see below, regularities of everyday life only exist through the 
actions of the individual agents: if people stopped practising them then they would cease.   
Thirdly, it is now considered that the idea of social structure is essentially static, and 
so it is not helpful in explaining change in a society.  As Asad has stated, 
 
‘One aspect of this weakness can be seen in what is often admitted to be the 
repeated failure of social anthropologists to produce a viable theory of social change. 
 The reason for this may not be, as it is sometimes proposed, that ‘real’ factors of 
social change are many and complex, which is a practical difficulty, but rather that the 
way the object of change is itself conceptualised makes the possibility of such a 
theory difficult if not impossible.’44 
 
All this has shifted the emphasis from ‘society’ to the place of the individual - the 
‘agent’ - in his or her society. 
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The particular body of thought that deals most prominently with the individual in 
society has been called ‘Practice Theory’, or less commonly ‘Process Theory’.  It highlights 
the difference between ‘rules’ (in either the formal legal sense or the unwritten social sense) 
and the ‘action’ of individuals.  As Ortner put it,  
 
‘...modern practice theory seeks to explain the relationship(s) that obtain between 
human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we may call “the 
system,” [i.e. the ‘rules’] on the other.  Questions concerning these relationships may 
go in either direction - the impact of the system on practice, and the impact of 
practice on the system.’45  
 
Although it is not a single school of thought, in the sense of having a unified body of intellectual 
leaders and devotees, its adherents comprise a number of theorists who consider the actions 
of the individual in a social system.  Practice theory takes as its starting point the fact that the 
elements of social structure can only persist through time if they are reproduced by what 
individuals do, a process called ‘structuration’ by Giddens46.  Elements of social structures 
can and do change with the passing of time, and they can only do so because there is some 
form of collective action on the part of the individuals. 
A trivial example from the dress of Cambridge undergraduates will illustrate the idea.  
As Meyer Fortes, the Professor of Social Anthropology, was fond of pointing out, in the mid-
1960s the wearing of a tie at student lectures was almost universal but by 1971 it was 
exceptional47.  Nobody had issued a formal instruction to undergraduates that the practice 
should change, nobody had conducted an ‘anti-tie campaign’, no student meeting had taken it 
as an agenda item, yet change had come through a series of individual and unconnected 
decisions by the agents (the students) through time. 
Similarly, in his 1990 book Being Unemployed in Northern Ireland Howe48 used 
the ideas of Practice Theory to show how the individual members of the Department of 
Health and Social Security created their own modifications of the regulations governing 
welfare payments.  In spite of the legal principle that benefit payments should be made on a 
universal and disinterested basis, the civil servants involved had developed their own unwritten 
and barely articulated code dividing the applicants into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
categories, and they were treating the ‘deserving’ cases preferentially.   Interestingly, the 
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reason for this informal modification of an apparently binding administrative system was the 
simple constraint that they did not have enough resources (time and/or personnel) to observe 
the formal rules, but were driven to modify them for practical reasons.  Their practice 
represented a resolution of the tension between rules and constraints. 
An important contributor to the body of theory on ‘practice’ is Pierre Bourdieu 
(1930-2002).  In his  Introduction to the English translation (1991) of one of Bourdieu’s key 
works, ‘Language and Symbolic Power’, Thompson sums up Bourdieu’s contribution as 
follows: 
 
‘He portrays everyday linguistic exchanges as situated encounters between agents 
endowed with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that 
every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, bears the 
traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce.’49 
 
This passage is specifically about linguistic exchanges, but it encompasses one of Bourdieu’s 
most important general points.  This is that each individual - each agent - goes through a large 
number of experiences in his or her life and that these experiences are socially structured in 
that they are founded on, and generated by, what is considered ‘normal’ in the society in 
question.  These experiences in turn shape his or her assumptions and expectations and thus 
inform his or her actions and interaction with other people.  Those actions and interactions 
express and re-create the social influences that gave birth to them, and generate further 
practices and perceptions in the individual and the social group.  Social structure is thus 
experienced, expressed, and re-created in a continuous cycle during the processes of normal 
life.   
Bourdieu’s two key ideas in the context of this thesis are habitus and bodily hexis: 
 
 
- Habitus.  Each individual has a habitus, defined as a set of ‘durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations’.50   
‘The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are “regular” 
without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any “rule”.’51  Its relevance to 
this thesis is that soldiers acquire an identifiably idiosyncratic set of ways of behaving, 
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and that the idea of habitus enables us better to understand the means by which these 
ways are acquired expressed and passed on, and their deep-seated nature. 
 
- Bodily Hexis.  Everyone has their own personal way of treating their body.  This is 
a combination of their general attitude to their body and personal ways of holding, 
moving, clothing and decorating it (one might say, ‘organising’ and ‘deploying’ it).  
Bourdieu’s idea of bodily hexis is that these personal actions are, like one’s habitus, 
the results of accumulated personal experience.  The individual’s history is literally 
engraved upon their body, ‘a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby 
of feeling and thinking’.52  The idea of bodily hexis is important to the topic of 
soldiers because it encompasses the observable point that soldiers project a 
distinctive appearance in the minutiae of their everyday behaviour, and it encourages 
the observer to search for the processes encoded in this appearance. 
 
Giddens is another important author in the practice tradition.  For him, like Bourdieu, 
social structure is reproduced in the actions of the individual agents, ‘It is always the case that 
the day-to-day activity of social actors draws upon and reproduces structural features of 
wider social systems.’53  However, he adds his own useful terminology to describe the 
process.  ‘Structure’ consists in ‘rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, 
organized as properties of social systems’54, while the process of re-creating structure, 
‘structuration’, consists in ‘conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, 
and therefore the reproduction of social systems.’55  It is best thought of as a useful term 
designating the process of expression and reproduction of social structure (or structural 
systems) in the informed behaviour of ‘situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in 
the diversity of action contexts’.56 
In setting out his theories of the structure of society and the position of the individuals 
within it, Giddens wants ‘to get away from the characteristic Anglo-Saxon way of 
conceptualizing structure, where structure is some given form, even a visible form of some 
sort’57.  Indeed, he reacts strongly against this idea, calling it ‘naive’58, and emphasising the 
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freedom of the agent to choose to act in any one of a number of ways in any situation, 
possessing the ‘capability to have done otherwise’ in any specific situation59.   
Although he has a wide following in this view, it is by no means universally accepted, 
however, as is demonstrated for example by Loyal and Barnes in their recent (2001) 
critique60.  The essence of this critique is that Giddens ascribes too much freedom of action to 
the agent and that it is more realistic, and analytically useful, to treat that action as the result 
either of choice or of external constraints that remove the agent’s ability to choose, 
 
‘When a human being acts, it may be regarded as the implementation of choice or as 
the effect of cause or causes.  In either case, the conditions and circumstances of 
what is done will be relevant to understanding what occurs: they will be taken account 
of as a choice is made, or else they will feature as the necessary conditions in which a 
cause will bring about its specific effect.’61 
 
The importance of this critique is that it helps us to recognise the important tension 
between ideas of social structure and agency as an ongoing theoretical issue and to balance 
the concept of a free agent and that of the power of social constraints.   
 
A conceptual model of society and the individual 
 
The social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz gave us a model in 1993 that allows us to conceptualise 
society and agency in a useful, if very general, way62.  Drawing on an idea initially proposed in 
a lecture by Redfield in 195763, Hannerz considers the influence of the individual (the agent), 
the ‘collective’ (the system or society), and whatever human universals may or may not exist, 
on the ‘modes of thought’ and thus behaviour of human beings.  He draws up the following 
table,  
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INHERENT 
 
DEVELOPED 
 
INDIVIDUAL (idiosyncratic) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
ENDURING COLLECTIVES 
 
3 
 
4 
 
UNIVERSAL (panhuman) 
 
5 
 
6 
 
Table 1.1.  Hannerz’s conceptual table of culture 64 
 
Notes to Table 1.1. (summarising Hannerz): 
 
1.  ‘Inherent’ means in this context ‘Biological in origin, and part of the human 
nature’. 
2.  ‘Developed’ means ‘acquired in the course of experience.  Not biological 
in origin’.  
3.  ‘Enduring Collectives’ mean ‘large-scale cultural groups in which the 
individual spends the majority, or all, or his or her life’.  An example would be 
‘British society’. 
4.  The numbering of the boxes is for reference only, and does not imply any 
relative importance. 
 
This table neatly captures the idea that human rule sets governing attitudes, 
expectations, and behaviour, arise from a combination of naturally occurring (biological) 
influences present at birth and experiences during life.  In the case of an individual, for 
example, we may confidently say that some elements of his or her attitudes, expectations and 
behaviour are there by the nature of the construction of the human mind, and others are there 
because they have been acquired by experience. 
The usefulness of Hannerz’s paper is not that it tells us anything new, but that it 
communicates it in a way that is easy to describe and refer to.  We may say, for example, that 
sociobiologists seek to address box 565, and psychologists address boxes 1 and 2.  Similarly, 
Bourdieu in his consideration of the individual’s acquisition of his or her bodily hexis  
addresses box 2, while the ‘generating principles’ through which is it acquired could be 
assigned to boxes 3 and 4.  Giddens’ concept of structuration addresses the interplay 
between boxes 2 and 4.  We may also say that the conduct of human groups arises from 
boxes 3 to 6, but the differences in the conduct of groups from different origins, say Japanese 
and British fishermen, probably lie in differences in box 4. 
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It must be remembered, however, that this table does not assist us in assigning any 
specific observed behaviour with any certainty to any particular box.  In particular, it is no 
simple matter to judge whether a particular feature of observed behaviour should be placed in 
the ‘inherent’ or ‘developed’ columns as it is usually impossible to differentiate precisely the 
effects of nature or nurture.  Furthermore, the drawing of apparently hard boundaries around 
the boxes runs counter to the efforts of the Practice theorists to show how practice influences 
behaviour (collective and individual) and vice versa.  We should view the table as merely a 
useful conceptual tool with which we can discuss the focus or product of research concerning 
human behaviour, and we will use it as such in Chapter Four. 
 
Structuralism 
 
‘Structuralism’ is a separate school of thought which originated in France in the 1930s.  It is 
not widely followed in the social sciences at present, but it is described here because it had 
some influence on the direction and conduct of the research for this thesis.   
Structuralism’s ‘ultimate concern is to establish facts which are true about “the human 
mind”’66.  The founder of this intellectual movement within Social Anthropology, Claude Lévi-
Strauss (1908-1990), used mathematical principles and ideas from linguistics to probe 
beneath the surface of human culture  and deduce deep-lying thought processes.  In his view, 
every tiny detail of culture is a reflection of these processes, and therefore an informed social 
anthropologist can get at them by closely examining those details in any part of the culture that 
he or she chooses.  These details are in his terms ‘structural transformations’ or partial 
manifestations of the underlying structure: ‘the emphasis here is upon the transformability of 
the relational set rather than upon the quality of the relations as such ... the mathematical idea 
is abstract and very general; it includes the biologist’s notion of structure as a special case.’67. 
 However, because the observed details do not plainly and unambiguously reveal the 
underlying structure, the social anthropologist has to review as many structural transformations 
of the basic patterns as possible (in other words to look at a very large amount of detail) and 
select the most illuminating ones for analysis. 
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An illustration that Leach, the most prominent British structuralist, was fond of using68 
was that of the various stages of recorded music.  The music begins as a pattern of dots on a 
printed page which the musician turns into sound waves; these sound waves are recorded 
electromagnetically; the electromagnetic information is physically transferred onto the play-
back medium and then turned back into sound waves by the play-back equipment.  The 
‘structure’ is that which is common to all the various stages.  Those stages are ‘structural 
transformations’ of the underlying structure.   
The structuralist school has been criticised because of the apparently arbitrary nature 
of the analysis it gives rise to, and indeed this criticism is hard to refute.  Because the analyst is 
allowed to search for the structure in his own intuitive way, it is perfectly possible that different 
analysts would come up with quite different ideas about the structure in any particular case.  
However, the ideas of this school are nevertheless useful: they encourage the social 
anthropologist to look at the human group in a different way that is complementary to other 
schools; they stress the importance of the minute details of everyday life; and they offer a 
unifying theory to explain what can at first sight can seem chaotic material.  As Ortner put it in 
her analysis of anthropological thought over the previous 20 years (mid 1960s to mid 1980s): 
 
‘The enduring contribution of Lévi-Straussian structuralism lies in the perception that 
luxuriant variety, even apparent randomness, may have a deeper unity and 
systematicity, derived from the operation of a small number of underlying principles.’69 
 
The impact of structuralism on this thesis is not immediately apparent, as it does not 
feature strongly in the presentation and testing of the model.  However, the idea the everything 
and anything that was observed could be a structural manifestation of simpler and deeper 
patterns was one of the important factors informing the research. 
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The work of Erving Goffman (1922-1982) 
 
Although it does not represent a school of thought per se, the work of Erving Goffman must 
be mentioned at this point.  Goffman fits neither the description ‘sociologist’ nor ‘social 
anthropologist’.  His first degree was in Sociology, his first area of research was as a member 
of the Social Anthropology Department of Edinburgh University, his PhD was in Sociology, 
and he held senior posts in the departments of Anthropology and Sociology at the University 
of Pennsylvania.  His main preoccupations included the minutiae of daily life in Western 
societies, and life in closed institutions.  Two of his works are directly important for this thesis. 
 The first, Asylums (first published in 1961), is his collection of essays on what he calls ‘total 
institutions’ in which he looks at daily life in mental hospitals, with reference to other 
institutions including closed religious orders and, important for this context, military units.70  
His definition of a ‘total institution’ is: 
 
‘a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut 
off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an 
enclosed, formally administered round of life.’71 
 
It is self-evident that military units will have at least some of the characteristics of a total 
institution, and so the insights that Goffman gives into life in such places has inevitably 
illuminated some of the findings of this thesis. 
The second important work, from the 1970s, is Frame Analysis72.  He uses the word 
‘frames’ or ‘frameworks’ to mean schemata of interpretation in the minds of ‘individual 
actors’.  In his argument, an individual applies these schemata to incidents and encounters in 
the normal run of everyday events, and they enable him or her to interpret what is going on 
and to co-operate with others in the same context to act out a ‘normal’ interchange or a give 
a ‘normal’ response.  ‘Frames provide a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective ... 
each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly 
infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms’73.  He insists that his emphasis is 
on the individual, rather than society or social group, and that his book is  
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‘about the organization of experience - something that an individual actor can take 
into his mind - and not the organization of society.  I make no claim whatsoever to be 
talking about the core matters of sociology - social organization and social 
structure.’74 
 
Although his analysis is entirely focused at the individual level - the individual organising his or 
her experience - it is clear that these frames are conceived by him as for use in contexts where 
those using them are in the presence of others.  They are not unique to each individual but 
consist of expectations and attitudes that are shared by those in any situation and must 
therefore impinge heavily on the social as well as the individual level.  Indeed, he says as much 
early in the book, 
 
‘Taken all together, the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a 
central element of its culture, especially insofar as understandings emerge concerning 
principal classes of schemata, the relations of these classes to one another, and the 
sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose 
in the world.  One must try to form an image of a group’s framework of frameworks - 
its belief system, its “cosmology”.’75  
 
As we will see, although it is specifically excluded from Frame Analysis, this idea of 
a shared framework of understandings is one of the central ideas in the model which this thesis 
presents.  Indeed, it could be argued that the main purpose of this model is to provide a 
means to grasp the ‘classes of schemata’ and their relations to one another in the particular 
case of regular British soldiers in combat arms units. 
 
Postmodernism 
 
Postmodernism76 is an important intellectual strand that has affected all aspects of the 
humanities over the past 20 years, including all forms of social science.  In essence, it 
recognises that all social inquiry is conducted within a social context and that this context is 
conditioned by assumptions and webs of power and significance that affect the perceptions of 
the actors undertaking the investigation.  Bluntly, it presents the view that there is no such thing 
as objective ‘truth’, and that all observed phenomena are altered in the perception of the 
observer by the mental standpoint of that observer.  Whilst there is no ‘school’ of 
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postmodernism, the ideas which have been labelled ‘postmodernist’ have affected most 
academic disciplines.  It has special implications for the social sciences because they are 
based so much on observation and inductive reasoning in the first place, and in the second 
place on the attempt to achieve a deliberately neutral and objective representation of the 
findings.  If there is no ‘truth’ to find, and if all observations and representations are 
conditioned by the intellectual viewpoint of the observer, then anything that a sociologist or 
social anthropologist claims to discover is open to the criticism that it is simply an artifact of 
his or her mind.77  
Postmodernism therefore presents an intractable difficulty.  Whereas in the past, 
social scientists could set out with confidence to apply what they thought of as scientific 
principles to their research and to the presentation of their findings,  in the current intellectual 
climate such confidence would be seen as misplaced.  It is therefore important to address this 
difficulty here in this Introduction. 
The approach in this thesis is to make an assumption that the existence or otherwise 
of a ‘ground truth’ is unknowable, and not to make that the issue at all.  As we have noted 
earlier, this study presents a model which can be used to describe, analyse, and predict 
soldiers’ behaviour.  Furthermore, no exclusivity is claimed for the model, and it is required to 
do no more than its core functions.  No doubt other models can be built from similar data by 
other observers who come from different backgrounds - and whose perceptions are 
conditioned in different ways.  That is not relevant: what is relevant is that this thesis presents a 
particular model and its importance should be judged on how well it can be used to carry out 
its task. 
The gathering of data on soldiers’ behaviour is also problematic with respect to 
Postmodernism.   The only access that could be gained to ‘soldiers’ behaviour’ is through 
observation: my observations as a long term participant in British military life at unit level, 
those of the soldiers I interviewed, and those who left their impressions behind as written 
records in the past.  It must be accepted that the people who produced these data were 
speaking from a particular standpoint with their own personal histories and their own points of 
view, and this of course also includes myself as the principal observer in this study.   
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The answer to this problem lies in two significant advantages of this current study.  
First, there is the nature of the data, and in particular its quantity and the variety of its sources. 
 Socially constructed or not, such are the size of the data sets and the number of different 
sources included in the study that the data are sufficiently extensive for any regularities found 
in the material to be considered significant.  The model is built from such regularities, and its 
power can be tested against the core requirements to describe, analyse and predict soldiers’ 
behaviour as observed and reported.  Even if other observers took the same or different data 
and detected different regularities and built different models, this model can still be considered 
a legitimate way of addressing the lives of British soldiers at unit level if it proves to be a useful 
and revealing tool in illuminating the complexities of their social life. 
Second, there is the advantage that both I as researcher and those whose lives I 
researched occupied the same social milieu and shared a common set of conceptions and 
assumptions about life at unit level.  This meant that there was a harmony between our 
perceptions, and any distortions that are encoded in the model are likely to have arisen from 
our shared perceptions.  In essence, our shared position enabled me to construct a model that 
rang as true to the soldiers among whom I researched as it did to me.  Whilst we must heed 
the postmodernist warning that all models are derived from particular social and psychological 
positions, we may also say with confidence that, distorted or not, the model set out in this 
thesis serves to represent very well the insider’s view and make it accessible to the outsider. 
 
The Theoretical Position of This Thesis 
 
So much for the anthropological and sociological antecedents of this study: it must now be 
located within the current body of social science. 
Although the description of the model and the demonstration of its usefulness (which 
follow in Chapters Three and Four respectively) are both rich in ethnographic detail, it must 
not be thought that this thesis attempts a single global ethnography of the combat arms units of 
the British Army.  Such an enterprise would not be possible because the research field would 
be too big, far in excess of the communities of a few hundred people for which the techniques 
of Social Anthropology were refined.  A lesser purpose is attempted here, but one that will 
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nevertheless be shown to be interesting and useful.  This purpose is to present a model which 
provides a tool with which to describe, analyse, and predict soldiers’ behaviour at regimental 
duty [i.e., serving in a unit] in the combat arms.  This thesis presents an ethnographer’s tool, 
not an ethnography, though its usefulness goes beyond the boundaries of pure ethnography. 
 
Design of the model 
 
As we have seen is true of any model, this model contains assumptions which both make it 
useable and give it limitations, which are now explored. 
The main axis which underlies all the inherent assumptions is the concept of ‘social 
structure’.  This is a convenient way of expressing within the model the observed phenomenon 
that people in groups present regular patterns of behaviour, that their attitudes and 
expectations seem to be informed - structured - by a body of ideas, rules, and conventions.  
It therefore provides a way of conceptualising the background to, and framework for, daily 
life.  However, it is not suggested that the model is a complete account of an empirical reality, 
or that it proposes the existence of a powerful and impersonal force that holds individuals in 
the sort of grip that Durkheim is accused of suggesting in his concept of ‘society’. 
In the absence of any standardisation of social anthropological terms, there is no 
agreed general definition of ‘social structure’ in the social anthropological literature.  This has 
made it necessary, for the sake of analytical rigour, to generate a specific definition for use in 
this study so that the model could be developed and tested.  This definition was generated 
with reference to two basic works of British Social Anthropology from the 1960s, by John 
Beattie78 and Lucy Mair79, and is as follows: 
 
‘Social structure’ is a shared body of ideas, rules, and conventions of behaviour 
which informs groups of people or individuals how to organise and conduct 
themselves vis-à-vis each other.  Social structures therefore provide the indispensable 
background to, and framework for, daily life. 
 
In this model, ‘social structure’ is not assumed necessarily to comprise a single unified 
and coherent body of ideas, rules, and conventions of behaviour, but potentially to consist in a 
number of subsets of such entities, as we will see in Chapter Three, the operating subset being 
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determined by the context of the moment.  There is no direct equivalent of this model in the 
social scientific literature about soldiers, but there are two important precedents in other areas 
of social science.   
The first is Geertz’s description of the peculiar, complicated, and extraordinarily 
diverse village structures that he found in Bali.  He showed that the different structures all bore 
a family resemblance as they were all derived from what he called seven interwoven ‘planes 
of social organization’80.  The seven ‘planes’ each consisted of a set of social institutions 
based on wholly different principles of affiliation, different ways of grouping individuals or 
keeping them apart.  He analysed the structure of social life in these villages as intricate 
variations on a common set of organisational themes which arise from this constant set of 
seven interacting and intersecting organisational components.  In the terms of this thesis, he 
identified seven ‘social structures’. 
The second is Goffman’s use of the conceptual tool that he calls ‘frames’, which we 
visited earlier.  Although, as we saw, he denies that ‘frames’ apply to the organisation of 
society his concept may be bound into the idea of ‘social structures’ in the sense in which that 
term is used here.  The body of ideas, rules, and conventions of behaviour can be conceived 
as the resources from which an individual builds his or her frames, and which they use in 
framing a particular situation. 
Another principal assumption in the model is that it pictures a combat arms unit as a 
bounded entity, though not an isolated one.  Although Giddens warns against such an idea as 
artificial81, pointing out that few social systems have hard edges, it is a useful fiction for the 
purpose here.  As discussed further in Chapter Four, it proves to be a practical working 
assumption because of the special nature of military units, conforming as they do to many of 
the criteria for Goffman’s ‘total institutions’. 
A further important feature of the model is that it is focused on norms: collectively held 
attitudes and expectations and shared mental models of what is seen as natural and normal.  
Although special attention is paid to the position and experience of the individual throughout 
the detailed description of the model in Chapter Three, it is how the individual is affected by 
those norms that is examined, not how he or she acts as an agent within their social group.  
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The individual’s freedom of choice which, as we saw earlier, is so emphasised by Giddens, is 
given much less attention than the norms. 
This approach is particularly useful for a study of the British Army because norms are 
an important ingredient of everyday life among soldiers and are regularly thrown into relief in 
the light of daily events in units.  Soldiers readily accept the existence and legitimacy of rules, 
and there is an observable tendency among them, individually and corporately, to want to 
know what behaviour is ‘appropriate’ and ‘right’ and to expect such behaviour from their 
fellows.  Not only are they expected to enforce and conform to the official rules, for example, 
but there is also pressure on them to ‘fit in’ with their peers, subordinates and superiors. 
 
Limitations 
 
The two main limitations which arise from the design of the model are the classic limitations of 
any model of social structure which were identified earlier (page 12).  First, there is little room 
for agency, and second the model, being essentially static, is not well designed to help to 
explain change.  These must be borne in mind when the model is used, and the following 
research strategies can help. 
On the question of agency, it is useful to consider the model to be analogous to a 
map.  Social structure, or in this case a set of ‘social structures’, can be thought of as a 
cognitive map of the social terrain in which the individual agent finds himself or herself, but the 
agents navigate their own path through it in the process of living.  Such a concept manages the 
tension between structure and agency which we examined above.  It proposes the existence 
of a common structured body of rules and shared expectations (the map) within a social 
group whilst still allowing scope for individuals to act in ways of their own choice, and 
sometimes in so doing to make changes to the map (the processes we saw above as captured 
by Giddens in the concept of ‘structuration’).  The observer using the model should therefore 
be alert to the ways in which the individuals use it for navigation, and aim to identify the terrain 
in which there is little choice but to follow the well-trod paths, the terrain which is more open 
to choice.  The observer should also watch out for the rogue agent (a rare but occasionally 
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encountered creature in the British Army) who is determined to take an unexpected or difficult 
path. 
Although the model is in itself a static device, locked into the present, it can 
nevertheless be used as a means to detect and predict change, and to examine the likely 
consequences of future changes.   
Where the interest is in measuring changes from the past, the key principle is to treat 
the current model as a snapshot of life at unit level during the research period.  It is possible to 
detect and describe changes by comparing this snapshot with life in the past, an idea that we 
explore inter alia in Chapters Five and Six.  It would also be possible to build other similar 
models that seek to capture social structures in the British Army in different periods in the past 
and use them to observe the course of such change.  The series of models could be used, as it 
were, to create a moving image out of a series of still images presented in sequence.  This 
concept is touched upon in Chapter Six and identified as a promising area for future research 
in Chapter Seven. 
Where the interest is in monitoring changes that are currently taking place, the 
researcher need do no more than compare what he or she observes with what is in the model. 
 Where there are significant discrepancies, the model should be amended, the amendments 
showing where change has occurred.   
Ideas about future change can be explored by running a series of ‘what if’ scenarios, 
either by changing important parameters in the soldiers’ lives and examining their effect on the 
model or by changing parts of the model and speculating about the likely effects on the 
soldiers concerned.  An activity of the first type is reported in Chapter Four with respect to 
predicting changing attitudes to drug abuse, and of the second type is attempted in Chapter 
Six when we examine the issue of increasing the number of women in combat arms units. 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, then, the theoretical position of the model is as a tool rather than as an 
ethnography in itself, and like all models it needs to be used sensitively and intelligently 
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because of its inherent assumptions and limitations.  Nevertheless, as we will see, with all its 
limitations it is a powerful and revealing tool. 
 
 
SECTION SIX - THE VALUE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study will prove valuable in several fields.  First, it will enable a better understanding of 
the contemporary British Army for those making decisions about its future.  It comes at an 
opportune time, when what seem to be fundamental changes are in the offing.  Such changes 
include the acceptance of a larger number of women into combat units, the acceptance of 
self-declared homosexuals, and a fundamental idea, expressed in the setting up of the Bett 
Study82, that changes in management practice, terms of service, and structure are called for. 
Second, it will also provide a means to promote better understanding of the British 
Army among the general public who have little direct contact with it, but who help to fund it 
through the taxes which they pay. 
Third, the historical element of this thesis offers new insights to historians of the British 
Army. 
Fourth, it is also likely that this study of formally organised military units will be of 
relevance to other academic fields, and in particular to Organization Theory. 
 
SECTION SEVEN - METHODOLOGY 
 
As we have seen, the methodology used in this study it is derived from social science 
techniques, and especially the techniques of Social Anthropology.  This section addresses 
particular methodological approaches used in the research for this thesis. 
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The Question of Participant Observation 
 
One of the defining characteristics of Social Anthropology83 it is fieldwork in the form of 
participant observation84.  Here, there are immediately some methodological difficulties 
because of my position as a serving officer in the British Army throughout the period of the 
research.  
First, it has long been a methodological tradition in Social Anthropology that the 
researcher examines exotic cultures that are alien to his or her previous experience85.  The 
idea behind this tradition it is that the outsider has what has been described as ‘stranger 
value’86, and will thus be in a position to observe without his or her observations being 
conditioned by being a member of the culture that it is being observed.  Not only will such an 
outsider notice the significance of mundane features which would otherwise be taken for 
granted by a member of the group being observed, but he or she should be able to place an 
interpretation on the data that it is neutral and, it is hoped, scientifically detached. 
I cannot claim any natural stranger value in the overall context of the British Army.  
Although there are important detailed differences in culture between different units and 
different parts of the same unit (officers’ mess, WOs’ and sergeants’ mess, and so on) I am 
as much at home in the general cultural milieu that I describe as any other member of the 
British Army, and so any stranger value or alien viewpoint that I employed had to be 
artificially created by my own intellectual effort.  
Second, a related point, the majority of my informants and I had equal membership of 
wider British society, and therefore those elements of their behaviour and attitudes which arise 
from that source - and they must be assumed to be all pervading and significant elements as 
Bourdieu has demonstrated in his writings about habitus discussed earlier - might well have 
been opaque to both me and them because they were so much a natural part of our social 
background. 
Third, as an officer with no service in the ranks, I have had no direct experience of the 
life of the non-commissioned officer or private soldier.  An outsider might be able to 
participate as a quasi-equal in the activities of soldiers in a band within the rank structure, as 
Killworth achieved in his work which was focused at the platoon level87 and involved 
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participating in the activities of recruits, private soldiers, junior NCOs, senior NCOs and 
subalterns.  Equally, an outsider might experience life in a single part of a unit selected by 
himself, as Hockey did in his study of recruits and private soldiers88.  As an insider, of the 
status of commissioned officer, these were not options for me.  Therefore, all data that I have 
gathered on private soldiers and non-commissioned officers have either been conditioned by 
my status as an officer when I gathered them directly, or, when they were indirectly gathered, 
have emerged through interview or casual conversation with soldiers and non-commissioned 
officers in circumstances where the relative differences in rank can be assumed to have had at 
least some effect on the information gathered. 
On the other hand, there are certain positive features of the study which substantially 
offset these difficulties.  The first it is its great length.  The first consciously academic research 
observations were made as far back as 1974, shortly after I graduated with a degree in 
Archaeology and Anthropology from Cambridge University, and they have continued ever 
since as opportunities have arisen over much of the intervening period.  In 1993, the study 
became more intensive, first as a year’s full time research at Cambridge University, 
Department of Social Anthropology, and thereafter as a formal part-time study at Cranfield 
University which culminates in the presentation of this thesis.  This time span gives an 
extensive nature to the inquiry which it is not usual in studies at this level.  In particular, the 
experience over such a long period of investigation has provided a fund of background 
knowledge against which to judge the responses and statements of individuals, and thus to be 
able to detect particularities arising from differences in rank. 
The fact that I, as researcher, shared common membership of British society with 
those I was researching may well have led to a lack of focus in some of my observations 
which a true stranger would not have suffered.  However, this need not be considered a 
serious obstacle to the research, which was aimed primarily at the social characteristics of 
being a soldier rather than a participating member of overarching British culture.  This is an 
essentially ‘zoomed-in’ study into one important facet of the lives of those being researched, 
and there it is valid precedent for this type of inquiry into British soldiers’ lives by British 
investigators, specifically in the cases of Killworth and Hockey89.  Similarly, there it is valid 
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precedent for examining institutions within one’s own culture: Howe’s book on being 
unemployed in Northern Ireland is an obvious example.90 
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly acceptable in Social Anthropology for the 
anthropologist to conduct ‘anthropology at home’91.  A specific example is Superintendent 
Malcolm Young’s study of the Police in Newcastle, published in 199192.  He sees that there 
are considerable advantages in the observer having personal experience of the culture he or 
she it is studying, 
 
‘it is here that an anthropological observing participation comes into its own, for in 
living with the semantics of the system the analyst has the potential to undertake a 
rarely used method of social research.  This contains the experience and depth of the 
insider’s knowledge, which Holdaway (1979)93 recognizes it is unlikely to become 
readily available, simply because “there it is a lack of impetus within contemporary 
sociology to spend lengthy periods of observation in what may be uncomfortable 
research situation”’.94 
 
This feature of my study was noted during the Defence Fellowship phase, when the Professor 
of Social Anthropology remarked that my research was “interesting because it is unusual, 
being anthropology from within”95. 
One of the advantages of studying ‘from within’ was that, during the periods when I 
was at regimental duty, I was able completely to blend in to the human group when carrying 
out participant observation.  It is unusual for a social anthropologist to be able to work so 
completely integrated into the group and this factor can be considered to be a considerable 
strength in this study. 
Another advantage is equal and opposite to the lack of stranger value.  This lies in the 
fact that I shared the basic perceptions and assumptions of my informants, and so the model 
presented in this thesis is in harmony with the social milieu as experienced by both researcher 
and researched.  Similarly, whilst it is true that I was less likely than a stranger to be able 
easily to set my observations in an external and detached framework (though I have 
attempted to do so) I was much less likely than an outsider to import misconceptions into my 
analysis.  As Scheurich points out, in his 1993 book on carrying out research in the 
postmodern context: 
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‘[Researchers from outside the culture they are studying] are unknowingly enacting or 
being enacted by ‘deep’ civilizational or cultural biases, biases that are damaging to 
other cultures and to other people who are unable to make us hear them because they 
do not ‘speak’ in our cultural ‘languages’.96 
 
The particular nature of my participant observation, therefore, is a source of potential 
weakness for this study in its lack of ‘stranger value’, but there are significant compensating 
strengths.   
 
Techniques Employed for Gathering Data on Contemporary Soldiers  
 
The three major techniques employed for gathering data on contemporary soldiers were 
observation, interview, and library based research. 
 
Observation    
 
Observation was practised over a much longer period than that covered by the interviews, as 
it started 19 years before the first interview and has continued to date.  The purpose of the 
observations was to record elements of soldiers’ lives as an anthropologist would, rather than 
as a soldier might, with the aim of finding out the organising principles behind their behaviour 
and attitudes.  I wrote up field notes from these observations, recording such things as what 
soldiers said about themselves, how they behaved, how they arranged themselves when in 
groups, their attitudes to material objects and the juxtaposition of those objects in military 
contexts, what they sang, what they wrote, and what they drew.   During the study I made a 
consistent policy to separate observations from analytical comments in my notes, in an attempt 
to minimise the distorting effect of interpretation on the raw observations.  For example, on a 
day when I visited a unit in civilian clothes, 
 
‘At 1425 I was met at the gate by the guard, one of three men on duty at the gate, a 
young male private. I explained that I had an appointment with his commanding officer 
at 1430.  He examined my ID card.  I asked where RHQ was.  He said “Battalion 
HQ it is at the bottom of the road”.  He did not call me “sir”’. 
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Comment [entered in field notes at the time].  He identified me as an outsider, not 
entitled to “sir”[although he might have deduced my officer status from my dress, 
accent, and the personal number on the ID card].  This was reinforced by my calling 
Battalion HQ, “RHQ”.’97 
 
After 1993, the fieldnotes tended to be more focused, but not entirely so, on 
observations connected with the current inquiry into social structures. 
 
Interview  
 
The interview material belongs to the intensive part of the study (since 1993).  I visited a 
variety of combat arms units and a recruit training unit and interviewed soldiers rank ranged 
from private soldier to lieutenant colonel.  I also interviewed selected students on the Staff 
Course who had all spent most of their service so far at regimental duty, and members of the 
military staff at the Royal Military College of Science whom I felt could contribute special 
insights.  Additionally, in the final phases of the research, I interviewed a small number of 
soldiers principally to confirm the findings of previous research and to act as a check against 
missing major changes.  The number of one-to-one interviews was 135, with a further six 
group sessions, and six significant one-to-one conversations from which particular fieldnotes 
were made (as opposed to general fieldnotes from observations and fleeting discourse).  The 
majority of interviewees were British soldiers because they were the target for the field of 
study, but other interviews were conducted with Gurkhas and US Air Force personnel to 
provide a small sample of cross-cultural material. 
I varied the selection of interviewees in combat units by either leaving the choice 
entirely up to the unit hierarchy or by specifically asking for certain types of individual.  I used 
both methods approximately evenly as a control method.  My only consistent request was for 
a spread of ranks, to include private soldiers, junior and senior NCOs, and junior officers.  
Senior officers tended to offer themselves and I did not need to ask for them.  This led to a  a 
varied cross-section of interviewees, from highly polished and integrated individuals who were 
doing well to those in the unit gaol who were being punished for anti-social activity.  
Interestingly, I found that there was little difference in the nature of the data given by either a 
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soldier chosen by a superior (often an officer designated by the Commanding Officer to look 
after me) or one that I specifically asked for, and the degree of the individual’s career success 
did not seem greatly to affect his or her responses either: the same trends were observable in 
material from all types of interviewee. 
The subsequent choice of interviewees at the Royal Military College of Science was 
entirely directed by me.  I selected individuals whom I thought might contribute new material 
to the study, including a number of female officers and two officers and one warrant officer 
who had had experience with Special Forces. 
 
Tables 1.2 to 1.5 show the interviews by rank and type of unit: 
 
 
Rank 
 
Private 
 
Junior 
NCO 
 
Senior 
NCO 
 
Warrant 
Officer 
 
Subaltern 
 
Captain 
 
Major 
 
 Lt Col 
 
Arm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RA 
 
4, 1 
 
2, 1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
1 
 
RE 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2** 
 
2 
 
1 
 
RAC 
 
2, 2* 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1, 1** 
 
 
 
 
 
R. 
SIGNALS 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
AAC 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1* 
 
2 
 
 
 
1 
 
2** 
 
1 
 
Guards 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Line 
Infantry 
 
9 
 
7 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3**, 3 
 
2, 1** 
 
Paras 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
Special 
Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
RLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Int Corps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
AG Corps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Totals  
 
26 
 
21 
 
8 
 
13 
 
5 
 
11 
 
20 
 
11 
 
35 
 
Table 1.2. British Army British Regiments/Corps Personnel - Interviews  
Notes to Table 1.2. 
1.  Total of 115 interviewees, including 11 women. 
2.  Highlighted figures refer to women. 
3.  * refers to logistic corps personnel attached to a combat arm unit. 
4.  ** refers to LE Officers 
5.  Brackets ( ) contain individuals already entered elsewhere. 
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Rank 
 
Private 
 
Junior 
NCO 
 
Senior 
NCO 
 
Warrant 
Officer 
 
Subaltern 
 
Captain 
 
Major 
 
 Lt Col 
 
Arm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gurkha R 
SIGNALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Infantry 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1, 1 
 
1, 1 
 
1 
 
Totals  
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
Table 1.3. British Army Gurkha Personnel - Interviews  
Notes to Table 1.3: 
1.  Total of 13 individuals interviewed, 4 of them British. 
2.  Highlighted figures refer to British officers.  
 
 
Rank 
 
Private 
 
Junior 
NCO 
 
Senior 
NCO 
 
Warrant 
Officer 
 
Subaltern 
 
Captain 
 
Major 
 
 Lt Col 
 
Unit Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special 
Operations 
Squadron 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Table 1.4. United States Air Force Unit - Interviews  
Notes to Table 1.4: 
1.  Total of 7 individuals interviewed, one of them female. 
2.  Highlighted figure refers to women. 
 
 
Guards 
 
Officers 
 
Line Infantry 
 
Sergeants and warrant officers 
 
 
 
Junior NCOs and privates, two group sessions 
 
Paras 
 
Officers 
 
 
 
Junior NCOs and privates 
 
Table 1.5. Group Interview Sessions  
Notes to Table 1.5: 
1.  All group sessions were with Infantry soldiers: 
2.  The groups were composed of up to seven individuals.  
3.  The sessions lasted for about an hour each. 
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 Interviews were semi-structured, in that I developed a suite of questions designed to 
allow the interviewees to talk about their experiences of and opinions about life in their unit. A 
representative sample of these questions is at Appendix C.  However, the interviews were as 
unconstrained as possible to allow for new data to emerge, as happened on several 
occasions.  The one common element in virtually all the interviews was that initially each 
interviewee was asked to describe their military career to date.  It was found that this helped 
in the analysis of what they said by providing a record of personal experiences and, more 
importantly, it usually set them at their ease and started to allow the words to flow naturally. 
One of the concerns which interview material of this kind must raise in the mind of the 
researcher is the possibility that it is so conditioned by the interview situation that it is not 
useful for the task in hand.  I was aware throughout that my position as a commissioned 
officer of the same rank as a unit’s commanding officer would be bound to influence to some 
extent what the interviewees said.  I addressed this aspect on two levels: the social and 
physical conditions of the interview, and the analysis of the data produced. 
As far as possible, I made the social and physical conditions of the interview as 
congenial and unthreatening as possible.  The majority of the interviews were conducted in 
private rooms in the barracks occupied by the unit from which the interviewees came.  These 
rooms were usually empty offices allocated to me for the purpose, sometimes rooms within 
officers’ or WOs and sergeants’ messes and on a few occasions shelters on training areas.  
For the majority of the interviews, I wore civilian clothes and sat in a physically and 
structurally lower position to that of the interviewee.  For example, where I was given the use 
of an office, I sat the interviewee behind the desk and sat myself in what might be described 
as the ‘client’s chair’ on the other side.  I invariably started by saying that what would be said 
would be kept confidential, that any quotes I made would be anonymous, and that the 
interviewee could refuse to answer if he or she so chose at any point.   Where, as in most 
cases, the interviews were tape recorded, the interviewee had control of the tape recorder 
and was able to - and in some instances did - switch it off when they wished their remarks to 
be off the record.  These measures were designed to encourage the interviewee to disregard 
the differences in rank as far as possible (though at no stage did I pretend to be other than 
what I was) and to feel that they were in control of the situation. 
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Analysis of the data was aimed at determining the organising principles behind the 
interviewees’ behaviour and attitudes.  As such, it did not particularly matter to me if the 
interviewee told the absolute truth or not, so long as he or she felt that what they said was 
convincing (and thus fitted the pattern of life in the unit).  Similarly, I did not take any 
particular element of information as significant in isolation, but only when confirmed by reports 
from other informants, or by separate observation.  For example, when the first senior NCO 
told me that he allowed his men to use his first name under controlled conditions (something 
that I had never heard done), I recorded it with a comment that it probably represented 
idiosyncratic behaviour.  However, when other NCOs and soldiers who had never met my 
original informant told me that the use of first name terms was often sanctioned by sergeants 
as a leadership tool but never when ‘the hierarchy’ was present’, I realised that I had 
discovered an interesting and relevant piece of information which was denied to me in my 
normal life as an officer (and thus by definition a member of ‘the hierarchy’).  
One remarkable feature was noted during the vast majority of the interviews.  
Whereas in normal conversation I have observed that soldiers’ speech is usually marked by 
regular and frequent use of swearwords, in hardly a single case were these words used during 
interviews except in reported speech, such as, 
 
  “[The platoon commander comes up to the platoon and says] ‘We fucked up big 
style’ and then he’ll slag the platoon off for maybe 10 minutes and then it will be 
forgotten about.”98 99 
 
And  
 
[of an officer during the Falklands War] “... he’d go round looking at the company’s 
defences etcetera etcetera, but he just would make a point of coming up and talking 
to a couple of the Toms and asking them what they thought of it.  He’d generally get a 
reply... ‘It’s fucking crap!’ or something like that.  He’d come round with a smile and 
a brew, but he wasn’t one of them stupid nod of the head, smile and walk on.”100 
 
This phenomenon must be significant, not only because it is unusual but also because of its 
remarkable consistency throughout almost all the interviews.  Its significance might be that it 
demonstrated that the soldiers were not speaking from the heart - that they were watching 
and weighing their words carefully and thus not speaking naturally and spontaneously.  
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However, the general atmosphere of many, if not most, of the interviews was anything but 
constrained and oppressive.  The speakers appeared to speak spontaneously and, after an 
occasionally awkward beginning, in a relaxed way and sometimes with considerable relish.  
Furthermore, on some occasions they said things which we both knew would be taken as 
disloyal or shameful in an open military context, as in the following: 
 
[Notes from an interview of an infantry soldier about to leave the Army] He thinks 
joining the Army is a good idea for someone like him, but he might tell a youngster to 
join one of the corps, rather than his own Regiment so that he could learn a trade that 
would be useful in civilian life.  He quoted the example of the RCT [Royal Corps of 
Transport, now part of the Royal Logistic Corps], where you get every licence there 
is!  He asked me not to tell anyone that he had been disloyal to his Regiment.101 
 
I concluded that this phenomenon probably indicated that the context of the 
interviews was a special one, in which the interviewee was taken out of his or her familiar 
milieu and transported to neutral ground where some of the normal rules and constraints of 
their lives were temporarily suspended.  This view was at least partially confirmed by one 
group of interviewees who said that they had never had a conversation like this ever before.102 
  
The interview material was taken, therefore, as representing what the interviewees 
genuinely thought and felt at the time, with some understandable and predictable reluctance to 
reveal the whole truth about their lives and attitudes (surely an impossible task anyway).  It 
was also assumed that, in principle, interview material it is likely to be biased towards the 
normative - what people expect to happen, what they consider ‘normal’, or what they believe 
it is the ‘right’ way to behave.  It was particularly suitable, therefore, for the construction of 
the model which, it will be recalled, is focused on norms (see pages 25 and 26 above).  
However, it would be as well to recall once again that, in the practice of everyday life, norms 
have to be considered as informing, but not compelling, the action of agents and that in the 
totality of events individuals will sometimes rupture them.  This made the material gained by 
observation all the more important, as it acted as a gross error check on what interviewees 
said, so that differences could be discussed and, if necessary, challenged. 
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In keeping with my promise to interviewees to make all quotations unattributable, I 
have changed all names and have not identified the units in which they were serving.  
However, when the type of their unit may be significant, I have identified it to the corps or arm 
level (‘Royal Engineers’, ‘Royal Artillery’, ‘infantry’ and so on). 
 
Library based research    
 
The library based research involved reading published material on the contemporary British 
Army.  A literature review appears in Chapter Two, but suffice it to say at this stage that 
although much has been written about the British Army as an institution and its relationship to 
the wider British society, very little has been written about life at unit level.  There are thus 
very few documentary sources against which to balance the views and results encapsulated in 
this thesis.  However, this shortfall was more than made up for by the amount of time spent in 
participant observation and interviewing. 
 
Techniques for Obtaining Data on Historical British Soldiers  
 
It has already been said that one of the means employed to test the model was to carry out a 
historical study.  The purpose of this study, reported in Chapter Five, was to test the model 
by applying it to the recorded behaviour of British Soldiers in an environment that is close 
enough to that for which it was developed but distinctive enough to present a different arena in 
which to examine it.  The predictive function of the model could not of course be tested in 
retrospect, so this particular study concentrated on whether or not it provided a good means 
of describing, analysing and explaining soldiers’ behaviour. 
Historical material has long been accepted as a legitimate field of research for social 
anthropologists103 .  The major challenge in this study was to abstract evidence about social 
structures from first hand accounts which were not written for the purpose of describing such 
structures.  The task was to deduce principles of social organisation among soldiers and then 
place the result against the model to test the degree of match or mis-match.  The purpose of 
the present section is to describe the methodology used and comment on its validity. 
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The span of the separate historical section of the study runs backwards in time from 
the Korean War (1950-1953) as far as the existence of a sufficient quantity of suitable first 
hand material allows.  In effect, this meant that it could go with confidence to the late 
eighteenth century, back to which period there is a wealth of first hand material, and with 
decreasing levels of confidence as far as the English Civil War where only a very small 
number of first hand accounts by soldiers exist. 
The technique was, in essence, to treat letters diaries and memoirs as if they were 
statements by informants gathered by a social anthropologist.  Analysis was carried out on the 
text, backed up as necessary with research into the operational and socio-political context in 
which the material was written.  The majority of such material used in this research consists of 
published documents, but some unpublished first hand material produced by members of the 
Royal Artillery was also used.  The bulk of this unpublished material comprises an archive of 
some 135 letters from 34 different correspondents relating mainly to the Second World War 
and the Korean War, which I have collected over the past five years as part of a personal 
‘Unrecorded Heritage’ [UH] project.  This project was aimed at recording Gunners’ day-to-
day experiences, and particularly such perishable material as their songs, chants, and 
anecdotes.  Where reference is made to this material it is designated by a pseudonym for the 
author (in keeping with a promise to keep the material unattributable), followed by ‘RA/UH’ 
and the date of the document [Smith, Private J., RA/UH, 12 January 1998].  One particular 
correspondent, called here ‘Jock Hanbury’ has been singularly prolific, producing 50 letters 
and a set of handwritten memoirs104, which are used extensively in Chapter Five.  A notable 
further unpublished source is my father’s memoir of 1939 to 1943, covering his regimental 
service from subaltern to battery commander105. 
The treatment of first hand material as if it were statements by informants could be 
challenged because it is far removed from participant observation.  As the investigator, I was 
not present when the material was generated and there was no opportunity to put questions to 
any of the informants (apart from the authors of Unrecorded Heritage material).  There was 
therefore no means clarify what the individuals said or to question the light in which they 
portrayed themselves.  Whilst all this is true, such a challenge is to be answered by 
considering the volume and nature of the material that was analysed.  The inability to question 
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the informants is offset by the wealth of the material and the focused nature of the 
investigation.  Furthermore, there is the pragmatic element: whether or not the investigation 
can be considered Social Anthropology in the purest sense, there is no alternative to this 
literature based approach to an historical study of such chronological depth because the 
literature is the only evidence that can be reached.  
 
Data/Theory Interaction 
 
A significant element in this study has been the interaction between data and theory.  The 
theoretical basis of the study remained as fluid as possible so as not to constrain the gathering 
of data; data were not knowingly distorted to fit theoretical paradigms; and data have been 
revisited as the theoretical basis has developed. 
Concerning the nature of the data, there is an on-going debate in social science about 
the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative methods.  Writing in 1963, Mitchell reflected 
the prevailing view in the 1960s and earlier106 in saying that social anthropologists were 
inclined to ignore the quantitative in favour of the qualitative approach, and he advocated a 
positive move towards statistics which ‘are “still generally avoided today like the mother-in-
law”’107.  His subsequent efforts and those of like-minded social scientists108 have led to an 
increasing acceptance of quantitative methods in Social Anthropology, but not all social 
anthropological studies lend themselves to a statistical approach.  Numerical methods should 
be considered simply as part of the investigator’s available tool-kit rather than as a sine qua 
non of acceptable investigation.  This present study does not lend itself to quantitative analysis 
in the conventional sense, but it was possible to use a content analysis computer package on 
data of all kinds.  This package is the NUD*IST package by Scolari, Version 4.  It is 
‘designed to aid users in handling Non-numerical and Unstructured Data in qualitative 
analysis, by supporting processes of coding data in an Index System, searching text or 
searching patterns of coding and Theorizing about the data’109.  It was most useful in making 
connections between different elements of data and identifying trends in the data. 
Given that there is an absence of statistical evidence in this research, it might be 
thought that the model which this thesis presents is overly inductive in that it, and the data 
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upon which it is based, are products of material gathered according to my choice as 
researcher and analysed according to my selected methodology. 
Although there can be no mathematically based proof of the validity of the model, this 
consideration does not necessarily invalidate it, for two reasons.  First, this study is in the main 
stream of social science in that the bulk of ethnographic inquiries are qualitative in nature, 
simply because human social behaviour does not lend itself to quantitative analysis, 
 
‘[T]he crucial elements of sociological theory are often found best with a qualitative 
method, that is, from data on structural conditions, consequences, deviances, norms, 
processes, patterns, and systems; because qualitative research is, more often than not, 
the end product of research within a substantive area beyond which few research 
sociologists are motivated to move; and because qualitative research is often the most 
“adequate” and “efficient” way to obtain the type of information required and to 
contend with the difficulties of an empirical situation110.’ 
 
 A good example of this aspect is given by Young in the context of the Newcastle Police: 
 
‘[A sociologist from the local university] had been given a room adjacent to the 
charge room and there we fed him a diet of charge sheets from which he took his 
numerical data on males, females, ages, and numbers of charges for theft, burglary, 
drunkenness, and the like, which would “tell him nowt about what really happens”.  
He knew nothing of the negotiations before the charge, nor of the activities with the 
8,000-9,000 who were bailed, summonsed, or merely released without any further 
action.  He had nothing on the culture of dealing with the streams of remand prisoners, 
for any true revelation of bridewell [prisoner induction and processing centre] culture 
had been thwarted and the academic, or ‘sociologist prig’, had been defeated while 
believing that he had won. ... His visit was also useful to me, for it further revealed the 
mythology of seeking any objective statistical truth in this world of negotiation and 
wheeler-dealing.’111 
 
And indeed, the present study is one of those for which the quantitative approach is simply 
not suitable.  The generation of a model of social structures, the written and unwritten 
conventions by which people live, is not a quantitative task but a qualitative one.   
Second, my model arises from a very large quantity of data, as will have become 
apparent.  Whilst these data are not capable of formal quantitative analysis because they are 
not in a form that could be so analysed, they comprise a considerable corpus of evidence.  
 
44 
This evidence has a logical momentum of its own which is quite sufficient to be used 
legitimately in the construction of theory, as Glaser and Strauss have pointed out, 
 
‘Most writing on sociological method has been concerned with how accurate facts 
can be obtained and how theory can thereby be more rigorously tested.  In this book 
we address ourselves to the equally important enterprise of how the discovery of 
theory from data - systematically obtained and analyzed in social research - can be 
furthered.  We believe that the discovery of theory from data - which we call 
grounded theory - is a major task confronting sociology today, for, as we shall try to 
show, such a theory fits empirical situations, and is understandable to sociologists and 
layman [sic] alike.  Most important, it works - provides us with relevant predictions, 
explanations, interpretations and applications.’112 
 
I did not adhere to the full methodology of Grounded Theory, with its strict drills and 
procedures113 because this methodology appears to have been developed for short, intensive 
studies, in contrast to my extended and extensive one.  However, I followed Glaser and 
Strauss insofar as I allowed my theoretical conclusions to emerge from the data and in that I 
followed their principles on ‘theoretical sampling’, 
 
‘Even during research focused on theory, however, the sociologist must continually 
judge how many groups he should sample for each theoretical point.  The criterion for 
judging when to stop sampling the different groups pertinent to a category is the 
category’s theoretical saturation.  Saturation means that no additional data are being 
found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category.  As he sees 
similar instances over and over again. [sic] the researcher becomes empirically 
confident that a category is saturated.  He goes out of his way to look for groups that 
stretch diversity of data as far as possible, just to make certain that saturation is based 
on the widest possible range of data on the category.’ 114 
 
No feature was accepted as significant unless it was independently confirmed by other 
observations or interview material.  In effect, a factor was only accepted as informing the 
model after it had appeared with consistency and coherence in the research material.  This 
method allowed for a systematic analysis whilst simultaneously allowing for the potentially 
infinite variety of the form and content of individual responses. 
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Model Building 
 
The model had its origins in an observation which I made in 1974 that soldiers tended to 
identify themselves as belonging to groups, but that the precise nature of the group and group 
membership altered with the context.  There seemed to be a continuous process of stating, 
revising and restating structural distance in a situation of physical proximity.  For instance, 
members of different subunits accommodated in the same building would express their 
distinctiveness from each other but would happily consider themselves part of the same 
sporting team.  Similarly, individuals who were cross posted between subunits would very 
rapidly shed their apparently deeply felt identity as members of the first subunit and take on 
the mores and symbols of the new one. 
During the course of the ensuing research, an initial model was built, using as its basis 
the idea of social structure in the structuralist-functionalist sense of the term.  This prototype  
has subsequently been developed and refined during the research, as new data and new 
elements of theory have emerged, to reach the form in which it is presented in this thesis.   
This form follows the general lines set out by Wilson in his studies of ‘Soft 
Systems’115, areas of human activity that are not amenable to rigorous mathematical analysis 
or representation in numerical form.   The principles that he articulates have been useful in 
focusing and confirming the work I have undertaken, although his particular interest lies in the 
representation of the much narrower field of what he calls ‘human activity systems’ (defined 
as ‘purposeful activity’ within an organisation116).  The two most useful of these principles 
concern resolution and rigour.  In the first, he recommends a means of addressing the problem 
of complexity in the model, 
 
‘It is frequently the case that, for a given situation or for a particular stage in the 
analysis, a single model is inadequate or too complex to be practicable. ... A way of 
overcoming this problem is to develop, not a single model, but a hierarchy of models. 
 A concept that is crucial to this type of development is that of resolution level, or 
level of detail.  The characteristic that differentiates one level in the hierarchy from 
another is the degree of detail with which the elements of the model is expressed.  It is 
usual that the highest level in the hierarchy contains a broad description of the situation 
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(low resolution) while the lower levels contain increasingly more detailed descriptions 
of less and less of the situation being modelled (high resolution).’117 
 
In the second of these principles he stresses the importance of seeking rigour, 
 
Just because we are trying to use ideas and concepts to analyse highly complex, 
messy and confused areas of real-world activity rather than specific, well-defined 
problems associated with ‘hard’ interpretations, we should not allow those concepts 
and ideas to become equally confused and messy.  It is as important to seek 
whatever rigour we can in the development and formulation of concepts for 
application to ‘soft’ areas.’118 
 
We will see from Chapter Three in which the model is set out that I propose a ‘top 
level’ (low resolution) comprising a small number of areas, each of which is subsequently 
described in detail (higher resolution), and that within one area there is a further model 
constructed to address a particular area of complexity.  This methodology has greatly 
simplified the process of putting across the information contained in the model.  We will also 
see that I have given rigour to the model by the use of precise terms with consistent and 
exclusive meanings throughout.  These words are differentiated in the text by the use of 
italics.  Their usage in this way is an original product of this study. 
 
Testing 
 
We have already seen that it is a general principle of modelling that before a model can be 
accepted as useful it must be tested to establish its suitability for its purpose and to explore its 
limits.  In this case, we need to ensure that the model is in harmony with the data so that its 
inherent assumptions and simplifications do not distort them to an unacceptable extent, and to 
test whether it has a sufficient degree of rigour. 
 At an early stage in the testing process a fundamental theoretical problem presented 
itself.  A sociological model, as an heuristic abstraction from a mass of observed data, can 
never be fully ‘validated’, as this word implies that there is a defined body of known ground 
truth - full, un-abstracted reality - against which it can be measured.  As Sanger has pointed 
out about the world of human beings, ‘the world is exponentially messier than a laboratory 
and the latter has proven more ambiguous and error-strewn than science would ever 
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admit’119.  I therefore attempted a lesser goal than full ‘validation’:  that of testing the model 
by setting it against as much observed data as possible, in line with the principles articulated 
by Parkin and King: 
 
 ‘We begin by building a model.  This involves making some assumptions and then 
working out some implications.  We then make some predictions about the world.  At 
this stage we have a theory about the real world.  The predictions can now be tested 
by comparing them with reality - with some observations we wish to explain.  If the 
predictions are consistent with the facts we observe in the real world, we are inclined 
to think the theory is a good one - though it is possible that it is a bad theory which by 
fluke predicted well in our test!  If the predictions are inconsistent with the real world, 
we have two choices.  One is to discard the theory in favour of a superior alternative 
based on the same assumptions.  The other is to return to the model-building stage, 
modify our assumptions and create a new model.’ 120 
 
This testing process fell naturally into two parts.  The first part consisted in the 
continuous iterative process of checking the contemporary data against the current state of the 
model and refining the model accordingly.  The second part was the separate process of 
formally testing the finished model in the historical context.  The first part is not reported 
separately in this thesis, but has been an essential element in the production of Chapters Three 
and Four, and the second part is reported in Chapter Five.   The first part may 
conveniently be called ‘internal testing’ because it consists in testing the model with the data 
generated during the study, and the second part may be called ‘external testing’ because all 
the data existed before the study began. 
The means by which internal testing was attempted in the present study was to set 
against the model all the data gathered and look for inconsistencies or discrepancies in the 
model’s power to provide a means to describe and analyse what was observed.  Increasingly, 
from early 1994 onwards, I also discussed the model with members of the British Army 
(people who are immersed in the life that I was trying to model) and close observers of the 
Army to see whether or not it rang true to them, following Sanger, who finds that 
 
‘analyses of the relationship between events and people achieve greater validity if 
participants who have been observed in the research, recognize themselves, their 
motives, their actions and their rationale in the researcher's recordings and 
reconstructions.  Or those outside the research recognize that it echoes, in some 
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confirmatory way, what they themselves feel to be right, or true or reliable, Or [sic] 
that the research achieves its analytic rigour by the initial comprehensiveness of its 
data collection techniques.’121 
 
Where difficulties occurred, and where these difficulties were confirmed by other data, then 
the model was adapted to take into account the new discoveries.  The result is a robust and 
flexible model which covers the behaviour of modern British soldiers in combat units. 
The power of the model to predict soldiers’ behaviour was less easy to test than its 
capacity to describe and analyse it because fewer opportunities occurred to use the model for 
this purpose.  However, predictions were made from time to time and when the results were 
known they provided important arenas for internal testing. 
The forum for the external test was an historical study, examining British soldiers’ 
behaviour in selected periods back to the mid seventeenth century.  The purpose of the test 
was to search for cases in which the model failed to answer the purpose of providing a means 
to describe, analyse and explain (rather than ‘predict’, as the events had already happened) 
the behaviour of soldiers in combat units.  The object of looking for this apparently negative 
result was to show that the model was rigorous and focused: that it was not so general and 
self-fulfilling that it only had the appearance of validity with no real substance.  The particular 
forum was selected because by varying the time frame but not the nationality of the soldiers it 
was minimising the variables.   It could, however, be argued that the ‘nationality’ of a soldier 
in the British Army of the past was different from that of a British soldier today, because 
British culture has altered in the mean time, and this should be borne in mind during the 
reading of Chapter Five.  To off-set this possible distortion, a range of historical periods was 
selected to give a series of data points through history starting as recently as the Korean War 
so that socio-political discontinuities should be apparent if they are significant.  In any case, it 
should be borne in mind that, with all its faults, such a study provides the most culturally 
relevant and stable diachronic element attainable. 
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Information cut-off date 
 
Further data was not collected after 31 May 2002, leaving six months for writing up. 
 
 
SECTION EIGHT - OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
In Chapter Two, it is shown by means of a literature survey that this study intersects with 
work already carried out in the areas of Military Sociology and Military Social Anthropology, 
but its focus on day to day life at unit level places it in a very small field.  Within that small field 
it is unique in that it attempts to consider all parts of the unit, rather than a particular rank band 
within it.  This chapter also explores relevant historical studies and the status of the sources 
used in Chapter Five. 
In Chapter Three, the model is set out and described, and its elements are illustrated 
with examples from my fieldwork and from other relevant primary sources. 
In Chapter Four, the power of the model to analyse, describe, and predict modern 
British soldiers’ behaviour is explored and contrasted with the power of other relevant models 
to do the same thing. 
Chapter Five shows how the model has been tested in the historical study, exploring 
the ability of the model to describe, analyse and explain the behaviour of British soldiers at 
various times back to the mid seventeenth century. 
Chapter Six addresses the potential for the application of the model to historical and 
contemporary military issues. 
Chapter Seven identifies the major conclusions from the work and looks at its 
implications for the British Army, for Social Anthropology, and for other academic disciplines. 
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature relating to the relevant elements of social theory and the practicalities of the 
research used in this thesis have been covered in Chapter One.  This chapter presents a 
review of the literature relevant to the object of the research: life in combat units in the 
British Army, including the historical dimension used in Chapter Five.  
 It is notable that such literature is comparatively thin.  As Killworth remarks in his 
social anthropological study of culture and power in the British Army, 
 
‘Examining the product of social science research on the analysis of Western 
military systems, the researcher is struck by two features: firstly, the low volume 
of work; secondly, its overwhelming domination by American literature.’1 
 
echoing an earlier remark by von Zugbach: 
 
‘Very little has been written about the structure of the British Army.  The main 
body of work that has been done is in the field of political science.’2 
 
 The first and most fundamental feature of this low volume of work on the British 
Army is the almost total absence of social anthropological studies.  Indeed, the only ones 
before this thesis that are specifically social anthropological in approach are the work arising 
from my Defence Fellowship 3 and Killworth’s Ph.D. thesis and subsequent paper in 
Cambridge Anthropology4.   However, this review will consider a wider field than pure Social 
Anthropology.  We shall examine relevant attempts to look at the British Army at unit level 
in any way that has something in common with the social anthropological approach.  This 
will at least locate this study in the wider literature. 
 We shall also consider literature resources that are relevant to the testing of the model 
in the historical domain in selected periods, and briefly look at two similar studies on other 
British disciplined institutions, one contemporary (the Northumbria Police Force) and one 
historical (the Georgian Navy). 
 
SECTION TWO - MILITARY SOCIOLOGY 
 
‘Military Sociology’ can be said to have been born with Shils and Janowitz’s seminal study 
into cohesion in the Wehrmacht 5.  Its identity as a coherent separate discipline emerged 
during the later 1940s, mainly in America, with the purpose of improving soldiers’ 
‘adjustment to military life and hence increased organizational effectiveness’6.  It has 
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provided a growing body of literature, but, as Killworth remarked, much of it is concentrated 
on the American military and therefore not of direct relevance to this study.  The main thrusts 
of Military Sociology have been towards the study of the military institution and its 
relationship with government, domestic society, and the wider world, rather than the life of 
soldiers at unit level which is the subject of this thesis.  For example, the doyen in this field, 
Janowitz, said in the Introduction to Sociology and the Military Establishment that he seeks 
to ‘Identify more precisely a set of characteristics of military organization that would be 
useful for comparative analysis ... [and to explore] the consequences of the larger society on 
military organization’ 7.  Similarly, the two fundamental questions he addresses in his paper in 
Van Doorn’s book on Armed Forces and Society are the adjustment by ‘the military’ in 
western industrialised countries to the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the high 
political profile of the military in developing nations8. 
 Much of what Janowitz says in Sociology and the Military Establishment appears to 
be remarkably prescient from the present perspective of 30 years of hindsight, with respect to 
both the American and the British Army.  For example, he points out that military institutions 
in the west are becoming more and more ‘civilianized’, blurring the distinction between the 
civilian and the military9, and that skill structures and the social basis of authority would 
change in the face of the increasing importance of technology and technological ability. 10 
 Prescient or not, the bulk of the writings of the military sociologists are of little direct 
relevance to this thesis because they deal with social questions at a far broader level than the 
military unit, which is our focus here.  However, there is a thread from the very beginnings of 
Military Sociology that deals with the importance of sma ll, face-to-face groups which its 
protagonists call ‘primary groups’11 and their role in unit cohesion in combat, and this is self-
evidently relevant to this thesis.  For example, as Hilmar has put it, 
 
‘It should be emphasised that men do not usually function either as isolated 
individuals or as tiny units of a huge collectivity such as an army or a nation.  
Instead, the face-to-face groups within which the individual performs his daily 
activities serve to organize and make meaningful his relationships with the larger 
military society in which he would otherwise be lost as but one of a multitude of 
members. ... Military life is essentially a group life; the individual in the armed 
forces finds himself in enforced, intimate association with others during virtually 
all phases of his service.’12 
 
 Similarly, Janowitz writes a chapter in Sociology and the Military Establishment on 
‘Primary Groups and Military Effectiveness’13 in which he considers the ingredients of their 
cohesion and their behaviour under stress.  This particular chapter will be examined in detail 
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later in this thesis and these ingredients will be measured against the elements revealed by 
use of the model presented in this thesis.  Suffice it to say at this point that although his 
analysis is an important contribution, in the specific context of British soldiers at regimental 
duty my model reveals further important factors that his analysis does not consider, and 
shows that some of the conclusions he reaches do not fit the British Army case. 
 British Military Sociologists have been much fewer in number than American ones, 
and there is no author of the stature of Janowitz.  However, as their work covers the British 
Army they are potentially of more direct relevance to this thesis.  The first to contribute to 
this small field was Baynes, in his book about ‘the soldier’ in British society in the late 
1960s14.  It was written at a time when the military in general in the Western world was 
unpopular, particularly with those of military age, following the widespread critical reaction 
to American involvement in the Vietnam War.  It is not so much about ‘the soldier in modern 
society’, as its title implies, but rather an examination of the British Army as an institution, its 
current structure and its future, from a viewpoint within the institution.  As such, it has little 
to say about soldiers at unit level and is therefore of little relevance to this thesis. 
 Von Zugbach, on the other hand, did pay some attention to the unit level in his 
examination of the distribution of power and prestige in the British Army, and he produced a 
model of the influences upon the unit and its members15.  This model has a superficial 
similarity to some of the elements of the model presented in this thesis and as such it will be 
examined in detail in Chapter Four.  However, his main concern was to show that certain 
parts of the Army had preserved a controlling interest in it as a British institution and that 
these parts represented a social and educational elite.  His work was therefore almost entirely 
concerned with officers and is focused at a much higher level than the unit.   
 Barker attempted a general description of life in the British Army in the early 1980s.  
He does not declare the extent of his research, but it appears to have involved some 
interviews with a selection of soldiers of all ranks, and some of their wives, and a series of 
visits to overseas garrisons.  It is a piece of journalism rather than social science, but he tries 
to provide what he calls in his title ‘an unofficial portrait of the British Army’16.  The main 
themes that emerge from the book are the examination of the Army as an institution, and 
especially the role of the regimental system as part of that institution, the relationship of the 
individual to the institution and the relationship of the institution to the wider British society.  
Analysis, where it occurs, is mainly personal comment without reference to other authorities.  
Whilst is has a ‘feel’ about it that is recognisable to the insider, it contains a small number of 
minor errors of fact and a patchy bias towards some parts of the Army which clearly attracted 
his approval (for example the Royal Engineers and the Green Jackets) and against others 
(such as the Household Division) that did not.  Although it is an interesting and entertaining 
book in many ways, it does not cover the same ground as this thesis. 
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 Beevor produced another general description of life in the British Army ten years 
later.  He declares in his book that his research consisted in a nine month study during which 
he visited eleven major units, nine minor units, thirteen training establishments, five 
recruiting offices and selection establishments, apart from arms directorates and 
headquarters17.   As far as unit level research is concerned his work therefore appears to be at 
least as extensive as mine.  He describes several parts of the British Army, showing that he 
has gained some interesting insights into the recruiting and training process and he makes a 
commendable attempt to describe the solider’s life in the various arms and services.  
However, the book’s effectiveness is limited by the fact that his outsider status is too obvious: 
he takes too much at face value and he has a tendency to concentrate on what he sees as the 
broader social consequences of an increasingly self-seeking society  - ‘Thatcher’s children’ 18.   
Nevertheless, like Barkers’ book, it remains a readable and sympathetic description of the 
contemporary Army, belonging to the tradition of the journalist rather than to the 
anthropologist.   
 A recent book that has brought together many threads in British Military Sociology is 
Strachan’s The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century19.  The 
three sections consider the historical context of the British Army from the late eighteenth 
century, the Army and contemporary British society, and the influence of social change on 
fighting effectiveness.  This book reflects the main thrust of British Military Sociology in that 
it is overwhelmingly concerned with the British Army as an institution (though room was 
found for my paper, containing a version of the model in this thesis, on the social 
anthropological approach to analysing fighting spirit20).  This thread is also exemplified in the 
writings of Mileham, an increasingly influential British Military Sociologist from the 
University of Paisley. 21 
 An interesting further dimension in British Military Sociology is provided by Jolly, 
who has studied the links between the Armed Forces, Servicemen, and their families22.  Her 
research goes well beyond the limits of this study and as such is not relevant to this thesis.  
However, her work gives a useful extra dimension to any conclusions drawn from the use of 
my model because it sets soldiers in a wider context.  The legitimacy of the narrow context of 
my research is an issue addressed in Chapter Four. 
 The general approach from Military Sociology, therefore, concentrates at the 
institutional, rather than the unit or the personal level.  However, from time to time military 
sociologists have provided some insights into areas that are relevant to this thesis, and in a 
few cases (notably parts of von Zugbach and Janowitz’s work) they provide material that can 
be directly examined using the model, as we will see in Chapter Four. 
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SECTION THREE - SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
STUDIES AT UNIT LEVEL IN THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH ARMY 
 
This section reviews the work on social interaction on the smaller scale, at unit level or 
below, in the contemporary British Army.  ‘Contemporary’ in this context means over a 
timescale that falls within the period over which the research for this thesis has been 
conducted: 1974 to 2002. 
 The most important work is undoubtedly Killworth’s thesis23.  It was a specifically 
social anthropological study, and it is recent.  He carried out participant-observation research 
with two infantry recruit platoons and a platoon in a regular infantry unit, using many of the 
tools and academic conventions that I have used.  However, his study differed in many major 
respects from mine.  First, the overwhelming body of his data was gathered among a much 
smaller sample of soldiers than mine, and among members of a single Regiment, whilst my 
data were gathered across all the combat arms.  Second, his research is confined to the 
platoon level and below, whilst mine covers the whole unit.  Third, and perhaps most 
significantly, our research aims were different.  Whereas my research is directed into the 
production of a model for the description analysis and prediction of soldiers’ behaviour, he 
investigated the mechanics of power, authority, and prestige.  Indeed, although his work used 
the British Army as a vehicle, his main theoretical concerns relate to a wide area of sociology 
and social anthropology: 
 
‘Although the ethnographic subject of this thesis has been the British Army, the 
theories discussed have wide ramifications across anthropology, and the 
conclusions reached in earlier chapters are not restricted purely to the military 
context.  At its broadest, the subject of this thesis has been to discuss how power 
and culture are related, whether a model can be created that grants autonomy to 
both concepts, or whether it is possible to reduce the meaning of one to the other.’24  
 
 Nevertheless, Killworth’s study has considerable importance for this thesis because he 
had an earlier version of my model at his disposal and he attempted to use it.  The views 
expressed in his thesis appear generally hostile to that version of the model and his detailed 
criticisms provided a useful aid in testing and improving it during the later stages of the 
present research.  These criticisms will be examined in detail in Chapter Four, but in general 
they arise from some misunderstandings of the status of the model in the first place and in the 
second place from the difference in research aims between his work and mine. 
 Previous to Killworth’s work, the best known study was that by Hockey, who also 
spent time with recruits in training and subsequently at regimental duty in their battalion25.  
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Although it was an important work of its day because it was the first attempt to describe the 
life of private soldiers in detail, it suffers gravely from its very narrow perspective, which 
may have been at least partly due to the very short time of participant observation (three 
periods of a month) and to Hockey’s personal commitment to the concept of the dialectic. 
 Hockey set himself the task of looking through the eyes of private soldiers only, and 
so he does not consider the lives of NCOs or officers.  The result is a frozen and unbalanced 
picture.  First, there is no acknowledgement that NCOs had once been private soldiers and 
that many of the private soldiers would be NCOs one day, so it lacked the dynamic element 
that Practice Theory might have provided.  Second, there is no allowance for friendly 
relations between ranks: his book portrays a dualistic society with squaddies at one pole and 
the hierarchy at the other.  We will see in Chapter Three how wrong this picture is. 
 Hockey’s main thrust is to describe the contrast between the formal command 
structure with its formal and inescapable official requirements, and the informal unofficial 
side consisting of the adjustments which privates make to obtain an easier life.  In doing so, 
he makes much of the concept of the ‘negotiated order ...  in which a relaxed interpretation of 
military law is traded-off for effective role performance’26.  This idea of a ‘negotiated order’ 
is heavily criticised by Killworth on the grounds that it oversimplifies the realities of military 
life27.  We will see in Chapter Four how it integrates with my model and how my model 
amplifies the concept to remove much of the simplifications inherent in it. 
 Although much of Hockey’s body of theoretical assumptions and many of his 
conclusions may be discarded in the light of Killworth’s and my research, he nevertheless 
provides a window (albeit a misty one) into the lives of private soldiers in the late 1980s 
which has been useful in refining my research, and particularly in helping to chose the 
direction of some of the questions asked in the course of interviews.  His work has therefore 
been useful to this thesis, although not perhaps in the way it was originally intended. 
 Another attempt to look at the soldiers at unit level was that by Stewart, who 
interviewed British and Argentine soldiers who had taken part in the Falklands War in 198228.  
Although there is some irritating evidence of a shallow and incomplete knowledge of the 
British Army and the Royal Marines in her occasional misuse of technical and organisational 
terms (which we will examine in Chapter Four) she presents an interesting and useful model 
of the factors that promote unit cohesion. This model consists in a framework for analysis, 
‘utilizing the concepts of societal factors, organizational bonding, horizontal (peer) bonding, 
and vertical bonding.’29  It is of obvious relevance to this thesis, as it addresses many of the 
same issues as my model does.  It will be examined in detail in Chapter Four, where my 
critique will show that her model has considerable power but that her research is too focused 
on too small a part of the British Army, her descriptions of the motivating factors for British 
combat soldiers are in some cases overplayed, and she takes a great deal at face value without 
detecting the resonances in some of the interview material she quotes.  All this means that her 
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model, whilst being complementary to mine, is less able to describe and analyse the subtleties 
of the detail of the day to day life of British soldiers. 
 There is one further work of interest to this thesis which is not so much a study in 
itself  as an interesting source of data.  This is Tony Parker’s compilation of interview 
material collected personally by him from 181 informants over 18 months to portray his 
impression of ‘what the British Army is now like in human terms - what sort of people 
become soldiers and why, how they see themselves, how in turn they look on society’ 30.  The 
result, by necessity, is edited and selective, but it is nevertheless a moving and intriguing 
archive of personal statements from infantry soldiers and their families during the time frame 
covered by my first hand research.  It is much to Parker’s credit that the selected statements 
generally ring true to the insider and form an important additional body of information. 
 
SECTION FOUR - HISTORICAL STUDIES 
  
This section sets the historical study, Chapter Five, in its context.  The purpose of this study, 
as we noted in Chapter One, is to test the model in a culturally relevant but separate context.  
Given that it would not be possible to carry out this test throughout the entire trajectory of the 
history of the British Army and its immediate antecedents, a series of six periods was chosen, 
to yield data points along tha t trajectory.  These periods are: 
 
Mid twentieth century (mainly the Second World War) 
 
Early twentieth century (mainly the First World War) 
 
The mid nineteenth century (mainly the Sikh Wars, the Crimean War and the 
Indian Mutiny) 
 
The end of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century  (mainly 
the Peninsular War), for convenience referred to here as the ‘Napoleonic 
period’ 
 
The mid to later eighteenth century (mainly the War of the Austrian 
Succession, the Seven Years War, and the American War of Independence) 
 
The mid seventeenth century (mainly the English Civil War) 
 
 It hardly needs to be established that there has been a very large amount written about 
the British Army and its role in history so only that part of this large corpus which is directly 
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relevant to this thesis will be discussed here.  We will first examine the use of documentary 
historical sources to provide raw material for specifically anthropological analysis, and then 
review the small body of  literature devoted to social structure and social relationships at unit 
level in the British Army of the past: those that come reasonably close to the thrust of 
Chapter Five.   Finally we will consider the sort of historical sources available to provide data 
with which to test the use of the model. 
 There is a small but rich body of literature that demonstrates that documentary 
sources can give a useful insight into the fine detail of the daily lives of individuals and small 
groups in historical settings.  Notable in this field is the study by Sabean of peasant life in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Germany31.   Drawing on a considerable source of 
written evidence, including baptism, marriage and burial records, records of land sales, 
mortgages and taxes, and the recorded proceedings of criminal and civil court actions, he 
draws a clear and lively picture of life at local level.  As he put it himself in his Introduction: 
 
‘What we find in this study are activities, structures, processes, and logics that 
simply are not visible outside of the local context ....  If we want to know about the 
content of this “premodern” kinship system, we can only get at it by patiently 
tracing out genealogies from small geographical regions and piling up examples of 
kin actually interacting.  If we want to recover the tenor of marital relations inside 
a particular context of production, we have to examine all the anecdotes we can 
find for the logic of confrontation, the strategies of subsistence and survival, the 
fabric of rights and obligations, and the coherence of life trajectories.  If we want 
to understand the moral and social relationships which bound together and divided 
houses and families, we have to examine in detail the tactical language, spatial 
interaction, and practical everyday exchanges.’ 32 
 
 The only drawback to this body of evidence is the absence of informal material.  
Every word that is available was collected for official purposes to do with legal and 
administrative events in the community.  Fortunately, the personalities of the protagonists and 
the fine detail of their experiences often shine through the formally recorded words, 
especially in the witness statements recorded in the legal proceedings.  However, it is likely 
that an even more vivid and perhaps more detailed anthropological work could have been 
produced if there had been personal written material to complement the official. 
 The work by Ladurie on a community in late thirteenth and early fourteenth century 
France33 is another relevant work of history on the small scale.  Although it is not a work of 
social anthropology, as Sabean’s is, Ladurie provides a detailed account of the social lives of 
the members of a small mountain village community.  The account is remarkably fresh and 
immediate and provides a convincing snapshot of life at an otherwise remote and inaccessible 
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time in history.  This is made possible by the survival of a body of written evidence 
comprising a register of procedures and interrogations carried out by the Inquisition in its 
investigation into the Albigensian heresy in that area.  The records were kept under the 
direction of an individual, Jacques Fournier, who was both rigorous and meticulous.  
Although this register, like Sabean’s raw material, is another set of formal records, the vast 
bulk of these records are verbatim statements by the individuals concerned and amount to a 
considerable body of interview material.  Once again, we must be cautious about taking the 
statements as entirely definitive, this time because of the threatening circumstances under 
which they were collected, but the book gives us another example of how the minutiae of 
daily life can be reconstructed from documentary evidence. 
 Parker has provided us with another book compiled from contemporary written 
sources concerning a small community in the remote past, this time the inhabitants of the now 
vanished town of Dunwich in East Anglia34.  This work is intriguing and informative and it is 
written with an informal air, personal and direct, with poetic licence.  He tells us that he is 
providing 
 
‘... truth.  Not the whole truth.  That will never be known.  If it ever existed, it now 
lies somewhere out there at the bottom of the sea, or mingles with the insubstantial 
breezes that caress the cliff-top grass.  But something like the truth.’35 
 
Although this book does not have the academic status of the previous two studies mentioned, 
it too demonstrates that the minutiae of daily life in the past can, under certain circumstances, 
be recoverable and, when recovered, subjected to analysis to reveal the social processes going 
on. 
 All these three studies exploit a considerable body of written evidence: Sabean uses 
legal records, Ladurie uses the transcripts of Inquisition interviews, and Parker uses the 
‘amazingly plentiful’ documentary evidence represented by such sources as the Calendar of 
Patent Rolls36.  Indeed, it is only the existence of such written evidence, what might be 
considered as voices from the past, which makes such studies possible, and therefore the 
historical element of the present study depends on the existence of similar material.  
Fortunately, there is no shortage of material for most of the period covered (mid-seventeenth 
century to 1953), as we will see later in this section. 
 We will now turn to the literature specifically written on social structure and social 
relationships within combat units of the British Army before 1953, literature which most 
closely approaches the social anthropological stance to be adopted here. 
 Many important works on the history of the British Army come close to this type of 
material.  Laffin’s Tommy Atkins37, for example, attempts convincingly to capture the mood 
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and concerns of English soldiers over all the selected periods and more.  Holmes seeks in 
Firing Line38  to do much the same with a wider target, that of the life and concerns of 
soldiers in the Western world generically, and in Redcoat 39 he focuses on British soldiers of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  McGuffie’s Rank and File40 covers much the same 
ground, though he begins his account in 1642.  However, none of these important works 
approaches the degree of resolution required to test the model.  For instance, all mention 
interaction between soldiers of all ranks but none seeks to analyse the different strands in 
those relationships that the model does, in the way set out in Chapter Three.  All mention the 
business of fighting and being on operations, but none analyses the ideas, rules and 
conventions of behaviour that informed British soldiers’ attitudes to the practicalities of 
soldiering. 
 There is also a small group of studies that concentrate specifically on the eighteenth 
century, attempting to apply a high degree of resolution to aspects of the lives of British 
soldiers.  Prime examples are Houlding’s survey of training in the infantry and the cavalry41, 
Brumwell’s analysis of the British army in America42, and Steppler’s work on the common 
soldier in the reign of George III43. 
 Houlding’s and Brumwell’s analyses both depict the army on a wider canvas than unit 
level, looking at it as an institution and an instrument of war.  Although, therefore, they 
contain passages that illuminate the lives of soldiers at regimental duty such passages are 
incidental to their main themes. 
 Steppler’s research on the other hand tries to capture the life of the common British 
soldier at unit level, demonstrating that the dominant constraint on him was his low pay.  He 
reviews the system of recruiting, pay, discipline and military justice, and ways round the 
meagreness of the pay.  This is a pioneering work that challenges many common assumptions 
about life in the Georgian army, but like Hockey he concentrates so heavily on the private 
soldier that his study does not give any idea of the vertical interaction in British regiments.  It 
is therefore useful as a background to the historical study Chapter Five, but in itself it does 
not provide much data. 
 Stevens’s research on the Rifle Brigade in the first seventy years of the nineteenth 
century44 also provides insights into regimental life, but her main preoccupation is on the 
effect that attitudes in the wider British society had on the ways in which Rifle Brigade 
personnel (and particularly officers) thought.  Her main contribution to this study, therefore, 
is not so much what she finds going on in the battalions of the Rifle Brigade, which is 
restricted to the effects of the idea of ‘gentlemanliness’, but rather her demonstration of the 
influence that the external environment can have on what appears to be an insular and 
isolated social entity.  This consideration is taken up in Chapter Five. 
 There are, however, three studies that do seek to attain the same degree of resolution 
as that provided by the model.  These studies are those of Sheffield, into officer-man 
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relationships in the First World War45, Baynes, into the social anatomy of a single unit at the 
start of the First World War46, and Odintz’s study into the mid-eighteenth century British 
Army47. 
 Sheffield’s work is, as the title states, an investigation into relationships between 
officers and men in the Edwardian and First World War Army. He makes two major 
contributions that are relevant to this thesis.  First, he shows that the stereotype of the army 
officer who was idle and had no real relationship with his men is incorrect.  Second, he 
demonstrates the remarkable persistence of pre-war types of relationships between the ranks 
into and throughout the First World War, when one might expect totally different patterns to 
emerge because of the huge proportion of conscripts and ‘citizens’ who were not professional 
soldiers.  Both these findings are in harmony with my model, and, indeed, Sheffield himself 
has said that he would have found his work easier if he had had my model to hand during his 
research48. 
 Although Baynes’s book, on the 2nd Scottish Rifles and its performance in the Battle 
of Neuve Chapelle in 1915, is not an academic work, it is a detailed and thorough 
reconstruction of the lives and personalities of several members of an Edwardian infantry 
unit.  Its purpose is mainly descriptive rather than analytical, which means that its main 
importance for this thesis lies in its provision of a case study for examination in the light of 
the model, as we will see in Chapter Six. 
 Odintz’s thesis is designed to produce ‘a collective biographical study of some 394 
British officers who served in four regiments of foot between 1767 and 1783’49 .  It achieves 
this purpose in a masterly way, giving a convincing portrait of the mid to late eighteenth 
century British Army as an institution and bringing out the influence exerted by the mores of 
the contemporary British society on the lives of the officers in  particular.  It also draws on a 
large body of first hand material from which many verbatim quotes are taken.  Although it 
does not use any social scientific model, as the present thesis does, it provides both a useful 
medium to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the model in contributing to the 
examination of the British Army at a remote time in the past, and a means to examine the 
model’s power and its limitations in a wider social context.  As we will see, the use of the 
model on Odintz’s own material will yield complementary insights.  
 Apart from my early and less substantial work on social structures in Wellington’s 
army in the Peninsular War50, which used a less mature version of the model presented in this 
thesis, only these three studies even distantly approach the analysis presented in Chapter 
Five.  
 This brings us to the matter of sources.  The  purpose of Chapter Five is to provide an 
arena in which to examine the legitimacy and usefulness of the model, rather than as a 
separate piece of research.  There was therefore insufficient time to research very much 
unpublished primary material, and I have for the most part used easily accessible, published, 
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sources.  However, this is not a significant drawback as the material is still rich in elements 
that can be examined in the light of the model. 
 In all cases, first hand material from eye witnesses was used, and virtually all of these 
eye witnesses are insiders, members of units in the British Army.  This material reaches us in 
the form of diaries and letters, which are contemporary with the circumstances described, and 
memoirs written after the event (which themselves are often based on diaries) . 
 It might appear that, in principle, the nearer to the time of the events that a document 
was written the more it can be expected to reflect the prevailing conditions, whether they are 
military social structures, operational events, or the political milieu.  This consideration 
would lead to the assumption that letters and diaries are more likely to be higher quality 
sources than memoirs.  This point is made by Lieven in his analysis of the writings of officers 
in the Zulu Wars who subsequently became high rank ing51, 
 
‘For most people, life unfolds in a patternless way bewildering to its subject.  By 
contrast, the autobiography is typically written by someone looking to find a sense 
and pattern as life nears its end.  It is a crafted work of art seeking to give meaning 
to a life, even to “create” it.’   
 
Put bluntly: memoirs are too often selectively edited. 
 Furthermore, it is probably a mistake to put the same weight on letters as on diaries.  
Most letters from soldiers have been written to people outside the military social structures, 
wives, for example, or mothers, fathers, brothers, or friends at home, and are usually less rich 
in military social material: military authors very often make allowances for the fact that the 
military world is foreign to the intended reader.  A case in point is the ‘diary’ written by 
Lieutenant Hugh Travers during the siege of Ladysmith52: this ‘diary’ was in fact two 
extended letters that could not be sent because of the siege.  These letters are full of events 
and anecdotes about those of Travers’s brother officers known to his parents but there is 
nothing whatever about the daily life of himself and his soldiers, or any information about 
their social relationships.  As far as this thesis is concerned, in spite of its encouraging (and 
misleading) title this publication is a barren source. 
 This might lead to the conclusion that the only satisfactory sources are diaries, and 
that letters and memoirs are less likely accurately to reflect the prevailing conditions.  Whilst 
I would agree that this is probably the case with letters to non-military recipients, I suggest 
that, at least as far as the thrust of this thesis is concerned, it is a mistake to dismiss the 
memoir entirely.  An author of a memoir may impose a selective order on his or her account 
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of the stream of events and slant the descriptions of their own behaviour, but the 
undercurrents of social pressure and the general rules informing behaviour (the core of this 
thesis) are very often still well represented.  For example, when Rifleman Harris gives his 
account of the retreat of Sir John Moore’s army to the Atlantic Ports in 1808 he portrays 
himself in his memoir as on good terms with his Commander: 
 
‘I am proud that, in passing, General Craufurd seldom omitted a word to myself.  
On this occasion he stopped in the midst and glanced down at my feet: 
  “What, Harris!  No shoes, I see?” 
“None sir,” I replied.  “They have been gone many days.”’53 
 
The significance of this account for this thesis is not so much that Harris portrays himself as 
on good terms with his General, which may or may not be true, but rather that Harris 
considers that such a relationship was credible.  If it was credible, then such relationships 
must have been a feature of the general life of the soldiers in question, and therefore an 
element to be examined in the light of the model. 
 Thus, whilst diaries are the most productive source of material for Chapter Five, 
memoirs must also be considered, whilst letters are only likely to provide suitable material if 
they are exchanged between soldiers. 
 Fortunately there are enough published sources available to fit the needs of Chapter 
Five.  There is plenty of material from the mid twentieth century going back in time to about 
1800, before which date it begins to tail off but there is still a sufficiency as far back as the 
middle of the eighteenth century.  Going further back, by the beginning of the eighteenth 
century the pool is very small, and first hand accounts by soldiers of the English Civil war are 
very few indeed.  This reflects two historical processes.  First, it reflects an increase in 
literacy during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, so more soldiers were 
able to record their lives.  Secondly, it reflects an observable increase in public interest in the 
lives of soldiers from the Napoleonic Wars onwards.  Increasing interest has led to an 
increasing keenness on the part of publishers to seek out and publish first hand material 
written by the soldiers involved. 
 This first hand material is preferable to the formal legal documents used by Sabean, 
Ladurie, and Parker because it is more personal and does not sit under the shadow of the 
requirements of formal legal or administrative proceedings.  It is thus more likely to yield 
detailed insights into the feelings of the participants.  Whilst it would be interesting to 
compare the impressions gained from this first hand material with those gained from the 
proceedings of Courts Martial (the nearest equivalent to the material used by Sabean and 
Ladurie) it is not necessary to the present research and must wait for another occasion. 
 There is therefore substantial precedent for an historical study into the daily lives of 
individuals in the past using written records.  More than sufficient first hand written material 
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exists to carry such a study into the lives of British soldiers in the past, though, looking 
backwards in time, it begins to fade earlier than about 1800.  However, no other study 
approaches that in Chapter Five: even the scholarly descriptions of the British Army of the 
past do not cover the ground that will be covered here because, unsurprisingly, they are 
written from the historical rather than the social scientific viewpoint.  
 
SECTION FIVE - SIMILAR STUDIES OF BRITISH INSTITUTIONS OUTSIDE THE 
CONTEXT OF THE BRITISH ARMY  
 
Finally, it is useful to cite literature that attempts something similar to the present study but in 
a different context.  The two works that I have chosen as most relevant are Young’s study of 
the Northumbria Police Force54, already mentioned in Chapter One, and Rodger’s of the 
Royal Navy during the Seven Years’ War55.  The first is a specifically social anthropological 
study based on extended participant observation and the second is in the same general mould 
as Odintz’s in that Rodger uses first hand material and official records to describe face-to-
face life in a British military institution. They are both investigations of daily life and social 
relationships within formal organisations and both seek to analyse the social relationships 
involved in a way that places them in the overall context of social science. 
 The value of Young’s book for this research is that he looked at a formally organised 
force over a time that overlaps with the timescale of my research, and he successfully used 
Social Anthropology as the branch of social science for his research.  He was also an insider, 
as I am, being a senior member of the force that he was writing about.  He has thus 
demonstrated a valid parallel to my research position in looking at a disciplined British force 
composed of people from a similar social and cultural background and in approaching it from 
a broadly similar perspective.  Nevertheless, his work is different to mine in that his approach 
is not so much to produce a model with which to describe, analyse and predict the behaviour 
of policemen and women but rather to produce what he calls after Geertz ‘thick description’ 56, 
using a large number of case studies.  He also aligned his work more closely than I have done 
to that of the Structuralist branch of Social Anthropology, searching for indications of 
liminality and binary oppositions 57.  This latter point highlights the existence of many 
different valid social anthropological approaches, as explored in Chapter One. 
 Rodger’s work on the Georgian Navy is perhaps on the very edge of the relevant 
literature.  Nevertheless, his attempt to capture the details of the daily lives of sailors in the 
Seven Years’ war has interesting parallels with this thesis, as the following extract shows: 
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‘A ship’s company, large or small, was a microcosm of society with a manifold 
division of ranks and ratings, of social class and status, of skills and professions, 
and of age.  The life of the ship can only be understood in relation to these 
overlapping patterns.  In their dealings with one another, in tension and 
accommodation, in fear and affection, in persuasion and command, men acted 
within the constraints imposed by the complex internal structure of ship-board 
society.’58 
 
Such a paragraph, suitably reworded to account for the change between eighteenth-century 
life on the ocean and the twenty-first century life on dry land, would come close to describing 
the essence of this thesis.  
 
SECTION SIX - CONCLUSIONS 
 
The British Army, both contemporary and historical, has been written about from many 
different perspectives, but the vast bulk of the social science work has been on the Army as 
an institution, and its relationships with British Society and British politics.  Although 
Young’s work on the Northumbria Police Force demonstrates that a disciplined British 
institution is a valid field for academic analysis in the social sciences, very little work has 
focused on life in contemporary British Army units, and only a small proportion of that has 
used anything resembling the social anthropological perspective.  Even this literature for the 
most part does not cover the life of the whole unit, or attempt to give a perspective across the 
combat arms.  Apart from my earlier studies, only Killworth has produced a work specifically 
of social anthropology on any element of the British Army,  and that work is aimed in a 
different direction to the present thesis.  Only two works offer models addressing the subject 
area of this thesis, those of von Zugbach and Stewart: these will be examined in detail in 
Chapter Four which will show how they are deficient in certain important respects when 
applied to the minutiae of the daily life of British soldiers in the combat arms. 
 Written records, both personal and official, have been used successfully to reconstruct 
the daily lives of face-to-face communities in the past.  The assembling of historical material, 
of which there is more than sufficient for the purposes of this study, against which to test the 
model in Chapter Five therefore has sound academic precedent.  However, nothing 
resembling this model in this thesis has been used to analyse such material before, apart from 
my earlier attempt with a less mature version. 
 It may therefore be concluded that this thesis addresses a gap in the existing literature 
about the contemporary British Army, and the testing of the model against historical material 
in Chapter Five also represents a novel approach. 
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CHAPTER THREE - SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE 
COMBAT ARMS:  DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
 
‘Discussion of the future of the armed forces usually involves a concern with technological 
developments or global strategy.  Most members of the armed forces, however, understand 
and experience the military as a social organization’1 
 
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the model of social structures in combat arms units 
which is at the heart of this thesis, a model which conceptually provides a map of the social 
terrain through which soldiers pass in their daily lives.  Its starting point is the definition of 
‘social structure’ which was set out on page 24 above, 
 
‘Social structure’ is a shared body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour 
which informs groups of people or individuals how to organise and conduct 
themselves vis-á-vis each other.  Social structures therefore provide the 
indispensable background to, and framework for, daily life. 
 
 It will be recalled from Chapter One that for the purpose of this thesis the ‘combat 
arms’ consist of the regular units of the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, the 
Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Infantry, the Royal Signals and the Army Air 
Corps. 
 In order to make the model as clear as is practicable in the space available, as many of 
the areas as possible are illustrated by interview material from my field notes and by my 
personal recollections and observations.  These two types of information generally fulfill 
complementary purposes: interview material shows the expectations and assumptions of 
interviewees and how they view their lives, whilst my recollections provide direct access to 
incidents that I personally saw occurring.  The first provides a view that may be modified by 
the agents’ appreciation of how things ought to be, and the second has been consciously 
constructed to preserve a distinction between fact and comment as far as that is possible.  
Both contribute in different ways to the identification of the ideas, rules and conventions of 
behaviour that are the ingredients from which the model is constructed. 
 The model was worked up for the base case of a combat arms unit which is virtually 
all male, and in barracks, in the time period 1974 to 1998.  For the most part, therefore, non-
operational conditions are described, and ‘he’ is the usual single personal pronoun.  It should 
be noted, however, that an attempt has been made to apply it to the operational environment 2, 
and we explore its applicability to other time periods in Chapter Five. 
 Although the model can be applied to the analysis of particular units in depth, a 
capacity demonstrated in a small way by the detailed analyses of case studies in Chapter 
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Four, there is only room here for the reporting and description of general rules and trends 
across the combat arms: if we invoke the analogy of a map used on page 26, this section is 
drawn on a small scale.   This chapter therefore principally covers the common ground 
between combat arms units.  In the case of a putative future ethnography of a particular 
British unit or subunit (as exemplified in the case of the Canadian Army by Irwin’s recent 
study of an infantry company3), then the use of this model as a tool for informing that 
ethnography would represent its application at the greatest conceptual degree of resolution.  
 
SECTION TWO - THE MODEL - AN OVERALL VIEW 
 
Terminology 
 
As far as possible, normal English words have been used in laying out and describing the 
model, but it has been necessary to invent a small number of specific technical terms with 
consistent and exclusive meanings that are fundamental to it and are an original product of 
this study.  These terms are printed in italics from this point on in this thesis.  
 Confusion is sometimes caused by the different usages of the word ‘regiment’ in the 
context of the British Army.  In current British Army practice, if it has an initial capital 
(‘Regiment’) it refers to the level above the unit, and with a small initial letter (‘regiment’) to 
unit level.  The infant ry call their units ‘battalions’, the rest of the Combat Arms call their 
units ‘regiments’.  These usages will be used consistently within this thesis. 
 
Social Structures - an outline of the model - top level  
 
Four social structures. 
 
It has been traditional in social science to consider ‘social structure’ as an overarching entity 
embracing the whole of a human group.  However, the data which I obtained could not be 
organised under a such a single overarching heading because soldiers’ behaviour differed to 
such a marked degree between different contexts.  There simply was no single body of rules, 
ideas, and conventions of behaviour that could be constructed from the observed behaviour of 
the individuals or from the interview material.  The model presented here therefore departs 
from the traditional position by identifying a number of distinctly separate social structures 
in combat arms units, each with a distinctly different set of rules, ideas and conventions of 
behaviour.  There are four: 
 
- The formal command structure, which is the structure through which a soldier at 
the bottom of a chain of command receives orders from the person at the top.  It is 
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embedded in and expressed by the hierarchy of rank, the apparatus of discipline, 
and the formal arrangement of the unit into layer upon layer of organisational 
elements.  It contains the mechanisms for the enforcement of discipline, for the 
downward issue of orders and instructions and for the upward issue of reports, and 
it provides the framework for official responsibility and accountability. 
 
- The informal structure, which consists in unwritten conventions of behaviour in 
the absence of formal constraints.  It finds particular expression in the patterns of 
soldiers’ informal behaviour and in the web of rela tionships of friendship and 
association within the unit, an area which is expanded below into a separate sub-
model presented later in this chapter (pages 92 to 107).  Individuals come into 
personal contact with other people within the unit, of any rank, and establish inter-
personal relationships with them.  Although it might appear at first sight that the 
quality and intensity of such relationships are determined by free choice on the part 
of the individual (because they are informal), the network of a soldier’s informal 
relationships is for the most part constrained by his rank and relative position in the 
unit. 
 
- The loyalty/identity structure, which is manifested most notably in a nesting 
series of different sized groups which are defined by opposition to and contrast 
with other groups of equal status in the formal command structure.  The structure 
itself, the ‘body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour’, consists in the 
attitudes, feelings and expectations of soldiers towards these groups and 
membership of them.  Thus an infantry soldier would express his identity as a 
member of his platoon  and feel loyalty to it in competition with other platoons of 
the same company.  Where his company is in competition with other companies, 
these attitudes and feelings would be transferred to the company, rather than the 
platoon, and this process is continued up to levels beyond the unit (and below the 
platoon). 
 
- The functional structure, which consists in attitudes, feelings and expectations 
connected with the carrying out of specific tasks and military activities, and the 
concept of being ‘soldierly’.  Where groups are formed to carry out such functions, 
they might exactly reflect the formal command structure (which provides an easy 
and quick means of creating any group within a unit) or they might be independent 
of it.  For example, an infantry platoon (a basic element in the infantry command 
structure) tends to carry out military functions on exercise and operations as a 
formed body.  In contrast, a ‘rear party’ which remains in barracks while the rest of 
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the unit is away (perhaps on leave or on an operational tour of duty) is usually 
made up of soldiers from all over the unit, brought together into an ad hoc 
grouping. 
 
 The necessity for the number of social structures in combat arms units to be four 
emerged from the data: although I searched carefully for evidence that would require the 
specification of a fifth social structure, none appeared.  I am therefore confident that for the 
present case of the regular combat arms four such structures are sufficient. 
 These four social structures can be illustrated in the following diagram, which shows 
the four bodies of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour, each separate but contiguous 
with the other three and all in one overall system, 
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Figure 3.1. Social Structures in Combat Arms Units 
(Author’s diagram) 
 
This apparently simple four-segment diagram represents the top level of the model.  Below 
this top level there is a high degree of complexity.  Each of the segments  represents a large 
body of written and unwritten rules and conventions of behaviour and attitudes, all of which 
are available simultaneously to individuals and groups.  As a result, these rules and 
conventions are interwoven into a complex and intricate whole during the business of daily 
life, a whole that will appear arcane to an outside observer with no experience of the British 
Army. 
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The concept of the operating structure 
 
Although all of the structures are available to inform individual and group action at the same 
time, I found that soldiers’ behaviour tends to follow one structure only in any particular 
context and at any particular instant.  It is therefore implicit in the model that only one 
structure can be pre-eminent at any one moment and in any one situation, though the others 
remain as potential resources in the background.  For analytical purposes this pre-eminent 
structure is called the operating structure.  This is illustrated by the following observation, 
recollected from my time as a Battery Commander in an artillery regiment in Germany.  It 
stands for hundreds of such incidents in any combat arms unit: 
 
‘I was walking from my office in 27 Field Regiment towards the BQMS’s [Battery 
Quartermaster Sergeant] stores.  This walk took me across my Battery’s gun park 
where a small group of my soldiers was relaxing and smoking during a break in 
their work.  When I approached them, obviously walking past, the senior soldier 
present (a lance bombardier), called the men to attention by saying in a loud firm 
voice “Stand up!” and saluting.  The men stood to attention, cigarettes in their 
hands and therefore out of their mouths.  I returned the salute, and said “Carry on 
Bombardier [plus his name]”.  The NCO said something to the men who then 
relaxed and resumed their smoking and chatting.’4 
 
Analysis: The operating structure for the soldiers was the informal structure while 
they were taking their smoke break.  The approach of an officer demanded that 
they pay him an official compliment.  This required them to change operating 
structure to the formal command structure.  As the officer I also operated in the 
formal command structure by returning the compliment but I then restored them to 
the informal structure as their operating structure by telling the NCO to “carry 
on”.  The whole business took less than 5 seconds, during which time they 
transited from one structure to another and back again without hesitation or 
awkwardness. 
 
 This type of analysis using the concept of the operating structure is adequate for most 
of the situations in which soldiers find themselves.  However, there are occasions when more 
than one structure seems to be operating simultaneously and the model of a single operating 
structure seems inadequate.  This particular question will be addressed in Chapter Four when 
the model is assessed. 
 
The concept of the operating group 
 
There is a great deal of potential in the model’ s four segments to provide the basis for a 
considerable array of possible groupings.  This point can be illustrated by considering an 
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infantry soldier on duty guarding the gate to his camp as a member of a rear party.  He could 
be a member of a number of groups as delineated by the social structures including: 
 
 Formal Command and Loyalty/Identity Structures: 
 
His regiment. 
 
His battalion. 
 
The platoon and company in which he would normally be serving. 
 
Functional Structure: 
 
The rear party, which is a unique and temporary body formed from 
different parts of the battalion. 
 
Those members of the rear party on duty as gate guards at that time. 
 
Informal Structure: 
 
His group of friends in general (including those away from the camp). 
 
Those people also on rear party duties with whom he is friendly. 
 
 However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the soldier was equally committed to 
all of these groups simultaneously.  Indeed, under normal circumstances an individual will 
feel at any one time that one group in particular demands his attention and energy above all 
others.  As an aid to analysis, the concept of the operating group (originally used in my early 
analysis of Wellington’s army in the Peninsular War)5 will be used in this thesis to denote this 
particular group.   
 Where the model is used rigorously, as it is in this thesis, the description of an 
operating group should contain both an allusion to the operating structure and an outline 
description of the status of the people who form the membership of the group.  Thus in this 
case, where the soldier is on duty guarding the gate, his operating group could be described 
as the ‘functional group of gate guards with whom he is working at the time’. 
 Operating groups can and do change with changing circumstances.  Thus, staying 
with this same soldier on the gate, whereas his operating group at the instant of observation 
is the functional group of gate guards with whom he is working at the time, it will change as 
soon as he goes off duty, probably to an informal group of rear party soldiers with whom he 
is friendly. 
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Description of each of the structures 
 
The next four sections are detailed descriptions of each of the structures.  These descriptions 
are in two main parts, an observer’s view of the structure in question and a consideration of 
the effect of the structure as experienced by the individual soldier.  
 
SECTION THREE - THE FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURE 
 
Orders is Orders6 
 
This section outlines the formal command structure, which is perhaps the most easily 
understood of the four social structures, particularly by those outside the armed forces.   
 
Description 
 
As the name implies, this is the social structure that consists in the ideas, rules and 
conventions of behaviour which govern how soldiers are formally grouped and how they 
conduct themselves in specifically formal military situations.  
 The formal command structure is expressed in many ways.  The one common thread 
between all of them is that there is an underlying assumption that emotion plays no part in its 
expression, but that all is governed by formally stated rules, an aspect that Hockey noted, 
using the Weberian ideal of ‘bureaucracy’ in his description, 
 
‘The Army thus displays numerous bureaucratic features, including a hierarchical 
authority structure, a formal, highly detailed, almost monolithic body of rules and 
regulations, and a specialised division of labour.’7 
 
Because a complete account of this social structure would exceed the space available, a brief 
description of a number of particular aspects follow, which between them provide an 
overview of the structure, and each of which encapsulates its basic formal hierarchical nature.   
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Formal organisational aspects 
 
The formal command structure finds organisational expression in the rank structure and the 
formal division of the unit on a clearly defined hierarchical pattern (See Appendix D).  It 
defines the lines of official responsibility and the chain of command above and below each 
individual, and the route by which reports from any part of the structure are to reach the 
Commanding Officer or his appropriate representative.  The individual soldier experiences its 
effects by the obligation it lays upon him to obey orders given by those senior in rank to him, 
and the rights it confers on him to expect his own orders to be carried out by anyone junior in 
rank to himself.   
 The formal organisational elements are probably enacted in their most easily observed 
form when troops are on parade.  Each man, and thus each element of the parading body of 
troops, has a formal place on parade and the authority figures are obvious by their positions 
and by what they do.  When a unit parades as a unit there are a series of actions that serve to 
express the unit hierarchy.  Initially, the various sub units parade under their non 
commissioned officers, whilst the officers stand off to the side.  The unit is taken over by the 
Regimental Sergeant Major, who formally hands over to the Adjutant, the personal staff 
officer to the Commanding Officer and head of discipline in the unit.  The Adjutant calls 
upon the officers to join the parade.  When they have done so, he will hand over to the 
Commanding Officer.  A very similar pattern is carried out at a lower level when a sub unit is 
paraded, with the sub unit sergeant major taking over from the senior NCOs, and handing 
over to the officer commanding the subunit. 
 
Discipline 
 
Allied to formal organisational elements, there are the disciplinary arrangements in the unit, 
exemplified in a most concrete way by the Guardroom and its attached cells and exercise 
yard.  The apparatus of discipline derives its power from the law of the land, in the form of 
the Army Act, and is expressed in the Manual of Military Law8 and Queen's Regulations for 
the Army9.  The structure is seen in action, for example, in the enforcement of dress 
regulations, both in the unambiguous setting out in written orders of what is to be worn and in 
the inspection of soldiers to ensure that what is worn meets appropriate standards.  It is also 
seen in the publication of written daily routine orders issued in the name of the commander at 
the appropriate level (unit and sub unit), and during summary jurisdiction procedures (called 
OC’s and CO’s Orders), and Courts Martial. 
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Bodily attitudes    
 
Another form of expression is in particular attitudes of the body, bodily hexis, in Bourdieu’s 
terms10.  When the formal command structure is the operating structure, there are a limited 
number of postures available to the individual, each defined in the Drill Manual11.  Until 
given formal permission to relax by the senior person present, individuals are obliged to 
either sit or stand ‘to attention’ if they are stationary, or to move in a prescribed formal 
manner.  If the context is a disciplinary one in which a soldier is undergoing summary 
jurisdiction further special rules apply, as this example from my experience as a Battery 
Commander in the mid 1980s12 illustrates: 
 
Before Battery Commander’s Orders, the Battery Sergeant Major (BSM) and I 
would discuss the accused [in this case, Gunner Smith], and the alleged conduct 
that brought him to be charged and who witnessed this conduct.  Then I would 
check that the charge sheet had been correctly made out according to the Manual 
of Military Law (which it invariably was).  After that, the BSM and I would take 
everything off my desk and put it to one side.  I would put on my hat, and we 
would be ready. 
 
The BSM would then put his hat on and leave the room.  I would return to my seat 
behind the desk.  After a short pause, I would hear him in the corridor saying in a 
very loud voice, “Prisoner and escort, SHUN!”  Feet would stamp. “Prisoner and 
escort, quickmarchleftrightleftrightleftrightleftwheelmarktime!”  In would come 
the accused, hatless and without his belt, with one other man of the same rank on 
either side of him, wearing their hats and their belts.  They would be marching at 
several times the normal pace (something approaching 180 paces a minute) and 
come to a crashing halt in front of my desk.  The BSM would say “Gunner Smith, 
SIR!”.  The witnesses, wearing hats, would come in at a more sedate pace and 
stand to one side, in the ‘stand at ease’ drill position.  I would then formally check 
the identity of the accused, “You are 24657567 Gunner Smith”, to which he would 
reply “Sir!” and I would read the charge out to him in a prescribed form while he 
stood at attention in front of my desk.  I would end by  asking him if he understood 
the charge.  His reply was usually “Yes Sir!”, but whatever it was, it was always 
delivered in a firm and formal tone of voice. 
 
I would then hear the evidence from the witnesses, ask the accused if he 
understood, and ask him if he had any questions of the witnesses.  By the time this 
was done, I would have made up my mind if the man was guilty of the offence 
with which he had been accused.  I was obliged by the Manual of Military Law to 
ask him if he accepted my award or elected for trial by Court Martial, which in 
effect meant that he would be taken to plead his case in front of the Commanding 
Officer in a similar but more powerful summary court.  The CO would make him 
the same offer at the end of that, so if a man was determined then he could have a 
Court Martial.  None of my soldiers ever went that far.  
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I would pronounce them guilty or not guilty.  If they were guilty I would rift 
[upbraid] them soundly while they stared fixedly over my head, and I would allot a 
punishment from a set of prescribed options.  I would end by saying in a loud and 
aggressive voice, “March out!”.  The BSM would immediately reverse the entry 
process with “Prisoner and escort, SHUN!  Left turn! Quickmarchright 
wheelleftrightleftrightleftright...”13 14 
 
Analysis - Observations on bodily hexis: 
 
Dress: I wore my hat throughout the proceedings, though I never did at any other 
time in my office, and so did the witnesses, the BSM and the escorts to the 
accused.  The accused did not wear a hat. 
 
Use of the voice: Nobody spoke in a conversational tone of voice.  The BSM used 
parade ground volume and turn of phrase; I spoke more firmly than I would 
normally have done in my office; and all those giving evidence started with “Sir 
...” and used a more formal tone and pace than they would have done in a more 
normal setting. 
 
Holding of the body: All concerned, except myself, used drill manual attit udes.  I 
sat, and the accused stood.  In sitting, I held myself more upright than I would 
normally do. 
 
Movement of the body: I remained stationary throughout the proceedings, in sharp 
contrast to the swift movement of the escort and the accused. 
 
 Badges of rank     
 
Another obvious set of symbols consists in the badges of rank, which are worn in full view on 
the uniform, as is common in virtually all military forces15.  These badges of rank are often 
accompanied by distinctions in dress which help to identify the seniority of the individual 
from a distance.  These distinctions vary between regiments and corps, but are exemplified by 
such things as the wearing of light coloured shirts and brown shoes by officers and warrant 
officers in contrast to green shirts and black footwear for non commissioned officers and 
privates.  Similarly, where berets are the regimental dress, officers’ berets in most regiments 
carry cloth cap badges whilst those of warrant officers and below are of metal. 
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Symbols of power surrounding the Commanding Officer    
 
There are certain symbols of power associated with the Commanding Officer, the pinnacle of 
this structure within the unit.  Although the precise detail will vary from unit to unit, these 
symbols include such things as the convention that all officers in his officers’ mess will stand 
up when he enters the room, his exclusive right to a staff car and driver (a right which he 
alone within the unit enjoys), and the particular way his office is furnished and decorated.  In 
this latter respect, for example, his desk is usually larger than that of his personal staff officer, 
the Adjutant, although it will have less paper passing across it.  There will also be 
comfortable chairs in which he can entertain visitors, and there may well be silver ornaments 
on the desk or surrounding tables.  The following is an extract from a description of one 
commanding officer’s office, which is typical enough to illustrate this point for most such 
offices, 
 
‘Symbols of Power.  Given that the CO has great power within his own battalion, I 
looked for symbols of power in his office.  I identified the following: 
 
(1) The size and stillness of the office. 
 
(2) The large uncluttered desk, implying that  
 
(a) He was important enough to justify a big, old-fashioned desk.   
 
(b) Other people organise his work for him, bring it in and take it 
away. 
 
(3) The silver objects on the table. 
 
(4) The choice of a low easy chair, which put me physically lower than 
him in his desk chair. 
 
The sign on the door and the symbols of power identify this office as that of the 
most powerful person in the regiment.’16 
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Terms of address    
 
The formal command structure is also expressed in terms of address.  Where it is the 
operating structure individuals will refer to each other exclusively by rank and address each 
other formally.  For example, in the context of BC’s orders above, I would refer to officers 
giving evidence as “Mister” and surname if they were subalterns and “Captain” and surname 
if they were captains.  They would call me “Sir”.  Had the operating structure been the 
informal structure, for instance at coffee break in the officers’ mess (which may have been 
only a few minutes earlier), we would all have addressed each other by first names. 
 
Administrative details of daily life    
 
The influence of the formal command structure penetrates many small details of daily life.  
For example:  
 
- The location and type of sleeping quarters are also reflections of the formal 
command structure.  Barrack accommodation for the living- in personnel is 
normally divided between the officers (‘the officers’ mess’), the warrant officers 
and sergeants (‘the sergeants’ mess’), and the other ranks (ORs).  There will 
probably be a further division within the accommodation of ORs, depending on 
availability, which will place the private soldiers in communal accommodation, 
perhaps a ten-man barrack room or a four-man flat, and the junior NCOs in single 
rooms.  The ORs accommodation is almost always arranged so that soldiers from 
the same sub unit exclusively occupy a discrete portion of an accommodation 
block, and so that soldiers within the same troop/platoon occupy adjoining rooms.    
 
- Commanders at all levels hold periodic meetings, at which it will normally be 
clear from their position in the room, and from their right to chair or direct the 
meeting, that they are the senior person present.   
 
- The time of a soldier of any rank is at the disposal of any person in the chain of 
command above him. 
 
- Soldiers on duty in barracks eat food in separate rank groups: private soldiers and 
junior NCOs; sergeants and warrant officers; and officers. 
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Effect on the individual 
 
The most important implications of the formal command structure for the individual can be 
considered under the following headings: 
 
 Position and role.   The structure provides an unambiguous location for him within 
his unit, determined by his rank and the organisational elements to which he belongs.  For 
instance, one soldier described himself to me as ‘a mortarman in Fire Support Company, 
Number One on 1 Detachment’17.  Similarly, when a lance corporal in an armoured unit 
described himself as ‘the troop leader’s gunner’18, he was uniquely identifying himself as a 
member of a particular vehicle crew in a particular squadron in his particular regiment.  
However, this position changes with time as the individual is promoted or simply employed 
in different roles or in another part of the unit, or any combination of the three.  It is common 
practice, for instance, to post infantry soldiers from rifle companies to Support Company 
when they have gained experience, whether or not they have been promoted: 
 
‘His company [Support Company] is renowned for having a different role to the 
rifle companies and having a different way of life.  They are supposed to get the 
Senior Privates from the rifle companies: such men are more mature and therefore 
they do not have to be supervised as much.’19 
 
An individual’s trajectory through his career and over time can thus be delineated by the 
various positions that he has held in the formal command structure.  Here is an illustration 
from my field notes: 
 
‘[The interviewee] spent his first 2 years in 9 Platoon, of C Company.  Then he 
went to Signal Platoon from 1980 to 1991, where he rose from Private to Sergeant.  
In 1991 he moved back to a rifle company where he was platoon sergeant of 7 
Platoon, in C Company.  In Feb 93 he went to Zimbabwe for 6 months loan 
service.  Since then he has been the sergeant in the Signal Platoon.’20 
 
 Exclusive chain of assessment.  A soldier’s work and his personal conduct on and off 
duty are examined and assessed by his superiors in the formal command structure, who have 
the exclusive right to confer formal approval or disapproval on him.  For instance, a sub unit 
commander may periodically inspect all the equipment in his sub unit and its documentation 
and assess how well they are being maintained.  He has the authority to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against those responsible should either prove below standard.  The Commanding 
Officer may also inspect and discipline the same soldiers, but the other sub unit commanders 
may not.  Similarly, if a soldier behaves badly on or off duty he can only be formally 
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disciplined by those in his chain of command, even if his offence was committed against 
someone in authority in another sub unit.  
 The formal command structure also provides the mechanism whereby a soldier’s 
future is decided.  It is exclusively his superiors in the chain of command who decide the 
courses he will undergo to gain qualifications and experience, and they alone decide on his 
next employment (which could include a major change such as a posting to another unit).  
Perhaps most important of all, his promotion is controlled by his structural superiors. 
 Formal communications.   This structure provides a communications channel down 
which he receives the orders which determine the course of his daily life and his immediate 
future.  For example, a soldier reads on sub unit orders the day before what time he will be 
called in the morning, what his order of dress is to be, when breakfast is available, and what 
time he must be on parade.  On that parade there will be a roll call carried out by an NCO to 
ensure that all are present who should be, and the soldier will probably be allocated his day’s 
tasks at that parade. 
 It also provides a means of communications upwards, in that it embodies the channel 
through which he may make requests.  For example, if a soldier wants to go on a particular 
course or is told that a member of his family is ill and needs his presence, he will make the 
request for the course or compassionate leave up his chain of command.  
 In the same way, it provides a mechanism for him to make formal complaints.  For 
example, a soldier who wishes to complain that he or another man is being bullied is 
expected to ask for an interview with his sub unit commander.  He will start the process by 
making his request to the appropriate NCO, who is duty bound to pass it up the chain of 
command.  However, as we shall see in the next section, other channels of communications in 
the informal structure would probably provide a more effective way of getting his message 
through to those who can take action to resolve the undesirable situation. 
 
Control and manipulation 
 
I have so far described this structure as a set of rules which have the neutral and absolute 
force of military law behind them.  However, there is scope for members of a unit hierarchy 
to manipulate these rules.  For example, if the BSM had decided that Gunner Smith in my 
description on pages 84 and 85 should not be charged, then, even if I had heard about it 
(which I probably would not have done) I would not have over-ruled him.  This is not to say, 
however, that the apparatus of discipline is entirely in the hands of individuals like that BSM.   
At the time of my example, the Adjutant, as the focus for military discipline in the regiment, 
kept an overall watch on the application of Military Law in all the parts of the regiment in 
consultation with the battery commanders so that the same standards and interpretations were 
applied evenly throughout the unit, and this is typical of most, if not all, British military units.  
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This process means that the individuals with the greatest formally constituted authority define 
the limits within which the rules may be flexed and manipulated.  Soldiers in a similar 
position to the BSM in the case quoted make sure that he and they and their NCOs operate 
within these limits. 
 Such direct manipulation and control is of course beyond the power of private 
soldiers, which means that for the most part where the formal command structure is the 
operating structure their power to influence events is limited.  As we will see, however, this 
is not necessarily the case in other contexts. 
 
Concluding remarks on the Formal Command Structure 
 
This overview of the formal command structure has attempted to encapsulate and illustrate its 
main features.  It is noteworthy that this structure has caught the public imagination in a way 
that the other structures that I will describe have not.  Many times when I have revealed to 
new civilian acquaintances that I am a commissioned officer in the Army they have felt 
impelled to joke by adopting a rigid posture and making a comic salute.  In the same way, 
people with no knowledge of the Service often make the assumption that officers are fierce 
creatures who bark orders all the time, stamp their feet and habitually address each other by 
their rank.  It is as if the public’s perception of the Army is of a life spent permanently on 
parade or in summary jurisdiction. 21  Real life is far from this stereotype, as will become clear 
from the descriptions of the other three social structures which follow. 
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SECTION FOUR - THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE 
 
A soldier does not die for his country: he dies for his friends.22 
 
“You are better off being with your mates in combat - being  
part of a team.  Unit pride did not play a part, and Queen and Country  
did not either.”23 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Because the informal structure is the most complex of the four structures in this model, this 
section is perforce the longest and most complex in this chapter. 
 If the formal command structure of a unit were viewed as a vertical system, with the 
Commanding Officer at the top and the private soldiers at the bottom, the informal structure 
would then be a rectangular system, with spontaneous social interaction running both 
vertically and horizontally.  Unlike the formal command structure, it is not governed by any 
written regulations, and at first sight it appears to be the province of unfettered and 
unstructured individual choice: a soldier appears to choose who his friends are and whom to 
shun, and his behaviour off duty and in informal contexts on duty seems to be a matter purely 
for his personal inclinations.  However, there are patterns in soldiers’ informal behaviour and 
in the formation of their informal relationships, and the bundle of rules, customs and attitudes 
that underlie these patterns is captures in the model of the informal structure. 
 The description of this structure begins with an exploration of the types of informal 
relationship which exist in a unit.  We turn secondly to six other facets of the structure which 
I have selected for special attention.  These selected facets are the formation of informal 
groups, the effects of the passage of time, informal hierarchies, terms of address, a unit’s 
‘underlife’24, and special informal circumstances.  These topics were chosen because they 
appear more often in the interview material and in my experience than other elements of the 
informal structure.  However, they should be considered as examples of significant 
manifestations of informal military life rather than providing a complete portrait of it.  Such a 
portrait would not be possible in the space available.  I could also, for example, have included 
a treatment of jokes, nicknames, graffiti, and the singing of songs in informal military 
contexts, all of which are redolent of the informal structure.  However, they would probably 
not enhance the thrust of the thesis any further than the material that is included here, which 
is sufficient for the purpose of this chapter. 
 The third main part of this section considers the effect of the informal structure on 
individuals, considering private soldiers, NCOs and officers as different categories of agent. 
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A typology of informal relationships  
  
A key part of the informal structure is the network25 of bonds of friendship, association, and 
informal rights of access.  These bonds are described first in this section, after which other 
important expressions of the structure in the regular pattern of daily life in a unit are 
addressed. 
 As with my description of the four structures above, I have found it necessary to 
create sets of specialist terms, to be written in italics, to assist in the description of the 
informal structure.  The first set is a group of terms to describe non-sexual informal 
relationships26.  There are five of them: close friendship, friendship, association, informal 
access, and nodding acquaintance.  Their meanings are described in the following sub 
sections, and depicted in a diagram that will be built up as the terms are described.  The main 
parameters of this diagram are shown in Figure 3. 2, which is described below. 
 
Figure 3. 2:  Informal Relationships - Outline Diagram
Relative
Seniority
Junior
Close Distant
Senior
EGO -
Closeness of Relationship
(Author’s diagram)  
 
 Notes to Figure. 3.2: 
 
The diagram is drawn on 2 axes: 
 
1.  Vertical axis, relative seniority.  Any point on the axis is senior in rank 
to any point below it and junior to any point above it. 
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2.   Horizontal axis, closeness of the relationship.  The further to the left, 
the stronger the relationship, and vice versa. 
 
Soldiers’ personal informal relationships fall within the boundaries of the diagram. 
 
“EGO” is an individual of no particular rank who has some subordinates and some 
superiors in the unit.  The diagrams in Figures 3.3 to 3.7 that follow summarise the 
various relationships available to him, the effects of relative rank, and the relative 
closeness or intensity of the relationships. 
 
Close Friendship 
 
 Close friendship consists in a durable relationship that transcends the military environment, 
where there is a large measure of trust and respect between the parties and few barriers to 
discussion of highly personal matters.  It is a rare and special relationship, the strength of 
which cannot be underestimated.   It is the true ‘David and Jonathan’ relationship, ‘passing 
the love of women’ 27, and different in quality from the emotional and physical ties of a deep 
sexual relationship.  Close friendship was reflected in a memorable remark reported to me: 
one soldier speaks in confidence of his best mate, “If he were a woman I would have fucked 
him by now”28, indicating a deep level of personal commitment without any sexual content.   
 In my interviews with soldiers of all ranks I established that, for virtually every one, a 
useful test to identify close friendship would be to determine whether the relationship would 
survive unchanged if one of the parties was prepared to shed tears in the presence of the 
other: if one is were embarrassed by a friend’s tears then he is not a close friend. 
 In transcending the military environment, this relationship also transcends military 
rank.  However, there is a general feeling that such relationships are probably more likely to 
form between peers, because peers are more often in each others’ company informally than 
those who are separated by significant differences in either age or rank.  
 
The place of close friendship in the model is shown in Figure 3.3: 
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Figure 3. 3.  Close Friendship
Relative
Seniority
Junior
Close Distant
Senior
close
friendship
EGO -
Closeness of Relationship
(Author’s diagram)
 
 Whilst it is a special relationship, it is also extremely rare.  Most interviewees 
recognised it, either in their own experience or in observing their colleagues, but it was 
generally agreed that a person could only have a very small number of such relationships in a 
lifetime, about five at the most.  In  the words of a warrant officer in an infantry battalion 
“I’ve maybe made only two or three close friends in my career, though I’ve had plenty of 
military friends”29, a sentiment echoed by another warrant officer in the Royal Artillery who 
said that he had no friends but many “acquaintances”30.  This means that close friendship 
needs to be identified for the sake of completeness as part of the informal structure but it 
should not be considered as generally significant in the daily life of the majority of soldiers.  
Other relationships are more common. 
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Friendship 
 
The next and much more common relationship I have called friendship.  I use the term here 
specifically to refer to a less intense informal relationship which is frequently found to exist 
between soldiers.  It can have the appearance of close friendship, in that individuals 
constantly seek each other’s company, will help each other if they are in trouble, and will be 
prepared to share almost anything if the need arises, but it falls short of the depth and 
intensity of the other relationship.  Thus, during a group interview one soldier said of his 
particular circle of mates that he would be more than prepared to help any one of them: if a 
bloke was feeling unhappy then his friends would naturally take him out drinking to cheer 
him up. ‘However, there were some things that would not be legitimate topics of conversation 
between friends. ... if a friend of his said “I think I might be gay” then “I wouldn't want to 
know!”  [said with pantomime of rejection and horrified amusement].’31 
 Bonds of friendship, which make up an important element in the informal structure, 
are usually formed within narrow bands of rank.  Although there are no formally stated 
regulations which proscribe friendships growing up between people of widely diverse rank, 
such relationships are frowned upon because they are held to be potentially compromising for 
discipline.  For example, I was told by an infantry officer in a Scottish regiment: 
 
“We had an officer in [another Regiment] sent to us ...  And he came to us, decided 
that he didn’t like the officers’ mess, had coffee in the [soldiers’] lines, had 
sandwiches from the mess and had his lunch down there, and in the end there was 
complaints from the jocks [soldiers in a Scottish Regiment] through the sergeant 
major that they just couldn’t get away from this chap.  And initially his platoon 
were doing well, winning competitions and things ... but eventually when things 
started to go wrong they went wrong in a major way and ... unfortunately, when 
someone lets the officers’ side down like that it makes it difficult for everyone else.  
And I won’t tolerate it at all.”32  
 
and more succinctly by a soldier in the same regiment: 
 
“Because they’re officers they go out with other officers ... and we stay with our 
friends.”33 
 
Both these two quotes refer to the ‘wrongness’ of friendship across the commissioned/non-
commissioned divide.  Here is a private soldier speaking of the limits to friendship between 
those without commissions. 
 
“My group would be in the privates’ end of the thing.  Probably stretch up perhaps 
to lance corporals and corporals but not over that.”34 
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and here is a summary of an interview with an infantry sergeant who had broken the rules: 
 
‘His story was that he had was busted [reduced in rank] soon after his first 
promotion to sergeant because he had been found drinking in the Corporal’s Mess, 
which is out of bounds to sergeants (except the Battalion Orderly Sergeant). ....  He 
was down for duty on the Sunday (New Year’s Eve) and would not therefore be 
able to drink then, so he had decided to drink on the Saturday night.  There was 
nobody in the Sergeants’ Mess, so he had decided to go down town.  As he passed 
the Corporals’ Mess he heard the juke box playing, thought of his old friends there 
and decided to go in.  The Battalion Orderly Sergeant had seen him go in, and he 
reported it to the RSM [Regimental Sergeant Major].  The RSM then charged him 
and the CO busted him.  There was no question of him behaving badly.  Just the 
very fact that he entered the building not in the line of duty was enough.  He had 
only been a sergeant for 12 weeks, so most of his friends were in the Corporals’ 
mess.  It took him two and a half years to get his rank back.’35 
 
Similarly, when I asked in the early interviews about a putative friendship between a warrant 
officer and a corporal I was told every time that such a relationship would be wrong. 
 From analysis of the interview material as a whole I concluded that the usual rank 
limits of friendship could be set out thus: 
 
- Anyone can form a friendship with anyone of the same rank within the unit. 
 
- Private soldiers may form friendships with lance corporals/lance bombardiers, 
though a friendship with a full corporal/bombardier may attract disapproval from 
above. 
 
- Junior NCOs may form friendships with one another. 
 
- Sergeants and staff sergeants/colour sergeants may form friendships, but senior NCOs must 
not have friendships with junior NCOs and private soldiers. 
 
- Warrant officers may form friendships with sergeants that they have known for 
some time, but there will always be a certain distance in the relationship, especially 
if they are in the same sub unit. 
 
- The Regimental Sergeant Major is not expected to be on familiar terms with his 
colleagues in the sergeants’ mess, no matter how well he got on with them in the 
past. 
 
- Subalterns (second lieutenants and lieutenants) are expected to form friendships 
with each other, and the senior lieutenants may form friendships with captains. 
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- Majors are expected to form friendships among themselves, but are also expected 
to maintain a certain distance from more junior officers.  The degree of distance 
varies from unit to unit, but it is reflected in the custom that the Commanding 
Officer may well ask a major to provide him with a draft annual report on those 
officers in his sub unit.  It is hard for a junior officer to form a friendship with a 
person whose opinion of him will have a hand in deciding his future.36 
 
- The Commanding Officer is expected to remain distant from his fellow officers 
within the unit, as the Regimental Sergeant Major does from his sergeants’ mess 
colleagues. 
 
These are general trends, and there are, of course, some small variations between regiments.  
In particular, the Foot Guards experience greater constraints than other infantry regiments, 
whilst, on the other hand, where promotion comes early with technical trade qualifications (as 
it can do in the Royal Signals for example) then those thus promoted to senior NCO status 
will not easily shed their friends of the same age but junior in rank. 
 Friendship is constrained not only by rank, but also by structural separation within the 
unit.  This is easily apparent when it is considered that soldiers can only form friendships 
with those they meet reasonably often.  For junior soldiers this means that there is in effect an 
outer organisational line beyond which an individual is unlikely to have the opportunity to 
make friends. 
 
- Private soldiers tend to confine the majority of their friendships within the sub 
unit to which they belong (and within which the living- in ORs [‘other ranks’, 
soldiers below senior NCO rank] are accommodated), with the possible addition of 
their work mates if they are specialists with a work area outside their sub unit (for 
example people from different sub units who are qualified as Medical Assistants 
might work together under the Medical Officer).  Analysis of the interview 
material showed that it would be typical for a private soldier who has been in a unit 
for about two years to have developed a pattern of 30% of his friends in the same 
platoon/troop, 45% in the rest of his sub unit, and 25% elsewhere.  The major 
individual variation appeared to be in the number of friends rather than in this 
approximate balance.  This feature appeared with remarkable consistency during 
interviews.  For all but the Royal Signals the exceptions were confined to those 
who had recently been posted between units or sub units, those fresh from training, 
and one individual who was so dissatisfied with Army life that he had been AWOL 
[absent without leave] for over three months.  All of these had the greater balance 
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of their friends outside the sub unit.  Royal Signals interviewees insisted that they 
formed the majority of their friendships inside the troop rather than the sub unit.  
No full explanation for this was found, though it is probably significant that all 
Royal Signals interviewees reported that the troops in which they had served were 
larger than the equivalent elsewhere - well over twice the size of an infantry 
platoon. 
 
- For junior NCOs there will be the opportunity to make friends outside the sub unit if the 
unit corporals’ club or Junior NCOs’ Mess is active, but the old friendships from within the 
sub unit will remain. 
  For members of the sergeants’ and officers’ messes the constraints are tha t they may 
make friendships only within the confines of their messes, with the further restrictions 
outlined above. 
 These constraints mean that it is common for a soldier to lose touch with an 
apparently important friend once they are separated by physical space (when one of them is 
posted from the unit or leaves the Army) or by structural space (when one of them is posted 
to a different part of the unit or promoted beyond the scope of friendship).  However, that is 
not to say that the friendship is necessarily obliterated: it can often be readily revived when 
the circumstances are right, even if a substantial period of time has elapsed since it was last 
activated.   
 Here is an example of restoration of friendship after physical separation.  The 
interviewee was a private soldier in the Royal Engineers, who had been trickle posted37 
[posted as an individual] from another regiment to his present one: 
 
 “There’s a lot of lads here that I was in my last unit with, and nine times out of ten 
you won’t remember the ir name.  It’ll come to you eventually and then when it 
does it like picks up and carries on where it broke off.”38 
 
and, after a more drastic separation: 
 
‘The interviewee [a private soldier in the infantry] left the Army in 1988 and spent 
three years in civvy street.  He rejoined three years later, because he had run out of 
money and he had nowhere to live.  The process was that he spent three days at the 
Depot and took some tests - which he passed - and then went straight to ... [his 
battalion], and ‘rejoined’ B Company.  Initially, he found that most of his old 
friends had moved on to the mortar platoon.  However, he made friends in B 
Company and fitted in well, seeing little of his mortar platoon friends.  But after 
two months he joined the mortar platoon, and his friendships in the mortar platoon 
picked up straight away.  (He said that he had not been in touch with them while he 
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was in civvy street).  His [new] friendships in B Company faded - they did not go 
away, but they did go into cold storage.’39  
 
Here is one of restoration after structural separation: 
 
‘I asked [a senior NCO] about the effect of joining the sergeants’ mess. 
“You say that it will make no difference to your friendships, but it does.”  He 
explained that you start to drink in a different place, you are living in a different 
place and you are eating in a different place, and all with different people.  You 
form new friendships and the other ones dwindle.  However, when the friends with 
whom he had lost touch got promoted to the mess they just picked up where they 
left off. 
 
Comment :  This means that the friendships that he had with people outside the 
sergeants’ mess necessarily went into cold storage, only to be got out when those 
friends joined the same social environment of the sergeant s’ mess.’40 
 
An infantry sergeant summed up the situation well by saying that each person would find 
different companions when they were separated, but the friendship would still be there.41  
 Finally, length of service can be important.  I observed, and confirmed during 
interviews, that soldiers do not generally make friendships with men who are very much their 
junior or senior in experience.  This may well be connected with the idea which I call the 
‘pecking order’ below. 
 
Figure 3. 4 shows friendship in the model: 
Figure 3. 4.  Friendship
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 Friendship therefore is essentially a relationship between peers.  There seems to be a 
popular perception, played out all too often in the media, that a close informal relationship 
across significant steps in rank is not possible in the Army.  The following sub section will 
demonstrate that this is a false perception. 
 
Association 
 
Where two soldiers separated by rank distance wide enough to exclude friendship between 
them come into regular and frequent contact they will often form an informal bond of mutual 
trust and respect.  This bond falls short of friendship as defined above, but is nevertheless a 
strong informal relationship.  I have called this relationship ‘association’. 
 The nature of this relationship is illustrated in the following four extracts from my 
field notes: 
  
A warrant officer, of the relationship between the sub unit commander and his 
sergeant major, “They like each other and they work closely together...”42 
 
An officer, of his chief clerk from a previous posting,  “We had established a warm 
relationship ..., sharing jokes and views on politics, as well as forming a good 
professional working arrangement.  In a particular time of distress for my family 
he had even offered me a small amount of moral support in private.”43 
 
A subaltern about life in his sub unit, “The good thing ... is that the seniors [senior 
NCOs] and officers can form quite close knit relationships, and so they do talk, not 
really as a Staff Sergeant to an Officer but sometimes as a - though it’s never 
friendly - friendly chat.”44 
 
‘He said that a troop sergeant and his corporals would go out drinking together, but 
there was still a bit of distance between them - a corporal wouldn’t ring up the 
sergeant and say “are you going out in the piss tonight?”’ 45 
 
It is a mixture of closeness and distance: closeness in terms of the mutual trust respect and 
affection, and in the flow of information and relaxed conversation between the parties, and 
distance in terms of an underlying expectation of deference by the junior partner when it is 
required by the senior one.  In essence it has many features of a warm and close client/patron 
relationship. 
 Bonds of association may superficially resemble friendship in many ways, but the 
relationship is not the same.  Although the two individuals concerned may get to know each 
other very well, spend a great deal of time in each other’s company, get to develop trust in 
each other, and can even criticise each other without damaging their relationship, it is likely 
to have a substantial professional element: its primary context is the arena of work.  As a 
 101 
particular example, a sub unit commander is more than likely to form a strong bond of 
association with his sergeant major so that each grows to know how the other thinks, and so 
that no professionally important subject is a forbidden matter of discussion between them.  
Indeed, a sub unit sergeant major is the only person within the sub unit who is accepted to 
have the right to tell the officer commanding that sub unit that he is making a mess of things - 
though he should only do so in private.  However, it is extremely unlikely that they will 
choose to spend much of their spare time in each other’s company. 
 Like friendship, association has structurally defined limits.  The most significant ones 
are:  
 
- First, the obvious one that it is only likely to arise between people who come in 
close regular contact with each other at work. 
 
- Second, within its context, association can only be formed between two people 
whose structural positions are directly connected in some way.  Thus, a company 
commander will form an association with his sergeant major, but probably not 
with corporals from another company.  However, it should be noted that there are a 
variety of contexts in which the conditions for association can arise, and that 
individuals can form association in several of them in different contexts at the 
same time.  For example, a battery commander might well form associations with 
his battery commander’s assistant (usually a sergeant) in the context of exercises 
and operations, and with his driver (usually a private soldier or a lance bombardier) 
in the context of long road journeys, as well as with his battery sergeant major in 
the more general context of the life of his battery. 
Because the pattern of the bonds of association are so dependent on the context, 
they vary observably between units with different organisational structures and 
roles.  Whilst, for example, it is likely that any commanding officer will be in a 
relationship of association with his regimental sergeant major, at lower levels these 
is a different pattern of association between members, say, of an Army Air Corps 
unit and an infantry unit.  Specifically, in this instance, there is no equivalent 
pattern in an infantry battalion of the bonds of association that exist between 
aircrew of significantly different ranks. 
 In exploring the limits of association, I discovered that a very reasonable test 
was the matter of family holidays.  Whilst it is reasonable for friends to take family 
holidays together, at no stage, for example, did any officer or senior NCO say 
during an interview that those linked by even the closest bond of association would 
be likely to choose to do so.  This was highlighted in a conversation between 
myself and a colleague who had heard me present my model at a seminar.  He told 
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me that I was wrong in saying that friendship could not be formed across wide rank 
gaps.  When he commanded his regiment, he told me, he got on so well with his 
driver (a junior NCO) and spent so much time with him that he considered him his 
‘friend’.  He could not be shaken in this view until I asked him if he had ever 
considered having him along on a family holiday.  “Certainly not!” he replied, after 
which he agreed that the relationship was probably a very close form of 
association rather than friendship.46 
 It is worth noting here that it is widely recognized in the Army that the 
relationship that I have called association provides an important vehicle for an 
experienced NCO to pass his experience on to an inexperienced young officer.  
This is exemplified in the statement by a Royal Armoured Corps officer that “It is 
the Troop Sergeant’s responsibility to train the young officer”47.  
 Like friendship, association can be revived after a lapse of time.  It is not 
uncommon, for example, for a Commanding Officer to choose as his RSM the man 
who was his sub unit sergeant major when he was a sub unit commander. 
The position of association in the model is shown in Figure 3. 5: 
Figure 3. 5. Association
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Informal Access 
 
It is recognized, though not officially laid down, that each individual has a right to speak 
informally and without a formal appointment with certain other people who are at a degree of 
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rank distance (superiors in his chain of command for instance), even though a link of 
association does not exist between them.  Thus a newly joined junior officer can expect to be 
able to have informal access to his sub unit commander, as the sub unit commander can to 
even the most reserved and unfriendly Commanding Officer.  Similarly, any member of a 
sergeants’ mess can expect to have opportunities informally to approach the RSM. 
 Informal access therefore allows informal contact between people who are 
structurally widely separated, either by rank or by position in the unit.  It is a distant 
relationship in that it resembles more a client/patron state of affairs than the fellowship of 
equals, but it is nevertheless an important element in the informal structure because it allows 
informal contact across lines over which other informal relationships will not stretch.  This, 
for example, is an extract from notes from an interview with a RSM: 
 
‘Although he likes to keep a certain amount of structural distance between him and 
the soldiers, he needs to keep in touch with them.  He does this by direct contact with 
the private soldiers and through the CSMs [company sergeant majors] and so on.  He 
does not think of himself as in an unapproachable position.  “I would still have now 
[private soldiers] come and see me and although I’ll listen to them, I’ll tell them when 
I’ve heard them to go through the correct chain of command.”  These are soldiers who 
knew him personally as a company sergeant major or as a platoon sergeant.’48 
 
Here a captain speaks of informal conversations with his soldiers when he was a platoon 
commander a few years earlier: 
 
“But on the one to one level it’s probably, you know, when you’re popping round 
the platoon harbour [temporary base] and find the guy on sentry and you’ll sit there 
and chat with him and keep your eye on the trees [i.e. seeking to avoid eye contact 
to make the situation more informal].  I always used to hold platoon interviews, 
and there were plenty of characters who were quite prepared to come out and tell 
me what was going on but there were some who I would only know I could talk to 
and hope to get anything out of on an exercise when they were on their own and it 
wasn’t an interview-type situation.  It was a sit down and shoot the breeze while 
sharing a cup of tea or something [situation].”49 
 
 Although this relationship is manifestly cooler than those we have considered so far, it 
is a means for the construction of important personal bridges within the unit.  For example,  
 
- It provides the necessary vehicle for the Commanding Officer to remain in 
personal touch with those of his officers with whom he has not established a bond 
of association. 
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- It similarly provides the RSM with the means to form a reserved but informal 
relationship with the members of his sergeants mess which allow them to approach 
him without formal appointment.  
 
- Where, as is usual, the relationship between a sub unit commander and his 
officers is likely to fall short of friendship, and where no association exists 
between them, then they will almost always have a relationship of informal 
access50. 
- Any sergeant can expect to be able to have informal access to his sub unit 
commander. 
 
- Any private soldier can expect to have informal access to his troop or platoon 
sergeant and his troop or platoon commander, and vice versa, as we saw in the 
captain’s remarks above. 
 
- A young officer can use this relationship informally to approach influential 
people outside his chain of command where friendship does not exist between 
them.  For example, from my personal experience, when I was a comparatively 
newly-arrived second lieutenant and the food member of an officers’ mess51 it 
provided the mechanism to allow me unofficially to approach the unit 
quartermaster.  I needed to approach him because my food account was in the red 
and he was in the best position to help me to get it out of debt without making its 
parlous state fully official.  However, my approach to him was made difficult 
because he was a formidable man who had no liking for young officers and I knew 
that he would be unsympathetic.  In that case the relationship of informal access 
existed because we both had common membership of the officers’ mess, but the 
quartermaster’s hostile attitude excluded friendship or association.52 
 
 As with the other informal relationships, there are structural boundaries to this 
element in the informal structure: 
 
- Like association, informal access only exists between people who come into 
regular contact. 
 
- There are rank limits beyond which this relationship will not usually go.  For 
example, few private soldiers are likely to have informal access to their sub unit 
commander53, and, it would be comparatively rare for a subaltern to gain informal 
access to his Commanding Officer. 
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- In most cases the relationship will follow the lines of the formal command 
structure, in that it would not be normal for a private soldier in one platoon to have 
informal access to the commander of any other platoon.  However, exceptions can 
arise, but only where there is obvious common ground between the parties, a 
shared function or common professional interests for instance. 
 
- The subject matter for conversation in informal access relationships is also 
constrained.  While the junior party may seek to air his own personal affairs, the 
senior one will not.  For instance, a soldier may use his relationship of informal 
access to tell his troop sergeant about some unfortunate family fact as background 
to a possible bid for compassionate leave in the future: the sergeant would be 
unlikely to reciprocate with details about his own marriage.  Similarly, there would 
be no question of criticism passing from the junior to the senior in this relationship. 
 
Figure 3. 6 places informal access in the model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 6.  Informal Access
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Nodding Acquaintance 
 
The most distant informal relationship that completes the typology of relationships is nodding 
acquaintance.  Here, the parties to the relationship know each other by sight, but not 
necessarily by name.  They know something about each other, and both acknowledge that 
they belong to the same organisation (at whatever level is appropriate) but no other informal 
relationship exists between them.  As one soldier said in an interview, “You generally nod at 
him because you’re on the same side.”54 
 An important aspect of nodding acquaintance is that there is always the potent ial for a 
closer relationship to develop between the parties when the right conditions arise.  Whilst 
there is no inevitability that the relationship will grow closer, it can be considered to be a 
closer relationship in waiting.  This is illustrated by the following two examples: 
 
One soldier told during an interview how while he was away on a Northern Ireland 
tour his wife and another man’s wife got to know each other very well, “got 
themselves both through the tour together” and became very close; he hardly knew 
the husband of the wife’s new friend, but “when we came back ... I started to know 
him more, and now I’ll say that ... he’s probably one of my two or three really 
close friends.”55 
 
On the other hand, in another interview a regimental quartermaster of nearly 30 
years service regretted the fact that now many of the junior members of his unit 
were known only to him by sight.  He might greet them in passing and have a brief 
word with them, but he did not know them at all.56   
 
In the first example, the nodding acquaintance led to a close friendship, but in the second the 
relationships remained at the nodding acquaintance level. 
 
Nodding acquaintance is now added to complete the model in Figure 3. 7. 
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Figure 3. 7.  Nodding Acquaintance
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Comments 
 
Given the great variety in human relationships, it may seem counter- intuitive to model 
soldiers’ relationships with only five categories.  However, it is to be remembered that each 
of the boxes in the diagram has a horizontal dimension which corresponds to various degrees 
of closeness on the horizontal axis of the diagram.  On the principle that a line consists of a 
very large number of points, there are a very large number of places along each line where 
the closeness of a particular relationship might fall.  This gives a range of closeness or 
distance in any of the relationships which allows for a high degree of variety.  Relationships 
of association, say, can vary from the more distant - barely beyond informal access - to a 
degree of closeness that considerably overlaps the closeness of friendship.  However, it never 
reaches the depth of the more intense friendships and never approaches close friendship.  
Similarly, a soldier will like some of his friends more than others, and will find informal 
access easier with some people than others.   
 Some of those who have seen and commented on this diagram have been distracted by 
the gaps between the boxes.  Most of these gaps have no significance apart from separating 
the boxes on the page to make the model readable.  The one gap that has genuine significance 
is that between nodding acquaintance and friendship which signifies that a relationship 
between peers will be either one or the other: there is no hinterland in the way that informal 
access comes naturally between nodding acquaintance and association.  Once peers have got 
to know each other then there is an expectation that they will form friendship, albeit for some 
parties the relationship will not grow particularly warm. 
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 Another important consideration here is agency, as discussed in Chapter One.57  It is 
perfectly possible for two individual agents in an informal relationship to experience, and 
thus to view, the relationship in different ways.  A clear example is that it is easy for a person 
of superior rank to assume, and therefore to have, informal access to his subordinates whilst 
the subordinates would not necessarily have the same relationship with him: a company 
commander might go to see any of his private soldiers at whim, for example, during the 
working day but the company sergeant major would probably arrange things so that the 
privates may not call upon him without making an appointment.  In other cases, an individual 
might perceive a relationship with a peer to be a close form of friendship whereas the other 
party may consider the relationship to be less close.   
 The lack of an allowance for individual agency should be recognised as a limit to the 
model, and this limitation should be borne in mind when using it to examine individual cases 
in detail.  However, this is a comparatively minor deficiency in considering either a number 
of cases or in examining general trends and making general predictions. 
 Rather than dwelling on any real or assumed lack of precision in this diagram, it is 
better to concentrate on its power as an analytical tool in considering informal relationships 
between soldiers, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four. 
  
Limits to enmity 
 
Although informal relationships within a unit of the combat arms are generally positive and 
mutually  bonding, not all are so: mutual dislikes also occur.  Apart from providing a 
structured suite of relationships, therefore, the informal structure contains elements that 
address personal enmity.  
 All those interviewed on the subject agreed that there were certain people whom one 
might dislike, but with whom open animosity was not sustainable.  In particular, there was a 
limit to the degree to which those in close proximity (either physical or structural) could 
openly fall out.  For example, for private soldiers who lived in barracks, there were social 
pressures which meant that those in the same room could not fall out for long, and neither 
could those in adjacent rooms (who are usually within the same troop or platoon).  While 
arguments and possibly the odd blow might be exchanged, virtually no quarrel lasted for very 
long, the control mechanism being usually provided by the other soldiers in the same context  
(same room or same troop/platoon).  An infantry corporal summed up the situation concisely: 
 
“You can’t have a grudge between individuals in a barrack room.  You go round 
the back and have it out, or you sort it out under the Junior NCOs.”58 
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He added later in the same interview that fights, if they occur, must be in private and in the 
open air (outside the building).  However, he had not seen this sort of thing for a long while. 
   
 As another example, in a different interview an infantry soldier told me, 
 
“ ... it’s never ... the people you’re living with.  It’s very rare that you have a fight 
with anybody that you’re actually staying in a room with. ... Very rare.  Most of the 
time it would be somebody outwith your platoon.”59 
 
 A similar message came from an interview with a Royal Armoured Corps warrant 
officer when I asked him about fighting in the accommodation block.  He told me that 
soldiers naturally keep apart if they dislike each other and there are usually people prepared 
to break up fights within the accommodation, “Nine times out of ten there is a more sensible 
person there, for example, a senior soldier.”60 
 In a tiny minority of cases the mutual dislike of the parties exceeds the capacity of 
these control mechanisms.  In such cases, it is usual for the soldiers’ superiors to arrange a 
posting for one of them, either out of the sub unit or out of the unit altogether, which 
effectively suspends the quarrel. 
 Within the sergeants’ mess, mutual hostility is usually constrained by the disapproval 
of the RSM and the consequent actions of the disputants’ peers to stop them exchanging 
blows. 
 
A RSM: “I’ve got to say I have never... I’ve... never seen a fight in the mess in my 
time.  There may have been words said but it’s a case even then of saying ‘Right!  
Stop!  [as if addressing the WO2s in turn] Company Sergeant Major!  Company 
Sergeant Major!  You leave.’ or whatever it may be.” 61 
 
 Similarly, among the officers there is a degree of mutual animosity that is considered 
unacceptable and any potentially explosive situation will normally be constrained from 
getting out of hand by the peers of those involved. 
 Although informal relationships are one of the key expressions of the informal 
structure, there are many other such expressions.  The rest of this section explores selected 
examples that are prominent features in the informal life of a unit. 
 
Other selected facets of the informal structure 
 
We now turn to the six other areas which I have selected as important manifestations of the 
informal structure. 
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The formation of informal groups 
 
Informal groups among private soldiers and junior NCOs will primarily be formed on the 
basis of friendship and thus do not contain a significant spread of ranks.  Thus a single private 
soldier will choose to eat his meals or go out drinking (perhaps the most informal of group 
activities) with people with whom he is friends, or with whom he wants to build a friendship, 
and this means that for the most part they will probably come from his troop or platoon or at 
least his sub unit.   
 Groups in the informal surroundings of the officers’ or sergeants’ mess will similarly 
tend to fall within the structural bounds of friendship: the subalterns of a unit may well form 
a group, and so may the captains (perhaps with a senior subaltern or two included), but it will 
be rare for an informal group to include subalterns, captains, and majors because that exceeds 
the structural limits of the relationship of friendship. 
 
Structural position and the process of time 
 
Although informal relationships (especially friendship) seem at first sight to be determined in 
large measure by individual taste and mutual compatibility, they change as the individual’s 
position in a unit changes with time.  The relationships in the informal structure therefore 
have a dynamic and flexible quality.   
 Those who join a unit together from training usually tend to form identifiable groups 
at first (regardless of their dispersion over different sub units), but these groups fall apart as 
the individuals settle into their new sub units.  This extract from my fieldnotes shows how I 
recorded a private soldier’s view of his arrival at his artillery unit from recruit training. 
 
‘His period of induction was made easier for him because he had eight friends 
from training and they stuck together for the first week and a half, after which they 
started to make friends with other people, “losing touch” a little bit with those 
people from training who were in different troops, and much more so with the one 
who went to a different battery. 
 
Comment :  A good description of the process, reflected in other interviews.  
Friends formed in the priority: troop, then battery, with very few father afield.  
Initial friendships withered as structurally closer friendships took their place. 
 
Analysis: The newly-arrived soldiers imported their existing bonds of friendship 
from training into the battalion, but more structurally appropriate friendships arose 
as they settle in.’62 
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 Promotion also causes changes in informal relationships.  Although at the most junior 
end of the scale it does not make much difference to the individual’s relationships with those 
who were his peers, increasing responsibility starts to limit his freedom of action.  As one 
lance corporal put it, 
  
‘You can’t try and skive, you can’t take the mickey out of other NCOs in front of the 
lads, and you must knuckle down to work, but promotion made no difference to 
friendship.’63 
 
However, as people become divided by rank and some get promoted faster than others, so 
their relationships usually have to change, 
 
‘ ... he found the promotion to corporal was the most difficult.  There were senior 
[private soldiers] who dropped him as a friend.  He hated this, and it made him 
very pleased to leave [the unit on posting] when the time came.’64 
 
Summary of information from a sergeant: ‘When he and the current RSM joined 
together [as private soldiers] they were on first name terms, naturally.  When the 
RSM came back from the Depot as a lance sergeant, their paths did not cross 
sufficiently for their mutual terms of address to be identifiable.  Now he is the 
RSM, he calls him “Sir”.  The only exception is on the sports field, “He’s actually 
played football for the battalion as well.  During training and during the match I’ve 
called him ‘Bill’.”  But if he met him in the street, it would be “Sir” - so football is 
the only context in which he would use his first name.’65 
 
We saw an extreme example on page 96 of formal disapproval in the case of the newly 
promoted sergeant who lost his rank because he went into the Corporal’s Mess, but the need 
to put one’s former friends at a distance on promotion to sergeant is a well recognized 
element in unit life. 
 Another illustration of the dynamic nature of the informal structure is provided by the 
post of Adjutant (the Commanding Officer’s personal staff officer).  Typically, a 
Commanding Officer will choose as Adjutant one of the captains already in his unit, and one 
that he already knows.  The captain concerned will usually hold the post for somewhere 
between a year and 18 months, during which his informal relationships undergo a detectable 
change.  Although he will still retain his close friends, a degree of distance is likely to grow 
into his relationships of friendship with his fellow captains and the senior subalterns, while an 
increasingly warm relationship of association will grow between him and his Commanding 
Officer.  It is unlikely that he will form any friendship with the younger subalterns: indeed, in 
some units a degree of structural distance between him and the subalterns will be formalised 
in a rule that they all have to address him as “Sir” (no other captain would be addressed as 
such by any officer).  However, if he is not posted or promoted at the end of his period as 
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Adjutant then he will become just another of the unit’s captains, and be able to revive his old 
informal relationships and form appropriate new ones. 
 
Informal hierarchies: the pecking order 
 
We have already noted that informal groups are primarily formed between individuals who 
fall into the category of potential friends and therefore there is an insignificant spread of 
ranks between them.  Although the informal structure is by its very nature not formally 
stratified, there can nevertheless be distinctive levels of seniority within these informal 
groups of peers, or near peers.   These levels of seniority are best expressed as a hierarchy of 
influence and prestige (and often privilege), within informal groups without direct reference 
to formal authority.  To distinguish them from the rank system of the formal command 
structure, I have chosen to use the term pecking order. 
 The majority of the private soldiers interviewed described versions of the pecking 
order in the informal surroundings of their troop or platoon living- in accommodation.  An 
example of this mechanism operating is the early morning cleaning task or ‘block job’.  In 
many units where this is still done 66 the most junior soldiers have to do the really unpleasant 
tasks (cleaning the lavatories seemed to be most commonly the province of the lowest 
member) while the more senior ones graduate to what might amount to no more than a little 
light dusting.  
 
  ‘An infantry private, in response to my question, “What about block jobs?”, 
“Normally it goes up in seniority.  The more senior guys get the easier ones. ... 
When you get to the top and you become the senior, there’s no more room jobs.  
You come off and then you monitor the room jobs.  You’ll be in charge of five or 
six room jobs.”’67 
 
   “Somebody that’s been in a long while will maybe brush the corridor and all the 
new guys who come in always get landed with the toilets.”68   
 
‘If an officer gave a senior soldier a dirty job to do, that soldier ‘would probably 
end up palming it off to the newer guys”.’69 
 
 As these three extracts from my fieldnotes indicate, a highly significant factor in 
ranking in the pecking order amongst private soldiers is length of service.  Thus only those 
who are newly arrived from training find themselves right at the bottom, and the ‘senior 
soldiers’ of longer standing are likely to be at the top.  The power and prestige of a senior 
soldier amongst his fellows can become almost institutionalised.  Such soldiers are ‘guardians 
of standards’ in the unit 70. 
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 There, are, however natural variations on this pattern.  First of all, an important 
ranking factor in the pecking order can be force of personality, which can occasionally 
overcome the primacy of length of service.  A second, demonstrated by Killworth71,  is the 
ability to perform well at military functions rated as important by an individual’s peers.  Thus 
it can happen that the soldier without a strong personality or one with poor military skills 
never attains the level in the pecking order to which he might otherwise be entitled by length 
of service.  Such men were informally called ‘rejects’ in one unit that I visited.  It was noticed 
by one of the interviewees in that unit that these men tended to be friendly to newcomers, 
who could be presumed to be ignorant of their weak position as ‘rejects’. 
 
‘The people who keep talking to you [whilst you are new] are the ones you should 
stay clear of.  They are either the bad lads who are going to get you into trouble or 
borrow money off you - or they are the rejects, “it’s easy to talk to a Crow [unit 
jargon for a soldier fresh from recruit training], like”. ... A senior soldier took him 
under his wing and pinpointed who to talk to and who not to. ... 
 
I asked about the rejects - did they not become senior soldiers?  How could he tell 
the difference?  He said the no one stays where they’re not wanted, so the rejects 
don’t tend to get to be senior soldiers in rifle companies.’72 
 
 Another private soldier in a Scottish battalion summed up this situation in another 
way:  “... if you get an idiot staying in for nine years you’ll never call him a ‘senior jock’.”73 
 The pecking order is not confined to private soldiers and junior NCOs.  However, in 
sergeants’ and officers’ messes there is more potential for variety  because in both fora there 
is the extra factor of rank. 
 An infantry subaltern, in answer to my question, “It is there a pecking order in the 
Officers’ Mess?” said,  
 
“Yes, very much so.  It’s like, really, the Sixth Form, I suppose.  The prefects - the 
more senior captains.... To start at the bottom you have the newest guys, and then 
people like myself who have been there for a little bit: they’re allowed to speak and 
talk.  And then you’ve got the senior captains, the captains and the senior captains, 
who generally run the show up there.  And then we’ve only got one major living in 
at the moment, who’s called sort of ‘Grandfather of the Mess’, but he’s a mega 
bloke and someone you can talk to.” 
 
Analysis.   A pecking order based on experience and time in the Service.  The 
senior major has a relationship of association with the junior subalterns.74 
 
  Rank can be the primary determining factor: thus, for example, one ex-RSM 
described how throughout his time in his mess (over 15 years) at lunch times and in the 
evenings the sergeant majors always stood in a group at the bar, while the rest sat at tables 
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and approached the bar only when they needed to order a drink.75  In another unit the primacy 
of the sergeant majors in the mess pecking order was recognized by their exclusive 
entitlement to a part of the ante room during coffee break in the morning. 76  In a similar way, 
in most officers messes the best bedrooms are allocated to the more senior single officers by 
rank, and a junior one may well have to move to a less sought-after room if a more senior one 
arrives.  However, length of service can still be an important factor: for instance, in a 
particular Royal Artillery officers’ mess access to scarce resources (a garage, and extra 
furniture for the officer’s room) was allocated with time in the regiment as the only 
determining factor.77 
 Killworth has disputed this concept of the pecking order, having read the description 
in my defence fellowship thesis, which is essentially an earlier and more compressed version 
of what appears here78, 
 
‘I suggest that there are two key difficulties with the construction of the pecking 
order.  Firstly, it separates or reifies an order from what are, on the ground, a 
morass of interwoven social situations. ... Secondly, by restricting the model to 
private soldiers, Kirke follows Hockey in artificially separating common ideas 
about hierarchies and prestige held by both private soldiers and NCOs.’79 
 
Such a clear critique of my concept deserves a reply. 
 
 His second point, that I restricted the model to private soldiers, is simply incorrect, as 
the concept of a pecking order in both sergeants’ and officers’ messes was considered there, 
as it has been here.  However, his first point is worthy of further examination. 
 The observation that the concept ‘reifies an order from what are, on the ground, a 
morass of interwoven social situations’ is a criticism that can be levelled at any social model 
if that model is mistakenly given the status of a scientifically complete description of facts.  
In this case, as in the whole of this thesis, what is presented here is not an attempt to put 
forward an established set of facts, but a model that is useful in the description and analysis 
of observed situations and contexts (Killworth’s ‘morass of interwoven social situations’) and 
which can have a predictive power in examining future contexts.   
 I am, however, indebted to Killworth for highlighting the fact that the ability to 
perform military skills well is an important ingredient of the prestige system, a point missing 
from my defence fellowship thesis which gave particular emphasis to the importance of 
length of service and personality.  This omission has been rectified above. 
 There is also an important methodological point of difference between Killworth’s 
work and mine, which may well have caused him to view parts of my work in a critical light. 
In observing soldiers, especially at junior NCO level and below, discussing and disputing the 
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prestige of individuals80 his attention was drawn to the process in which prestige was 
manipulated.  My analysis from very similar observations was more focused on the existence 
of an informal prestige system between soldiers who are peers (or near peers) and I 
concluded that such a system should be a necessary component in a model of the informal 
structure.  Our observations and conclusions are therefore complementary, rather than 
opposed. 
 Killworth’s further argument that the pecking order is a manifestation of a wider 
system of prestige 81 integrates with a point that will be examined later as a background 
ingredient to the model.  This background ingredient is the idea, present in most soldiers’ 
minds for a very large proportion of their service, that there is a hierarchy of superiority and 
inferiority in all contexts. 
 
Terms of address 
 
When the informal structure is the operating structure, terms of address give an important 
indication of the relationship between individuals, and there are clearly distinguishable 
patterns. 
 Those in a relationship of close friendship or friendship invariably address each other 
by their first name or by a nickname acceptable to both parties.   
 For association and informal access, on the other hand, the usual patterns vary with 
the various ranks and appointments involved.  Both kinds of relationships are by their nature 
asymmetrical in rank and the terms of address reflect this imbalance.  Where one party is a 
commissioned officer and the other is not, the officer will normally be addressed as “Sir” 
(sometimes “Boss” as a deliberately informal alternative to “Sir”) while the junior will 
normally be addressed by his rank or, with certain appointments in the unit, by his 
appointment or a derivative of it.  Thus a conversation reflecting informal access between a 
company commander and one of his platoon sergeants will include “Sergeant (coupled with 
the sergeant’s surname)”, or the slightly less formal “Sar’nt”, and “Sir”.  Similarly, the modes 
of address between the unit Chief Clerk and the Adjutant (who are typically in a relationship 
of association) are likely to be “Sir” and “Chief”. 
 Where both parties are commissioned officers, there is further variety, but still within 
a discernible pattern.  Officers of the same rank will be on first name terms, and all subalterns 
and captains will be on first name terms.  It will be normal for junior officers to address their 
sub unit commander either by his first name or as “Sir” (the choice depends on the custom of 
the unit and sometimes the personal tastes of the Commanding Officer at the time).  The 
Commanding Officer is normally addressed as “Colonel” by all but the most junior of his 
officers, who call him “Sir” (there are certain exceptions: for example, all the officers in Foot 
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Guards battalions usually call their Commanding Officer “Sir”).  However, in all cases, the 
junior of the two parties is addressed by his first name, or (less usually) by a nickname. 
 Where neither party is a commissioned officer, context is a significant factor.  When 
senior members of the sub unit or unit (often called ‘the hierarchy’ or ‘the management’) are 
present (for example, the sub unit commander, his sergeant major or the Commanding 
Officer) it is normal for the junior to be called by his first name or by his nickname and for 
the senior one to be called by his rank or by its diminutive (“Bomb”, “Corp”, “Sarge”, 
“Colour”, “Staff”82) where it is below warrant officer, and “Sir” if he is a warrant officer.  
However, when ‘the hierarchy’ are not present, private soldiers will call junior NCOs by first 
name or nickname and sergeants will quite often allow their first names or nicknames to be 
used.  The right of a junior to call a sergeant by his first name results from a process of 
negotiation between the two.  Sergeants in interviews claimed that they set the rules and gave 
permission for their first names to be used.  One sergeant, indeed, made a point of saying that 
he deliberately used this as a leadership tool, bestowing it as a reward for good team work 
and withdrawing it if things did not go well.83  However, a minority of private soldiers said 
that they “tried it on” with their sergeants by using their first name or nickname without 
permission and, when successful, established the right to use it regularly. 
 The terms of address for nodding acquaintance also vary with the relative ranks of 
those involved.  Among commissioned officers the terms of address appropriate for informal 
access will be used, with the proviso that, in units where young officers are expected to 
graduate from the respectful “Sir” to first name terms when addressing majors, a subaltern is 
more likely to use “Sir” to a major before forming a closer relationship with him.  Fellow 
members of the sergeants mess will probably adopt the terms of address appropriate to 
association and informal access.  A sergeant is likely to be addressed by his rank by all 
nodding acquaintances junior to him, whereas it is less likely that a junior NCO will insist on 
his rank being used, even by nodding acquaintances unless the context calls for it.  Private 
soldiers will be on first name terms with nodding acquaintances who are private soldiers, but 
may not allow the use of their nickname. 
 There remains one further ‘term of address’, which regularly emerged during 
interviews, where one or both parties simply speaks to the other without using a term of 
address at all.  The majority of occasions where this circumstance occurred seemed to be 
connected with ambiguous states where the operating structure was either not certain or was 
in the process of changing.  For example, it might occur where a sergeant and a private 
soldier have been speaking on first name terms and a member of ‘the hierarchy’ intrudes onto 
the scene, or when a warrant officer meets a private soldier unexpectedly outside the military 
context. 
 
‘Underlife’ 
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In Asylums, his examination of life in public institutions, Goffman devotes a long essay to 
what he calls the ‘underlife’84, or the ways in which the members of the institution adjust their 
behaviour to enhance their ability to thrive or, in oppressive contexts, survive as comfortably 
as possible.  He investigated the operation of informal structures in formally structured 
organisations (for example armed forces, prisons, mental hospitals, boarding schools and 
religious institutions, mostly in the Anglo Saxon tradition of the USA and Great Britain), and 
so his work provides many insights that are relevant to this thesis. 
 Describing the way that an individual adjusts to life in what he calls ‘total 
institut ions’85, he makes a significant distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
adjustments86.  Primary adjustments consist in the cooperation of the individual in what the 
institution requires, whereas secondary adjustments belong to the informal world: they 
‘represent ways in which the individual stands apart from the role and the self that were taken 
for granted for him by the institution’ 87.  This concept of ‘adjustments’ maps well into the 
model of social structures in that  primary adjustments would represent adaptations to the 
formal command structure, whereas secondary adjustments would belong to the informal 
structure.  Goffman further makes a distinction between ‘disruptive’ secondary adjustments, 
which are aimed at rupturing the smooth running of the organisation, and ‘contained’ 
secondary adjustments, which fit into existing institutional structures without introducing 
pressures for radical change 88. 
 The vast majority of secondary adjustments in the Army are ‘contained’ in that they 
do not introduce pressures for radical change.  However, to develop Goffman’s model, 
‘contained secondary adjustments’ can be further subdivided, at least in the British Army.  
 There is an observable division of secondary adjustments into what are seen by those 
practising them as the sort which add to the smooth running of life in the unit and attract little 
or no formal disapproval, and those that are expressly forbidden and will be punished if 
discovered.  I have called the former legitimate secondary adjustments, and the latter 
illegitimate secondary adjustments. 
 The range and extent of secondary adjustments in the field of study are so great that it 
is impossible in the space available to give a comprehensive account of them.  However, it 
should be understood that legitimate secondary adjustments are an all-pervasive aspect of life 
in a combat arms unit, and that opportunities for illegitimate secondary adjustments are 
permanently in the offing for most soldiers.  The limited number of examples given here will 
have to suffice to give an insight into the whole. 
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 The following are examples of legitimate secondary adjustments: 
 
- ‘Contacts’.  There are certain formally approved ways of getting things done in a 
military unit, but it is often more effective for the individual if he exploits an 
existing informal relationship to achieve his end.  As a single example from a vast 
field, one private soldier said in an interview that if he felt he needed to go on 
leave at a time when it was inconvenient for his company’s programme of 
commitments he would approach his company sergeant major direct.  According to 
the formal rules, he first should make his bid to his platoon sergeant, who would 
consider the matter and pass it upwards to his sergeant major.  It transpired that the 
soldier and the sergeant major were both in the battalion football team and that a 
relationship of association existed between them (which would guarantee a 
sympathetic hearing), whereas he only had a relationship of informal access with 
his platoon sergeant.89 
 
- ‘Favours’.  It is accepted that anyone doing a favour for another person in the line 
of business can expect the favour to be reciprocated in due course.  This is summed 
up in the often-used phrase “I owe you one for that!”.  Such exchange of favours is 
typical, for example, of agreements between sub unit sergeant majors to help each 
other with covering inconvenient manpower commitments such as camp guards or 
the provision of transport at a difficult time. 
 
- ‘Buckshees’90.  Virtually every NCO who runs a military store has equipment surplus to his 
ledger, known as ‘buckshees’.  This is despite the fact that such surpluses are discouraged 
and periodic inspections are carried out by those in authority to identify and eliminate them.  
Such equipment is known as ‘buckshee’.  When he finds that he has a shortage against his 
ledger the NCO will use his informal relationships (his ‘contacts’) to set up an exchange with 
another NCO who has a surplus of the item he needs, giving an appropriate ‘buckshee’ item 
in exchange.  Should the situation arise where the man with the ‘buckshee’ does not have a 
shortage, he may still give up the item to someone who needs it, but then the transaction 
becomes a ‘favour’. 
 
 Examples of illegitimate secondary adjustments include several activities identified 
by Hockey as what he calls the ‘informal’ or ‘unofficial’ aspects of a certain infantry 
battalion91.  He identifies a number of practices which he calls ‘deviant’, which, in the terms 
of my model, amount to secondary adjustments that attract active disapproval within the 
formal command structure and are thus ‘illegitimate’.  Examples are ‘skiving’ (avoiding 
work), ‘scrounging’  (appropriating unmarked personal military equipment), and ‘shortcuts’ 
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(such as using destructive acidic abrasives to clean weapons more easily), which may make 
life easier for the individual but are against the rules.  Hockey also notes that private soldiers 
have the power to undermine the career of their superiors by under-performing their military 
tasks92, a process which might be called ‘passive revenge’.   
 Other important types of illegitimate secondary adjustment, identified in the course of 
the research for this thesis are: 
 
- Active revenge93.  Sometimes a group of soldiers will become so infuriated with a 
particular superior that they will actively take measures against him.  These 
measures usually take the form of making his life difficult, embarrassing or 
uncomfortable without risking formal punishment.  For example, two soldiers who 
were fed up with their sergeant’s idleness on exercise ate all his rations one night: 
“He was asleep at the time and so me and the other lad, the runner, we ate that 
scoff just out of sheer spite: we felt ‘Sod it!’.  We were nearly sick.”94  Again, one 
highly unpopular officer discovered while on exercise in Canada that he had lost 
his pistol (a very serious military offence).  It transpired that some members of his 
vehicle crew had buried it somewhere on the prairie, but as they subsequently 
(anonymously) exhumed it no disciplinary action was taken. 95  It is noteworthy that 
very little lasting damage is done during these episodes of active revenge, in spite 
of the opportunities that present themselves.  As one soldier remarked during an 
interview, the purpose of such acts is to convey the warning “We don’t like you” 
rather than to carry out vindictive action for its own sake96.  It is hard to gauge the 
frequency with which this sort of secondary adjustment takes place.  I concluded 
that it was not commonplace, but I noted that in every unit where the subject was 
raised at least one interviewee had an eye-witness story to tell on the subject. 
 
- Fun.  Entertainment that is formally disapproved of is sometimes arranged by a 
group of soldiers.  This can range from the highly illegal, such as the abuse of 
drugs, to the not strictly illegal, such as the ‘roof race’ custom in one regiment, 
which involved climbing out of an upstairs window and going round the roofs of 
the barracks.97 
 
- Informal discipline.  Bullying in the Army has become a high profile topic in 
recent years 98.   In many cases the term is accurately used in that it refers to the 
systematic persecution of vulnerable soldiers for the personal pleasure of the bully.  
However, the informal imposition of discipline, which used to be a normally 
accepted part of the life of an Army unit99, has become absorbed into the same 
concept and is therefore punished as ‘bullying’ whenever it is confronted by those 
 120 
in authority.  A certain amount still goes on, though now it has become part of the 
underlife because it is formally disapproved of and punished.  ‘Informal discipline’ 
includes such action as the correction of a persistently smelly soldier by his peers 
in the same barrack room, “... you’d start [by] stealing his shoes and putting them 
in the bins.”100, the appropriation by his peers of the military equipment of a soldier 
who goes absent without leave 101 and other measures which fall into the class of 
what Hockey calls ‘unofficial sanctions’ in his chapter on occupational values and 
beliefs102.  Informal discipline also includes the punching of a soldier by an NCO 
superior, 
 
“There is of course the informal discipline system which used to be 
expressed with punches and kicks from the sergeant major down through 
the sergeant, which still undoubtedly goes on, but not much of it because of 
the severe repercussions.”103 
 
“... if you’d done something wrong you’d get belted in the back of the head, 
you know.  And then again if you’d done anything wrong again ... you’d 
get a couple of good swift kicks or a couple of good swift digs you know.  
And then that would have been it over and done with. ...  You know, it’s a 
quick way to teach you a lesson.  And it works.”104 
 
It was not possible in the course of this study to quantify the scale of ‘informal 
discipline’.  Those who were asked about it all said that it still went on but very 
few current examples were given.  This seems to reflect the severe attitude towards 
it taken at present by the chain of command, which probably discouraged my 
informants from elaborating on the subject. 
 
Two important consequences flow from the fact that the underlife is by its very nature 
not formally constituted.  First, although to a very great extent there is remarkable general 
agreement as to what is acceptable and what is not, it is continually subject to redefinition, 
interpretation and manipulation by individual agents, so disagreements can arise in particular 
contexts.  Where there is a disagreement, it is more than likely that the interpretation of the 
senior person present will become the dominant one.  The following incident illustrates this 
point nicely: 
 
‘... my sergeant major last summer ‘found’ a pickaxe (for use in an emergency 
destruction kit).  Our corporal (RAF) complained at length that he had surely just 
nicked [stolen] it, and this wasn’t on ... the [sergeant major] however announced 
that he had ‘just found it’, that we needed it (true) and therefore this was perfectly 
legitimate.  Being the WO2, he had his way...’105 
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 The second important consequence is that the identification of acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour by the authorities can undergo changes that appear capricious to 
individual agents.  Such changes can lead individual agents to make what turn out to be 
serious mistakes whilst acting in good faith.  Perhaps the most stark examples are in the fields 
of ‘bullying’ and ‘informal discipline’ which we have just discussed.  Over the past 30 years 
there has been a significant attitudinal change by the Army’s chain of command: at the start 
of this period there was an assumption that ‘bullying’ was in fact ‘informal discipline’ and 
was tolerated widely and was therefore accepted as legitimate.  However, now any 
endorsement of ‘informal discipline’ has become an illegitimate secondary adjustment.  
Whilst individual agents can easily draw a distinction between bullying and discipline for 
themselves, their view is not necessarily shared by those with whom they are living, or their 
superiors - all of whom are of course different agents.  What one party sees as ‘informal 
discipline’, and therefore a legitimate secondary adjustment, the party in authority sees as 
‘bullying’, and therefore an illegitimate secondary adjustment.  Indeed, there have been cases 
where the alleged bully clearly thought that he was meting out discipline in good faith and 
that he would be supported (if unofficially) by his superiors whereas in fact his superiors 
prosecuted him formally.106 
  
Special informal circumstances 
 
Circumstances can arise when the conventions which constrain activity in the informal 
structure are either deliberately relaxed by those in a senior position or stretched and tested 
by those below.  The following paragraphs give some common illustrations to provide a 
flavour for the situation, but they cannot provide a definitive list because the circumstances 
are so varied. 
 First, there are sporting occasions and adventurous training.  On the sports field it is 
frequently found that everyone, regardless of rank, is called by their first name or their 
nickname for the duration of the game and the ensuing post-match celebrations 107.  On 
adventurous training exercises soldiers and their officers find themselves in a semi-civilian 
environment and carry out challenging but not strictly military activity, such as canoeing or 
rock climbing.  Much depends on the personality of the officers and the NCOs who are there 
at the time, but it is not uncommon for everyone to be on first name terms for the duration of 
the exercise.  However, if nicknames are used they are generally restricted as terms of 
address from a senior to a more junior in rank. 
 Second, there are informal social events involving a mixture of ranks.  Such events 
provide a ready arena where the unwritten rules of the informal structure are flexed and 
tested by junior individuals.  The convivial atmosphere and the flow of alcohol can put most 
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of those taking part into a relationship at least as close as informal access for the duration of 
the event, and (depending on the event) a temporary state resembling association and even 
friendship can be found where it would not exist in other situations.  However, even in these 
circumstances there are still limits which ought to be observed: as one private soldier put it, 
although when he was “down town” with his platoon sergeant he was allowed to call him by 
his first name, “you don’t abuse rank”108. 
 It is so common that it is almost a military institution that when private soldiers get 
drunk in an informal gathering which includes their platoon or troop commander they will 
attempt to call him by his first name and tell him what they think of him (mercifully the 
alcohol usually gives the rosiest of tinges to their views of the moment).  This is not thought 
of as ‘abuse of rank’ so long as nothing is said that is deemed by those present to be too 
insulting, and as long as no violence is offered to the young officer. 
 On such occasions it is usually not so much that the structure itself is challenged or 
put under pressure, but rather that individuals acknowledge its existence but attempt to create 
or simulate a closer relationship within the existing structure than is normally permitted.  In 
this way, for example, the private soldiers who are addressing their platoon or troop 
commander by first name are using the language of friendship to address someone with 
whom their normal relationship would probably be informal access. 
 A third example of circumstances where the conventions of the informal structure are 
commonly tested occurs when a junior officer is detached with a small number of soldiers for 
a period of days or weeks.  A typical example was given during an interview with a platoon 
commander who described how when he was with some of his men on an isolated 
detachment in Belize a few of them tried to use his first name: “I felt it was wrong because 
they know [speaker’s emphasis] it’s wrong.  They were just playing the game”109.   
 Exercises and operations provide another context where the rules of the informal 
structure may be relaxed, particularly when pressure is low and there is time to talk.  The 
absence of the more normal and structured life of the barracks provides opportunities for 
people to talk informally in a way that would not be appropriate in other circumstances.  As 
one platoon commander put it, in the middle of the night when nothing is happening and he is 
in the company of just one of his men then “a couple of home truths might slip out”. 110  
 Again, another officer said that after 16 hours waiting with some of his men for 
something to happen one can talk about anything and everything111.  Such occasions can be 
interpreted as providing the medium for relationships of association to arise where informal 
access or even nodding acquaintance might only have been appropriate before.  
 Finally, there are the rare circumstances under which the limits on open enmity are 
removed and fighting can occur.  Violence among junior NCOs and private soldiers would 
conventionally be exercised in an out of the way place where the normal rules of conduct can 
be suspended: in some corner of the barracks where the influence of the formal command  
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structure (discipline) can be ignored for a time, or outside the barracks altogether.  On the 
other hand, senior NCOs and warrant officers expressed the view that violence between 
members of the sergeants’ mess, when it does occur, should only take place on the premises 
of the mess itself112.  This is illustrated by a case in which two warrant officers had a serious 
fight in an empty room in the all-ranks NAAFI building: it was remarked among their 
colleagues that the disciplinary action that followed could probably have been avoided if only 
they had fought in the sergeants’ mess rather than in an all- ranks environment (albeit in a 
private room).113  Violence between officers is very rare, but if it takes place it will usually 
happen during the rumbustious aftermath of a mess dinner, in the officers’ mess or its 
grounds. 
 When these special informal circumstances occur, it is normal for them to be 
contained in specific contexts of a limited duration. The one common element to all the 
examples quoted above is that the challenge to, or suspension of, the conventions of the 
informal structure only lasts for a finite time identifiable to all concerned and in a defined 
context.  Operational tasks, exercises, parties and sporting events all have a finite term and 
nobody expects any changes specific to those occasions to last beyond that time.  Thus even 
in extreme cases the conventions of the informal structure are not threatened or rendered 
unstable in the long term, even if they are temporarily suspended. 
 
 
Effect on the individual 
 
So far, the informal structure has been viewed from the outside, as an observer might see it.  
There is of course a complementary view, that of the individual soldier, and we turn to the 
individual in the third main part of this section.  To give a representative (but scarcely 
comprehensive) snapshot of a unit, we will consider private soldiers, NCOs, and officers.  
However, it must be borne in mind that all NCOs and some officers begin their career as 
private soldiers so these categories are not exclusive through time: they represent snapshots 
in what might be an individual’s long trajectory through several ranks. 
 Whereas the formal command structure provides the individual with an unambiguous 
definition of his position in the organisation and certain codified rules for his behaviour and 
for the behaviour of others towards him, the informal structure is very different.  Although 
informal rules of conduct exist, and although there are customs and practices which 
circumscribe his choice of off-duty activity, they are not codified and he has to discover them 
for himself through the behaviour of his fellows.  The moment, therefore, when the individual 
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arrives in a new unit is crucial, and so are the succeeding weeks as he absorbs the unwritten 
rules. 
  
The newly arrived private soldier 
 
In general terms, there are two kinds of newly arrived private soldier, the man straight from 
training and the man posted in from another unit.  The former can be assumed to know little 
or nothing, and the latter to have a good idea of what the informal structure consists of.   
 For single unit organisations such as the cavalry and the single battalion regiments of 
infantry, the most common new arrival will be the soldier from training ‘fresh from the 
factory’, as it is sometimes put.  All interviewees agreed that under non-operational 
conditions there was some form of induction process for such people, often taking up to 
several weeks.  For example, in many cases nobody spoke to the individual for a period of 
time (unless he was lucky enough to have friends from training in the same situation), and he 
was unable to find drinking companions for a night out.  In one (extreme) case, a young 
soldier was given no bed space for the first week which meant that he had to sleep on two 
chairs pushed together and he had no rights over any part of the accommodation114.  In other 
more exotic cases individuals have been put through initiation ceremonies, usually involving 
the consumption of unusually large amounts of alcohol, ceremonies which are now officially 
banned because of fatal accidents. 
 The overriding requirement is that the new arrival should somehow have to earn his 
way into the informal structure: he must not be ‘mouthy’ to the more senior soldiers, and he 
must show that he can do his job professionally (he must not show himself to be stupid or 
incompetent: a ‘knob’ or a ‘waster’ or a ‘doughnut’, the language of different regiments 
varies but the meaning remains the same). 
 The beginning of the end to this period of informal induction is usually signalled by a 
gradual increase in the time that the established members will spend talking to the newcomer 
and the end often comes with an invitation to join in some informal activity.  This might be, 
for example, a trip to a pub or even something as simple as sharing a table at a meal. 
 There is, however, an important difference under operational conditions.  In this case 
a new soldier is normally accepted into the operational team with the minimum of delay, for 
the simple reason that the other members of the team have to rely on him for their own safety 
in dangerous circumstances.  They will still watch the new arrival and assess his professional 
capabilities, but they will make his integration as easy as possible. 
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 In the units of the Royal Engineers, Army Air Corps and Royal Signals the soldiers 
are subject to trickle posting, which means that they spend no more than three years or so in 
any one unit.  In the Royal Artillery the majority of the soldiers spend most of their career 
belonging to one unit, but some are posted as individuals to other units.  In all of these, 
therefore, while a proportion of the private soldiers arriving will be from the ‘factory’ others 
will have already been through the process of joining a unit elsewhere.  For these more 
experienced soldiers the informal process of induction is different.  Although they will be 
checked out by their peers (any reputation they may have from previous units will be passed 
round by word of mouth, and their professional and social styles will be examined critically) 
there will be no need for them to prove themselves to the same extent as a soldier fresh from 
training.   
 
Promotion of NCOs 
 
Promotion to NCO rank is only given on the recommendation of the officers of the unit, a 
process that will always involve the Adjutant and the Commanding Officer.  While there are 
certain formal requirements for promotion (mainly the passing of so-called ‘career courses’) 
the crucial determining factor is the impression that the individual has made on his superiors 
in the chain of command.  Promotion is therefore an uncertain business with nothing 
guaranteed by length of service.  Thus some soldiers receive promotion earlier than others, 
many never attain promotion at all, and it is possible to become stuck at any stage. 
 Because with promotion a soldier changes status in the formal command structure, he 
has to find a new position in the informal structure.  It is a widely held view that the most 
difficult promotion is the first, that from private soldier to lance corporal or lance bombardier.  
For the first time the man has the authority and duties and responsibilities of a junior NCO, 
but his authority will fall over many of his friends with whom he will continue to be living 
and working in close proximity.  He will still be on first name terms with them in all but the 
most formal of situations and, if single, will be living in the same accommodation.  Off duty, 
he will still want to associate with his friends, though there may be a junior NCOs’ mess (or 
corporals club) for him to go to without them and there may be a separate dining area for 
junior NCOs.  Some never make the change successfully (either becoming distant from their 
friends so quickly that they lose their support, or never quite putting the necessary degree of 
structural distance between themselves and their friends), but the majority do so by 
maintaining a balance between friendship and authority in the different contexts provided by 
on- and off-duty activities. 
 While promotion from lance corporal/lance bombardier to corporal/bombardier 
involves further changes around the individual within the informal structure, the next big step 
is from corporal/bombardier to sergeant.  Because this usually involves both a break from 
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friendship with junior NCOs and private soldiers and the beginning of membership of the 
sergeants’ mess, which amounts to an exclusive club for senior NCOs and warrant officers 
only, it therefore involves a drastic change in the individual’s position in the informal 
structure.  Further, the sergeants’ mess has its own informal structure, its own groups and 
pecking order (as we have seen already, on page 114) and the process of entering its 
membership and adjusting to its rules sometimes feels somewhat reminiscent of entering a 
new unit for the first time.  This process is generally made easier for the individual by a 
convention that he is posted out of his current sub unit (and thus away from the majority of 
his friends) so he can make a fresh start with a new position in the formal command structure. 
 Promotion to warrant officer likewise alters the rank range of people with whom 
friendship is possible, and puts more people in the relationships of association and informal 
access than before.  It also moves the individual up through the pecking order in the 
sergeants’ mess and may or may not change his group affiliation within the mess.  For 
example, one interviewee reported that the sergeant majors of his unit formed an exclusive 
group which cut across sub unit boundaries115; another noted that in a different sergeants’ 
mess the groups were based on sub units and promotion within the sub unit did not alter one’s 
membership of the group, though it did alter one’s position in it116.   
 Finally, promotion to RSM removes the possibility of friendship within the unit, 
places the individual at the head of the pecking order in the sergeants’ mess and removes him 
from any informal group.  The only relationships (apart from close friendships from the past) 
which he may legitimately enjoy are association and informal access.  Sergeant Peter D. 
described this situation for Tony Parker, “It’s a funny system where you have an Army that 
prides itself on its spirit of comradeship, but that the top sold ier doesn’t have single 
comrade”117, or, as one ex-RSM put it more briefly but with some feeling, “It is a lonely 
job”118. 
 
The newly arrived officer 
 
The informal life of a newly-arrived subaltern fresh from officer training will be centred on 
the officers’ mess.  The details will differ from unit to unit, but (like the private soldier fresh 
from training) he will certainly have to endure a process of induction.  During this process, he 
may for example have to spend some time (up to a matter of weeks and sometimes months) 
during which he is expected to defer to any other officer who has been in the Army longer 
than he has, and he may be put through a practical joke on arrival.  He may also be expected 
not to start a conversation with the more senior members of the mess.  Thus, until the period 
of induction is over he is prevented from forming any new relationship stronger than a distant 
form of association.  However, if he has contemporaries from officer training in the officers’ 
mess they may well form a group of friends in themselves: such groups will remain strong 
 127 
while they have to be collectively subservient to the more senior members and will probably 
form the basis of enduring groups for the future. 
 The induction process for an officer who has just been promoted through the ranks 
(usually from Warrant Officer Class 1) is different.  He will have at least 20 years military 
service behind him and possibly may have already formed bonds of association with other 
officers in the unit.  There will be no question of him being looked down upon in the same 
way as a newly arrived officer straight from training, but he may feel uncomfortable in the 
presence of the younger officers of his rank with whom he has little in common at first.  It is 
usual under these circumstances for such a man quickly to form friendships with other 
officers in the unit who have been commissioned from the ranks.  Indeed, the commissioned 
warrant officers usually form an identifiable informal group in most officers’ messes. 
 Where an officer is a member of a single-unit regiment, he is unlikely ever to have to 
join another unit, though exceptions can occasionally occur when a single unit Regiment has 
no right person for a key post (Second- in-Command, for example, or Commanding Officer), 
in which case appropriately qualified people are posted in from another unit.  Where his 
regiment or corps consists of more than one unit (as, for example, the Royal Engineers, Royal 
Signals and Royal Artillery) then an individual will have to join several units in the course of 
his career.  Here again, as in the case of the private soldier, once he has been inducted into 
one unit he will not have to go through the process again, though his social and professional 
style will be checked out by his new group of peers. 
 
The officer’s informal structure and promotion 
 
Once established in the unit, the individual officer will fit his informal relationships into the 
pattern provided by the informal structure.  However, in contrast to the private soldiers and 
NCOs, promotion for officers is much more even through time: people of the same age tend 
to be of equal or adjacent rank and to be promoted at roughly the same pace.  We have 
already seen that the exceptions, the commissioned warrant officers (who are older for the 
equivalent rank), are likely to form a group in themselves: this group too will move through 
the system at a relatively uniform pace.  Therefore there is less requirement than for private 
soldiers and NCOs for officers to alter their relationships as they are promoted.  That part of 
the structure which surrounds them moves with them. 
 In the same way as the RSM may not form friendships with his colleagues in the 
sergeants’ mess, the Commanding Officer may not form friendships with his officers.  Here 
too, the only relationships which he can enjoy in the military environment are association and 
informal access.  Circumstances will probably have prepared him for this in that he will be 
the only officer of his age group in the unit (so his contemporaries and friends will all be 
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elsewhere) and his time as a sub unit commander will probably have precluded him forming 
friendships with younger officers. 
 
Effect of marriage 
 
When a soldier marries, he will almost always adopt a new domestic life style, either living in 
married quarters close to his unit barracks, or living in his own house which may be some 
distance away.  If his new home is too far away for him to commute daily to his place of 
work then he will continue to live in the appropriate single man’s accommodation and his 
pattern of informal relationships is unlikely to undergo significant change.  However, if he 
moves out of the single accommodation to set up house within reach of the barracks119, then it 
might be expected that his informal relationships will change, for the following reasons: 
 
- He will no longer have the spare money to go out as often as hitherto.  He will 
therefore be less able to participate in the informal entertainment that is 
characteristic of the exercise of a single man’s friendship. 
 
- He will be drawn to spend more off duty time with his new wife and less time 
with his friends. 
 
- He will no longer be living with his friends in close proximity. 
 
- His wife may wish him to change his circle of friends. 
 
Remarkably, the great majority of married men interviewed on this subject were adamant that 
their patterns of friendship did not change.  They said that they saw less of their friends than 
hitherto, but they saw enough of them at work for the friendships to be undamaged, and they 
always had the opportunity to invite their single friends to their house in the evenings and at 
weekends.  Several made the point that they still saw their friends at social occasions such as 
sub unit parties or mess functions.  A few said that their friends increased in number because 
they met new neighbours whom they did not know as single men120. 
  It seems therefore that the nature of friendship lends itself to the adjustments due to 
marriage because friendship does not need to be constantly exercised to survive.  This is 
another manifestation of the capacity of friendship to endure periods of separation (either 
structural or physical) mentioned on pages 98 and 99. 
 It is also worth noting that soldiers spend considerable amounts of time deployed 
away from their barracks as unit or sub unit groupings, either on exercise or operations, and 
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on such occasions the influence of wife and family is diminished and the effects of the 
informal structure are enhanced. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The informal structure comprises a body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour which 
are not written down and are acquired purely through interaction between individual agents.  
Although, being informal, they appear to permit a large array of free choices for the 
individual, in fact they are to a great extent systematic and constrain and mandate the action 
of individual agents.  One of the key areas within the structure is the system of different types 
and intensities of  informal relationships which connect every member of a unit in many 
different ways to many other members, within the constraints of rank and position in the 
formal command structure.  These relationships are sufficiently systematic for them to be 
modelled into five categories only.  The structure provides a vehicle for soldiers to cooperate 
with and befriend each other and it also puts limits on the degree to which individuals can fall 
out.   
 We have seen how the informal structure is worked out in the daily lives of soldiers 
by considering a sample of topics, namely group formation, the effects of the passage of time, 
informal hierarchies, terms of address, the underlife of a unit, and special informal 
circumstances.  We have also have looked at the trajectory of individual private soldiers, 
NCOs and officers and considered the effects of marriage on their informal relationships. 
 The next section looks at the rules and conventions that are concerned with belonging 
to the various levels of organisation within the unit. 
 
SECTION FIVE - THE LOYALTY/IDENTITY STRUCTURE 
 
"The Army’s full of people who think they belong to the best organisation - and it’s true for 
everybody!  It's true for everybody, it's a sort of miracle." 121 
 
Introduction 
 
The loyalty/identity structure of combat arms units consists in a set of ideas, assumptions and 
expectations centred on a concept which is best called ‘belonging’.  However, this concept of 
belonging is multi- level and highly flexible because each soldier has several possible 
organisational levels to which he belongs. 
 In the description part of this section, the essentials of the structure will be set out.  In 
the second part we will then consider the effect that it has on the individual. 
 
Description 
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The structure is easiest to see in its manifestation as a nesting series of groups, varying from 
size between 3 or 4 soldiers up to the full unit, each one being an element of a larger group.  
Initially, therefore, we will look at this aspect.  These loyalty/identity groups are defined by 
the formal command structure, in that they are identified by the formal divisions of the unit 
into sub units and lower organisational segments.  Indeed, when drawn out on paper, there is 
no distinction between the groupings in the two structures.  Together they resemble what a 
soldier might call a ‘wiring diagram’ or an anthropologist might call a ‘segmental lineage 
system’122, and two examples can be seen in Appendix D.  However, in contrast to the formal 
command structure, where behaviour is hierarchical and marked by disciplined deportment, 
behaviour in loyalty/identity groups is marked by cooperation and mutual support between 
members of the operating groups, and is observably more relaxed. 
 A soldier in one loyalty/identity segment belongs to all the segments above his level as 
well as that group, and is expected to give each of them a degree of loyalty and support and to 
defend their reputation.  For example, in the artillery regiment in Appendix D, a soldier 
located in a particular battery would be expected to be committed to the well-being and 
success (however defined by context) of all of the following groups: 
 
his gun detachment, his troop, his battery, his regiment, the Royal Regiment of 
Artillery, the British Army, the Armed Services, Great Britain, and any alliance of 
which Great Britain is a part and in support of which she has deployed his 
regiment. 
 
His battery commander, on the other hand, does not have membership of troops or gun 
detachments, but is a member of his battery, regiment, and so on. 
 As this study is limited to consideration of social structures at unit level, only the first 
four levels are strictly relevant here.  However, it is as well to recognize that the system goes 
onwards and upwards. 
 Groups based on the loyalty/identity structure are distinctive from informal groups in 
that they contain wider rank and age ranges.  For example, in the artillery battery considered 
above there would be a major, three captains, two subalterns, three warrant officers, one staff 
sergeant, ten sergeants, about 20 junior NCOs and about 60 gunners.  This feature lends 
loyalty/identity groups a special characteristic in that all their members, regardless of age, 
rank and structural position, have the same rights of membership of the group and share the 
same obligations to support it.  Through their shared commitment to it, members of a 
loyalty/identity group thus share a degree of equality when the loyalty/identity structure is the 
operating structure that is entirely absent from the formal command structure.  This is best 
seen during a sporting occasion, where the most junior member of a loyalty/identity segment 
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is likely to show exactly the same enthusiasm in support of the team representing that 
segment as the most senior person in it. 
 The structure, however, is more than just a series of groupings.  It consists in all the 
conventions and shared expectations connected with the approved behaviour of a member of 
any particular loyalty/identity segment, at any particular level.  Some of its more obvious 
manifestations in soldiers’ lives at unit level are set out under the headings which follow. 
  
Combination and recombination 
 
It is self-evident that a soldier cannot focus his allegiance simultaneously on all the potential 
groups formed by the loyalty/identity segments to which he belongs.  It is therefore a feature 
of the loyalty/identity structure that the appropriate focus for loyalty is determined by the 
context of the moment, and specifically by the group against which his group is being 
compared or opposed.  Two illustrations from the sports field will demonstrate this point: 
 
- It is theoretically possible for, say, a Royal Signals troop to produce such a fine 
football team that the same individuals form not only the troop team but also the 
squadron and regimental teams.  A soldier from the troop would be correct in 
cheering for that troop by name in an inter-troop match but not in an inter-
squadron or inter-regimental match.  At such matches he would cheer on his 
squadron and his regiment respectively, in spite of the fact that the members of the 
team are the same on all of the occasions. 
 
- In the more usual case, the members of teams of larger groups are drawn from all 
the available smaller groups of which it is composed.  In the artillery regiment in 
Appendix D, members of the unit football team might come from all four batteries, 
and the battery teams from both troops in the battery.  Now the soldier on the 
touch-line (let him come from C Troop, 23 Battery) finds himself cheering on 
members of his troop in a game against D Troop, members of both C and D Troop 
(the former opponents) in a game where 23 Battery plays against 6 Battery, and 
members of all batteries, including 6 Battery, in a game against another unit. 
 
 These examples illustrate one of the most distinct features of the loyalty/identity 
structure, which is its flexibility.  The size and scale of the segment of the moment is 
determined by the segment that it is being compared with, or is in opposition to, and this 
changes with changes in context.  Thus in the course of a working day an individual can find 
that his active segment in the  loyalty/identity structure changes many times.  For instance, a 
soldier may well find himself parading with his troop/platoon in the morning, attending a sub 
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unit briefing mid-morning, supporting a unit sports team in the afternoon, and being part of 
his section quiz team in a bar games night in the evening. 
 Soldiers can, therefore, find themselves in opposition to a particular individual at one 
moment, when their loyalty/identity groups are in opposition, and in cooperation with the 
same individual a short time later when their loyalty/identity groups are in combination 
against a larger, structurally opposed group. 
 
Special areas of the structure 
  
For each of the combat arms, there is one special level in the loyalty/identity structure for 
which feelings run particularly high.  The appropriate level is either the unit (the battalion for 
the infantry, for instance, and the regiment for the Royal Armoured Corps), or the sub unit 
(for the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and Army Air Corps).  These are what I have called 
‘loyalty hot-spots’. 
 Sometimes there is no obvious opposition by which soldiers can identify the 
appropriate loyalty/identity segment.  Such occasions might arise, for example, when they are 
away from their units on leave or on courses.  For such occasions the structure contains a 
level which is always present in the background - what might be called a residual focus of 
loyalty.  This focus tends to be at the level above the unit, either the ‘Regiment’ (for the 
Royal Artillery, the Royal Armoured Corps and the Infantry) or the ‘Corps’ (for the Royal 
Engineers, the Royal Signals and the Army Air Corps). 
 
Distinguishing marks 
 
At certain levels, loyalty/identity segments are distinguishable by particular characteristics, 
such as visible symbols or intangible prerogatives and traditions, to which they have an 
exclusive right.  This area is a highly complicated one, but the simple examples that follow 
serve to illustrate the point. 
 
- Infantry and Royal Armoured Corps units have rights to a unique suite of battle 
honours, have their own customs traditions and reputations, and may have animal 
mascots, while their Regiments have distinctive designs of uniform and capbadges 
which no other Regiment shares.   
 
- On the other hand, in the Royal Engineers such differences are vested in the sub 
units: squadrons have exclusive distinctions (including battle honours, the right to 
fly distinctive flags and exclusive rights to display certain colours and logos).  
There are no such distinctions at unit level in the Royal Engineers, though its 
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members are distinguishable as fellow members of the Corps of Royal Engineers 
by their dress and capbadge. 
 
- In the Royal Artillery, the same type of sub unit distinctions exist for batteries as 
for squadrons in the Royal Engineers.  There is, however a further distinction 
above unit level between those units in the Royal Horse Artillery and the rest.  This 
difference expressed in the exclusive right of members the Royal Horse Artillery to 
wear a particular capbadge and belt. 
 
These levels, at which the loyalty/identity segments display their uniqueness, generally 
coincide with the loyalty hot spots. 
 
Function and dysfunction 
 
The loyalty/identity structure exerts considerable influence on the minds and attitudes of 
soldiers, and this influence can be experienced both positively and negatively in terms of 
military performance. 
 The positive elements are best summed up in the drive to be ‘the best’.  Most soldiers 
interviewed were adamant that the ir loyalty/identity segment in the particular context of the 
interview was ‘the best’, for example: 
 
[In reply to my question, “If you had to nominate the best battalion [in your 
Regiment] would you have any hesitation in choosing?”]  “Oh, you’d have to pick 
your own.  I don’t think that anyone believes that any other battalion’s better than 
their own.”123 
 
“Oh I do like Charlie Company.  Charlie Company’s the best company in the 
battalion. ... ‘Cos it’s the best bunch of lads and that.  The lads are brilliant you 
know.  They’re good, and all the platoon sergeants and all the full screws 
[corporals] are good.”124 
 
“Wherever you are, whichever regiment, you’re always the better battery.  I think 
that’s all to do with your team spirit. ...  Throughout the Army that is what we want 
to do - we want to be better than anybody else.”125 
 
Only two interviewees said positively that their unit was not the ‘best’ and both of them 
confessed that they were ashamed of saying so.126 
 The implication of this desire to be best is tha t, when the loyalty/identity structure is 
the operating structure soldiers will expend much effort to achieve more than their rivals.  
This by its very nature enhances the overall achievements of the loyalty/identity group. 
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 Being ‘the best’ has another positive function, and that is that the identity of the group 
is reinforced and its cohesion enhanced.  When soldiers were asked, ‘What, in your opinion 
makes soldiers stick together?’ virtually all of the replies included some or all of the 
following: 
 
- Common Regimental or Corps identity 
 
- The desire to be the ‘best’ as a unit, and also the best at platoon/troop level 
 
- Belonging to a common organisation. 
 
 There are, however negative aspects.  The first is comparatively mild, though it can 
bring problems to commanders in extreme cases.  Sometimes the members of a group hold on 
to their self- identity as ‘the best’ in spite of obvious evidence to the contrary.  Even when 
outperformed militarily and on the sports field and when suffering from inefficient leadership 
and administration, members of loyalty/identity segments can still have the capacity to 
convince themselves that nothing is really wrong.   
 Secondly, soldiers can be so filled with feelings about the appropriate loyalty/identity 
segment that they will not lightly tolerate any change to what they see as its ‘character’, as is 
exemplified by the fight between the warrant officers in the NAAFI mentioned earlier (page 
123).  This fight was caused by a deep disagreement over the handling of a loyalty/identity 
segment which was brought to a head during the formal annual celebration of that segment’s 
identity.  On the larger scale it is a common experience that soldiers in the infantry and Royal 
Armoured Corps find it hard to adjust to the amalgamation of their units.  The loss of the 
identity of old units can arouse bitter feelings among their erstwhile members, and there can 
be serious barriers between the soldiers of different unit origins in the new unit.  Such things 
can be ascribed to a forcing together of two different loyalty/identity structures. 
 Thirdly, the rivalry between loyalty/identity segments can be carried so far that it leads 
to difficulties.  A case in point discovered during an interview with an officer who had been a 
member of a training team working to assist infantry battalions to convert to a new armoured 
vehicle.  The first unit that they were deployed to was a Guards battalion, and there was 
friction between that battalion and the team.  The single Guards officer in the training team 
got on well with the host battalion, but all the other officers found it difficult to work with 
them and as a result the conversion was not as effective as it might have been. 127 The problem 
appears to have been that the Guards officers felt that they were innately superior to the 
members of the team, and the members of the team were too ready to believe that the Guards 
officers were disinclined to learn from outsiders. 
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 Rivalry between loyalty/identity segments can even reach a state of mutual hostility 
expressed in lack of cooperation in the face of external opposition that ought to unite them: in 
some cases this hostility can lead to violence.  Soldiers from certain infantry battalions, for 
example, readily get into fights with members of certain other ones when they are off duty, a 
situation I had first hand experience of in the early 1970s, during an air defence exercise in 
Germany.  We were sharing our camp with two infantry battalions,  and the officers of both 
units were very concerned because they had a long standing mutual hostility.  This hostility 
was manifested in off-duty fighting within a few days 128.  Similarly, as another illustration, 
there is no particular love lost between the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers. 
 
Other people's morale 
 
An interesting manifestation of the loyalty/identity structure’s capability to define ‘the best’ 
was regularly demonstrated by the Army Personnel Research Establishment’s ‘Continuous 
Attitude Surveys’ and those of the DERA Centre for Human Sciences (privatised in April 
2002 as part of QinetiQ)129.  As part of Army-wide surveys on soldiers’ attitudes towards the 
Army, a sample of some 2,000 soldiers was asked three times a year to rate their own morale, 
that of their work group and that of their unit as a whole.  The results consistently indicated 
that, no matter what the satisfaction or dissatisfaction expressed,  individuals of all ranks said 
that their morale was higher than that of their work group and that their work groups’s morale 
was higher than the unit’s as a whole.  Thus the smaller loyalty/identity segment is generally 
believed by its members to have higher morale than the larger of which it is part. 
 
Effect on the Individual 
 
As with the other structures, the loyalty/identity structure has an influence on the life of the 
individual soldier, as well as on groups within the unit. 
 
Membership of loyalty/identity segments. 
 
We saw above how there was a process to be gone through for a soldier to enter the informal 
structure in any depth (pages 124 and 125).  No such process is necessary for membership of 
a loyalty/identity segment.  The only criterion for rights and obligations of participation in 
loyalty/identity groups is membership of the relevant loyalty/identity segment, irrespective of 
rank and experience.  An individual is a full member simply by virtue of being posted into it, 
and fully entitled to support it, represent it, and defend its reputation from that moment 
 136 
onwards.   Here is a soldier from the Royal Engineers remembering his first day in his first 
unit, at the very bottom end of the prestige scale, and without the proper issue of equipment: 
 
“I arrived in the middle of an ACTIVE EDGE [a no-warning call-out exercise] and 
I didn’t have a sewing kit with me and I didn’t have scrim [camouflage garnish 
material] - at the time we had to wear scrim on our helmets.  So they [members of 
his troop] all chipped in.” 
 
Interviewer: “Even though you were a new sprog [young and newly-arrived 
soldier]?” 
 
“Yes, Sir.  Because I was part of their troop.  Although I was a sprog, I was their 
sprog [interviewee’s emphasis].  And nobody else was going to ridicule me apart 
from that troop.”130 
 
Analysis: Although the interviewee had no status, and in other circumstances 
might have been left to fend for himself as best he might, in this case the reputation 
of the operating group, the loyalty/identity segment [the troop], was at stake and its 
members protected him from ridicule from outside.  This implies that he was a full 
member of the segment from the very beginning, with no probationary period.  
This would not have been true of the informal structure. 
 
 Conversely, a solder’s membership of a loyalty/identity segment only lasts until the 
time he leaves it for another segment.  An illustration from my own experience will illustrate 
this point: 
 
In a Royal Artillery regiment, there was deep rivalry between two of the batteries, 
one of which ‘owned’ the colour red, and the other the colour blue.  One of the 
troop sergeant majors in the red battery was promoted to the position of BSM 
[Battery Sergeant Major] of the blue battery.  As he had been a long term loyal 
member of the red battery for over 15 years, some people wondered if he could 
really transfer his allegiance properly.  He settled the question by asking his 
erstwhile (red) BSM for a piece of red carpet to take with him.  Some, including 
the red BSM, thought that he wanted a small piece of red to remember his old 
battery by.  He settled the matter, having been given the carpet, by saying, “Thank 
you: I wanted this piece of carpet so that I can wipe my boots on it each 
morning!”. 131 
 
 In passing, it should be noted that individuals hold a special affection for their 
loyalty/identity segments in the past.  However, this affection usually only manifests itself at 
reunions, where membership of current loyalty/identity segments is not an operating issue and 
individuals temporarily recombine in loyalty/identity segments that are part of their past.  
These situations are special and bounded, much as the special informal circumstances 
covered in the description of the informal structure above. 
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Marks on the person 
 
The loyalty/identity structure can also be expressed by physical attributes displayed by 
members of particular loyalty groups.  Beevor remarked that:  
 
‘some regiments even seemed to produce a physical stereotype - willowy cavalry 
officers with flopping hair, slim Green Jackets with saturnine good looks, and 
large, fair-haired and ruddy-faced officers in the Scots Guards - but the exceptions 
almost certainly outnumbered such a thumbnail rule. 
 Clothes were a better guide.  A waisted, full-skirted hacking jacket ‘cut in the 
cavalry style with ticket pocket’ was hard to miss, but to specify the regiment 
required a mass of minor clues, ranging from the jacket’s state of repair to the 
visibility of a polka-dot handkerchief; while a Coldstreamer who had the cuff 
buttons of his grey suit arranged in two pairs, like those on his uniform, presented 
no challenge, and if a gunner could not be spotted by his dapper pinstripe, his 
labrador would give the game away.’132.   
 
Although Beevor says that these differences are not so marked as they used to be, he has 
come upon an identifiable feature of the loyalty/identity structure.  Soldiers, and particularly 
officers, in many ways acquire physical marks that distinguish them from members of other 
loyalty/identity groups (mostly at Regimental or Corps level).  Bourdieu’s concepts of 
habitus and bodily hexis, outlined in Chapter One, are particularly relevant here: individuals 
absorb a sense of how to act and respond in the course of the multiplicity of experiences in 
their lives.  They acquire a sense of what is appropriate behaviour, and this behaviour is 
manifested in what Bourdieu calls the ‘practical sense’: 
 
‘The practical sense is not so much a state of mind as a state of the body, a state of 
being.  It is because the body has become a repository of ingrained dispositions 
that certain actions, certain ways of behaving and responding, seem altogether 
natural.’ 133 
 
These ingrained disposit ions, according to Bourdieu, result in adjustments of the body134, 
which are manifested in such things as bodily attitudes and movements, ways of cutting and 
dressing the hair, speech (both words used and accent), and clothing.  They are displayed as 
part of the natural attributes of the individual (they are ‘ingrained dispositions’).  A soldier 
acquires the ones that distinguish his residual focus of loyalty early in his career, as the 
following extract from notes of an interview with a member of the Foot Guards illustrates, 
 
‘He told an anecdote about five men, all from Liverpool, who joined the Guards’ 
Depot as recruits on the same day.  [Liverpool is a common recruiting area for all 
five Guards regiments]  Although they were from the same civilian culture, within 
2 weeks they had become recognizably different from each other, according to 
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Regiment.  They had acquired Regimental characteristics in that short time, during 
which they were all doing the same training in the same place and together.’135 
 
Conclusion 
 
The loyalty/identity structure consists in the bundle of ideas, rules and conventions of 
behaviour that confer on soldiers their sense of belonging to and representing certain 
organisational segments in the unit.  These segments form a nesting series of groups defined 
by the formal command structure.  An individual belongs to many such groups in a series 
from very small (‘section’, ‘gun’, ‘tank’ and so on) through troop/platoon, sub unit, up to unit 
and beyond.  His membership is an automatic consequence of his posting into a particular 
part of the formal unit structure.   
 When the loyalty/identity structure is the operating structure, the appropriate segment 
is defined by the level at which his operating group is opposed or contrasted in the context of 
the moment, and it can change from moment to moment.  Thus it is expressed in level group 
rivalry and recombination in the face of larger organisational groups, and has thereby an 
intrinsic flexibility and dynamic quality.   Loyalty/identity groups embrace both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions in that equal membership is enjoyed by all members, regardless of 
rank and service, such membership acting as a bonding quality promoting the unity of the 
group.  Where there is no visible opposition there is an appropriate level in different 
Regiments or Corps on which loyalty can be focused (a residual focus of loyalty).   Certain 
levels (loyalty hot spots) can provoke particularly powerful emotions of loyalty and 
belonging, and these levels tend to be those at which certain segments (the level differs 
between different Regiments and Corps) display their uniqueness. 
 The loyalty/identity structure provides the loyalty/identity segments with a strong 
force for unity and encourages the individual soldiers to aspire to be ‘the best’.  On the other 
hand, it can also lead to complacency, resistance to change, and disruptive rivalry between 
segments. 
 The structure is often expressed in the form of distinguishing physical attributes 
displayed by its members.  These attributes tend to be defined at the Regimental and Corps 
level. 
 So far we have examined social structures whose prime characteristic is membership, 
either acquired or ascribed.  The final social structure is more focused on military activity: a 
structure of doing rather than belonging. 
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SECTION SIX - THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
He seemed keen to tell me that his philosophy was that the job, the common task, was the 
overwhelmingly important thing and that everything else should be subordinated to it.  
Nothing else matters but doing the job.136 
 
We are warriors!  We are Warriors! 
We’ve got a rifle! 
And a bullet!137 
 
Introduction 
 
The functional structure consists in the ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour that are 
connected with carrying out what soldiers see as soldierly tasks.  In this section we will look 
briefly at the nature of those soldierly tasks, the groupings which arise from the functional 
structure, and the attitudes and mental models which soldiers hold concerning soldierly 
functions.  All are manifestations of the structure. 
 The third part of this section is a discussion of a critique made by Killworth on the 
version of the functional structure set out in my defence fellowship. 
 
Description 
 
What soldiers see as soldierly tasks ranges from the intuitively obvious, such things as 
weapon handling, fieldcraft, and the driving of military vehicles both on and off roads, to the 
less obvious but nonetheless soldierly.  Such less obvious soldierly activities include, for 
example, lighting a cigarette or a cooking fire in high winds and heavy rain, keeping one’s kit 
dry in the field, cooking military rations with a palatable result, holding one’s liquor on a 
night out, and attracting women. 
 Although the functional structure does not provide a background framework for 
general activity in the same way as the other structures do, the carrying out of soldierly tasks 
is a major element in military life: indeed some would say that it is the raison d' tre of a 
military unit.  As many tasks (particularly in barracks) do not exactly fit the groups which the 
other structures can make available, soldiers spend a proportion of their working hours in 
transient functional groups.  Furthermore, it is relatively common for commanders at all 
levels to give high priority to the military tasks in hand and in the offing, and thus to give 
particular prominence to the functional structure.  It is therefore a major factor in the lives of 
soldiers, and not unusually found to be the operating structure. 
 The exercise of professionalism in the face of a military problem, and the 
demonstration of one’s ability to perform as a soldier is expected to, are self-evidently two of 
the basic ingredients of being a soldier, and it is no wonder that it lies at the heart of one of 
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the social structures in my model.  Even Hockey showed that he detected this aspect, in spite 
of being hampered by his very narrow perspective (as I have shown in Chapter Two) by 
pointing out that ‘doing the job’ (any task that is associated with combat) is an important 
ingredient in soldiers’ lives, and by reporting a comment by a lieutenant that “There is more 
spirit and the lads seem more together when we have got something to complete, particularly 
in the field”138. 
 I will first consider functional groups, because they are an obvious manifestation of 
the functional structure.  I will then consider some of the more important other aspects which 
the model captures. 
 
Functional groups 
 
The size and composition of a functional group vary with the task: sweeping a garage, for 
instance, might only require two or three soldiers, whilst erecting a tented camp for a subunit 
to live in for three weeks would require considerably more, especially if it is to be done to a 
tight deadline.  Not infrequently, the formation of different sized groups for different tasks is 
made simple because both the formal command and loyalty/identity structures define military 
groups that offer a variety of scale and capability.  The right size and composition is therefore 
available to meet many different functional requirements. 
 However, there are many occasions when both administrative and operational tasks 
emerge that require the putting together of soldiers from different segments of the formal 
command and loyalty/identity structures, and sometimes from different units entirely, into ad 
hoc groups.  The function that they are called upon to perform is the only reason for such 
groups’ existence, and this function therefore provides its purpose and the bonding forces, 
weak or strong, which keep the group together.  In these respects the groups formed within 
the functional structure resemble the ‘Action Sets’ identified by Mayer139 but in this case the 
field from which group members can be drawn is restricted by the boundaries of the unit and 
therefore would be more limited than in Mayer’s more open example taken from Indian local 
politics.  I therefore prefer the term functional groups for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
 The following cases illustrate the point: 
 
- Guarding the Barracks.  The routine provision of a guard for the barracks out of 
working hours is seldom the task of a complete segment of a unit.  In some units it 
is an overnight duty for selected soldiers who return to work the next day, whereas 
in other units men are taken away from their designated jobs for a period of several 
weeks and formed into a special ‘RP’ [Regimental Police] troop or platoon which 
works on a shift system.  In either case, there is no guarantee that the members of 
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the guard all share common membership of an appropriately sized formal 
command or loyalty/identity segment.  Furthermore, the guard will contain a 
number of junior NCOs who will have authority over their subordinates in the 
guard, but these subordinates may not necessarily be the men that they would 
normally command.  The provision of a rear party considered on pages 80 to 81 
above is another example of the need to form special groups for the task of 
maintaining barracks security. 
 
- Grouping.  It is common practice on exercise, and an accepted part of British 
tactical doctrine, that the structure of a military group is changed in the face of 
different operational tasks.  This is achieved by what is called ‘grouping’ of 
elements of one unit or sub unit to work with those of other units or sub units, and 
this ‘grouping’ can take place several times in one day.  The fighting group that is 
thus formed is neither a formal command group, a loyalty/identity segment nor an 
informal group.  It is a functional group. 
 
- Reinforcement.   Sometimes individual soldiers or small groups are needed to 
reinforce a different unit.  Such reinforcements are usually chosen because they 
can be expected to have the relevant military skills, but they will only be able to 
participate fully in the unit’s social structures on arrival if they had previous 
service with that unit.  When forces were assembled for the Gulf War in 1990, 
several operational units were deemed to be too small for the task ahead and were 
reinforced by soldiers from other units.  These other units were not expected to be 
operationally deployed, and could therefore bear the loss of some of their 
personnel.   Until they had acquired informal relationships and adjusted to the new 
command structures that they now came under (and adjusted their loyalty/identity 
frameworks) the newcomers were chiefly tied to their new units by shared 
function.  In other words, function provided their only operating structure to start 
with.   This extract from my field notes cites a particular case: 
 
‘I asked about the considerable influx of outsiders [of which my 
interviewee was one] to his regiment to bring them up to war establishment 
for the Gulf War140, and he replied that it was a bit of a problem because at 
first they did not feel fully part of the regiment that they had joined.  This 
lasted until after they had integrated as a team through an intensive training 
period.’141  
 
 Although the form of a functional group may not be taken directly from the formal 
command structure it can be expected to contain within it a system of authority and 
responsibility which is considered to be a necessary feature for the carrying out of tasks, 
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especially under adverse conditions.  Where there is a rank structure in the group it will be 
used; when all the members are the same rank, for example a small ‘fatigue party’ of private 
soldiers for routine labouring tasks142, it will still be usual for the person setting the task to 
designate one man to be in charge. 
 An important feature of functional groups is that they are usually transient.  Once the 
common task has been achieved, the group can be expected to be disbanded because there is 
no further reason to keep them together.  If the group also happens to be a formal command, 
loyalty/identity, or informal group in its own right then it will of course persist, but without 
function providing the operating structure. 
 Because of the normally transient nature of functional groups, their cohesion is 
usually stronger when there are other social structures present as well, to provide mutual 
reinforcement of the social bonds, as I have argued elsewhere143.  The functional structure can 
therefore be considered to be less bonding in its own right than the other structures. 
 I did, however, come across two examples where functional groups became so long 
lived that they began to take on a permanence that caused social changes in the units that 
were noticeable to the soldiers.  The first was a case in which an infantry battalion was 
reorganised for the Northern Ireland role on functional lines, with the result that the rifle 
platoons were divided into two ‘multiples’ and thus were effectively split in half for the 
duration of the pre-deployment training and the deployment itself.  As the soldiers spent 
virtually their entire Northern Ireland tour in these functional groups of half-platoons, social 
relationships became focused on the functional group rather than the other possible groups 
provided by the loyalty/identity structure and the formal command structure.  As a member 
of one of those platoons said during an interview,  
 
“The best I’ve ever seen our company, Sir, was just before we went to Northern 
Ireland ... November the year before.  ... From senior ranks down, Sir, everybody 
was... you know, your mates and there was... you really felt you were one big, you 
know, like, family type thing.  Just before we went, Sir, it was, you know, we were 
all in one room and we were all... and that’s when everybody’s emotions sort of 
like came out.  Everybody was, ‘Ahh, remember when we were doing this...’ ... 
and while were in Ireland Sir, for six months ... everything was fine.  But then 
when we come back, everyone just... the platoon was split in half ... into two 
multiples, and it sort of like changed the platoon cos the multiple... that’s sort of 
like the cut now ... The platoon’s ... split now.”144 
 
 The second case involved a different infantry battalion and took place during another 
six month operational tour, this time in Cyprus.  An officer who was there at the time told me 
that, 
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‘During a UN Tour in Cyprus, the then CO had decided to keep the battalion in 
two halves, half working with the UN and half in the Sovereign Base Area.  So far, 
this was normal practice, but unlike the normal practice he had decided not to 
change them over half way through the tour.  This meant, among other things, that 
the half of the unit serving with the UN received the UN medal and the others did 
not.  The CO chose to command personally the half that was with the UN.  The 
split into two halves was geographical, by role [function] and by command 
structure because a parallel structure was created by the CO in the half he was not 
with - a local Lt Col commanded it, it had an Adjutant and an RSM - all set up by 
the real CO.  The split between the two halves was therefore nearly complete.  So 
great was the split that the CO himself was prevented at one point by a gate guard 
from entering the part he was not with when he tried to visit it, and the “real” RSM 
was invited to a party by “RSM Dhekelia”.  This did not go down well with the CO 
and the RSM.’145 
 
Here we see that there were several factors at work, including what could be seen as an 
understandable reaction to what appeared to be a capricious distribution of campaign medal-
earning opportunities.  However, it is also clear that a split within the unit had developed 
along functional lines, between the half that was with the UN and the half that was in the 
Sovereign Base area, and that at least the half in the Sovereign Base Area had acquired a 
separate identity and internal structure.  
 
Attitudes and mental models 
 
Although groups are an easily observable manifestation of the functional structure, there is 
much more to the structure than groups alone.  One of the central areas of the functional 
structure is the set of attitudes that soldiers hold towards tasks.  We have already seen how 
Hockey identifies military tasks associated with combat as drawing the commitment of the 
soldiers he observed.  Killworth provides further confirmation in noting that the soldiers he 
observed went out of their way to volunteer to join in with another platoon’s training in pistol 
shooting146.  In contrast, he also describes an opposite case in which soldiers showed distinct 
lack of commitment to a task.  This task was erecting tents for a fair to publicise aspects of 
the Army:  
 
‘Elements of 2 Platoon were assigned to assist for the week.  By chance I also 
knew the Staff Sergeant to whom they were responsible, from an ACIO [Army 
Careers Information Office] .  She later complained about how they would always 
group together and work extremely slowly: 
 [She complained] “You would send them out and say ‘these tents all need 
putting up’; you’d come back and they’d all be in one big group again.  So you’d 
split them up and in half an hour they’d be back again, the privates and the lance-
corporal, with the corporal again. It was like they couldn’t operate on their own” 
.... 
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 It was not seen by the contingent as real work and there was little perceived 
compulsion to carry out the tasks.’147 
As Killworth observed, the erecting of tents for a fair did not have the cachet of more 
soldierly activity such as pistol shooting, and therefore the soldiers did not have an attitude of 
commitment to it.   
 The functional area that generates the strongest attitudes is most likely to be an 
operational deployment, seen as the ultimate test of military function.   
 
[Of being in the Gulf War and on operations in Northern Ireland]: “For an infantry 
soldier you’re actually doing what you’ve been trained to do.  You know that 
everything you do is for real, like.  When you’re doing exercises and all that you 
don’t put everything into it because it’s no’ real.  But when you was in the Gulf or 
you was over in Ireland you put everything into it because you know your next 
mistake ... if you make a mistake that could be you gone, you know.  So you do 
everything for real over there.  If I could get a chance to do a two year posting to 
Northern Ireland ... I’d take it straight away.  I really liked Ireland.”148 
 
 I saw this demonstrated during my fieldwork in the case of an artillery unit that was 
preparing to be deployed to Northern Ireland in the infantry role.  The unit, which contained 
about 30 female soldiers among about 500 male ones, had been reorganised from its normal 
artillery-role structure to a new structure based on four-man patrols (known as ‘bricks’ 
(subsequently, ‘teams’149)).  As this organisation did not require as many soldiers, choices had 
to be made as to who should stay behind.  The majority of the female soldiers were selected 
to stay in England and this led one of them to complain to me that she was now being 
rejected by her erstwhile (male) friends.150  In this case the attitude of the soldiers to their new 
military function was stronger than their informal bonds.  These informal bonds were being 
re-aligned along the lines of the newly created functional groups because of the importance of 
the military function that they were about to be committed to. 
 As well as attitudes to various functions and tasks, the functional structure is also 
manifested in shared mental models about how to achieve them.  For example, it is an 
important military quality to be able to match groups to tasks.  In some cases there are 
formally stated rules, (such as ‘Standing Operating Procedures’), as to the appropriate group 
size and composition fo r particular tasks (the unit guard for instance).  However,  in other 
cases such things have to be worked out, and the person making the calculations (whether he 
is aware of it or not) draws on a shared fund of knowledge as to the size and structure of 
groups demanded by different types and magnitudes of tasks.  This is manifested in a feeling 
that the answer to such calculations is easy to derive. 
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Effect on the individual  
 
Having looked briefly at the functional structure’s influence on the collective lives of 
soldiers, we can now consider its effect on the individual soldier.  Two elements stand out. 
 First, the functional structure gives the individual an ever-present frame of reference 
by which to gauge the likely significance or importance of what he is doing in the eyes of his 
peers, and this will prompt his commitment to it.  A soldier will not want to appear backward 
in functionally important areas, but neither will he want to be overly committed to tasks that 
are thought of as unnecessary, or low in status.  However, an important feature of this 
structure is that there are in fact few absolute standards to judge these things by: the 
definition of ‘functionally important areas’ is not as obvious as it might seem.  Attitudes to 
particular tasks cannot be inferred purely from their nature or from consideration of the 
physical and mental resources needed to carry them out.  They are a product of the prevailing 
functional structure, which can develop and change with the process of time.  This point is 
illustrated by a junior NCO’s remark to me that things had changed in his unit: years before, 
when he joined it, the attitude of his colleagues to personal camouflage on exercise was very 
slack - “if you put a bit of scrim on your helmet then you were thought of as being ‘keen’ [in 
a sneering voice], but now look at us!” [pointing out a well camouflaged group of soldiers]151. 
 Given that there is no obvious and permanent standard by which to define the 
importance of a particular soldierly function, mistakes can be made by individuals.  Here is 
an example from Hockey, showing how an individual made a miscalculation by treating 
something as trivial when he should have treated it with soldierly respect, according to the 
prevailing functional structure: 
 
‘The squad is formed up and about to move off.  The Sergeant in command is joking 
with a private about the latter’s beret, maintaining that its style is that of a raw recruit.  
The private’s nickname is used by the Sergeant, and there is lots of laughter from the 
squad.  As the Sergeant turns away the private who has ‘lost’ the joke, points his 
weapon at the Sergeant’s back in a mock fashion, grinning.  The Sergeant perceives it 
out of the corner of his eye, spins around and in a very loud, fierce and serious tone, 
tells the private - using his surname - that if he ever points a weapon at a person again, 
“you won’t have a head to put your hat on, and what’s more I’ll gaol you!”  The 
Sergeant then orders all members of the squad to assume the correct position of 
attention.  The squad is very quiet.’152 
 
Analysis: The sergeant was ridiculing the beret, which was not shaped in the way 
that a proper soldier would have it (as defined by the conventions of the functional 
structure).  The sergeant was behaving in a general way which indicated that the 
operating structure was the informal structure, but when the soldier violated one 
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of the basic principles of the functional structure by using his weapon in a 
lighthearted and potentially dangerous way, the sergeant jumped suddenly into the 
formal command structure.  
 
 Secondly, this structure helps to define a soldier’s status in the eyes of his peers.  This 
status can be expected to increase with service as he acquires more and more mastery over 
the soldierly skills that are valued in his particular unit.  This means that most soldiers’ status 
can be expected to go up whether or not they are promoted: they will either become NCOs or 
‘senior soldiers’.    I am indebted to Killworth’s critique of my concept of the pecking order 
examined above in so far as he makes this point that military performance is an important 
ingredient in a soldier’s prestige (and hence, in my terms, his position in the pecking order).  
It is easy to conflate this aspect with length of service per se, as I originally did 153. 
 Where a soldier’s military performance is generally low, his status can be expected to 
be low.   Here is a generic description of such a soldier, given by an experienced private 
soldier, 
 
   “Someone that’s been a waster at the Depot and scraped through.  He’ll come here 
and he’ll suffer.  Maybe [on] his first exercise you just look at him and think, ‘That 
man is shite.  He hasn’t got a clue.’ Then you hear the rumours that he’s just 
scraped through the Depot ... because they need the numbers.  He’ll start getting 
hammered - not physically, but hammered for, you know, ‘We need a bloke for the 
QM’s, you get yourself up there because we know you’re a knob.’ ...  Normally 
you find that blokes who are like that will stay like that and they will do as little 
time in the Army as they can.”154 
 
 It is the same for young officers as for private soldiers.  Military competence is sought 
after and cherished as a necessary ingredient of prestige and what is known as ‘credibility’.  
As Killworth noticed, the platoon commanders he observed felt the need to claim superiority 
through military competence, and stressed the importance of their attendance on the Platoon 
Commanders’ Battle Course as proof of that competence.155  In contrast, here is a generic 
description of a low status officer, given by an experienced subaltern, 
 
“Someone who’s for ever putting his foot in it with the blokes and with his fellow 
officers.  Someone who’s just not on top of his job.  Initially when you get there 
obviously you get quite a lot of breathing space.  Obviously there’s a very very 
steep learning curve.  The blokes understand that.”156 
 
 Should the soldier’s performance of functionally significant tasks not improve, then 
he will remain low status, whatever his experience.  Such are the ‘rejects’ described on page 
113. 
 147 
 
Killworth’s critique of the concept of the functional structure 
 
The functional structure provides one of the significant points of disagreement between 
Killworth and my earlier description of the model157.  The full critique is on pages 109 to 112 
of his PhD thesis158: it may briefly be summed up in the following extracts: 
 
‘An initial difficulty with this presentation is that it links three distinct social 
features.  It is true that ad hoc work groups are formed in the Army to deal with 
particular tasks, but it is also the case that work groups are formed in the rest of 
society wherever group tasks are required, often sharing the characteristics of 
transience and task-specificity.  Similarly, almost any organisation that employs 
personnel in group tasks has a shared body of ideas of how to accomplish these 
tasks.  It is, however, also true that the infantry do share an ideology of 
professionalism expressed through the idea of ‘doing the job’ and an attachment to 
a method of work division termed ‘tasking’.  These three elements, functional 
groups, professionalism and tasking, are however not necessarily inter- linked in 
the way that Kirke suggests.... In short, the mapping of professionalism or ‘doing 
the job’ onto functional groups is simply untenable: it is in fact much more 
complex.’159 
 
‘Kirke almost entirely neglects the other side of this formulation, however, in that 
functional groups are normally formed by use of authority by higher ranking 
personnel.  The missing aspect of Kirke’s analysis is that the formation and 
operation of functional groups is inevitably bound up with the operation of power 
and the formal command structure.’160 
 
 Once again, as with the pecking order (see pages 114 and 115 above), I find little to 
dispute in Killworth’s critique, except to point out that he has confused soldiers’ groups, 
which are one expression and manifestation of the social structures of the model, with the 
social structures themselves: the body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour which 
informs groups of people or individuals how to organise and conduct themselves vis- -vis 
each other.  This confusion was probably caused by the fact that I used soldiers’ groups as a 
running concrete example for the model throughout the document.  Nor do I dispute his 
observation that there are power and hierarchies present in almost every aspect of unit life, 
which indeed is reflected in the concept of ‘superiority and inferiority’ described below. 
 I see no difficulty, therefore, in accepting that his ideas, on power and prestige 
systems in the Army (based on fieldwork with the infantry), can sit beside this model and 
each can illuminate the other. 
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Conclusion 
 
The functional structure thus provides a defining framework for attitudes to particular tasks 
that soldiers undertake, and for judgement of the worth and standing of an individual by 
virtue of his ability to undertake them.  Such attitudes develop through time, and although 
there is a basic ingredient that ‘soldierly’ tasks are important, the exact definition of what is 
‘soldierly’ and what is not is a social process that changes with time.   
 The structure often forms the basis for the formation and subsequent disbandment of 
ad hoc functional groups which are matched to the intended task, which is an important 
ingredient in the bonding of the groups concerned.   
 
SECTION SEVEN - INTERACTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE STRUCTURES 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the four social structures in the model have been described separately, they must 
not be considered in isolation from one another.  The ideas, rules, and conventions of 
behaviour captured in the model should be viewed as intertwined and overlaid in an intricate 
and complex pattern and as co-existing in some form of mutual balance.  This section 
examines the interaction of the structures and the balance between them, and some important 
common ground which I have called ‘superiority and inferiority’. 
 
Interaction 
 
There are two types of interaction between the structures that are particularly important in the 
context of this thesis.  The first is the tendency for elements in one structure to inform the 
other structures and the second is the constant potential to switch operating structure. 
 
Reading between the structures 
 
The aspects that are modelled in the separate social structures do not exist in isolation, but, 
because they are experienced as a whole in the run of life, they constantly interact with and 
inform each other.  Indeed, we have already seen how some of the ideas and conventions of 
one structure have an effect on some of the others in the case of the effect of military prowess 
(functional structure) on the status of an individual in the pecking order (informal structure).  
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Another example would be the way in which particular aspects of the formal command 
structure contribute to the unit’s loyalty/identity structure, as in the following example: 
 
I have been attached at different times to a Foot Guards regiment and a Household 
Cavalry regiment.  In the former, the soldiers were very punctilious about saluting, 
which was always carried out in the prescribed drill book manner which includes 
regulation movements and invariably the wearing of head dress at the time of the 
salute.  In the latter, the atmosphere was less formal: salutes were exchanged, but 
not as vigorously, and as this regiment had a tradition in which non-commissioned 
soldiers saluted with or without headdress I was often surprised to be saluted by a 
bare-headed soldier.161 
 
Analysis: The different modes of salute in the formal command structure were 
important identifying elements in the loyalty/identity structure. 
 
 A third would be the case where informal behaviour in the officers’ or sergeants’ 
mess is regulated by the Commanding Officer or RSM through the formal command 
structure, as in the following case, 
 
An ‘Italian Night’ in the officers’ mess got seriously out of hand when some 
officers and their ladies began to throw food at each other.  The Commanding 
Officer responded by ordering the PMC [President of the Members’ Committee] 
(who, as the officer responsible for the organisation of the mess, was ultimately 
responsible also for the conduct of its members), and the sub unit commanders 
who were present at the party, to report to him the next day in their best uniform.  
He gave them a serious rifting [ticking-off].  Behaviour in the mess became more 
orderly thereafter.162 
 
Constant switching of operating structure 
 
Because all four structures are present simultaneously, it is unlikely that one will remain the 
operating structure for an extended period of time.  For example, a private soldier in barracks 
might pass through all four in a single morning, thus: 
 
0815: sub unit parade (formal command structure) 
 
0830: weapon training and range work (functional structure) 
 
1000: NAAFI break (informal structure) 
 
1030: inter-platoon shooting competition (loyalty/identity structure) 
 
1130: OC’s Orders (formal command structure) 
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1200: lunch (informal structure) 
 
 Similarly, the context of the moment can instantly change, as in the case on page 80 
when an officer approaches an informal group of privates enjoying a ‘smoke break’ and the 
senior soldier calls the group to attention.  In that case, the operating structure switched from 
the informal to the formal command structure and than back again when the officer told the 
men to relax, all in the course of a few seconds. 
 This capacity of the system frequently to change operating structure has a number of 
consequences, of which these are common instances: 
 
- Each structure provides separate and complementary channels of communication 
because each contains a different alignment of individuals and relationships.  
 
- The normal case is that constant realignment of the structures prevents any single 
structure from tending to remain dominant, and thus no arrangement of groupings 
becomes permanent.  This endows the system with a flexibility and suppleness that 
under normal circumstances prevent insurmountable personal or structural barriers 
growing up within a unit. 
 
- The combination of widespread communications and constant changes of context 
provides checks and balances on dysfunctional behaviour because circumstances 
regularly arise in which any (even the most senior) members of a unit can be 
corrected or encouraged by other members.  
 
 A further feature of the system is that when all the structures are in harmony then 
group cohesion and military effectiveness are enhanced, even in the most stressful 
circumstances, as an equivalently strong bonding process is taking place in all structures.  
This means that they will continue to promote bonding whatever the operating structure 
switches to at any time, as I have explored in my analysis of the social processes taking place 
in an infantry company attack163. 
 
Balance 
 
The model suggests that it is advantageous for the morale and efficiency of a unit if the four 
structures are kept in balance.  Too much emphasis on the formal command structure, for 
example, can reduce communications in the informal structure; too much emphasis on the 
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loyalty/identity structure can allow the importance of military performance to decline in 
favour of maintaining team spirit and unit cohesion, and so on. 
 The following case provides a clear illustration of this need for balance, 
 
In a particular unit the new Commanding Officer discovered that military 
performance was below what he expected.  He therefore resolved to lift the 
standard.  The method he chose to achieve this increase in standards was to cut 
through what he perceived as ‘slackness’ by making life difficult for his 
subordinates.  He rigidly and publicly dominated his officers and senior non-
commissioned officers by openly instilling fear in them and subjecting them to 
public ridicule if they failed to present the soldierly image that he wanted to see.   
He set very high standards of military achievement and became openly furious at 
any failure to attain them.  He stressed the importance of a strong personality in his 
officers (his own personality was a dominant one and he had plenty of energy with 
which to exert his dominance).  During his two and a half years in command, the 
majority of his officers felt ill at ease and were delighted when their time came to 
be posted out of the unit.  Over the same period an impermeable clique of officers 
(favourites and ‘courtiers’) grew up around him and those outside this circle 
trusted each other less and less. The unit became fragmented as the sub unit 
commanders cut themselves off from the Commanding Officer as far as they could.  
Instead of rising, military performance standards fell.164 
 
Analysis: 
 
The Commanding Officer’s public domination of his subordinate commanders and 
other authority figures in the unit undermined their positions in the formal 
command structure. 
 
The informal structure developed impermeable fences.  The members of the 
Commanding Officer’s clique were avoided and mistrusted by the other officers, 
and partial barriers arose between those other officers who were no longer certain 
that they could trust each other.  This constricted the channels of informal 
communications that would otherwise have flowed through relationships of 
friendship and association. 
 
The fragmentation of the unit was in part caused by lack of use of the full extent of the 
loyalty/identity structure which did not operate much above sub unit level. 
 
  The functional structure became at least partially diverted into avoiding trouble 
from the Commanding Officer at the expense of carrying out the military job in 
hand.   
 
The continued stressing of importance of military function over all other 
considerations led to the dominance of the functional structure over the other three 
structures.  The resulting imbalance sapped the unit’s morale. 
 
Comment : 
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Overall, the very methods which the Commanding Officer chose to raise military 
standards resulted in the ir further reduction because they caused disturbances in the 
unit’s social structures. 
 
 Apart from demonstrating the negative results of imbalance between the social 
structures this case illustrates the fact that there is room for a person in authority, the 
Commanding Officer, the RSM, or a sub unit commander for example, to vary the balance of 
structures in the segment of the unit over which they have influence or control.  This is an 
important consideration as it shows that the social structures are amenable to influence or 
control and are not, therefore, as fixed as they may appear at first sight. 
 An unexpected conclusion of this study was that the appropriate balance varies 
between Regiments/Corps and between units within Regiments/Corps.  Indeed, the feeling of 
what constitutes the appropriate balance seems to be an important aspect of unit and 
Regimental/Corps identity.  For instance, the Foot Guards place a greater emphasis on the 
formal command structure in comparison to the functional structure than do the Parachute 
Regiment.  Similarly, the functional structure is dominant in the Army Air Corps because of 
the exacting requirements of flying and servicing helicopters: indeed, in the Army Air Corps 
unit visited during the study the most usually manifested groupings within squadrons were 
entirely along functional lines (aviators, ground crew, and mechanics).165 
 
Superiority and inferiority 
 
It will have become apparent in the descriptions of the four social structures above that in 
each one there is a distinct element of hierarchy.  Each has a way of accommodating and 
expressing various forms of superiority and inferiority.  The formal command structure 
defines the legally constituted hierarchy and lines of authority; the informal structure 
contains ideas of superiority and inferiority manifested in such aspects as the pecking order 
and in the conventions of the rank-asymmetrical informal relationships described as 
association and informal access; the loyalty/identity structure has the idea of being ‘the best’ 
as a basic ingredient, and credit and prestige are awarded according to ability to ‘do the job’ 
in the functional structure. 
 It will also have become apparent from this chapter that from an individual’s 
perspective the definition of who is superior to whom and where the inferiority lies is not the 
product of rational logical analysis.  It depends very largely on agency and context.  Here 
Killworth and I are in agreement, though we approach from different directions and 
ultimately draw different conclusions.  He uses ‘authority’ in a sense that is close to my 
‘superiority’: 
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‘If authoritative discourse, through which we perceive authority, is dependent upon 
the nature of the instance of articulation for its meaning, then it can be seen that 
this meaning is not fixed.  With different social agents, either as speakers or 
audience, discourse takes on different meanings.  Deriving from this observation, 
different understandings [italics in the original] of authoritative discourse, in effect 
different meanings, emerge according to the position of the individual actors 
involved.  ‘Authority’ is constantly interpreted from multiple perspectives, there is 
no simple link between an utterance and ‘authority’.166  
 
 These observations present something of a logical anomaly.  On the one hand, as I 
have determined, there is a clear assumption of superiority and inferiority that informs all 
agents in most contexts, but on the other hand there can be no absolute agreement as to 
precisely what is superior to what, or who to whom, in any structure apart from the formal 
command structure because there is no absolute rule or fully agreed standard by which to 
decide.  There always seems to be room for the statement, “I am better than you” or “we are 
better than you” in the mouth of any individual.  And yet, somehow, individuals and groups 
manage to cooperate effectively in terms of living in harmony and achieving what are 
commonly identified by them as worthwhile goals. 
 We must therefore accept the existence of a constant presence of ideas of superiority 
and inferiority whilst noting that it does not necessarily imply oppressive management of 
individuals, groups, or situations, or disharmony in the minutiae of daily life. 
 It was suggested by one of the interviewees who had not seen regimental service in 
the field army that this element of superiority and inferiority indicated that there was, in fact, 
only one social structure, and that was the formal command structure167.  This structure, in 
her eyes, dominated all aspects of life.  It is to be hoped that this chapter has shown that this 
is not the case, but her observation does highlight the fact that the formal command structure 
is a resource that those senior in rank can always call upon, with an assurance of success in 
most contexts, to establish their authority (and thus their superiority) over those who are 
junior and thus inferior in the formal command structure.  It is always potentially present, as 
it were, even when it is not the operating structure.   
 It would seem relatively simple to match this constant background presence of the 
formal command structure to the constant ideas of superiority and inferiority which I have 
detected, and argue for a kind of covert dominance for that structure, even when another 
social structure is the operating structure.  By this argument, all ideas of superiority and 
inferiority are manifestations of the formal command structure in a hidden form, reflecting 
the fact that it is a dominant feature of soldiers’ daily lives.  It is a short step from this 
argument to say that the formal command structure is the ‘dominant’ structure in soldiers’ 
lives. 
 However, such an argument is too simplistic.  It might equally be suggested, for 
example, that the apparent universal and ready acceptance of the formal command structure 
 154 
by all military agents is a manifestation of generic norms of superiority and inferiority that 
are embedded in the culture of the Army, perhaps acquired by individuals in their early 
training where their instructors have power and authority over all aspects of their lives, 
whether formal, informal, functional or connected to identity. 168 
 We are not going to resolve this discussion here, and in any case it is not necessary.  It 
is enough for our purposes to note that there is a constant theme of asymmetry - superiority 
and inferiority - in soldiers’ daily lives which needs to be presented as a basic ingredient in 
all four structures in the model.  For the sake of completeness, therefore, it would be best to 
include as a formal note to the diagram in Figure 3.1 that all structures contain ideas of 
superiority and inferiority. 
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SECTION EIGHT - CONCLUSIONS 
 
This final section provides a summary of the top level of the model and the typology of 
informal relationships in the form of two master diagrams and notes attached to each. 
 
The model 
 
The top level of the model of four social structures (shared bodies of ideas, rules and 
conventions of behaviour which inform soldiers how to organise and conduct themselves vis- 
-vis each other) can be depicted in this diagram, 
 
FORMAL COMMAND 
STRUCTURE 
 
INFORMAL 
STRUCTURE 
 
LOYALTY/ 
IDENTITY 
STRUCTURE 
 
FUNCTIONAL  
STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Social Structures in Combat Arms Units - Top Level 
(Author’s diagram) 
Notes to Figure. 3.8: 
 
1.  Soldiers’ activities in the context of the unit fall in one or other of the four 
social structures depicted in this diagram. 
 
2.  An individual can only be exercising one social structure at any particular 
instant. 
 
3.  The social structure of the context of that instant is called the operating 
structure. 
 
4.  Lower levels of the model represent greater degrees of resolution, revealing 
greater complexity. 
 
5.  The structures inform each other in matters of detail and are intertwined and 
overlaid in an intricate and complex pattern and co-exist in some form of mutual 
balance.   
 
6.  All structures contain a constant ingredient of superiority and inferiority, though 
its particular manifestation is dependent on the context and the individuals in that 
context. 
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The available relationships in the informal structure can be depicted in this diagram: 
 
Figure 3. 9.  Relationships in the Informal Structure
Relative
Seniority
Junior
Close Distant
Senior association
association
informal 
access
informal 
access
friendship nodding acquaintance
close
friendship
EGO -
Closeness of Relationship
(Author’s diagram)  
 
Notes to Figure 3.9: 
 
1.  The diagram is drawn on 2 axes: 
 
a.  Vertical axis, relative seniority.  Any point on the axis is senior in rank 
to any point below it and junior to any point above it. 
 
b.   Horizontal axis, closeness of the relationship.  The further to the left, 
the stronger the relationship, and vice versa.  Each of the boxes in the 
diagram has a horizontal dimension which corresponds to various degrees 
of closeness on the horizontal axis of the diagram.  On the principle that a 
line consists of a very large number of points, this incorporates a range of 
closeness or distance in any of the relationships which allows for a high 
degree of variety. 
 
2.  Soldiers’ personal informal relationships fall within the boundaries of the 
diagram. 
 
3.  “EGO” is an individual of no particular rank who has some subordinates and 
some superiors in the unit.  
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4.  The boxes summarise the various relationships available to EGO, the effects of 
relative rank, and the relative closeness or intensity of the relationships. 
 
5.  The gaps between the boxes have no significance apart from separating them on 
the page to make the model readable. 
 
 In the next chapter we will explore the power of this model of social structures to 
analyse, describe, and predict modern British soldiers’ behaviour, compared with the power 
of other relevant models, which were introduced in Chapter Two, to do the same thing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - EXPLORING THE MODEL 
 
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the power of the model to analyse, describe, 
and predict modern British soldiers’ behaviour.  In sections two to four, it will be 
applied to particular case material reported by myself and others; in section five we will 
assess its advantages and its limits, and finally in section six we will compare it to other 
relevant models. 
 The material in this chapter is all taken from my fieldnotes or from my personal 
recollections.  As in Chapter Three, I have included both types of material because they 
complement each other. 
 As may be expected, I had a considerable array of data from which to select the 
cases.  I made the particular choice of fieldnote extracts for this chapter using the 
NUD*IST data base tool1 to provide samples of text that I had previously tagged as 
containing the appropriate degree of complexity and analytical interest.  I used this 
means of selection because it provided a mechanism for choice that was refined enough 
to provide relevant material but not so selective as to produce only extreme or unique 
examples. 
 The choice of my personal recollections was made after the fieldnote extracts 
had been identified.  I can claim no systematic means of selection for this type of 
material: I used intuition and experience simply to choose cases that had the capacity to 
complement the interview material in illustrating the points in question. 
 
SECTION TWO - APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE DESCRIPTION 
OF PARTICULAR CASES 
 
So far, we have looked at each of the social structures individually and discussed their 
interaction and integration.  We are now going to examine the use of the model as a 
tool to describe incidents in the life of a unit in barracks.  Whilst this is the simplest use 
of the model, and its effectiveness may be inferred from some of the material already 
presented in Chapter Three, its examination is included here in order positively to 
demonstrate the power of the model in this role.  Certain incidents observed by myself 
and others will be described in two ways: first in pure narrative form, and then using 
the model with its special terms in italics to indicate that they are being used rigorously 
as precise terms.  However, as this use of the model may be so plainly demonstrated, 
we will confine ourselves to four cases only.  One is from my field notes, one is 
recalled by me in retrospect, and the other two are taken from Hockey2 and Killworth3 
respectively. 
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Case One - A Soldier Describing Unofficial ‘Fun’ 
 
The interviewee (a private solder in the mortar platoon of an infantry battalion) 
described ‘corridor parties’, which involved drinking in the block (against 
orders).  The parties were fun to plan, the details being circulated secretly by 
word of mouth.  Most of the full corporals usually went out at the time the party 
was due to happen so that they would not be involved, but a few came, and they 
would make sure that it did not get boisterous.  He made the point that the 
celebrations stopped short of ‘Zulu Warrior’ [boisterous striptease performed to 
a particular chant] because that would be too noisy, and I should bear in mind 
that his platoon were a sensible lot because they were was full of senior and 
mature soldiers, not teenagers who don’t know how to behave.  He then recalled 
an incident in B Company lines when some of the youngsters got out of hand.4 
 
Using the model: 
 
The interviewee described an example of an illegitimate secondary adjustment.  
‘Corridor parties’ would be arranged by passing round information through the 
communications provided by the informal structure.  These informal 
communications enabled the full corporals unofficially to hear about what was 
to happen and to decide for themselves whether or not they would attend.  He 
made the point that the members of his platoon (from Support Company) were 
sufficiently controlled to keep the noise down to levels where the authorities 
could reasonably ignore them, invoking the loyalty/identity structure to declare 
that they were capable of such self control, unlike other platoons who were full 
of less mature individuals. 
 
 This description helps us to appreciate the tension and balance in this situation 
between the acknowledged rules and the practice of bending them, whilst 
independently highlighting the importance of experience gained through length of 
service in the speaker’s mind and the use of ideas described in the loyalty/identity 
structure as a means of expressing superiority and inferiority. 
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Case Two - A Message At A Party 
 
The senior NCOs and warrant officers of my battery were holding a party in the 
sergeants’ mess after I had been in my new regiment as the BC [Battery 
Commander] for about a month.  They had invited the battery officers and their 
wives and we had all come.  It felt a cosy, comradely event at which I felt I 
properly belonged, in spite of my newness.  After the meal, the floor was 
opened for dancing and there was much partying and smiling and shouting 
against the noise of the music.  All present appeared well lubricated with 
alcohol and were enjoying themselves accordingly.  Suddenly, one of my two 
troop sergeant majors, Staff Sergeant Driscoll, approached me in the smoky 
semi-darkness and took me to one side.  He told me that one of the battery’s 
senior NCOs, Sergeant Wallis, was not being treated fairly.  He went into some 
detail about how there were people in high places who had it in for him and 
how I had had the wool pulled over my eyes about him because I was new.  I 
thanked him quietly for this information and he disappeared to the bar, to get on 
with enjoying himself.  I had noticed that, curiously, his breath did not smell of 
alcohol at all.  Later he became joyfully drunk and led the dancing in a wild 
way that probably had something to do with his Celtic ancestry. 5 
 
Using the model: 
 
The battery NCOs and warrant officers were celebrating their identities as 
members of the battery hierarchy (formal command and loyalty/identity 
structures) and celebrating the battery’s loyalty/identity structure by holding a 
party and inviting the battery officers and their wives (and nobody else).  We, 
the officers, proclaimed our membership of the battery loyalty/identity structure 
by turning up and by relaxing enough to feel at home in the convivial 
atmosphere.  Staff Sergeant Driscoll took advantage of the context to act as if it 
was a special informal circumstance under which he could approach me in a 
way that would not be possible elsewhere.  He used the situation temporarily to 
simulate a relationship of association that did not yet exist between us (because 
of the short time I had been the Battery Commander) to tell me that I was being 
deceived and that one of my senior NCOs was suffering because of it.  He 
deliberately manipulated the situation by behaving as might be expected of a 
subordinate who is drunk, whilst actually having taken little or no alcohol up to 
that point. 
 
 Here, the description allows us to identify the means whereby an individual 
agent found it comparatively simple to use the unstated conventions modelled in one of 
the social structures to exercise his own agenda. 
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Case Three: A Dramatic Contrast 
 
A researcher’s observation during a late stage in recruit training: “Recruits are 
keenly aware of the changes in treatment that occur within different locations, 
as one put it whilst on the final Battle Camp on the northern moors: ‘It’s better 
out here, not as strict as in barracks, you can have a laugh with the NCOs out 
here.  Everyone’s more relaxed in a way.’” 6 
 
Using the model: 
 
Recruits are sensitive to contrasting contexts.  One of them drew a sharp 
contrast between the barracks context, where the formal command structure 
tended to be the operating structure and the context of the final Battle Camp on 
the northern moors, where the functional structure and the informal structure 
tended to predominate. 
 
 We can see here how an incident described by a different researcher not only 
fits the pattern of the model but is also easily re-stated using its terms. 
 
Case Four: A Soldierly Complaint 
 
In an infantry battalion in barracks, and during an otherwise relatively slack 
period, when there had not been much to do, ‘The platoon were informed that 
they were working that weekend, information that produced general 
unhappiness.  Cundell commented that “I don't mind so much if you’re on 
exercise or something, you expect it.  But this is just work for work’s sake.  
Let’s get some hand grenades and blow up the head shed [top person in the 
management] or something”.  Various comments were aimed at the CSM, who 
was held to be responsible for this decision in lieu of any other members of the 
company command at the time.’ 7 
 
Using the model: 
When the platoon were told that they would have to work that weekend, after a 
week in which there had been little to do, there was general unhappiness among 
them.  Nobody minded working at weekends when there was soldierly work to 
be done, as when they were in the field on exercise where the functional 
structure would be predominant.  However, they perceived that this new work, 
outside the normal working hours of a unit in barracks was not consistent with 
the soldierly roles defined by the functional structure, and it was being imposed 
in what seemed to be an arbitrary manner through the formal command 
structure. This irritated Cundell so much that he made some violent (and almost 
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certainly empty) suggestions towards the man whom he saw was to blame, 
while talking informally with an operating group consisting of his friends in the 
context of the informal structure. 
 
 Once again, this case shows how the situation, words, and actions of soldiers 
reported by a different observer are amenable to description by a third party using the 
model. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A large number of further cases could be cited to continue to demonstrate the capability 
of the model to be used to describe soldiers’ behaviour, but there seems little advantage 
in taking up more space on a point which is self-evident.   These four cases show that 
soldiers’ behaviour can be described using the objective and structured terms in the 
model.  The added value which this simple procedure provides is that it shows how 
events reported in different places and by different researchers in the context of a 
British Army unit can be brought into a common frame of reference by expressing 
them in the model’s special terms.  Once they have been brought into this common 
frame of reference, they may be subjected to common treatment, for example a 
balanced comparison of equivalent features.  However, this is the least of the model’s 
capabilities and the easiest to demonstrate.  
 We now move on to the more exacting task of analysis, and, later, prediction. 
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SECTION THREE - APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE ANALYSIS OF 
PARTICULAR CASES 
 
In this section, we will go beyond pure description and use the model to analyse certain 
cases.  As this is a more sophisticated use of the model, a larger set of examples will be 
taken. 
 
Case Five: A Wise Sergeant Major 
 
When I had been away at university for my first year of undergraduate studies I 
had returned to my regiment, now deployed to Northern Ireland on an 
emergency tour, during the long vac [university summer holiday].  I settled 
rather uncomfortably into Headquarters Battery as a spare subaltern.   I had 
previously served exclusively in another battery, which was then deployed at 
some distance from where I was to spend my time, and most of the officers in 
the regiment had changed over while I had been away at university.   I therefore 
knew very few of the people I was with.   For me, it was a strange role and a 
strange place, populated largely by strangers. I had been affected by the free and 
easy life at Cambridge sufficiently to feel awkward about using the rank of a 
junior person as a term of address when I talked to them.  I would therefore do 
my best not to call them anything at all. This had obviously been noticed 
because after a few days one of the sergeant majors in HQ Battery whom I 
scarcely knew took me to one side and told me firmly that the NCOs had spent 
a great deal of effort achieving their ranks and needed to be addressed by them.  
I listened to his advice, changed my behaviour and found myself more 
comfortable almost immediately. 8 
 
Analysis: 
 
I had lost my feel for what I would later call the ‘social structures’ in the 
regiment.  Furthermore, I had been put in a position where I had very few 
existing relationships and as I had not taken part in the training for the 
deployment I did not have the skills that the other members of the unit had 
developed.  I was not therefore able to participate fully in the informal structure 
or the functional structure.  By adopting the no form of address term of address 
to the private soldiers and the NCOs I was indicating poor engagement with the 
formal command structure as well.  Because I was not in a relationship of 
association with any senior NCO at the time, the sergeant major used his 
relationship of informal access to correct my behaviour. 
 
 The analysis of this incident shows the factors that give a structurally weak 
position to a recently-arrived junior officer in a unit that has earlier undergone rigorous 
training and is already engaged in operations when he arrives.  It also shows how a 
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formally subordinate individual (in this case a warrant officer), even on slight 
acquaintance, can correct the behaviour of a superior and thus help him to attain 
credibility as an officer.  It also indicates the ease with which this can be accomplished 
without breaking any norms. 
 
Case Six: Celebrations, But Against the Turn of Events 
 
In 1985, a gun detachment in my battery (one of three gun batteries in the 
regiment) had won the annual ‘Best Gun Competition’, which was a much 
prized event.  The following year the competition came round again and another 
battery took the title, leaving our top gun second.  That evening we held a 
battery ‘smoker’ [informal all-ranks celebration], as did the other batteries.  It 
was a thoroughly enjoyable and boisterous event which included loud and 
enthusiastic singing, spontaneous speech-making, and special ‘Gunner’ party 
games.  The other batteries reported that we displayed a very high level of 
‘battery spirit’: the other battery senior NCOs told mine, in conversation in the 
sergeants’ mess, that we made the most noise and must therefore have had the 
most fun.  How could this be, as we had lost?9 
 
Analysis: 
 
The battery smoker was a celebration of the battery’s identity, drawing on the 
loyalty/identity structure.  The noisy activities were primarily a statement of our 
worth as we saw it, to which the failure to win was not relevant.  Whatever the 
result of the competition, we knew that we were really ‘the best’, and we made 
this clear through acting as a noisy loyalty/identity operating group consisting 
of all the members of the battery.   The surprise expressed by the other 
batteries’ senio r NCOs was communicated through their informal structure 
relationships in the private and informal environment of the sergeants’ mess.  
Their surprise reflected their beliefs that their batteries were ‘better’ than us: 
one battery had the Best Gun Trophy to prove it in their own eyes and the 
members of the third battery believed that we ought to be more ashamed at 
losing it than them who had simply failed to win it.  Thus each of the batteries 
had sound reasons to believe that they were ‘better’ than my battery.  This is a 
typical manifestation of the loyalty/identity structure. 
 
 Cases like these help to remind us that apparently anomalous behaviour may 
well result when the loyalty/identity structure is the operating structure. 
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Case Seven: An Ambitious Subaltern 
 
Harry Cooper, a subaltern in the same battery as myself, was military highly 
proficient and had considerable personal courage.  However, he was criticised 
by some of the soldiers under his command for ordering them to follow him 
into unnecessarily risky situations on operations in Northern Ireland.  Such 
orders naturally carried with them the implication that he would deal with them 
formally if they did not do what he said.  His soldiers believed that he was using 
them to impress his sub unit commander and his Commanding Officer with his 
prowess as a brave leader of men.  It was my personal judgement when I 
occasionally patrolled with him that they were right. This is not to question 
either his personal courage or his military proficiency: both were of a high 
order.  He was also noted by his peers for his assiduousness in speaking to the 
Commanding Officer and visiting senior officers (particularly the ones who 
might be in his reporting chain10) who were in a position to affect his future 
career.  
 
His fellow subalterns did not like him, and his men distrusted him, as evidenced 
by this extract from my fieldnotes: 
 
‘Harry continues to be difficult to get on with and annoys me intensely 
at times.  He and Bob [the other subaltern in the battery] don’t get on at 
all’ 11 
 
and this statement on a wall in the soldiers’ ablutions: 
 
‘Here we are in Snipers Alley 
Then comes cooper [sic] Dillys and Dallys 
Might as well all give it up 
As hes [sic] as much use as a stringless mop.’12 
 
‘Sniper’s Alley’ was the name given by the soldiers to a dangerous alleyway in 
the battery’s area of operations.  The accepted practice was to get through it 
quickly and aggressively.  Cooper, however, would court trouble by lingering in 
it.  As he led his patrol, the soldiers were forced to linger with him. 
 
Analysis: 
 
This is an example of an individual manipulating the military social structures 
to his own advantage: 
 
- Formal command structure: He made his soldiers take risks that they 
judged to be unnecessary by the use of formal authority. 
 
- Informal structure: He attempted to establish informal relationships of 
association with those who could influence his future career.  However, 
he was unable to sustain friendship of any closeness with his peers. 
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- Functional structure: By taking operational risks he was trying to 
establish a reputation as an operationally competent officer.  However, 
in the eyes of his solders, and myself, the risks he was taking were 
greater than the conventions of the functional structure would require. 
 
The price of these activities was paid in the informal structure within the unit.  
His informal relationships with his soldiers were impoverished by what they 
saw as his self-centred attitude to their lives,  and he failed to form any strong 
friendships with his fellow subalterns because they disliked what they saw as 
selfish behaviour. 
 
Although Cooper did not wield his formal authority constantly (indeed, like all 
of us, he exercised all four structures in the normal way), his soldiers 
accompanied him in his risky activity at least in part because they knew that 
formal sanctions were available to him, and this factor gave them little choice in 
the matter. 
 
 This case highlights the means whereby an ambitious individual can manipulate 
the norms and conventions represented in the model of social structures to further his 
own ends, and the consequences that flow for his reputation among his subordinates 
and peers.  It also illuminates our understanding of the capacity of the formal command 
structure to act as a constantly available resource for commanders, even when it is not 
the operating structure, an aspect which we explored towards the end of Chapter Three. 
 
Case Eight: A Difficult Sub Unit Commander 
 
In this next case, my informant speaks of his time as RSM in an infantry 
battalion that was on a two-year operational tour in Northern Ireland.  Battalions 
in this position had a ‘reserve’ role and were called upon to reinforce troops on 
shorter term deployments as necessary.  It was the practice on such a tour to 
give the soldiers as much time off as possible because no one knew when they 
would be required to work at full stretch and for how long.  A newly arrived 
company commander had begun his tour by working his soldiers excessively 
hard: 
 
  “...his own ideas of how to run his company was a little bit... SAS-ish shall I 
say.”13   
 
Such was the impact on the soldiers’ morale (and consequently on their 
performance) that his company sergeant major attempted to advise the company 
commander to ease up, 
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“The guys were meeting themselves coming off [exercise].  There was no social 
life happening at all. It was all, bloody well cut and thrust and ‘Let’s go!’ and 
people were performing badly because they weren’t having time to recover... It 
was just bumping on from one bloody crisis to another.  The company sergeant 
major advised him, and spoke to him about it but no, the company commander 
wasn’t having any of it. He was having it the way he wanted it.  If the platoon 
commanders weren’t performing they were chopped off at the knees and thrown 
into the waste pile and get someone else along.” 
 
Having failed to convince the company commander, the company sergeant 
major then approached the RSM and made him privately aware of what was 
going on.  He first approached him in the sergeants’ mess and subsequently 
came to see him in his office. 
 
“And then I [the RSM] went to the Commanding Officer the following day.  I 
left it for a day, and went in to see the CO the next day rather than going in 
from now, straight into his office with the sergeant major going that way and 
the company commander getting called up there.14 ... The Commanding Officer 
... played it quite correctly, so he then left a time, and then, either in the office 
or in the mess, whatever, he spoke [to him].” 
 
A little later the sub unit commander became less intense in his requirements of 
his soldiers. 
 
Analysis: 
 
By over-stressing function, the sub unit commander was not allowing enough 
time for the informal and loyalty/identity structures to be exercised, and the 
soldiers’ morale was dropping.  He had the balance wrong. 
 
The sergeant major was able to approach his sub unit commander both because 
he was directly subordinate to him in the formal command structure and 
because he would have had at least informal access to him, if not a developing 
relationship of association.  He also had responsibilities within the 
loyalty/identity structure for the reputation of the sub unit within the unit, and 
within the functional structure for the efficiency of the soldiers.  
 
Once he had failed to convince the sub unit commander, the sergeant major 
brought the matter indirectly to the sub unit commander’s formal superior, the 
Commanding Officer.  He did so by exploiting an informal relationship with the 
RSM (approaching him first in the sergeants’ mess), knowing that the RSM 
could approach the Commanding Officer either formally through his position in 
the formal command structure, or informally, using the relationship of 
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association with him.  The CSM thus used the informal structure to overcome 
what he saw as a barrier in the formal command structure. 
 
Whatever happened next is not recorded: the correction of a senior member of a 
unit is a delicate matter because, if handled badly, it can undermine his position 
in all four structures.  In any case, it would have taken place in private.  
However, it is clear that it had the effect that the company sergeant major 
desired because the training pressure was lifted from the soldiers in his 
company.  It should be noted that all this took place without the need for a 
public confrontation at any stage. 
 
 This analysis by the model clearly reveals the existence and importance of the 
various means of communication available through the informal relationships in the 
informal structure.  It also shows us that the speaker, the RSM, saw no disloyalty on 
the part of the company sergeant major, indicating that it was accepted between them 
that, where there was a conflict, the collective interests of the soldiers came above the 
wishes of the sub unit commander. 
 
Case Nine: the Missing Cannon Balls 
 
This next informant, a Royal Engineer, was remembering an overseas tour when he was 
a junior NCO clerk: 
 
“Not many people in our squadron liked the... I don’t know what he was 
called... the Commander of the British Forces in the [overseas base].  And 
outside of his office he had eight cannon balls - three on the base, outside of his 
door, one on the top.  And to get from our accommodation you had to go across 
the square, past his office to our squadron bar. ... I used to do Duty Clerks [24 
hour duty] in the headquarters building.  And one day the Commander’s cannon 
balls went missing.  And he guessed it was the Sappers that did it.  I was on 
duty the night that they went missing.  So he called me in, he said ‘Find my 
cannon balls’.  So he used me to get his cannon balls back, because he knew I 
was a Sapper.  ...  And I did.  I didn’t personally find them.  Right, I got the 
word round the squadron that ‘you'd better have the cannon balls back p.d.q. 
[pretty damned quick] otherwise the squadron’s in deep shit.’ ... I didn’t know 
who had taken them. ... I was the vehicle to say ‘Get those cannon balls back or 
we’re in deep shit.  The squadron’s in deep shit - the OC downwards.’  And 
they came back.  So I was the vehicle but I never knew who... you see at the 
time I was also the squadron barman so I knew a lot of the people.  I knew what 
was going on.”15 
 
Analysis: 
177 
 
In taking the cannon balls, the soldiers were communicating their dislike of the 
Commander by exercising informal revenge.  However, as in most cases of 
informal revenge the action taken was easily reversible but made the point 
clearly and anonymously. 
 
The Commander reacted, also using informal means, by exploiting communications 
channels in the informal structure to get the cannon balls back.  Rather than making an 
official complaint to the OC of the sapper squadron, he got his message round by using 
his relationship of informal access with one of the clerks who worked in his 
headquarters.  It is likely that the Commander deliberately chose this individual for the 
task because he was also a barman in the squadron bar and therefore had a very good 
network of informal relationships and thus a quick and usable system of informal 
communications. 
 
In passing on the implied threat of sanctions, the junior NCO was using the 
formal command structure.  The soldiers reacted informally by replacing the 
cannon balls.  
 
 This case highlights four important aspects of British Army life.  First, we see 
that all the actions took place using the conventions modelled in the informal structure, 
which indicates the widespread possibilities for individual and collective action 
provided by these conventions.  It also indicates, as the previous case does, the 
existence of a many-branched set of informal communications available to all agents.  
Thirdly, it shows the nodal position of a comparatively junior individual, in this case a 
junior NCO, who has informal relationships both with figures of authority and with his 
peers.  This individual had formal and informal links with the Commander British 
Forces, and loyalty/identity and informal links with his fellow Royal Engineers.  
Finally, we see again the availability of the formal command structure to a senior 
person as a potential resource: even though he never raised the stakes to formal 
disciplinary action the commander was able informally to issue a credible threat to do 
so. 
 
Case Ten: A Quarrel in the Mess 
 
The context for this incident was an evening in the officers’ mess at a training camp in 
Germany.  I was one of the three gun battery commanders in the unit that was under 
training, during a regimental firing camp 16. 
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During the earlier part of the day, my battery had been firing under my direction 
for a helicopter-mounted observer, using ammunition allocated specifically for 
the training of that observer from a central training pool.  A few hundred metres 
away one of my fellow battery commanders, Jim Stirk, was exercising his 
battery in a simulated operational scenario.  Unfortunately, we had a very 
limited supply of ammunition overall and the regimental second- in-command, 
Paul Roberts, had decided that we would share it between us, ignoring the fact 
that much of it was supposed to be fired exclusively for the training of the 
helicopter-mounted observer.   He had made this clear to Jim Stirk, but not to 
me, as he had been in a hurry to meet an appointment that was going to take 
him away from the regiment for a few days.  Inevitably, as the ammunition 
dwindled, Jim and I had a disagreement over the radio as to who should use it.   
 
In the officers’ mess that evening, the atmosphere was tense, as two battery 
commanders had had a public disagreement.  A third, Gerry Smyth, took the 
part of Jim and tried to upbraid me.  Gerry was a technically highly proficient 
officer, selected for battery command at an early age, but he was hard to like 
because he was unambiguously ambitious and tended to become aggressive 
under pressure.  I was not prepared to accept his criticism, and, angry as I was, I 
told him not to be silly, turned my back on him and ignored him.  The 
atmosphere became yet more tense.  The other officers said nothing and looked 
away, but it was obvious that they were waiting for the next development. 
 
By now I had begun to realize that the problem was caused by Paul’s failure to 
make the ownership of the ammunition clear, and Jim had acted in good faith.  
As Paul was not there he could not clear the matter up.  In the mean time, we 
were all becoming more and more uncomfortable. 
 
I resolved the situation by going over to Jim, apologising, and offering to buy 
him a drink.  He accepted my apology and a normal atmosphere asserted itself 
in the mess.17 
 
Analysis: 
 
During the day, Jim and I had each acted in accordance with the importance that 
we had individually placed on our respective exercises, using the resources of 
the functional structure to inform our attitudes and actions towards the limited 
supply of ammunition.  Had we been told the same thing about its purpose, we 
would have cooperated, but our perceptions were at variance. 
 
Whereas we had been able to sustain our functional disagreement during the 
day, the officers’ mess, a place where the operating structure was expected to 
be the informal structure, was an inappropriate setting in which to develop or 
prolong it.  We all felt uncomfortable, which probably gave Gerry Smyth the 
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feeling that he ought to do something about it and prompted what I saw as his 
irritating intervention. 
 
Even though I could see by now the real cause of the problem, I knew that it 
could not be resolved properly without waiting for Paul Roberts’ return, which 
would be too late to prevent a build-up of resentment.  After a little thought, I 
took the blame because it was clear to me that the losses involved in 
compromising an informal relationship of friendship with Jim were greater than 
the loss of face I would suffer in apologizing. 
 
The peace offering of a drink was highly appropriate to the informal setting of 
the officers’ mess, and it was well timed because it enabled Jim to co-operate in 
deflating our quarrel in an informal way. 
 
The constant element of superiority and inferiority was evident in the lack of 
intervention by any of the other officers present in the mess, all of whom were 
junior to the battery commanders. 
 
 The main point that emerges from this analysis is the sharp and widely 
understood difference between the functional context, where disagreement was 
possible, and the informal context where disagreement was not appropriate. 
 
Case Eleven: Disgraceful Behaviour 
 
Whilst a unit was deployed on operations, the families’ officer (a man 
commissioned after long service in the ranks) was, as is usual, left behind in 
UK.  During the tour he had an extra-marital affair with the RSM’s wife while 
her husband was away with the unit.  This RSM had been brought in from 
another Regiment because none of the warrant officers in the unit had been 
judged to be suitable, and so he was viewed as an outsider.  The behaviour of 
the families officer was considered to be inexcusable, and he was sacked: the 
interviewee who described the incident called it “a form of incest”.  The RSM 
left as well, according to the interviewee because he had lost his credibility with 
the sergeants’ mess.  This created a vacuum and the then TQMS [Technical 
Quartermaster Sergeant], one of the most senior warrant officers class 2 in the 
unit who had been passed over earlier, was given the post of RSM. 
 
While the families officer and the RSM’s wife were having their affair in UK, 
the Commanding Officer was having his own, open, extra-marital affair with a 
civilian aid worker.  However, he was neither sacked nor punished.  He served a 
full tour as Commanding Officer and was subsequently promoted.  None of his 
officers or men spoke badly of him in interviews.  One interviewee described 
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the Commanding Officer’s marriage as in difficulties before the affair, and 
implied that his action had been very understandable.18 
 
Analysis: 
 
At first sight, this case has the appearance of a manifestation of the British class 
system, as a man who had seen long service in the ranks was punished whilst 
the Commanding Officer, who had committed the same moral offence, was not.  
However, this does not explain the removal of the RSM, an innocent party to 
his wife’s adultery.  This thesis’s model of social structures provides a different 
and revealing axis of analysis, as follows. 
 
- The unit had had to accept a man from outside its bounds as RSM.  It 
seems probable that the loyalty/identity structure was taxed by this 
arrival of an incomer to such an important post.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that he was vulnerable to rejection should the opportunity 
arise.  His wife’s affair provided the opportunity for the unit to reject 
him, using the reason that his position as RSM was compromised. 
 
- Furthermore, as the RSM was an outsider, he would not have had the 
automatic personal support that might have come if he had a long 
standing set of relationships of association (and dormant friendships) 
with his sergeants’ mess members and with the officers.  What was 
expressed as his loss of credibility was therefore inevitable, and due 
more to his structural position as an outsider than to his personal 
attributes or competence. 
 
- The appointment of the TQMS, a member of the unit who had 
previously been passed over for promotion to the position of RSM, fitted 
much more comfortably with the loyalty/identity structure. 
 
- The families’ officer had clearly abused his position of responsibility, 
as set by the functional structure, and it was very reasonable to send him 
away from the unit.  Furthermore, his illicit relationship with a woman 
who was married to a member of the unit, albeit an outsider, was a gross 
violation of the conventions of the informal structure and the  
loyalty/identity structure. 
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- The Commanding Officer, on the other hand, had his affair with a 
woman who was nothing to do with the unit, and so there was no 
question of ‘incest’, or transgression of the informal or loyalty/identity 
structures.  As a full member of the loyalty/identity structure of the unit, 
his soldiers were inclined to be open-minded and forgiving about his 
conduct. 
 
 Analysis using the model therefore demonstrates that, whatever other external 
forces were at work, the conventions represented in the loyalty/identity structure played 
a particularly important part in the acceptance by members of the unit of the different 
outcomes to the two extra-marital affairs, and the lack of personal support for the RSM 
may have been the product of his lack of long standing informal relationships in the 
unit.  It also demonstrates the power of the model to work in complex and potentially 
highly charged cases. 
 
Case Twelve: A Successful Amalgamation 
 
Amalgamations are frequently difficult because they involve the sudden 
pushing together of social structures from different units.  This, however, is a 
case where amalgamation went smoothly. 
 
Two Royal Armoured Corps units amalgamated to form one unit during one of 
the periodic reductions in size of the Army.  Knowing that successful 
amalgamations are difficult to achieve, the Commanding Officer of the new unit 
and his Second- in-Command together decided on the following measures: 
 
- As both old units were being moved to a new barracks to form the new 
unit, there would be a deliberate change of unit identity for each person 
arriving at the new barracks.  Each man would wear the special 
distinctions of dress of the new unit from the moment he arrived in the 
new barracks and the new name of the amalgamated unit was to be used 
from the first opportunity to distinguish it from the names of the two 
amalgamating units. 
 
- There would be two amalgamation parades: one private one just for the 
members of the new unit and their families shortly after the new unit 
was set up, and a larger-scale public one rather later.  Both parades were 
to emphasise both the new unit’s identity and the new sub units’ 
identities. 
 
- The deployment of each individual was carefully managed so that 
every group, down to the four-man crew of a tank, contained at least one 
man from each of the two amalgamating regiments.  
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Beyond the control of the Commanding Officer, there was also a great deal of 
training to do, and a great number of military commitments.  Most members of 
the unit reported that they had hardly ever been so busy. 
 
The amalgamation was successful in that cohesion in the new unit was achieved 
quickly and with little difficulty.19 
 
Analysis: 
 
The Commanding Officer and his Second- in-Command carefully manipulated 
the formal command, loyalty/identity and informal structures of the new unit to 
give the best chance of achieving unit cohesion quickly.   
 
- Making each soldier adopt the regimental distinctions of the new unit on arrival in the 
new barracks began the process of locating all the members in the new loyalty/identity 
structure. 
 
- This process was enhanced by the strict use of the new regiment’s name as 
early as possible. 
 
- The two amalgamation parades exploited the flexibility of the loyalty/identity 
structure.  The private one had a unifying effect downwards into the body of the 
unit and the public one proclaimed the identity of the new unit to the rest of the 
Army.  In both cases the sub units’ identities were enacted in the presence of the 
other sub units.  Thus both unit and sub unit levels of the loyalty/identity 
structure were exercised. 
 
- The deliberate mixing of soldiers from the two original units down to vehicle 
crew level meant that they had to unite in the functional structure, and it 
prevented rivalry between elements of the two old units. 
 
- This process also ensured that the lower levels of the new loyalty/identity 
structure united soldiers from the different old units in the belief that their new 
groupings were ‘the best’. 
 
- It also meant the single private soldiers and single junior NCOs from the two 
amalgamating units were evenly mixed in the barracks accommodation.  This 
mixing ensured the growth of informal bonding between members of the 
different old regiments.  Essentially, therefore, a set of new relationships of 
friendship were created by manipulating the accommodation plot. 
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- The heavy task load, due to training and other commitments and the two 
amalgamation parades, exercised the functional structure of the new unit. 
 
 In this case, the careful manipulation and exercising of elements described in 
the model as being from all four social structures created a positive atmosphere in the 
unit, and the soldiers accepted the amalgamation more easily than many external 
observers expected. 
 This is a particularly interesting case because it very closely followed principles 
that could have been derived from the model: many elements modelled in each of the 
social structures were exercised and all were given particular emphasis at various 
times.  However, the model was not available at the time and what was done had its 
origins purely in the military instincts of those who made the plans and carried them 
out.  As the Commanding Officer subsequently said to me, “All we did was sit down 
and think it through from first principles.”20   The fact that the plans fall so easily under 
the categories generated in the model is a strong indication therefore that it is provides 
a good encapsulation of military instinct.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing section has demonstrated the model’s power to analyse soldier’s 
behaviour in a way that enhances our understanding and illuminates certain elements 
that might otherwise be difficult to detect.  Not only does such an analysis help to 
identify some of the social undercurrents affecting their behaviour, but also it helps to 
explain events that flow against an external observer’s intuitive expectations. 
 
SECTION FOUR: APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO PREDICTING 
SOLDIERS’ BEHAVIOUR 
 
This section takes this capacity of the model to explain soldiers’ behaviour after it has 
taken place onto a further stage by examining its ability to act as a tool for prediction of 
soldiers’ behaviour before it is known.  It does so by providing the observer with the 
means to model the situation that he or she is observing, and its background, and then 
to make projections into the as yet unknown. 
 The model’s predictive power in the small scale interactions of life between 
soldiers at regimental duty should by now be obvious from the earlier sections in this 
chapter, and from Chapter Three.  We may predict with confidence, for example, that a 
relationship of association is likely to arise between any adjutant and his chief clerk, 
that formal terms of address will be used on any particular parade, and that soldiers 
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who are friends will choose to eat together at their next opportunity.  We may also say 
that it is likely that soldiers who are incompetent in their military skills will not have 
much prestige among their peers, and that an individual with many channels of 
communication at his disposal will use informal means in preference to formal means. 
 This section now goes beyond this general minor level and examines a small 
number of specific cases where the predictive power of the model was specifically 
demonstrated on the larger scale.   
 It must be understood that the number of specific larger scale predictions that I 
was able to substantiate is small because the scope and structure of my research 
precluded my checking of the accuracy of many of the predictions I made.  There are 
two main reasons.  First, I was not able to revisit the units where I had gathered 
interview material, so the outcome of most of the predictions that I made during these 
visits is not known. Second, the other data I have gathered were either gained before 
the model was sufficiently mature for predictions to be possible, or were gained outside 
the context of regimental duty when I was collecting recollections of past events, which 
precluded prediction. 
 Nevertheless, there are a small number of cases where I found specific large 
scale predictions confirmed, and these affirm the predictive power of the model. 
 
Case Thirteen: the CO’s Options for Correcting A Sub Unit Commander 
 
Whilst building up scenarios to discuss with my informants, I generated an 
imaginary case of a sub unit commander (major) who would not listen to advice 
from his sergeant major, and persisted in making his sub unit work too hard. At 
the time I had no idea that I would come across an actual case for discussion 
(see Case Eight on pages 174 to 176).  An important part of the scenario was the 
interview between the CO and the major during which the major was made to 
see the error of his ways.  Such an interview would have been a important 
incident in the life of a unit (although it would be in private) because the 
correction of the behaviour of a senior member of a unit’s management is a 
significant event.  To make the case sound convincing, I used the four-structure 
model to generate from first principles possible options for lines of approach for 
the CO as follows: 
 
- He could have disciplined the sub unit commander (formal command 
structure),  
 
- He could have had a quiet but firm word with him, exploiting such 
factors as “the good of the battalion” (loyalty/identity structure) or 
“we’ve known each other for some time and I can see that something is 
185 
wrong” (informal structure) “or you have a job to do, and you’re getting 
it wrong” (functional structure).21   
 
During the interview from which Case Nine is taken, I put these possibilities to 
the informant, whose reply is illuminating: 
 
“I think you’ve covered the ways that it would go and that I would see it 
go.”22 
 
 In this case I had used the model to produce a scenario that I had not 
experienced and from that scenario to derive from first principles what I saw as a 
plausible plot.  In fact, I had generated a set of options that appeared convincing to an 
individual who had indeed been involved in just such a situation and who declared that 
I had correctly predicted the available options. 
 
Case Fourteen: An Unbalanced Policy 
 
The Commanding Officer of one of the units that I visited held strongly that the 
only thing that was important for his unit was function.  He saw success and 
failure solely in terms of good military operational performance and the training 
that had to be done to achieve it.  Having spoken to him, informed by the 
model, I noted that his approach was unbalanced in favour of the elements 
captured in the concept of the functional structure.  I therefore predicted a 
decline in morale and performance in the unit because the soldiers were not 
being allowed time to exercise the elements modelled in the other three social 
structures to the same extent 23.  
 
In a subsequent interview, an experienced officer who had observed this unit 
closely declared that their morale became ‘brittle’ in the year following my 
visit, and that although their peacetime performance had held up he would not 
have wanted to trust them on operations.24  This view was confirmed by an 
officer of that unit who uncompromisingly said to me that morale was ‘low’ at 
the time he joined it, about a year after I had conducted my research and made 
the prediction25. 
 
 This is a case where a simple prediction based on the model came true, 
unambiguously demonstrating its predictive powers.  It is also an interesting 
confirmation of the fact that, as is clear from the model, military performance is more 
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than the product of training alone (functional structure) but also depends on the other 
aspects that are modelled in the other three social structures. 
 
Case Fifteen: Behaviour Patterns of Soldiers Who Take Illegal Drugs 
 
Drawing on the model, I predicted that if a soldier was indulging in behaviour 
that would meet with the disapproval of his peers then he would be unlikely to 
form friendships in the same pattern as other soldiers who did not behave in this 
disapproved of way, whatever it might be.  He would be in a very small 
minority in the unit, possibly a minority of one, depending on the behaviour at 
issue.   
 
I noted that the taking of illegal drugs (referred to hereafter as ‘drug abuse’) at 
regimental duty was considered unprofessional by all my informants who 
expressed an opinion on the subject.  As a junior NCO put it to me clearly and 
to the point, 
 
“Soldiers really do not like the feeling that they may have to rely on 
someone who might be whacked out of their minds.”26 
 
I therefore developed the original prediction into a further one, that those who 
take illegal drugs would tend to be shunned by their peers and seek out the few 
available like-minded individuals.  Those individuals would form the core of 
their group of friends in that they would share a profound interest, trust each 
other, and look to each other for supplies of the drugs.   Such like-minded 
individuals would be likely to be scattered at random within the unit, or indeed 
the garrison.   Having observed that the majority of private soldiers’ and junior 
NCOs’ friendships were within the sub unit27, I therefore predicted that private 
soldiers and junior NCOs who regularly took illegal drugs would form a higher 
than usual proportion of their friendships outside the sub unit. 
 
There  is a remarkable consistency in the interview material which I gathered 
after I made this prediction that confirms it.  For example, a junior NCO told 
me, 
 
‘that the drug using fraternity all share a close personal habit and that 
therefore form a close bond of friendship.  Best friends share secrets.  
Drug abuse is a secret.  Drug users will therefore form cliques.  As drug 
abuse is rare they will therefore form cliques where they can find 
like-minded friends.’28 
187 
 
and another junior NCO: 
 
“[It spoils friendships] because I don’t want to know anybody that does 
drugs and I’m sure a lot of people... [are the same]. ...  But a lot of 
people, whenever they smoke drugs they stay in a clique with certain 
people and them cliques become tighter and they go away from the 
group.” 
 
“And would those cliques be from more than one company?” 
 
“Yeah.  Always.”29  
and 
 
‘[From a group session of senior NCOs] They raised the question of drugs and social 
patterns.  They said that drug misfits would gang together because they had shared 
interests.’30  
 
and from interview notes with a private soldier: 
 
‘I asked about activities about which the other soldiers might 
disapprove, without being specific.  He said that someone doing 
something disapproved of would find it difficult to make friends.  In that 
case he would find a like-minded friend or friends outside the [sub 
unit].’31 
 
and from an officer who had had to deal with a drug abuser in the rear party he 
commanded: 
 
“...on the Rear Party, ... one was a young soldier from the Depot ... He 
made very few friends within even his own peers who came from the 
Depot with him. And he was hanging around people from other 
regiments.”32  
 
and from a conversation with an Guards RSM: 
 
‘He told me that such people had few friends, only really like-minded 
individuals, and they formed a little group that was not based on a 
company.’33 
 
Some time after making the original prediction, having observed the increasing 
toleration of drug abuse in general British Society (especially among the young, 
the pool from which soldiers are recruited) I speculated about a situation where 
drug abuse might become something that was informally tolerated by the junior 
soldiers.  I predicted that in that case there would be a strong tendency for the 
majority of drug abusers to take drugs out of the military context and to separate 
it from any activity that involved military training or deployment on operations.  
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My reason was that it was incompatible with the conventions of the functional 
structure. 
 
I followed up these predictions in March 2001 by talking to an experienced 
member of the Royal Military Police who had been involved in investigating 
drug abuse for the past 15 years.  He confirmed both of my predictions.  In the 
first part of his service, the RMP investigators had used the pattern of 
‘associates’ of suspected drug abusers as an axis of investigation, having 
discovered that the friendship patterns of such drug abusers tended to be along 
the lines I had predicted.  But now that drug abuse was more widely tolerated in 
British society, the pattern had changed and a drug abuser’s associates were as 
likely to come from his sub unit as not.  However, soldiers very seldom mixed 
drug taking with soldierly activity and drugs were hardly ever found on 
operations.34 
 
Conclusion 
 
The predictive power of the model for the minutiae of soldiers’ lives is self-evident, 
and its power in larger scale issues has been demonstrated by these three examples.  
We may therefore say with confidence that prediction of soldier’s behaviour, both 
individual and collective is made possible by use of the model.  At whatever scale, the 
model may be said to encapsulate what an insider would feel is likely to happen, and 
might therefore be used by either an insider or an outsider to gain insight into any 
situation within a unit and its likely outcome.   
 We will now explore the limitations of the model before we compare it with 
other models that cover soldiers’ lives at regimental duty. 
 
SECTION FIVE: ASSESSMENT 
 
The model has been shown to be capable of describing, analysing, and predicting 
soldiers’ behaviour.  Furthermore, because of the rigour of the language of the special 
terms within the model and the model’s clear and simple structure, there seems to be 
every chance that different observers using it would produce similar descriptions, 
analyses and predictions. 
 This assertion has been supported by the reaction of the dozen or so military 
audiences to whom I have presented the model over the past six years and then offered 
cases for on-the-spot description and analysis.  They found the model intuitive and easy 
to use.  More significantly, every soldier to whom I have described the model, 
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including many of my interviewees (rank ranged from private soldier to major general), 
has said that it provides a good description of their lives at regimental duty. 
 However, as is the case with all models, this model can only provide an 
approximation to the ground truth and therefo re has certain limitations which will now 
be examined.  They fall into two main groups, those limitations that are to do with the 
model’s boundaries, and those limitations concerned with its practical use. 
 
Limitations to the model: boundaries 
 
The first set of limitations concerns the definition of the boundaries of the model: what 
it includes and what falls outside its scope.  First, it has an impermeable outer edge, in 
that it is bounded at unit level.  Second, it does not deal very well with soldiers’ 
behaviour which falls outside the typical pattern because it is focused on norms: 
collectively held attitudes and expectations and shared mental models of what is seen as 
natural and normal. There is an inherent assumption in the model that unit members 
will behave in ways that are consistent with the social structures.  Specific areas of 
difficulty are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Outer edge of the model 
 
First, as noted in Chapter One, this is essentially a ‘zoomed in study’ 35 that does not 
cover the wider context of events or individuals’ social relationships outside the unit: it 
artificially treats the unit as a discrete and self-contained social element.   
 This limitation of scope is of course a feature of most models, which usually 
have edges as a matter of design to make them usable 36.  However, these limitations 
have implications for this model which we need to acknowledge and assess. 
 There are many reasons why the unit can legitimately be considered as a 
discrete element for analytical purposes.  Unlike many social groupings, military units 
have clearly defined physical and social boundaries, membership is unambiguous and 
the members both work and live together for extended periods of time during 
operational deployments and exercises.  As Kier says of the US military, it ‘creates an 
encompassing environment, integrated around collective goals and relatively isolated 
from civilian life’37, thus echoing Goffman’s observations about ‘total institutions’ 
which we visited in Chapter One 38. 
 There are, however, some areas of difficulty with this approach.  While it may 
be legitimate to exclude general political and social events that take place outside the 
unit, it could be argued that the model has a weakness in excluding the external social 
and personal contacts that are part of the regular lives of the individuals who comprise 
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the unit.  Those soldiers who have friends and family away from their place of duty 
correspond with them, talk to them on the telephone, and visit them during their off-
duty time (and especially during their periods of leave).  Furthermore, those soldiers 
who are living in married quarters combine their family lives simultaneously with 
exercising membership of their unit.  
 It can confidently be argued that the disregard of soldiers’ more distant family 
and social links is perfectly legitimate, because these links hardly impinge on the 
contexts to which the model applies.  However, the absence of engagement in the 
model with the families of married accompanied soldiers is harder to justify and must 
be accepted as a weakness in the model.  Having accepted this omission as a limitation, 
it must be said that it has precedents in the social science literature on the British Army, 
for example: 
 
‘I would have liked to have written a chapter, or more, on the position of Army 
spouses and the parents of soldiers.  Unfortunately my field work often centred 
on single soldiers and dealt with Army wives mainly from the perspectives of 
their husbands, which no doubt did not give an entirely balanced perspective.  
In the absence of better data, and additional space, I considered it fairer to leave 
the debate with Jolly’s excellent discussion of the topic (1987/9239).’40  
 
and no other model has yet been produced which manages the incorporation of this 
missing element. 
 This exclusion of married accompanied soldiers’ families must be accepted as a 
limitation in the model, if a necessary one.  An observer using the model should 
therefore bear this omission in mind and be on the alert for the possible influence of 
family matters. 
 
Agency 
 
Another area of potential weakness in the model is that it does not predict the effects of 
an individual’s attitude and personal agenda.  It is certainly possible to use the model to 
describe and analyse in retrospect the chain of events and the social relationships in a 
situation where an agent with a strong personality attempts to dominate a situation.  
However, the model has little capacity to predict if or when a strong-willed individual 
will choose to oppose the norms represented in the model or attempt to force the 
outcome of particular situations from a position of social weakness.  Nor can it predict 
what will happen when they do.  For example, in the following situation a private 
soldier (the narrator) has irritated his sergeant, George Simms, and the sergeant is 
attempting to resolve the situation unofficially.  Their platoon is on a route march in an 
isolated spot and the sergeant is in charge, with Corporal Brown as his second in 
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command.  There are no other troops around and the sergeant has reached the end of his 
tether with the speaker, 
 
“He [Sergeant Simms] just said, ‘Corporal Brown, take the rest of the platoon 
on.’  And he and I stayed back and Brown took the rest of the platoon on and 
sort of three or four hundred metres down the track.  I always remember George 
Simms saying to me, ‘So, you think you're a boy do you?  One of the boys?  Put 
it there!’, and he was inviting me to hit him, and I was inviting him to hit me 
first.” 
 
Comment : Although the situation could be described and analysed using the model,  as 
an attempt to exert unofficial punishment (an illegitimate secondary adjustment), 
without knowing the individuals concerned it would be impossible for the model to 
predict what the outcome of this incident would have been because so much depended 
on the reaction of the private soldier.  It was entirely dependent on his personal feelings 
whether he struck out or held back.  Similarly, the sergeant’s subsequent response 
would depend on his own reaction to what the private soldier did.  As it turned out, the 
private held back and sergeant was deprived of the opportunity to hurt him: 
 
[Continuing] “I remember being quite cool, calm, and let the whole thing... 
Young as I was, and the short time I had been in the Battalion and I was sort of 
taking on this guy, you know, verbally, and in the end you know, he sort of 
clipped me round the head and said, ‘Right, let’s join the rest of the platoon.’  
And off we went.”41 
 
 Similarly, the suite of informal relationships in the model does not allow for 
cases such as that alluded to on page 109 of Chapter Three, in which the mutual dislike 
of two parties exceeds the capacity of the control mechanisms described in the model.  
For example: 
 
‘[The interviewee, a member of an armoured regiment] then told me about a 
certain QM(Tech) and a certain Squadron Leader [sub unit commander in an 
armoured regiment] who had fallen out. ... In this particular case, they had 
fallen out in such a big way that neither would speak to the other, and they had 
a very obvious mutual distaste for each other.  This was exemplified in a 
shouting match on one particular exercise [presumably not a private affair].  
This relationship was never sorted out, and only ceased to be acute when they 
were posted apart through the natural processes.’42 
 
 A further situation which falls at least partially outside the model is that in 
which an agent deliberately absents himself from the military social structures.  
Consider this case, which is a summary of an interview I conducted with a private 
soldier while he was serving a sentence of detention in a unit guardroom for going 
absent without leave43: 
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His personal life was “full of hassle” and he felt that it was all too much for 
him.  He therefore decided to go AWOL and move in with his long standing 
girlfriend and their daughter in his home town [well away from his duty 
station].  He knew from his experience in the Army that almost all absentees 
either give themselves up or are recaptured in the end and so his absence was 
likely to be temporary.  He also knew that his duties would have to be shared 
among the remaining members of his troop or platoon, and that it was a unit 
custom that they would therefore appropriate some or all of his military 
equipment to pay him back.  Nevertheless he decided to go, and disappeared at 
the end of a period of leave.   
 
His absence was reported to the unit Adjutant, who informed the Commanding 
Officer and put his name on a formal list of ‘absentees’.  At the same time, the 
authorities in his sub unit asked his friends to try to contact him and persuade 
him to return. 
 
During his absence he lived with his girlfriend and had some form of paid 
employment. 
 
Analysis: 
 
 Some of what happened can be described with reference to the model: 
 
- He decided to reject the authority of the formal command structure, though he 
knew that he would have to submit himself to it again at some stage in the 
future. 
 
- He subordinated the claims upon him of the loyalty/identity and informal 
structures to his personal desires and obligations.  He knew that this would 
confer an informal right on his room-mates to take items of his military kit (a 
legitimate secondary adjustment) 
 
- He removed himself from the functional structure, in the knowledge that other 
people would have to perform his share of unliked jobs such as guards and 
fatigues. 
 
- His superiors took appropriate formal (disciplinary) action, but then tried to 
use the informal structure to persuade him to return. 
 
 However, this is not a complete picture.  The following factors outside the 
model probably also applied: 
 
- Personal emotion towards his girlfriend and their daughter. 
 
- The general acceptance of cohabitation outside marriage in British Society, 
but not at that time in the British Army, which forced them to live apart because 
they were not entitled to a married quarter44. 
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- A psychological profile that allowed him to justify to himself his rejection of 
authority. 
 
- Childhood experiences and upbringing that made him willing to subordinate 
military loyalty and duty to personal ties. 
 
- The existence of agencies outside the Army who paid him a wage which 
allowed him to sustain himself and his household. 
 
Finally, there is no room in the model for soldiers who habitually go beyond the 
boundaries of the ideas, rules, and conventions of their daily lives at regimental duty, or 
do not feel significantly affected or bound by them.  For the purpose of this thesis, I 
have called such individuals rogue agents.  Here we are not considering the effect in 
certain limited contexts of the attitudes and agendas of the agents present, but rather 
agents who normally consider themselves outside the norms, or are not sensitive to 
them.   Here is an example from the interview material45.  The interviewee is a private 
soldier whom I described in my fieldnotes as: 
 
‘Apparently unflappable and seemed gently amused by the whole experience of 
being interviewed.’ 
 
This is the way he described his attitude to the chain of command during a domestic 
crisis when he asked for help: 
 
“I didn’t feel anti them - I’m not one of these people who’s anti authority - but I 
just thought, ‘He’s a guy, he’s a sergeant-major or he’s a captain or he’s a 
lieutenant colonel and ... he’s in charge’ and that’s really all I thought.  My 
attitude was I didn't like the way some people seemed to cower from authority.  
... They treated a person differently just because of his rank.   
 
Comment : He is not in awe of the formal command structure. 
 
When I asked him if he felt he ever had to prove himself: 
 
“No, I don’t feel I have to prove myself to anyone else but myself. ... I wanted 
to show myself that I could do my job a hundred percent professionally.” 
 
Comment : He has his own personal version of the functional structure. 
 
When I asked him if he felt that his sub unit was the best in his unit: 
 
"[Dismissively] No.  I’ve never felt that.  It was just another [sub unit]. ... I feel 
I would have been the same in any other." 
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Comment : He does not subscribe conventionally to the loyalty/identity 
structure. 
 
Of friendship: 
 
“We’re sort of thrown together, for some reason there’s more... you might only 
meet a guy for two or three days and say ‘Could I borrow ten pounds?’ and he’d 
say ‘Sure, and you can give it back tomorrow’.  That wouldn’t happen outside 
in civvy street.  But I don’t think it has that same depth.  There’s a lot more 
back-stabbing goes on, ... people criticising and slagging each other off.” 
 
Comment : an idiosyncratic appreciation of friendship. 
 
Such a man is so free from the influence of what I model as social structures that the 
model could not be used with confidence to describe, analyse or predict his behaviour. 
 
Addressing the difficulties  
 
A useful tool for summarising these limitations in the model may be drawn from the 
work of Ulf Hannerz, which we briefly reviewed in Chapter One 46.  It will be recalled 
that he produced a table summarising the field of possible origins of human ‘modes of 
thought’, and thus behaviour, and that these fields encompassed ‘inherent aspects’ 
(modes of thought with which human beings are born) and ‘developed’ aspects (modes 
of thought that were acquired through the process of culture). 
 As pointed out in Chapter One, it proves extremely difficult practically to assign 
particular elements of behaviour with any confidence to the ‘inherent’ or the 
‘developed’, but they are nevertheless useful as conceptual categories. Hannerz 
numbered the resultant six cells in his table from 1 to 6, but without assigning any 
significance to the numbers concerned.  For ease of reference, this table and the 
associated notes from Chapter One are reproduced here: 
 
 INHERENT DEVELOPED 
INDIVIDUAL (idiosyncratic) 1 2 
ENDURING COLLECTIVES 3 4 
UNIVERSAL (panhuman) 5 6 
 
Table 4.1 Hannerz’s Conceptual Table of Culture  
 
Notes to Table 4.1 (summarising Hannerz): 
 
1.  ‘Inherent’ means in this context ‘ Biological in origin, and part of the human 
nature’. 
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2.  ‘Developed’ means ‘acquired in the course of experience.  Not biological in 
origin’.  
3.  ‘Enduring Collectives’ mean ‘large-scale cultural groups in which the 
individual spends the majority, or all, or his or her life’.  An example would be 
‘British society’. 
4.  The numbering of the boxes is for reference only, and does not imply any 
relative importance. 
 
 This table can be adjusted to make Hannerz’s general conceptual model 
specifically relevant to the present study.  The adjustment consists of the insertion of a 
new row, entitled ‘temporary collectives’, defined as social environments in which 
individuals spend a significant proportion of their lives and which can be expected to 
provide a forum for the generation of particular ideas, rules and conventions of 
behaviour.  Because individuals enter, pass through, and leave these ‘temporary 
collectives’ those individuals are significantly affected by them, though not to the same 
extent that they are influenced by the constant background of what Hannerz calls 
‘enduring collectives’.  By this typology, we would categorize the Army as a 
‘temporary collective’ and adjust the table thus: 
 
 INHERENT DEVELOPED 
INDIVIDUAL (idiosyncratic) 1 2 
TEMPORARY COLLECTIVES 3 4 
ENDURING COLLECTIVES 5 6 
UNIVERSAL (panhuman) 7 8 
 
 Table 4.2 Hannerz’s Conceptual Table of Culture (Adjusted) 
 
 We may now use this adjusted table to address the status of the model 
conceptually, without seeking to assign particular detailed elements of soldiers’ lives or 
behaviour to any specific box.  Our purpose in so doing is to use the categories in the 
table to throw into clear relief those areas where the model does, or does not, contribute 
to understanding the totality of the lives of soldiers and by doing this we may 
unambiguously identify its limits. 
  It is readily apparent from consideration of this table that the model presented 
here is focused mainly on the modes of thought and behaviour which fall in boxes 3 
and 4 insofar as they pertain to regimental duty in the relevant temporary collective (the 
British Army), and makes no attempt to differentiate between inherent or developed 
elements.  We may also conclude that any behaviour or mode of thought that falls 
outside those two boxes may not be so well covered by the model. 
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 The table shows clearly and concisely that there are likely to be significant 
elements in the lives of soldiers that might indeed fall outside those two boxes, and thus 
acts as a prompt not to ignore them in the analysis of soldiers’ lives.  In the first place, 
the table encourages us to observe that the behaviour of soldiers will be at least 
partially informed by elements that fall logically into boxes 1 and 2, as this is the arena 
of individual agency.   Where an individual’s attitudes and assumptions conform to the 
expectations captured in the four social structures, we can say that, as far as these 
boxes are concerned, he appears well integrated into military life.  However, where it 
does not, then his actions or attitudes set him apart from the conventions captured in the 
model, and he is a rogue agent whose behaviour is not going to be effectively analysed 
and predicted using the model. 
 Secondly, we must accept that there is likely to be some influence on soldiers’ 
behaviour from boxes 5 and 6, their non-military cultural background and origins, 
which, again, is not captured in the model.  An obvious example is the effect of the 
regional or national origins of individual soldiers which can lead to the formation of 
groupings that are not predicted by the model.  Fellow Scotsmen, for instance, or fellow 
West Indians, may join together to support their national team against England in front 
of the television in the NAAFI, irrespective of their loyalty/identity affiliations in the 
unit. 
 We may use this adjusted table, therefore, to express clearly the boundaries of 
the model by saying that it focuses on boxes 3 and 4, has some capacity to deal with 
material that falls naturally into boxes 1 and 2, but does not directly encompass aspects 
that would fall into boxes 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
 It remains to assess the significance of these boundaries.  On the one hand, it 
could be said that they are significant because they limit the scope and power of the 
model to capture the totality of soldiers’ lives, and that a fully effective model would 
have to encompass all eight boxes.  On the other hand, it must be accepted that a fully 
effective model might well be impossible to create, would be highly complex, and, 
because of its complexity, may well prove unwieldy even if it were produced.  
Furthermore, as we have seen demonstrated in Chapter Three and the early part of this 
chapter, the current model has significant practical utility in describing, analysing and 
predicting the behaviour of most British soldiers in the context of their unit. 
 A reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that the model may be used with 
confidence, provided that the person using it is aware of the possible range of factors 
which fall outside it and keeps alert for their influence.  As established in Chapter One 
(pages 23 to 27), the model is neither more nor less than a tool, a means to target 
ethnographic inquiry and to inform ethnographic analysis, not an ethnography in itself, 
and it is up to the researcher to use it intelligently and sensitively.  Having said that, we 
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may make a fair assumption that the vast majority of factors that will emerge from 
participant observation of British soldiers will be amenable to analysis using the model. 
 
Limitations to the model: difficulties in use 
 
The second main area of difficulty is in the practical use of the model.  Two particular 
issues stand out: determination of the operating structure, and the model’s observer-
oriented perspective. 
 
Determination of the operating structure 
 
The first difficulty with using the model is that it is not always possible to determine 
the operating structure unambiguously.   
 One of the model’s basic assumptions is that there can only be one operating 
structure at any one instant, though this structure can change from moment to moment.  
However, there are occasions when the behaviour of soldiers might be ascribed to more 
than one structure.  Take, for example, soldiers going forward in the assault.  As I have 
shown elsewhere47 elements modelled in all four structures are at work in propelling the 
soldiers forward: they are obeying orders (formal command structure), they are with 
their friends (informal structure), they are doing the ultimate soldier’s task (functional 
structure), and they have the honour and reputation of their sub unit, unit, and capbadge 
in their hands (loyalty/identity structure).  An observer seeing these men advance upon 
the enemy would be hard pressed to decide which of these structures was the operating 
structure. 
 In the light of such situations it may seem unrealistic to insist upon the 
modelling of one single operating structure at any one instant, no matter what the 
context.  However, I do so, for the following two reasons.    First, this assumption in the 
model reflects a very high proportion of my observations: soldiers’ behaviour does pass 
through several social structures over short periods of time as the context changes.  
Refer to the very typical illustration on page 80 of Chapter Three, for example, when 
the soldiers’ behaviour changed from the informal structure to the formal command 
structure and back again in the course of a few moments.  Second, the concept that 
there can only be one operating structure encourages the observer to seek and identify 
moments of transition and thus to detect subtle changes in context.  This is illustrated in 
the behaviour that I observed during the events of Case Six above.  When the soldiers 
started playing the party games that were part of the boisterous celebrations of the 
battery’s identity, I observed that the participants’ behaviour underwent a change: they 
wanted to win and started to concentrate on the bizarre and unfamiliar task in hand.  
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Their behaviour thus changed from the conventions of the loyalty/identity structure to 
the functional structure, albeit in a thoroughly jovial and amusing way. 
 Generally, therefore, my experience has shown that there are considerable 
analytical advantages to this element in the model, which encourages the observer to 
detect what might otherwise be invisible ingredients of the situations that he or she is 
observing. 
 Nevertheless, it must be accepted as a limitation to the model that, as in the case 
of the troops in the assault, it may not always be possible to identify which is the 
operating structure at any precise instant.  In practice, I have found that a useful way to 
treat such ambiguous contexts is to consider that, although there can only be one 
operating structure at any single instant, sometimes the operating structure is changing 
so rapidly from instant to instant as to become analytically blurred.  This process is 
analogous to the apparent blurring of the blades of a rotating propeller: the speed of 
their rotary movement makes them appear as an homogenous disc, whilst in fact the 
blades remain separate solid objects. 
 I have called this the question of simultaneity. 
 
An observer’s perspective 
 
A second difficulty in using the model is the fact that it is drawn from the observer’s 
point of view, rather than that of the agent.  The observer uses it to differentiate 
between social structures, and uses the terms in the model to describe and analyse 
informal relationships.  However, that is not to say that individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of their of experiences and actions necessarily fit the structures, even if 
their behaviour follows the lines that it predicts.  There is therefore a potential 
dislocation between the observer’s and the individual’s perspectives that might conceal 
organisationally or personally important factors.  This is a manifestation of the 
difficulties presented by the approach via social structure which we examined in 
Chapter One (pages 11 and 12). 
 In use, therefore, it is to be remembered, once again, that the model provides a 
tool for the observer, to be applied sensitively and critically to the data, rather than a 
direct route to a complete account of soldiers’ lives. 
 Nevertheless, having noted that the model does not necessarily capture an 
individual’s subjective perception, it must be repeated that all soldiers who have seen it 
have said that it was a very close approximation to the lives that they were 
experiencing.  It rang true.  Indeed, it was said by senior NCOs on a number of 
occasions that it would have been considerably more useful to them than the 
management training that they received as part of their military education for 
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promotion.  The reason that they usually gave for this observation was that the model 
depicted the practicalities of their lives and its human challenges more clearly and 
accurately than the abstract management models that they had to learn. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear therefore that the model is not without limitations.  It draws artificial 
boundaries around the material it covers, there are some practical difficulties in the fine 
detail of using it, and it may not capture the individual agents’ subjective experience 
because it is drawn from an observer’s perspective and is aimed at norms. 
 These limitations, however, by no means invalidate the model as a tool for the 
social scientist who studies the combat arms of the British Army.  They are the sort of 
difficulties that are inherent in modelling: a model can never capture the complete 
ground truth, as we saw in Chapter One (on page 22).  At most, these limitations are 
warnings that point to areas where analysis may be unreliable, and an observer who 
checks against gross error in these areas may use the model with confidence. 
 We will now turn to other models to see if they can improve on the capabilities 
and limitations of the one proposed here. 
 
SECTION SIX: OTHER MODELS 
 
The purpose of this section is to compare this model of social structures in the combat 
arms units of the British Army to others which might be applied to the same area, all of 
which have been introduced in Chapter Two.  They are those of Janowitz, Hockey, von 
Zugbach, and Stewart. 
 
Janowitz: primary groups  
 
The first of these models is that of Janowitz, in his chapter on ‘Primary Groups and 
Military Effectiveness’48.  Although the majority of his research material came from the 
American Army, and he specifically considers soldiers in combat, he implies 
throughout the book that his conclusions are capable of being extended to other armies, 
which therefore would extend its legitimate use to the British Army.  
  Taking the concept of the ‘primary group’, the small face-to-face group of 
soldiers that live and work together, Janowitz models cohesion within this group as 
depending on four factors: 
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‘First, the technical dimensions of the weapons systems impose limitations on 
stability and cohesiveness in military primary groups. ... While generalizations 
in this area are most hazardous, it does seem that weapons systems which 
maintain close physical proximity of team members and enhance the process of 
communication contribute most to primary group cohesion. 49  
 
Second, the type of unit organization, including the personnel replacement system of 
the U.S. military establishment, has certain consequences for group cohesion that are 
worthy of study. ... When men do not know each other, combat units suffer in 
effectiveness. ... There is a further theoretical consideration.  Primary groups are by 
definition a system of informal interpersonal relationships.  Their value lies precisely in 
their independence of formal organization. 50 
 
Third, social cohesion in primary groups is influenced by the proximity of 
danger and the importance of the mission which the group is assigned. ... 
Fourth, social cohesion in combat or under conditions of stress or extended alert 
depends on the performance of small unit leaders.’51  
 
 This analysis is undoubtedly useful as far as it goes.  There is no question that 
small face-to-face groups have considerable potential for cohesion, and Janowitz has 
identified important factors in promoting and maintaining that cohesion.  However, his 
model is not adequate to explain all cases of group cohesion, which can go far above 
the small, face-to-face case that Janowitz explores.  This point may be demonstrated by 
examining the cohesion of the battery in Case Six earlier in this chapter. 
 Without doubt, the battery in Case Six displayed strong signs of cohesion, to the 
extent that their ‘battery spirit’ was noted by members of the other batteries, each of 
whom felt in their turn that they belonged to the ‘best’ and rejoiced in their own 
battery’s identity.  However, the conditions in a British gun battery do not measure up 
to Janowitz’s model very well. 
 Although the technical dimensions of the individual equipment manned by 
members of the battery may well have contributed to the bonding of the small teams 
that operated them, if the battery is considered as a whole this is not the case.  The 
technical dimensions of the weapons systems employed by the battery required that it 
be divided into three separated components when it carried out its military function.  As 
is normal operational custom in a British field battery, the command element and the 
associated observer parties had been working separately, deployed forward and out of 
sight from the group associated with the guns.  Similarly, the logistic element had 
usually been deployed to the rear of the gun group to be involved in moving and 
supplying ammunition.   
201 
 The primary groups that existed in British artillery batteries in general, and this 
battery in particular, were therefore dispersed.  It could thus be deduced from 
Janowitz’s model that in these conditions any bonding at battery level would be 
correspondingly weaker than at primary group level.  Such a deduction would, 
however, fail to take account of the situations when a battery was celebrating its 
identity as a battery per se (as in Case Six) rather than as a collection of primary 
groups.  On the other hand, the loyalty/identity structure in my model does allow for 
identity and bonding to be transferred, according to context, between different levels in 
a unit. 
 Janowitz’s second point is really two: that turbulence, resulting in soldiers not 
knowing each other, lowers the effectiveness of units; and that primary groups consist 
in informal interpersonal relationships that are independent of formal organisation. 
 The first of these observations integrates well with my model.  A major 
component of the informal structure is interpersonal relationships, and if the soldiers do 
not know each other then it could be expected that the bonding element of this structure 
would not be well established.  
 I take issue, however, with the second.  As far as the British Army is concerned 
Janowitz’s analysis is correct in observing that the informal relationships between 
soldiers are not under formal control, but it is not the case that, as he claims from his 
research, they are independent of formal organisation.  As we established in Chapter 
Three, informal relationships are constrained in many ways by the social elements 
modelled as the other social structures in a unit.  For instance, differences or 
equivalencies in rank determine the appropriate relationship (be it friendship, or 
association or informal access), and informal relationships usually arise only between 
individuals who are in the same sub unit, or share membership of the same mess, or 
come into contact at work in some other way.  Furthermore, it will be recalled that the 
field from which in individual’s friends can be drawn changes as he progresses through 
the ranks (Chapter Three, pages 110 to 112). 
 It was not possible properly to explore Janowitz’s third conclusion, that danger 
and the importance of the mission enhanced social cohesion, as most of my research 
was carried out in peacetime conditions.  However, what indications that did appear in 
the research material would suggest that he is perfectly right. 
 For similar reasons, it was not possible to research the effect of the conduct of 
small group leaders in combat, though, once again, Janowitz’s conclusions seem to 
integrate with the small amount of material that I gathered in this area. 
 Although, therefore, Janowitz’s model may have considerable utility in 
examining the interactions and bonding in small groups in combat, the model presented 
in this thesis provides a better means to address the wider canvas of the totality of life 
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in a British military combat arms unit and provides an altogether more comprehensive 
and more elegant means of addressing the question of small group bonding.  In 
particular, Janowitz’s analysis omits two key areas that are closely involved in group 
bonding in the combat arms units of the British Army: the effects of the other social 
structures upon the informal structure, particularly the influence of the formal 
command structure, and the influence of the loyalty/identity structure without which, 
we may confidently say from the material presented in Chapter Three, any 
consideration of bonding in British units would be incomplete.   
  
Hockey: Squaddies 
 
Killworth has already made a lengthy critique 52 of the Hockey’s work 53.  This sub 
section covers much of the same ground, using case material from my research to 
confirm it in the context of this thesis. 
 In ‘Squaddies’, Hockey presents a dualistic model of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  ‘Us’ are 
private soldiers, the ‘squaddies’ of his monograph, and ‘Them’ are everybody else, 
including NCOs, officers, and civilians.  He also draws a clear analytical distinction 
between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ behaviour, which reflects my characterisation of 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ behaviour.  For instance, ‘There was a constant interplay, and 
often a resultant tension, between behaviour which was official and that which was 
unofficial in terms of organizational goals.’54 
 One of the key theoretical concepts in his descriptions of private soldiers’ lives 
is ‘negotiated order’, which is the result of tension between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
goals.55  In his thesis this is the process by which the authority figures routinely do not 
make the lives of the soldiers too unbearable provided that the soldiers co-operate (and 
vice versa).  However, he makes the point that even here the formal authorities have the 
ultimate say: ‘the area(s) of negotiations, the bargains that are made, broken and 
reformulated, have limits which are set by the power held by superiors.’56 
 At first sight, much of the data that I collected seems to contain various versions 
of ‘negotiated order’.  Take, for example, Case Ten, the ‘missing cannon balls’, which 
we have already examined: the soldiers did not like the Commander; they removed the 
display cannon balls to irritate him and give him the message that they did not like him; 
although the Commander had the power to complain formally and thus to make the 
soldiers’ lives difficult for them, he made an unofficial threat through the clerk/barman 
who was my informant, and the cannon balls were returned.  This certainly could be 
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taken as an example of a polarisation between the soldiers and the Commander, and the 
indirect nature of his threat implies a process of negotiation. 
 In a similar vein, an interviewee (a private soldier) told me of an occasion when 
the private soldiers in his infantry company rebelled at an overbearing order, but 
rebelled within the letter of the regulations.  There was to be an all-ranks company 
Christmas party to which the Commanding Officer had been invited.  Someone in 
authority in the company, presumably the sergeant major or the company commander, 
had decided to make attendance at the party compulsory and to lay down in orders that 
the soldiers should wear ‘best dress’ [i.e., to appear smartly dressed in civilian clothes].   
 “What actually happened was it came out on the Daily Detail as a ‘Scale A’ 
parade [compulsory attendance], which put some peoples’ backs up... especially 
a party, a social do. ‘Best Dress’, and there was actually dress requirement.  
What the blokes did was basically lift the v’s [make figurative ‘v’ signs] to that 
one and turned up in drag.  A lot of them turned up in all sorts  ... Because the 
CO was turning up as well - I think that was why the dress situation was laid 
down.  But in the event it was a great evening.” 
 
Interviewer:  “Did any of the soldiers get into trouble?”   
 
“No they didn’t.”  
 
Interviewer:  “Was it accepted as being a permissible comment on the 
situation?"  
 
 “I think so, yes Sir.”. 57 
 
 Here again, soldiers are pointing out forcefully that those in authority had 
overstepped the mark in their heavy use of official channels, and Hockey’s model can 
be used to explain that the private soldiers’ act of defiance was part of the process of 
negotiation between those with formal power and those without. 
 However, although Hockey’s work captures certain aspects of the military life 
reasonably well, it does not give a complete picture, and its dialectic opposition of 
privates to ‘the rest’ is too stark to reflect the complexities that I have found in my 
research. 
 First, Hockey does not allow for any relationships between private soldiers and 
what he sees as authority figures.  In contrast, we have already noted in Chapter Three 
that friendship is possible between private soldiers and junior NCOs, and we have also 
seen the importance of the vertical, rank asymmetrical, informal relationships 
(association and informal access) throughout the unit.  For instance, there is no room in 
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Hockey’s model for relationships such as the one described here in my notes from a 
discussion between myself and a private soldier (a ‘squaddie’).  We were discussing the 
relationship between him and the RSM of his unit, arguably one of the most formally 
distant people in his working environment: 
 
‘I asked him about his view on the RSM.  He was most reluctant to answer this 
question, but after some gentle pressure from me he said that he had disliked 
him until he became the staff car driver, after which he got to know him through 
chatting in the staff car and he now thinks that he is a good bloke.   
 
Comment :  Here we have a bond of association being formed and adding 
another strand to their relationship which had previously only been through the 
formal command structure.’58 
 
In Hockey’s model, the only relationship that would be possible between them would 
have been rank-driven opposition, mitigated by some form of negotiated order.  In fact, 
the relationship was considerably closer than that. 
 If we return to the case of the missing cannon balls, we will see again that 
Hockey’s model cannot be used adequately to explain in detail what took place in the 
process of returning the cannon balls to their proper place.  According to my analysis 
the events were only made possible because the Commander had an informal 
relationship with the junior NCO clerk through whom he could communicate to the 
soldiers who had taken them.  He had no formal or official power to order such a junior 
person to get the cannon balls back, and the clerk would not have had sufficient formal 
power to investigate the theft.  If the Commander had chosen to go through formal 
channels it would have had to have been through the Royal Engineer Squadron 
Commander, and not through a junior NCO.  Whilst, therefore, it would be difficult to 
describe or analyse these events purely in terms of opposition and negotiated order, my 
model provides a workable means to do so, as we have seen.   
 It might be said in defence of Hockey’s model that the clerk was a junior NCO 
and therefore not a ‘squaddie’.  The clerk was therefore one of the ‘Them’ and not one 
of the ‘Us’.  This would bring us to the second major observation about his model.  In 
polarising private soldiers from the rest, Hockey is compressing the rank structure from 
junior NCO to Commanding Officer in a single category.  All those with rank are 
contrasted with all those without rank.  This denies the range of informal relationships 
that exist between superiors and inferiors throughout the different rank levels, the 
various forms and expressions of informal access and association.  Elements of this 
range are laid out, for example, in my observations about the changes that come to a 
soldier’s informal relationships as he rises through the various grade of NCO (see 
Chapter Three, pages 125 and 126).  We may see a particular manifestation of this 
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difficulty if we revisit Case Five, in which a sergeant major corrected my behaviour 
when I was a lieutenant using informal access.  Hockey’s model has no power to 
analyse such an interchange because both the sergeant major and myself are simply part 
of one entity, ‘Them’. 
 Third, Hockey treats the private soldiers as if they form a discrete group and are 
therefore fixed in time and space as privates.  In fact, as we saw in Chapter Three, 
many individuals are promoted and follow a trajectory that includes several different 
positions and ranks in a unit.  All senior NCOs and some officers start as private 
soldiers.  This dynamic is entirely missing from ‘Squaddies’, and may well be due to 
his very brief periods of fieldwork (three separate visits which came to three months in 
all59). 
 Fourth, what I have called the loyalty/identity structure is not present in his 
analysis, except perhaps a general consideration of membership of the infantry.  
Whereas the formal command structure is described, though in a perhaps over-rigid 
form, and the functional structure appears (though he does not seem to allow any room 
for development and change in the area of soldierly function), and so do some of the 
aspects of the informal structure, there is virtually no mention of regimental or sub unit 
identity, or of the cross-rank bonding that is achieved by common membership of a 
loyalty/identity segment.   
 Take this extract from my field notes, for example, part of which was quoted 
earlier on page 133, in which an infantry private soldier is speaking of his sub unit: 
 
[Enthusiastically] “Charlie Company’s the best company in the battalion. ... 
‘Cos it’s the best bunch of lads and that.  The lads are brilliant you know.  
They’re good, and all the platoon sergeants and all the full screws [corporals] 
are good ... If you work with them, they’ll work with you all the way, you 
know.”60 
 
Hockey’s model of the negotiated order might help to inform an analysis of the final 
statement: the support of the authority figures is conditional on the soldiers’ willingness 
to work with them.  However, it does not contribute to any understanding as to why the 
individual thought that his company was the ‘best’.  In contrast, my model of the 
loyalty/identity structure indicates that all soldiers in that battalion could be expected to 
think that their company was the ‘best’, and indeed it predicts that each soldier would 
be likely to believe that all the elements to which he belonged are better than any 
equivalent segment, as in this example, which is from an interview with an soldier in an 
armoured regiment: 
 
206 
‘He feels that his squadron is superior to the other squadrons.  HQ Tp [his 
troop] is the best in the squadron, because it has the best drivers and best 
gunners in the squadron’.61 
 
and this one, which is my own analysis of the feelings of the soldiers in my battery 
when I was a subaltern on operational duty in Northern Ireland: 
 
‘We feel that 203 Battery [with whom we worked closely] are not as good as us, 
but they are reasonable to work with, but that 204 and 260 Batteries [other 
batteries in the regimental group] are well below our standard.  Nothing much 
happens in their areas and they are not very good at what they really have to do.  
However, next door 407 Medium Regiment [another artillery regiment] break 
rules patrolling and therefore regularly endanger their men’s lives; while the 
Blankshires’ [an infantry battalion] security is unbelievably lax’.62 
 
 In summary, Hockey’s model presents too stark and hostile a portrait of 
soldiers’ lives.  Although it may provide insight into those contexts where the private 
soldiers are grouped together in opposition to figures of authority, such contexts by no 
means account for the majority of time spent by soldiers at regimental duty.  As for 
‘negotiated order’, I find myself in agreement with Killworth’s comments that 
‘Hockey’s model of the negotiated order has been shown to rest upon a division 
between formal and informal orders that is, in practice, confused and uncertain.’63.  I 
would further add that it takes too little account of the other elements that comprise the 
rich complex of ideas, rules and conventions that inform soldiers’ behaviour.  My 
model, in contrast, provides a considerably better tool with which to address the lives 
of soldiers at regimental duty. 
 
von Zugbach: Power and Prestige 
 
von Zugbach’s primary concern in Power and Prestige in the British Army64 is to show 
how those elements are not distributed evenly.  The elements in this case are the 
different regiments and corps, and the agents who enjoy this power and prestige are the 
officers, and in particularly those who reach senior rank.  His work is therefore focused 
well above unit level, which is the analytical ceiling of my research, and is entirely 
focused on commissioned officers. 
 However, in building his case, von Zugbach produces a model of a unit65 which 
appears to come close to the one presented in this thesis in that he differentiates 
different ‘sub-systems’ within the unit which have a prima facie resemblance to the 
social structures of my model.  These sub-systems are the ‘Formal, Organisational 
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Sub-System’, the ‘Technical Sub-System’, and the ‘Informal, or Sentient Sub-System’.  
These sub-systems comprise a system in which all parts interact. 
 He describes the ‘formal organisational subsystem’ as existing 
 
‘in a quasi tangible form in the shape of an organisation chart which expresses 
the organisational structure of the unit66 in terms of a classical Weberian 
hierarchy of appointments (Weber, 1947)67.  This is supported by a more formal 
document, known as the Unit Establishment, which specifies the numbers and 
ranks of its members, together with the equipment to which the unit is entitled.  
The formal sub-system represents an ideal type communication pattern.  It is the 
system by which orders are passed and, in its attendant maxim of “procedure 
through the correct channels” (meaning access to a higher superior, only 
through the individual’s superior) it represents the pattern of vertical 
communication which is both formally recognised by system procedures and is 
assumed to operate, by individuals acting within the system, to the exclusion of 
other patterns of communication (Blau, 1955)68. ... [The] formal organisational 
system impinges itself upon the everyday inter-actions [sic] of system members 
in respect of virtually every interaction that they make within the system’.69 
 
 This is very close to the formal command structure, in that von Zugbach has 
made the same observations as I have about the sub-system being the vehicle for the 
definition of the structure of the unit, and its capacity to define formal communications 
channels.  Furthermore, his observation that the ‘formal organisational sub-system’ 
impinges itself upon the everyday interaction of the unit members comes close to one 
of the elements of the permanent thread of superiority and inferiority noted in Chapter 
Three. 
 He describes the ‘technical sub-system’ as representing 
 
‘a bridge between the formal, organisational sub-system and the sentient sub-
system.  The formal system is concerned with the way in which the unit is 
formally structured, on the other hand, [sic] the technical sub-system relates to 
what is done in the unit and how this is to be done.  While the structure of this 
sub-system is less immediately visible to the observer than is that of the formal 
sub-system, the influence of the technical sub-system is all-pervasive in the 
operations of the unit.’70 
 
 At first sight, this element could be mapped on to the functional structure.  
However, his ‘technical sub-system’ is focused on the use of function (what is done in 
particular units) to different iate types of unit: infantry; armoured corps; engineers; 
artillery, and so on.  It is therefore more to do with matters of identity than ideas about, 
and attitudes to, military functions per se.  Thus he ascribes to his ‘technical sub-
system’ some of the aspects that I have ascribed to the loyalty/identity structure.  
Furthermore, by using technical matters as his only axis of differentiation he omits the 
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very large number of other ingredients which are included in the concept of the 
loyalty/identity structure, and in particular the continuation of feelings of identity 
below unit level down to the lowest organisational segment.  Thus it overlaps two of 
the social structures in model presented in this thesis without addressing the fine detail 
of either. 
 The ‘sentient sub-system’ ‘represents the sum total of the values, assumption 
[sic], expectations, “Kleinweltanschauugnen” and conceptions of self, upon which unit 
members draw for the development of their every-day patterns of action and 
consciousness’.71 
 Here, again, this ‘sub-system’ shares some features with my model.  In 
particular, it overlaps my construction of the loyalty/identity structure and the 
functional structure, but it does not differentiate between the importance of attitudes to 
loyalty/identity segments and to soldierly tasks, which are different in content and 
quality. 
 Thus far, these differences almost certainly reflect the different purposes of the 
two models we are comparing and probably represent a different arrangement of 
compatible ideas.  Von Zugbach’s is for use in identifying and separating different 
parts of the Army, whereas mine is for use in examining soldiers’ behaviour within 
individual units. 
 However, there is a major area missing from von Zugbach’s model, without 
which any analysis of a unit would be incomplete.  He does not cover is what is 
modelled here as the informal structure.  Although he mentions relationships between 
officers and men, it is purely in the context of the ‘technical sub-system’ to show that 
different technical sub-systems breed different attitudes in the officers.72   
 Even in this restricted context his analysis does not ring true when compared 
with one arising from my model.  For example, he seeks to show that officers in the 
Royal Armoured Corps form close bonds with their soldiers because they have to share 
the tasks of crewing a tank with them, while ‘in the infantry, on the other hand, such 
interactions are conducted at distance and in terms of formal orders from superior to 
subordinate’73.  Using the model presented in this thesis, we can quickly see that there 
are two difficulties with this analysis..  First of all, he underplays the importance of the 
wide-ranging processes and attitudes that are captured in the informal structure as a 
whole, and secondly he has missed the significant opportunities for bonding between 
officers and men that exist in the infantry, some of which we visited in Chapter Three 
when we considered the informal structure. 
 Let us confirm these observations by comparing the power of von Zugbach’s 
model to analyse two of the cases we have already examined, in this instance Case 
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Eight, the ‘difficult sub unit commander’ (pages 174 to 176), and Case Ten, ‘a quarrel 
in the mess’ (pages 177 to 179). 
 Case Eight shows a significant difference in quality between the two models.  
Using von Zugbach’s, we could explain that the sub unit commander was using the 
resources of the ‘formal organisational sub-system’ to impose his will upon his soldiers 
in making them work hard.  His CSM’s attitude to this overworking of the soldiers was 
informed by the ‘sentient sub-system’ in that he had values and standards against which 
to judge his company’s commander’s actions.  The model also could be used to say that 
the action he subsequently took was in accordance with the ‘sentient sub-system’ in the 
unit.   
 On the other hand, useful though this analysis may be, it will be readily 
apparent that it does not approach the depth that the model presented in this thesis 
provides.  Specifically, it does not provide the language for the fine grained analysis of 
the CSM’s informal relationships with his company commander or the RSM, nor does 
it provide the predictive framework for the CO’s conversation with the company 
commander discussed in Case Fifteen. 
 Case Ten demonstrates further how wide the gap is between the two models.  
von Zugbach’s model could be used to discuss the ingredients of the live firing 
exercise, which would be part of his ‘technical sub-system’ but it would not be capable 
of describing or analysing the nature and strength of the informal relationships that 
existed between myself, Gerry Smyth and Jim Stirk.  Nor could it be used to explain 
the significance of the change in context between the live firing exercise and the 
officers’ mess, or the mechanism whereby Jim and I co-operated in deflating our 
difference. 
 Although von Zugbach’s model, therefore, has a resemblance to the model 
presented in this thesis, this resemblance is superficial.  We have seen that it cannot be 
used with the same precision to describe, analyse, and predict soldiers’ behaviour in 
combat arms units of the British Army.  This is not to say, however, that von Zugbach’s 
is necessarily a poor model.  It is as well to remember that it was not generated to cover 
the minutiae of life at regimental duty but to act as a basis for arguing for differences in 
power and prestige between the Regiments and Corps in the Army, a purpose for which 
it appears to be reasonably well suited. 
 
Stewart: unit cohesion in the Falklands War 
 
Stewart examines unit cohesion during the Falklands War in both Argentine and British 
land forces, using as her framework a model of four analytically separate elements: 
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‘In sum, military cohesion consists of three major elements: 
 
1.  Relationships between peers (horizontal). 
2.  Relationships between subordinates and superiors (vertical). 
3.  Relationship to the military as an organization or unit 
(organizational). 
 
 But we cannot examine the soldier solely on the micro or small-unit 
level and ignore the social, cultural, economic, and political heritage of his 
nation.  Therefore, I include a fourth type of bonding: 
 
4.  Relationship of the military and the individual to the society or 
culture at large (societal).’74 
 
She attributes the structure of this model to ‘work done at the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Social and Behavioral Sciences’75, drawing particular attention to the 
work of Siebold and his associates76. 
 It is clear from her text that, as far as British forces were concerned, her 
research was mostly confined to members of the Royal Marines and the Parachute 
Regiment, though she interviewed members of all arms in the Argentine Army.  This 
seems to have weighted her comments and analysis to the concerns of the infantry.  
This does not by any means invalidate her research, but it is as well to bear it in mind 
when assessing its significance. 
 The area that her model covers is broader than Janowitz’s (which concerns 
small face-to-face groups only) and Hockey’s (which examines the soldier’s life 
through a lens which pits private soldiers against the rest), and von Zugbach’s (which 
almost entirely considers officers).  A particular strength in her model is that it can be 
applied throughout a unit, encompassing all its members, by treating horizontal and 
vertical bonding as separate but simultaneous axes.    
 There are many similarities in the elements of cohesion that she identifies and 
the ingredients of the social structures in my model.  For example, she shows in her 
description of ‘vertical bonding’ that relationships and interaction between officers and 
men are important considerations, thus addressing areas covered by the informal 
structure and her analysis of ‘organizational bonding’ captures many of the features 
drawn out in my description of the loyalty/identity structure.  It is certainly the closest 
model to mine of the four under discussion in this section, and presents fewer 
difficulties than the other three in use as a tool with which to describe life in a combat 
arms unit of the British Army.  However, although they are fewer these difficulties are 
significant. 
 First, a significant difficulty arises with her insistence on including the 
‘societal’ element as a force for bonding at unit level.  In her chapter covering this 
area77 she considers such widely different factors as national attitudes to the military, 
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the national defence budget, training, doctrine, tactics, logistics and supply and medical 
care.  All these elements most certainly have an effect on combat capability and may 
thus be indirect contributors to morale, but she does not make the case convincingly 
that they contribute to unit cohesion in their own right.  In effect, therefore, only the 
remainder of her model (the vertical, horizontal, and organisational axes) should be 
used as a direct comparator to mine, and we will proceed on that basis here. 
 Taking these three axes alone, I find four further significant difficulties with the 
analysis presented in her book.  The first is that her outsider status is all too obvious 
from time to time.  This is manifested in several minor errors.  Examples of such errors 
include references to a British army regiment she calls ‘the Blue Jackets’78 [in fact a 
historic term for members of Royal Navy79], an appointment in the Royal Marines 
called ‘Command Sergeant Major’80, neither of which exist, and her identification of 
the Commanding Officer of the Commando Logistic Battalion, Ivar Helberg, as a 
Royal Marine 81, when he was in fact an Army officer82.  These mistakes are probably 
harmless, in that they are not related to the main thrust of her analysis, but they raise 
doubts in the mind of the informed reader and cast suspicion on the depth of her 
research. 
 There are, however, areas where her outsider status counts more significantly 
against her.  An obvious example is her analysis of the Regimental System, which is 
uninformed.  She says for example that ‘a particularly salient factor in the regimental 
system in the British Army as a whole is a lack of personnel turbulence.  Men train, 
work, and fight together for years and years.’83.  This is a picture that is often presented 
to outsiders by members of the infantry and Royal Armoured Corps but it is not a true 
one.  The majority of soldiers in the British Army is in fact trickle posted as individuals 
(see Chapter Three, page 98 and note 37), and even in those parts of it where the men 
stay in their units there is considerable turbulence due to the normal turnover of recruits 
arriving, soldiers leaving, and postings to the regimental depot and other military 
establishments such as training units.  Indeed, she herself quotes the Commanding 
Officer of 42 Commando as saying that the average age of his soldiers was under 
twenty84 - hardly possible for men who had spent ‘years and years’ together because the 
minimum age for enlistment at the time was seventeen.  I believe that she formed this 
misconception because all thirty of her interviewees were from either the Royal 
Marines or the Paras85, who may be expected by the conventions of the loyalty/identity 
structure to sing the praises of the system to which they belonged. 
 In this respect, it would be more satisfactory to say, using my model, that a 
particularly salient factor in the British Army system is not so much the regimental 
system but rather that loyalty/identity segments provide a highly effective axis for 
bonding because of the shared conventions described by the loyalty/identity structure.  
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It will be recalled that by these conventions everyone who belongs to the operating 
loyalty/identity segment is a full member of the group, no matter what their status.  This 
is illustrated by the example given on page 136 in Chapter Three, in which Royal 
Engineers soldiers took care to look after a newly joined member of their troop.  In 
spite of his low status as fresh from initial training, they embraced him into their troop 
by looking after him when he was unprepared for a short-notice exercise deployment: 
they did not want people outside their troop (the operating loyalty/identity segment) 
ridiculing him and, by extension, their troop.  There was no question of any of the 
protagonists in this case having served together for a many years: not only was he new 
to the unit but none of the fellow-members of the troop could have served together for 
even as much as three years because the Corps of Royal Engineers are all trickle posted 
on two to three year tours. 
 On the one hand, outsider status can be a strength, as we reviewed in Chapter 
One (pages 28 and 29), as it confers ‘stranger value’ on a participant observer by which 
he or she can detect things that insiders would not notice because they appear so natural 
to them.  However, this is not fully relevant in this case as Stewart was not a participant 
observer, but was restricted to interviewing soldiers who had returned from the 
campaign.  Her errors of fact indicate that she probably did not know the background of 
her interviewees as well as she might have done, and as well as I knew the background 
of mine, and was therefore less able than I was to understand the implications of what 
they were saying or to make judgments on what may have prompted it86. 
 My next difficulty is in the way that she has separated ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
bonding.  Although this provides a workable pair of axes for analysis, day to day life in 
the British Army incorporates a continuous mixture of vertical and horizontal 
interaction, and, as I have shown in Chapter Three (pages 152 to 154), the background 
is permanently coloured by considerations of superiority and inferiority.  It would be 
better, therefore, to put both vertical and horizontal ingredients together in the same 
elements of a model, and to differentiate the different processes in which interaction - 
both vertical and horizontal - takes place, as I have done with the informal structure, 
the functional structure, and the loyalty/identity structure.  
 Thirdly, she combines elements to do with personal relationships and function 
in the same axes of bonding, for example the ‘sense of mission’ and ‘technical and 
tactical proficiency’ along with ‘trust, respect, and friendship’ into horizontal bonding, 
and ‘trust and respect for leaders’ and ‘sharing of discomfort and danger’ and ‘shared 
training’ into vertical bonding87.   Whilst there is a clear connection between these two 
areas in the realm of personal prestige and mutual respect, as we saw in Chapter Three 
(page 113), I believe that it is better to place an analytical distinction between attitudes 
towards function and towards personal relationships because this distinction provides a 
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finer grain set of analytical categories.  Indeed, in some instances individuals may have 
high functional capability and prove their functional worth in training and on 
operations but be disliked by their peers.  This is exemplified by peer attitudes to the 
ambitious subaltern in Case Eight and to Gerry Smyth in Case Eleven: both were 
highly proficient officers whose military abilities were not questioned by their peers but 
neither of them were trusted very much by those peers because of their aggressive 
ambition.   
 A fourth problem is that she puts more emphasis on patriotism and loyalty to 
the nation and its values than is justified for the British Army88.  Factors such as these 
may indeed show up in the British Army as a matter of identity when there is an 
immediate comparator.  British soldiers will of course compare themselves with those 
they perceive as foreigners when it is appropriate, and particularly when they are in an 
operational setting where the local population or the enemy are not British.  However, 
this is a long way from saying that the political heritage of the nation is the bonding 
force within a British military unit which Stewart implies.  I suggest that in almost all 
circumstances more immediate factors are more important than national bond ing, and 
that when ‘Britishness’ does appear to be an axis of bonding it is analytically more 
effective to regard it as the broadest category of the loyalty/identity structure.  
 This view is supported by the quotations we have already seen at the head of 
Section Four of Chapter Three (page 91), which say bluntly that British soldiers do not 
consider their membership of British society or their commitment to the government of 
the day to be as strong a bonding force as the presence of one’s peers.  Further weight 
in this specific context is given by a company commander in the Falklands War, who 
has said in public that men do not die for Queen and Country, but they ultimately die 
for the respect of their friends.89  
 This should have shown up in Stewart’s analysis because she tells us that she 
collected data that indicated it: 
 
‘Even though he may give an offhand answer to an eager military sociologist 
with her questionnaire - an answer that shows indifference to politics - the 
soldier on the ground is concerned with issues of just and unjust war, or the 
Geneva Conventions, or international politics.  But these feelings are on a 
deeper level than we usually assume in a questionnaire or an interview.’90 
 
It seems that she has made an assumption here that is not supported by her data, and 
one which I would not have anticipated. 
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 This is not to say, however, that Stewart’s model is so deeply flawed as to be 
useless.  Many of the problems that I have described in her analysis of British soldiers 
in the Falklands War can be explained by considering the purpose of her work.  Her 
aim differs from mine in that she carries out a comparative study between armies whilst 
mine is to describe the elements of daily life specifically in a combat arms unit in the 
British Army.  This means that her model has to fit the general case, whilst mine needs 
to be focused on a specific one. Viewed in that light, her model is highly suitable for its 
purpose, as she shows in the coherence of her comparative analysis of the British and 
Argentine soldiers.  The problems come from apparent shallowness in her research 
about the British Army and Royal Marines, and from the apparent temptation to force 
both Argentine and British forces into giving equal weight to all the parts of her 
framework.  A pertinent example of the latter is the question of organisational bonding 
which we have just addressed.  The evidence she presents for patriotism among the 
Argentine soldiers and marines is strong and interesting: the difficulty arises in her 
attempt to wish the same sort of feelings on British troops without the necessary 
evidence.  In this particular respect, her analysis could have shown up the interesting 
fact that in this domain the nationalistic and patriotic elements of organisational 
bonding were stronger among Argentine forces than the British, and that this indicates 
different patterns of cohesion. 
 In summary, Stewart’s model is superior to the other three models discussed in 
this section because it is capable of being used throughout a whole unit.  However, 
probably because of its general comparative purpose, it remains undifferentiated in 
certain key areas that are identified in my model and that represent important aspects of 
British soldiers’ lives at regimental duty.  It does not therefore go as far as mine in 
terms of analysing the minutiae of British soldiers’ lives and would be a less precise 
instrument in the task of describing, analysing and predicting their behaviour, though it 
remains a useful instrument for comparative analysis between military forces. 
 
SECTION SEVEN - CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have examined the application of the model in its purpose of 
describing, analysing and predicting soldiers’ behaviour at regimental duty, considered 
its limitations, and compared it with other models created to apply to the British Army.  
We have concluded not only that it is fit for its purpose, provided that the limitations 
are acknowledged and kept in mind during its use, but also that no other published 
model competes successfully with it for that purpose. 
 The next chapter presents the testing of the model against historical data from 
the British Army. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - TESTING THE MODEL IN THE 
HISTORICAL DIMENSION 
 
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the model in an environment that is close enough to that 
for which it was developed but distinctive enough to present a different arena in which to 
examine it.  
The need for testing is an important characteristic of the use of models, as we 
considered in Chapter One (pages 5 and 6), to assess their degree of rigour and to explore 
the limits of the simplifications or assumptions inherent in them.  To test a model, we need to 
search for areas where it breaks down or where it presents a distorted picture: in testing, we 
are probing to the point of failure to assess the implications of that failure for the future use of 
the model. 
 
The Research Questions  
 
The research questions used in this chapter aim to explore whether the model presented in this 
thesis has sufficient internal rigour for the analyses that it provides of contemporary British 
soldiers’ behaviour to be considered valid and useful.  A comprehensive test would involve 
changing both the organisational milieu to which the model is applied and the time period.  To 
that end, I carried out initial research in three areas, a unit of the contemporary United States 
Air Force, a contemporary Gurkha unit of the British Army, and the British Army of previous 
time periods, from the mid twentieth century back to the seventeenth century.  However, it 
became clear during this initial work that, while each could provide sufficient case material for 
the testing of the model, together they presented too large a research field for a single thesis.  
Accordingly I selected the third area, the historical British Army.  This was a personal 
decision, based principally on the accessibility of first hand accounts of life in that context 
through available published material compared to my opportunities for further access to 
serving members of the Gurkhas or the US Air Force.  
The chosen environment for the test therefore remains life in the British Army at unit 
level, but rather than the contemporary setting in which the model was derived we are going 
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to examine its suitability in historical contexts.  It is a fundamental assumption within this test 
that there have been sufficient changes in unit life over the span of the historical periods 
selected to provide a sufficiently diverse range of contexts for the test to be valid.  This seems 
a reasonable assumption given the considerable changes in British society, and in battlefield 
technology and tactics. 
 
The test questions used in this chapter are: 
 
1.  Does the model set out in Chapter Three reflect the behaviour of British soldiers 
from the mid twentieth century back to the mid seventeenth century? 
 
2.  Are there significant aspects of the behaviour of British soldiers of the past that are 
not revealed or illuminated by the model? 
 
A positive answer to either or both questions will indicate that the model has been tested to 
the point of failure.  Such failure, together with its previously demonstrated capacity to 
explain, analyse, and predict the behaviour of present day British soldiers in combat arms 
units, would indicate that the model has both sufficient rigour and power to be valid. 
 
The method 
 
It is self-evident that there is not enough space here to test every part of the model through the 
entire history of the British Army and its seventeenth century antecedents.  A choice had to be 
made as to the elements of the model to be tested and the historical periods in which to 
conduct the tests.  The final selection was a balance between those for which a thread of 
historical continuity might be expected and those that seemed likely to show clear differences 
from the British Army of today. 
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This selection is as follows: 
 
For Test Question 1 (must the model be modified for use in the different periods?): 
 
From the formal command structure, the apparatus of rank and discipline, and the 
formal division of the unit on a clearly defined hierarchical pattern. 
 
From the informal structure, 
 
The existence and practice of legitimate and illegitimate secondary 
adjustments. 
 
The existence and practice of the five-fold informal relationships of close 
friendship, friendship, association, informal access and nodding 
acquaintance.   
 
These particular areas have been chosen for two reasons: first, they currently pervade 
all parts of a unit, and are available to all ranks in any combination in a unit; and 
secondly they are closely connected with the workings of discipline, power and status 
which may be expected to have undergone change over the past 350 years as Britain 
has moved from a more to a less authoritarian and stratified society. 
 
From the loyalty/identity structure, the concept of belonging to several 
organisational levels simultaneously and the attitudes and feelings displayed by the 
individuals towards those organisational levels. 
 
From the functional structure, the existence of a distinct set of mental models 
concerning, and attitudes to, soldierly tasks, as depicted by the model. 
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A choice of particular historical periods was made to provide data points in the 
continuous history of the British Army and its immediate antecedents.  These data 
points had to be sufficiently far apart to provide bases for significant comparisons, but 
close enough together to minimise the likelihood of major developments being missed 
in the analysis.  The final selection (going backwards in time) was: 
 
Mid twentieth century (mainly the Second World War) 
 
Early twentieth century (mainly the First World War) 
 
The mid nineteenth century (mainly the Sikh Wars, the Crimean War and the 
Indian Mutiny) 
 
The wars with France at the end of the eighteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century  (mainly the Peninsular War) and shortly afterwards, for 
convenience referred to here as the ‘Napoleonic period’ 
 
The mid to later eighteenth century (mainly the War of the Austrian 
Succession, the Seven Years War, and the American War of Independence) 
 
The mid seventeenth century (mainly the English Civil War) 
 
For Test Question 2 (does the model fail to reveal or illuminate significant aspects of unit 
life?): 
 
Two social elements from the nineteenth century and earlier were selected, the 
concept of personal honour and the practice among officers of duelling.  These two 
aspects of life in the British Army show up in the literature as powerful forces in 
motivating behaviour in the past, and must therefore have had a significant influence at 
unit level. 
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From a later period, the social implications for combat arms units of the large scale 
and comparatively sudden expansion of the British Army during the First World War 
were chosen.  This expansion altered the Army’s social composition and can safely 
be assumed to have had an effect on life at unit level. 
 
The material 
 
The material used to test the model mostly comprises extracts from published first hand 
accounts written by British soldiers of all ranks, as described and assessed in Chapter Two 
(pages 67 to 70).  In the few cases where the individuals were serving in the army of the East 
India Company, I have only included material relating to interaction between British 
personnel.  Such material seemed to have a substantial similarity to that generated by 
members of the British Army (unlike interaction between British and Indian personnel), and its 
inclusion increased the number of sources available. 
These published first hand sources were supplemented by some unpublished material, 
chiefly from my collection of the ‘unrecorded heritage’ of the Royal Artillery which was 
described in Chapter One (page 40). 
I used first hand accounts as the axis for this research because it most closely 
resembled the interview material and personal observations from which I built the model.  This 
material seemed more appropriate than other options, such as the official contemporary 
records of daily life provided by, for example, Court Martial papers and order books, 
important and informative though they are. 
There is nevertheless a profound difference between the material presented in 
Chapters Three and Four  (which I either experienced myself or collected in person from 
informants) and this historical material.  Whereas my material was collected in times of quiet 
and in barracks (apart from my field notes during operations in Northern Ireland), the bulk of 
the historical material records times of war.  This is the result of a natural process whereby 
authors and their publishers were more inclined to make their experiences available to the 
public when there was public interest in what they were reporting than when there was not.  
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Accounts of daily life in peacetime tended not to provoke sufficient interest to allow them to 
survive or be put into the public domain. 
On the one hand, this difference might be considered so significant that there are little 
reasonable grounds for comparison.  It could well be said that the experiences of peace and 
war, the unthreatened barracks compared to the field of danger, are so far apart that they 
represent different domains of human experience altogether.   
On the other hand, it is my contention that the same basic social processes underlie 
both cases.  In Bourdieu’s terms, the habitus (see Chapter One, page 14) that has been 
ingrained in the soldier in times of peace and in training for war before actual combat is still 
with him when he enters the deadly context of the battlefield.  Furthermore, it is the common 
experience of the soldier of all eras that he spends the vast majority of his time not in combat: 
it is soldiers’ lore that even in time of war life is largely boredom, waiting for something to 
happen, with a very small proportion of the time consumed in the fear and confusion of 
combat. 
The position taken here is that it should be assumed at the outset that it is possible to 
apply the model to both peacetime and wartime contexts and let the differences, such as they 
are, emerge in the resulting analysis. 
In general, the first-hand literature about life at unit level for the more recent periods is 
abundant but becomes progressively more sparse in earlier time periods.  As Chandler says 
of contemporary sources in his introduction to a memoir of the War of the Spanish 
Succession:  
 
‘Inevitably, the further back in time the military historian delves the greater the 
problem of finding valuable contemporary sources - and yet these are vital requisites if 
any breath of life and immediacy is to be added to scholarly analyses of distant 
events.’1 
 
Whilst sufficient useful material does exist, albeit in small shreds, from even the earliest periods 
covered in this chapter for the limited task of assessing the model against it, it  must be 
understood that from the later eighteenth century backwards this material is very sparse 
indeed.  As far as rank and file are concerned, for example, there are very few published mid 
eighteenth century sources which can contribute to the testing the model, with one standing 
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out as of exceptional use in this context.  This is the Journal of Corporal William Todd2, its 
usefulness lying in its unusual length and in the way that it chronicles in such detail the every-
day events of peacetime as well as war3.  We will therefore see a disproportionate number of 
instances taken from his journal.  The seventeenth century material is represented by but a few 
letters and memoirs, mostly written by officers, and much of it is aimed either at justifying the 
author to the new political order after the Restoration or at recording large scale events rather 
than the everyday business that the model addresses.   
It was necessary to make a selection from the available material for use in this 
chapter.  In general I found myself, at least from the Napoleonic period onwards, in what is a 
familiar position of difficulty to those seeking to provide detail from the broad sweep of 
history, as expressed by McGuffie in the Introduction to his work on the British Army: ‘On 
the whole, however, the chief difficulty has been one of selection, both between books and 
between extracts.’4  In this study it was perforce a matter of personal choice.  In making this 
choice my only practical guide was to search for descriptions of events that contain a 
substantial element of social content (a necessary feature for the testing of a social model). 
There is also the question of quantity of examples and cases.  In a study that covers 
over 300 years the amount of material that could be brought forward for consideration is 
prodigious.  I have therefore restricted myself to the production of a small number of extracts 
from the material for each point in each time period.  The reader should be aware that this is 
generally representative of a much larger sample, at least from the mid eighteenth century. 
Quoted material is given in the spelling of the published version, which is usually that 
of the original document.  Where unpublished sources are used, they are in the original 
spelling. 
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Caveat 
 
There has been a constant temptation in writing this chapter to go beyond its purpose and to 
try to use the model as an analytical tool with which to examine the historical material.  
Although some analytical observations are forced into the light by the processes in this 
chapter, it must be remembered that our purpose is to test the model, not to use it at this 
stage.  Use of the model on historical material is explored in Chapter Six, where many of the 
questions apparently left open in this chapter are addressed. 
 
SECTION TWO - TEST QUESTION ONE: DOES THE MODEL REFLECT THE 
BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH SOLDIERS FROM THE MID TWENTIETH 
CENTURY BACK TO THE MID SEVENTEENTH CENTURY?  
 
In this section we will examine the applicability of the chosen elements of the model to 
soldiers’ behaviour in the historical periods specified above.  To maintain a consistent 
approach, the order in which we examine the social structures will be the same as in Chapter 
Three (formal command, informal, loyalty/identity, functional).  We will proceed 
backwards in time for each structure because in that way we will be moving progressively 
further from the familiar ground of the present. 
In giving the ranks of the individuals who are quoted below, as far as possible I have 
used the rank in which the author is speaking.  For the most part, this means the rank at which 
he wrote the material if it is a diary or a letter or his final rank if he is writing memoirs. 
The epigraph to each section comprises short selections from soldiers’ songs of 
various periods, indicating a thread of preoccupation with some of the issues in each structure.  
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The formal command structure 
 
‘Fifty [lashes] I got for selling my coat, 
Fifty for selling my blanket’5 
 
‘For there’s going to be an inspection in the morning, 
And the Battery Sergeant Major will be there’6  
 
The existence of a formal command apparatus throughout all the period needs scarcely to be 
argued.  A formally sanctioned rank structure and a system of discipline go back further than 
the earliest period considered here (see, for example, the work of McNeill7, and Bellamy’s 
entry in the Oxford Companion to Military History8).  Indeed, the statement by Lance 
Bombardier Spike Milligan that ‘It’s not too difficult to become a military criminal.  Not 
shaving, dirty boots, calling a sergeant “darling”’9 could have been made by a British soldier at 
almost any time in the Army’s history, and probably for a considerable period before that.  
The testing ground from the formal command structure in the model is the existence 
and nature of the apparatus of rank and discipline and the formal division of the unit on a 
clearly defined hierarchical pattern.  According to the model, this structure defines the lines of 
official responsibility and the chain of command above and below each individual.  It contains 
a written code of discipline, badges of rank, symbols and attitudes that express power and 
authority, and an expectation of the obedience of the junior that is shared by all. 
Establishing that such a description fits the cases of the British Army in the mid and 
early twentieth century and the mid and early nineteenth centuries would be superfluous, and 
there will be no attempt here to prove this obvious point.  Given the passage of years since 
the eighteenth century, however, it seems unsafe to make any assumptions in that period, so 
we will begin the test in that era and work backwards to the mid seventeenth century.  
At first sight, the rank structure of the British Army of the mid to late eighteenth 
century had elements in it that are unfamiliar today: we read, for example, of ranks such as 
‘mattross’10, ‘captain lieutenant’11, and ‘sub-brigadier’12.  However, the system of rank 
structure was in most important respects the same as the current situation.  There was the 
same distinction between those who held the sovereign’s commission and non-commissioned 
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officers, and between non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.  The generic design of 
a unit organisational structure would be familiar to a soldier today: the Commanding Officer 
had a small number of officers directly beneath him in his headquarters, including an adjutant 
and a quartermaster, and his unit was formally divided into subunits (companies for infantry 
and troops for cavalry), each commanded by an officer13.   
There was a written code of discipline, the Articles of War14, which were, inter alia, 
the legal basis for formal Courts Martial, and which were backed up in particular cases by 
orders by the local commander, as described in this example, by Mattross James Wood in his 
diary entry of 29 November 1759.  He quotes from ‘General orders’, setting out a new 
organisation and deployment of the artillery in his garrison in India and the duties and 
responsibilities of the King’s and East India Company’s artillery: 
 
‘The officer commanding each bastion is strictly to examine into the state of the guns, 
carriages, ammunition and all other necessaries belonging to the bastion under their 
charge and are to be answerable that everything is at all times fit for immediate 
service. ... An orderly sergeant of the King’s and Company’s artillery is to visit the 
different bastions and ramparts occupied by their corps every morning before the 
relieving of the guards and to report to their proper Commanding Officers who is [sic] 
to report if anything is found deficient to the Commanding Officer of the Garrison.’15 
 
Formal punishments followed Courts Martial, such as the occasion in 1756 described 
by Corporal William Todd, 
 
‘A Deserter belonging the Marrines was Shott in the front of our Encampment, our 
whole line being under Arms & Each man March’d singly by him as he Lay to strike 
terrow in the rest etc.’16 
 
who in the same diary entry tells us that his men had to smarten their appearance for a formal 
parade, 
 
‘Here I made Each man a Ball [an early form of blanco] & Colour’d his Buff [i.e., 
bring up his buff leather accoutrements to a smart standard] and was Allowed 4 2 ce 
[4 pence halfpenny] per man, against the review before His Royal Highness the Duke 
of Conberland & Sir John Ligoneer, where we went through the different Evolutions 
firings etc.’ 
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Such accounts confirm that discipline was enacted by those with the formal legal 
authority vested in their rank and structural position in the unit, as now. 
We may therefore conclude that, whilst there have been changes of detail, for 
example in the nomenclature of the rank structure and in other elements such as the forms of 
the badges of rank and the nature of the punishments legally available to those in authority, the 
selected elements chosen from the formal command structure model in Chapter Three are 
fully recognisable back to the eighteenth century.  
However, if we examine the evidence from the mid seventeenth century we see a 
different picture, which seriously challenges the validity of the model in its application to that 
time.  Whilst it shows that there was indeed a formal system for command, clearly 
represented by such elements as the apparatus of commission, military authority, discipline 
and punishment, and there was a formal system for structuring a unit into subunits - companies 
in the infantry and troops in the cavalry - some of its aspects were less well defined than in 
later years.  This is apparent, for example, in the relationship of the Northern Horse to the 
Royalist Army in 1645, as described by Richard Symonds, a member of the King’s Lifeguard 
of Horse: 
 
‘Wednesday [4 June 1645].  The Northerne horse left his Majesties army, and 
notwithstanding his promise to them on the word of a King he would go into 
Yorkshire after Oxford was relieved; but upon persuasion returned and marched with 
us.’17 
 
In this example we see that, although they were part of King Charles’s army, these regiments 
apparently felt that they were not fully bound in to it, or to the King as Commander-in-Chief.  
Similarly, the King could not give them a direct order, but had to invoke a previous promise 
and use persuasion. 
A similar example of conduct that does not fit into the formal hierarchical pattern of later years 
was an incident in August 1650 described by Captain John Hodgson, an officer in the 
Parliamentary army, in which the choice of a new colonel was put to the soldiers in what 
appears to have been an open and free-for-all vote:  
 
‘Not to omit one thing when we were about Alnwick, several colonels came into the 
head of the regiment, and told the soldiers, the general was much troubled such a 
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regiment should want a colonel; who would they have? ... The colonels asked, if they 
would have Colonel Monk?  “Colonel Monk!” said some of them, “What! to betray 
us?  We took him, not long since, at Namptwick, prisoner: we’ll have none of him.”  
The next day the colonels came again, and propounded the case afresh; and asked if 
they would have Major-General Lambert to be their colonel?  At which they all threw 
up their hats, and shouted a Lambert! a Lambert!’18 
 
Such a state of affairs would not have featured in any of the other time periods considered in 
this chapter. 
It is interesting to see that this apparent step change in the formal command 
structure between the mid seventeenth and mid eighteenth centuries coincides with one of the 
periodic ‘military revolutions’ described by Bellamy in the Oxford Companion to Military 
History19.  Drawing on the work of Roberts and others20, he describes how the changes in 
battlefield deployment from great blocks of troops in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
to line formation in the eighteenth necessitated a ‘vast increase in officers and NCOs’21 in a 
unit.  It seems likely from the quoted material above that these changes also brought with them 
a sea change in the ingredients of the formal command structure. 
 
Assessment 
 
Our test of the model, therefore, has shown that the selected elements of the model of the 
formal command structure would need some adjustment to cover the events of the mid 
seventeenth century, although they apply reasonably well after that period.  While there was 
certainly what might be described as a system for formal command in the seventeenth century, 
there was more scope for collective action on the part of soldiers and regiments to resist the 
wills of their commanders than there was in later periods. 
We now pass on to the selected aspects of the informal structure. 
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The informal structure 
 
‘Fill ‘em up, fill ‘em up; it is my birthday [repeated twice] 
Don’t stop, don’t stop; I love to hear the corks go pop, pop, pop!’22 
 
‘One night round the camp fire some soldiers were sat 
Talking of sweethearts they’d had’23  
 
‘This song is well sung I make you a vow, 
And he is a knave that drinketh now!’24 
 
Once the existence of a formal set of rules has been established, it is a short step to conclude 
that there must also be similar, informal, conventions of behaviour.  The question is not, 
therefore, whether some form of informal structure existed in the British Army in the periods 
being discussed, but rather whether or not the chosen aspects of the informal structure in 
the model can be applied to advantage as they stand, without modification, to those periods.  
These aspects, listed above, are the existence and nature of legitimate and illegitimate 
secondary adjustments, described in Chapter Three on pages 117 to 121 and the five-fold 
suite of informal relationships which are explained on pages 92 to 109 of Chapter Three. 
 
Legitimate secondary adjustments 
 
This sub-section contains examples of rule-breaking or rule-bending with the permission, or in 
full sight of, of figures of authority.  These next few examples show that the practice was a 
normal and natural part of unit life throughout the periods under consideration, and that the 
model fits the circumstances reasonably well.   
We start with an incident during the Second World War, described by James Lucas 
when public, but unofficial, action taken against recruits under training who were deemed to 
be dirty: 
 
‘Most [recruits] settled down and kept themselves clean, but there were always a few 
who would not wash regularly or thoroughly.  They were taught a lesson by means 
which although unofficial and frowned upon was still carried out.  They were bathed in 
public on the square.’25  
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If these measures were frowned upon and if a ban on them had been enforced, they could 
scarcely have been carried out ‘in public on the square’.  The formal chain of command must 
therefore have tolerated them at least.   
Gary Sheffield, in his thesis on officer-man relationships in the First World War, which 
we will revisit later when examining informal relationships, tells us of the custom in some 
contexts of officers, the figures of authority, bending the rules: 
 
‘Given the hazards of trial by FGCM [Field General Court Martial], some officers 
were prepared to turn a blind eye to what, in military terms, were serious crimes.  
There are many accounts of exhausted men being found asleep on sentry duty in the 
trenches, but according to Pte A.M. Burrage, a middle-class soldier who was often 
critical of the military system, officers were usually ‘too decent to make a song about 
it.’ The trick was for the officer to wake the sentry up without acknowledging that the 
soldier was asleep.’26 
 
Fifty years earlier, Captain Colin Campbell told a friend in a letter how he had bent 
the rules in the cause of recovering from illness.  He had been given three weeks sick leave 
after falling ill and was spending it on a ship in Balaclava harbour where he could be warm 
and dry.  When, during his convalescence, the ship had to sail to Smyrna he decided to stay 
on board, contravening his orders to stay in the Crimea.  He did so and returned safely in a 
few days.  Shortly afterwards, the ship once again had to make the same journey and he 
made the same decision, though this time he informed his superiors.  He recorded in the letter, 
 
I am going to take another trip in the vessel to Smyrna, although totally against orders, 
the Brigadier and the Medical Board agreeing to shut their eyes to the fact.27 
 
In much the same vein, Lieutenant-General Richard Barter recalls an incident during 
the occupation of Delhi immediately after the successful siege in 1857, when he was a captain, 
 
‘In the afternoon about 4 o’clock, my orderly, Joe Fullalove came up to me with a 
mysterious air and told me that he had got summat as he wished to send to Kussowlie 
to Mrs Barter in remembrance of Delhi if my honour had no objection.  I thanked him 
and asked what it was, to which he only replied by wagging his head in a most sapient 
manner as he walked away.  In about ten minutes back he came with his comrade 
both actually staggering under a huge cheval glass [a tall mirror fitted to an upright 
frame28].  I said, ‘It’s fine, Joe, and no mistake, but how could I ever manage to send 
such a thing as this to Mrs Barter?’  Joe replied ‘You leave that to me sir, only say the 
word and it shall be done.’  So I said the word and it was packed there and then in a 
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Persian carpet and up it got safe enough through Spare, the Mess Sergeant, I 
believe.’29 
 
This activity was technically looting, and therefore forbidden30.  However, such was the 
hatred among the British forces for the Indian mutineers and their political masters that no 
regard was taken for their property.  Barter therefore apparently felt no pangs in allowing his 
orderly to loot this item on his behalf and was clearly not in any fear of official disapproval. 
Sergeant Stephen Morley, then a company pay sergeant in the 5th Regiment of Foot, 
tells how in 1812 he was advised by his commanding officer to forge a signature: 
 
‘Once, and I shall never forget it, - I had made the returns ready for signatures, first of 
the quarter-master, and then of the Commanding Officer; after the most diligent 
search, not being able to find the former, the Colonel pounced upon me, and after my 
candid explanation of the dilemma, he said, “sign it yourself;” - “How, Sir,?” “as 
quarter-master,” I did so, and meaning my signature to be greatly dignified, I 
adopted for the first time the illegible mode I have used ever since.’31  
 
This forging of a signature unquestionably broke the rules of the formal command structure. 
 However, the personal involvement of the Commanding Officer made this secondary 
adjustment a legitimate one. 
The practice of rule-bending for the smooth running of daily life in the eighteenth 
century army is mentioned by Odintz in his thesis on the British Officer Corps.  He discusses 
the maintenance of discipline at regimental duty, and makes the point that unofficial violent 
action was condoned in certain circumstances by regimental officers: 
 
‘Casual violence may well have been an effective substitute for formal legal 
proceedings, saving the soldier from a more severe flogging, and saving his officer 
from the imputation that he could not control his men without invoking formal 
sanctions.’32  
 
Furthermore, in his investigation of the life of the common soldier in the same period, Steppler 
has shown us that there was a widespread unofficial understanding that private soldiers might 
seek work from civilian employers to amplify their meagre pay.  In general, officers only 
objected when this work kept the individual from his military duties.33 
An instance of rule-bending with the approval of authority in the seventeenth century 
is provided by Captain Richard Atkyns.  In his memoir, he describes a time in 1643 when the 
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regiment of which he was a member was commanded by the local commander, Prince 
Maurice, to go to quarters after a long night march.  However, the army’s rear guard was 
then attacked and scattered, and the commander was taken prisoner.  The problem was then 
that the regiment had its orders - to go to quarters - but there was a military need to do 
something else - counter attack.  Accordingly, he asked his superiors’ permission: 
 
‘My Lieutenant-Colonel, my Major, and the rest of the officers, advised what to do in 
this case; and the result was, that Prince Maurice having himself commanded his 
regiment to their quarters, they were subject to a Council of War34, if they should 
disobey command; to which I answered (being eldest captain) that I was but a young 
soldier, and if they would give me leave, I would draw off my division and run the 
hazard of a Council of War; they told me, they might as well go themselves, as give 
me leave to go; but if I would adventure, they would not oppose it, but defend me the 
best they could.’35 
 
Illegitimate secondary adjustments 
 
All the examples in this sub-section show activity that was intentionally carried out but had to 
be concealed from figures in authority, and therefore were considered by those concerned to 
be illegitimate. 
A Second World War private soldier writes of a time when he and some of his mates 
were on an extended duty as fatigue men, working at Battery HQ painting offices, and thus 
close to the motor transport garage: 
 
‘We got on well with the drivers and garage staff as all accidents had to be logged, 
ending up like courts of enquiries.  If no persons were involved, after the staff 
sergeant left for the day, the lorry was brought into the garage and the mechanics 
would check engine, braking system etc, panel-beaters would level out all dents and 
bashed wings, then we would paint the bodywork with quick-drying khaki paint and 
repaint the coloured artillery, battery and regimental signs. Any emergency at night, 
they knew where to find us.’36 
 
The illegitimate nature of this activity is made clear by the need to wait until the staff sergeant 
had gone off duty before it was begun. 
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Captain Harry Sliepmann describes how he obtained a particularly suitable horse in 
France in 1917, 
 
‘I became her proud owner as a result of one of those weary homeward treks by 
night, after serving the guns.  Dawn was just breaking and I rode, as usual, at the head 
of a long column of empty ammunition waggons.  That night, the Veterinary sergeant 
was the NCO in charge of the parade and, as we were passing down a narrow lane 
in open country, he rode up to me with a predatory twinkle in his eyes.  Had I 
noticed, a moment ago, that as we passed some horselines there was a horse with a 
loose halter, standing by the side of the road?  I had not noticed, but a loose horse 
was worth investigating, and in a minute or two she was a docile and decorous 
addition to our column.  On closer inspection, when she was safely tied to our picket 
ropes, she proved to be a jewel beyond price ... 
But thievery, in our war, was not just a simple business like cattle-rustling and 
we were well aware of the risks to which we had exposed ourselves.’37 
 
However, they now needed to conceal her from the prying eyes of the Cavalry colonel who 
came looking for her: 
 
‘Between us, the Veterinary Sergeant and I devised a scheme for the frustration of 
such inquisitive interference.  There had been, until then, only one entrance to our 
horselines; we got another one cut through a hedge, diagonally opposite.  An 
observer was posted near the original entrance to report in good time the arrival of 
any suspicious interlopers, and my groom was instructed, on receipt of an agreed 
signal, to take the Missus [the soldiers’ nickname for the horse] off the horselines and 
conduct her safely away through the new entrance.  It soon turned out that our 
measures were not superfluous.  Three times in the course of the following week their 
use was called for, and each time with perfect success.  Our horselines were open to 
inspection at any time, we innocently boasted.’38 
 
The model’s concept of illegitimate secondary adjustment perfectly fits this situation where 
advantage is taken by soldiers in the knowledge that this action is against the rules and they 
then take measures to deceive and outwit the forces of authority. 
Moving to the nineteenth century, Private Robert Waterfield tells how individuals 
disobeyed the rules governing the consumption of the rum ration, in India in 1848, 
 
‘In consequence of several men having been confined for drunkenness they [the 
officers] issued an order for every man to drink his grog at the tub where it is served 
out, thinking by this means to put a stop to the men getting drunk.  They might as well 
try to stop the wind, for the men, or at least a great many of them, get false bottoms 
fixed in their tin pots, and when they go for their grog it is measured into these.  Those 
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who want to carry grog away will take a small portion of bread with him [sic], which 
he will be eating, so as to allow his grog sufficient time to run through a small hole 
which is in the false bottom.  They can then raise the pot nearly upside down, without 
spilling the liquor; this enables them to carry it away and if they don’t want to drink it, 
they can always get plenty of men who will purchase it at four annas per dram, just 
four times its first cost.  By this means are the Colonel’s wishes baffled!’39 
 
Once again, this deception perfectly fits the model’s analytical category of illegitimate 
secondary adjustment. 
Similar examples of illegitimate secondary adjustments can be found in memoirs of 
the Napoleonic period, as illustrated by Sergeant James Anton’s recollection of his time 
guarding prisoners of war in 1804, as a private soldier in the 42nd Foot,  
 
‘The prisoners were locked up at sunset, and then the sentries, who were out of 
immediate view of the guard-house, laid their firelocks against the sentry-boxes and 
amused themselves by playing at putting-stone, pitch-and-toss, and such-like 
amusements, without fear of detection; for the cordial unity of feeling existed 
throughout the corps, so that as soon as the officer, sergeant, or corporal of the guard 
made his appearance, it was notified in an instant to the most remote corners, without 
his being aware of the communications, and our gambling amusements instantly 
ceased.40 
 
There is no sign that illegitimate secondary adjustments were less prevalent in 
earlier periods, as these next two extracts from personal memoirs show.  In the first, Sergeant 
Roger Lamb describes how some of his comrades had sold their ‘necessaries’ [military 
clothing and equipment] to finance their gambling and covered up the fact, 
 
‘... when the officers inspected and reviewed the state of their necessaries.  On such 
occasions they frequently borrowed shirts, shoes, stockings, and other articles of 
regimental appointment from their comrades, who happened to be absent on guard, 
while the inspection and scrutiny took place.  In this manner they frequently eluded 
strict examination.’41 
 
In the second, Sergeant Nehemiah Wharton tells of a similar incident in 1642, after a warning 
had been given by the officers that looting would not be tolerated: 
 
‘Fryday several of our soildiers, both horse and foote, sallyed out of the City unto the 
Lord Dunsmor’s parke, and brought from thence a great store of venison, which is as 
good as ever I tasted, and ever since they make it their dayly practise, so that venison 
is almost as common with us as beefe with you.’42 
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Assessment 
 
It seems, then, that the model’s characterization of legitimate and illegitimate secondary 
adjustments serves well in all the periods considered.  This raises a question as to whether or 
not this indicates a weakness, a plasticity, in the model: in serving all periods perhaps it is not 
well enough defined to be a useful tool in a particular historical context.  However, the 
existence of such activity, and the attitudes which give birth to it, may be identified as a natural 
human reaction to having to live under a code of discipline, which can reasonably therefore be 
expected to show in evidence from any period.  In that case we would need the concept of 
secondary adjustments in any model that tried to capture behaviour in such contexts.  
Similarly, the relevance of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate secondary 
adjustments to all periods reflects an adaptability among individuals in the chain of command 
which might be expected in situations where there is conflict between the rules and the needs 
and desires of their subordinates. 
 
Informal relationships 
 
A more testing question than the existence of legitimate and illegitimate secondary 
adjustments may well be whether the model of the five informal relationships could be used 
in a meaningful way in all these periods.  We will now examine these elements of the model in 
the same sequence as in Chapter Three. 
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Close friendship  
 
The element in the model which I called close friendship appears from time to time in the 
historical material, though not often.  This is consistent with the observation in Chapter Three 
that this relationship is a rare and special one.  Indeed, in first hand accounts it is usually only 
revealed by the author’s reaction to close friend’s death, perhaps because the relationship is 
so closely bound into the normal pattern of life that it seems unnecessary to mention it until the 
thread is broken.   The following quotations show examples of its occurrence in first hand 
accounts. 
First, and happily, my correspondent Gunner Jock Hanbury reports that he is still in 
touch with only one fellow member of his battery, Arthur (Geordie) Williams, a man from 
Newcastle who served on the same gun as him.  They had not met before the war, but have 
never lost touch since. 
 Secondly, but more sombrely, Lieutenant William St Leger confides in his diary about 
his feelings of loss following the death of his colleague, Denis Buxton, in 1917,  
‘I do miss old Denis so, Henry too, but Denis more. ... When I shared a tent with him 
I used to wake up in the morning and feel my heart glow with happiness to see him 
sleeping peacefully at the other side of the tent.  Then I used to get up and exhort him 
to do the same.’43 
 
In the same vein, Lieutenant Arthur Moffatt Lang mourns the death of his great friend 
Elliot Brownlow in 1858, in the closing stages of the Indian Mutiny 
 
‘The death of my dear friend Elliot has of course cast a gloom over the campaign as 
far as it concerns me, and has rendered it distasteful to me, and spoiled all my 
pleasure in war and victory and Lucknow.  He was a friend such as I can never find 
again in this world, more than a brother to me. ... In him the corps [the Bengal 
Engineers] has lost its finest young officer, and I have lost such a friend as I can again 
never find.  God bless him.’44 
 
We can see that this close relationship was reciprocated from Elliot Brownlow’s final letter to 
him, a letter to be opened only upon his death,  
 
‘Don’t regret me as I believe that if I die I shall go direct to a happier world.  That 
you were under the Divine Providence the means of bringing me to abandon a course 
of folly and sick [sic] for true happiness at the throne of grace has been the cause of 
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making me love you with an affection and respect I have never felt for any other man 
of my own age.’45 
 
  Sentiments of the same quality are shown by Sergeant Timothy Gowing as he 
remembers his grief at the loss of a comrade at the Battle of the Alma four years earlier, 
  
‘After the enemy had been fairly routed, I obtained leave to go down the hill; I had 
lost my comrade and I was determined to find him if possible. ... I found him close to 
the river, dead. ... I sat down beside him and thought my heart would break as I 
recalled some of his sayings, particularly his talk to me at midnight on the 19th;’46 
 
In an earlier instance, Sergeant Stephen Morley describes ‘my never to be forgotten 
friend Michael Wall’ in his Peninsular War memoirs 47, making a distinction between him and 
the other individuals with whom he interacted during his years in the Service. 
These examples all have in common relationships that transcended the usual bounds 
of that which is called friendship in this thesis, a distinction well made in the final extract in this 
subsection.  It comes from Odintz’s thesis on the eighteenth-century British Army, from the 
pen of a Lieutenant Armstrong, 
 
‘The Distress I felt on the Death of my much valued friend Capt. Leslie...cast such a 
Damp on my Spirits that I was for some time insensible to every Object around me.  
A more amiable young man never existed.  Now that He and Sir A. Murray are gone, 
I have no particular Intimates in the Regt. - Altho I am happy to say, that, with every 
one I am on the best footing.  But these were the Companions of my Early Years, my 
Schoolfellows.  On their friendship I could depend, But now they are no more!48  
 
The discrimination of friends and close friends in the model closely matches 
Armstrong’s comparison of those with whom he is ‘on the best footing’ and the companions 
of his early years, his ‘intimates’ on whom he could depend. 
 
Friendship 
 
We will now explore how the concept of friendship maps on to first hand material from the 
various eras under discussion. 
It should come as no surprise that this relationship is well represented in Second 
World War first hand literature.  It is the common, sustaining, relationship of peers within 
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groups of subunit size and below.  For instance, Lance Bombardier Spike Milligan says in the 
forward to his second volume of wartime memoirs, ‘I had with me wonderful comrades who 
made life worth while’49, a sentiment parallelled by Gunner Jock Hanbury’s remark, ‘...with 
characters around in abundance, life on the wartime gunsites was never dull’50. 
In the same way, first hand material from the First World War shows that the same 
quality of relationship existed as common currency among soldiers, as these three extracts 
from personal recollections of the Western Front illustrate, 
 
Corporal George Coppard says of his life in France in 1917 that  ‘The daily 
comradeship of my pals ...gave me strength.’51 
 
Private David Jones describes the relationship between two saturnine men, Joe 
Donkin, and ‘old Craddock, his most near associate - they always managed to get on 
the same Fatigue and used to sit silent together in the boozer’52 
 
An officer writes in a letter, ‘One of the 10th Service Battalion York and Lancaster 
Regiment got held fast by the mud and slime in a shell-hole which flooded as he 
struggled.  To haul him with ropes was impossible as he would have died.  It took 
four nights’ hard work by the Pioneers to get him free.  His comrade stood by him 
day and night under fire.  He fed him by means of a long stick.’53 
 
Turning to the nineteenth century material, we again see a pattern that fits the 
characterisation of friendship in the model.  We begin with Captain Colin Campbell, whom 
we met above convalescing on board a ship at Balaclava in December 1854, contemplating 
the contents of a parcel he has just received from home and writing that ‘The little black cap is 
a great treasure; the gloves are only surpassed by Archy’s; the sausages will create great 
excitement in camp...’54  The significant element in these remarks is that, with at least a 
fortnight’s sick leave ahead of him, Campbell is going to keep the sausages until he returns to 
camp.  It seems that he wants to share them with his colleagues instead of eating them where 
he is.  Such a desire to share is a characteristic of friendship.    
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In another account from the mid nineteenth century, Lieutenant General Richard 
Barter gives an account of an escapade carried out by a group of young officers during the 
Indian Mutiny when there was a pause in the military action which coincided with a dearth of 
rations.  
 
‘Bally’s long duck gun was a great Godsend.  It took a lot of little squares to make a 
charge certainly, but the results were grand.  It carried so much further, and brought 
down three or four [pigeons] at a discharge so that for a day or two we fed right 
royally, and thought that we’d hunger no more, but alas, the pigeons grew wary and 
avoiding our vicinity betook themselves to the neighbourhood of the Enemy.  Day 
after day we watched them hoping for a chance, but no use, and at last an irresistible 
craving for roast pigeon seizing us we resolved to literally do or die.  Bally Smith, 
Levelly (known as the white Demon), Haines (or Badmash [Indian Army word for 
‘bad character55] as he was called) and myself started off for game.  I carried an 
Enfield rifle and Bally the duck gun, the Demon and Badmash being armed with 
carbines.’56 
 
The use of nicknames and the informal peer group activity clearly indicates the relationship of 
friendship. 
As another illustration from the mid nineteenth century, Colour Sergeant George 
Evernden remembers the time of his deployment to the Crimea with a number of other 
members of his battalion as a private soldier fresh from training.  Shortly after disembarking, 
they erected 16-man tents and were then issued with rations.  He tells us that they 
immediately shared out the food in pairs: ‘We shared out the buiscuit and sugar into eight lots 
so that each 2 comrades had their own.’57.  This ordinary little detail is redolent of two 
particular aspects of the relationship of friendship, that of an expectation of sharing between 
friends and the fact that the relationship is such common currency among those who live and 
work together that it can be assumed to be available as a means of distributing food. 
 A Peninsular War example is provided by John Cooper, a senior NCO in the 7th 
Royal Fusiliers who recalls a skirmish in early 1812.  He was then a private soldier in the light 
company,  
 
‘We rejoined our company [from a reconnaissance with the Major of the battalion] 
just as the enemy’s skirmishers opened fire upon us.  Here two of us made our Wills. 
 My comrade said, “If I be killed, you take my knapsack.”  I said, “If I be killed, you 
take mine.”’.58 
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and in another part of his memoirs he makes an interesting observation about another of his 
colleagues,  
 
‘Now this Clapham [a private soldier in Cooper’s company] was a queer fellow; he 
generally had plenty to eat, but where he got his eatables was quite another thing.  He 
did not tell every one.’59 
 
Sharing is one of the characteristic signs of friendship.  In the first quotation, Cooper and his 
comrade enter into a sharing pact, ensuring that their possessions go to a friend.  In the 
second, Clapham did not share his food and so it is reasonable to conclude that he lacked 
friends.  This is consistent with the description of him as a ‘queer fellow’, which can be taken 
to mean that he did not fit into the informal groups around him. 
As another example from the same era, Frederick Pattison recalls that towards the 
end of the Battle of  Waterloo, at which  he was a subaltern, ‘On halting, a number of little 
coteries were formed to discuss the proceedings of the day ...60   These ‘coteries’ would have 
consisted of groups of friends who naturally drifted into each other’s company when there 
was a pause. 
The same sort of pattern is present in the eighteenth century material, as these next 
examples will show. 
 First, Richard Davenport, then a junior officer in the Life Guards, writes to his brother 
that,  
‘Captain Taylor has a female correspondent in England, with whom he is honourably 
engaged.  He entertains us with her letters, which are excessively foolish, as well as 
his answers, which he expresses without reserve.’61  
 
Such sharing of personal material would only be acceptable between friends. 
Second, we read in the diary of John Peebles, a junior officer in the 42nd Foot, an 
entry for 25 March 1779, ‘met at the Coffee house in the Eveng. my old acquaintance & 
chum Balnabie  he is eldest Capt. & has the Light Compy. of the 74th. we spent the evening 
together with a party at Black Sams’62. 
This incident has many of the characteristic elements of what is described as 
friendship in the model.  The relationship is obviously warm and is appropriately exercised in 
the informal surroundings of a coffee house and a place where people gathered to spend the 
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evening.  Interestingly, the text also suggests that the relationship was formed some time 
earlier and had lapsed: this is the first time that Peebles mentions this ‘old acquaintance & 
chum’ in his journal, and we can see not only that he is in a different Regiment but also that 
Peebles was not aware until he met him on this occasion that he was in command of the light 
company of that Regiment.  It is likely therefore that Peebles and Balnabie were exercising the 
revival of old friendship that had suffered separation by circumstances - a characteristic of 
friendship described on pages 98 and 99 of Chapter Three. 
Next, Corporal Todd’s journal of the Seven Years’ War  provides us with several 
cases which fit readily into the relationship modelled as friendship, of which the following are 
three examples.  In the first, Todd and his comrades are on board ship off the coast of France 
in 1758, 
 
‘My Comrade, Samuel Shaw, got a Bed-tick [fabric], as good as New, & I have 
brought a Board a very good strong Sheet that I got at Cancalle, so that we have 
agreed to have Each of us a pair of Breeches out of Each, & Thomas Poyne & 
George Darker, Taylors in our Company, made them up for us here on Board of ship 
for one shilling per pair.  And we have got Each of us two pair, so that we think 
ourselves well laid in for Breeches as they are of great service to us here, as the most 
of us was very Badly of for Breeches by tearing them so on Board etc.’63 
 
Sharing good fortune indicates friendship.  However, note that Poyne and Darker were not 
prepared to work for nothing and so would not be counted as friends by Todd and Shaw.  In 
a similar incident, after they had landed in France two months later, 
 
‘... we are in great wants of Linnen to shift us with, but one of my tent-mates 
happen’d to light upon some shirts [and] gave me one.  They were Course but they 
do very well at this time etc.’64 
 
The expression ‘tent mates’ superficially indicates nothing more than that these soldiers shared 
accommodation.  However, the sharing of the shirts indicates a relationships of friendship. 
After a period of two months’ leave at the end of 1758, Todd returns and catches up 
with what has been going on among his friends, 
 
‘In Quarters at the City of Canterbury.  Now begun to meet with all my Old 
Comrades & found that Samuel Shaw had got Married, and George Day, Wm 
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Gambole & Elias Perry, all belonging our Company, had been Detected by Serjeant 
Glenon for Sheep stealing & had been punish’d since I went upon furlow etc.’65 
 
From the seventeenth century material, we can observe a few references to 
relationships that fit the model of friendship, though, as we considered above, because the 
material is so sparse such references are small in number.  Our first example is from the 
memoirs of John Gwynne, a Welshman who joined the Royalist army in 1642 as a private 
soldier and subsequently rose to be a junior officer, remaining with the exiled Charles II’s 
army in Europe as an officer in the Royal Regiment of Guards.  He remembers that on one 
occasion (probably in 165866) his regiment was in a difficult situation without orders, and the 
senior officer present, the major, would make no decision.  He ‘neither came nor sent, but let 
us go as we came at; which I was something concern’d, and spoake to Ensign Sackfield, and 
Ensign Stoner, my familiar associats...’67.  These words, ‘familiar associats’, chime well with 
the definition of friends in the model, and the fact that they resorted to each other when they 
were in difficulties indicates that they enjoyed a measure of mutual trust, which is also a 
feature of friendship. 
Our second example is provided by Sergeant Nehemiah Wharton who recounts in 
passing in a letter in 1642 how he invited an old associate of his, Davey, to bring a friend to 
dine with him.  ‘This night I invited your man Davy and his comrade, and made them 
welcome.’68   Not only are Wharton and Davy friends, in that they have known each other 
for some time and choose to eat together, but Davy brings with him another man who, in the 
terms of the model, is identified by Wharton as Davy’s friend, rather than his own. 
The model’s category of friendship seems therefore fully applicable through all the 
periods considered.  
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Association 
 
Because British society has become progressively more egalitarian over the periods 
discussed69, as we go back in time it becomes less and less likely that relationships across 
ranks would be on an equal footing.  If friendship across substantial rank gaps is not 
considered legitimate in the present day, as we saw in Chapter Three, then we may also 
assume that it is most unlikely to have been the norm in earlier periods either. 
Working on this assumption, then, we may conclude that warm relationships across 
substantial rank gaps, where we find them, cannot fit the model’s characterisation of 
friendship.  The model provides only two viable alternatives to account for such relationships, 
close friendship, which transcends the division caused by rank, and association, which 
incorporates it.   We will see in this subsection that warm cross-rank relationships did indeed 
exist in all the periods examined, and we will assess the suitability of the model’s 
characterisation of association to encapsulate these relationships. 
The Second World War material reveals that warm cross-rank relationships were a 
regular and important element in everyday life, as these next two extracts illustrate, 
In the first, a Battery Commander, Major Chater, speaks to one of his men, in Italy in 
1943, 
 
‘ “Have you any of that fruit cake left, Milligan?” 
“No, sir.” 
“Just asking, Milligan.  It’s a hot evening, I don't see why we shouldn’t indulge in a 
dip, got your costume?” 
“No sir, I’ve learned to swim without it.” 
Adjacent to a POW Camp where a brass band played Tyrolean Waltzes, we 
enjoyed a delicious swim in the Med. starkers, save Chater who wore his knee length 
‘drawers cellular,’ ‘something to do with an officer being ‘properly dressed’.’70 
 
This is a conversation that is clearly indicative of association.  The Major tries to get some 
cake from one of his men, who feels perfectly free to deny it without apologies, while retaining 
the respectful term of address, ‘Sir’.  The question of swimming is not dealt with as an order 
or instruction from the senior person, but as a discussion, and the reply is a joke from the 
junior. 
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In this next example, in Burma in 194471, an infantry sergeant is approaching a private 
soldier (‘Jock’) in his platoon to tell him that he is about to give him a difficult and dangerous 
task.  The sergeant speaks first, 
 
‘ “Aye-Aye, Jock lad, w’at fettle?” 
“Not bad, sergeant, thank you.” 
“Champion!  They tell us yer a good cross-coontry rooner?” 
“Oh ... well, I’ve done a bit ...” 
“Girraway! Ah seen ye winnin’ at Ranchi - travellin’ like a bloody trail ‘oond w’en the 
whistles gan on.  ‘Ere, ‘ev a fag.” 
“Ta very much, sarn’t.  M-mm, Senior Service...” 72 
 
The terms of address emphasise the differences in rank between the two speakers, whilst the 
conversation is jovial and informal.  The private feels sufficiently relaxed to comment on the 
type of cigarette that he has been offered. 
Gary Sheffield has covered the area of cross-rank relationships comprehensively in 
his PhD thesis73.  Three extracts will show that what he investigated was a set of relationships 
that fits well into the category that I have defined as association in my model, 
 
‘Some officers certainly believed that they enjoyed close relationships with their men. 
 A subaltern wrote of the family atmosphere in the 16th Lancers.  At ‘stables’ an 
‘opportunity was provided for the most intimate relationship to be established 
between officer and men’.  Privates discussed their affairs with their officer, while old 
soldiers would give ‘friendly warnings’ to inexperienced subalterns, without ‘the least 
impairment’ of discipline.’74  
 
This warm informal behaviour across ranks, conducted without compromising differences in 
rank, are exactly as described in the model by the term ‘association’. 
 
‘One matter, absolutely central to the whole question of officer-man relations, has yet 
to be addressed: how could officers demonstrate friendship for their men and yet 
retain their authority?  Capt. Hamond [sic] in his unpublished treatise on officership, 
had some firm, common-sense views on this question.  He stated that men will follow 
an officer who has a strong, attractive personality and who ‘personally looks after 
their bellies and beds.’  However, he continued, ‘any form of familiarity that lowers 
your own position’ should be instantly checked, ‘but for God's sake don’t always be 
thinking about your own dignity, it should be there without any possibility of mistake 
for everyone to see’.  In sum, the officer needed to tread a narrow line between 
paternalistic friendship for his men, and undue familiarity.’75 
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Association precisely models this relationship of closeness without the familiarity of equals. 
 
‘Wyn Griffith, a company commander in 15/RWF, left an excellent pen-portrait of his 
relationship with his company sergeant major.  Relaxing together over a glass of 
whisky and a pipe in the company officers’ mess, they would gossip about the men of 
the company.  Griffith made two revealing remarks about this relationship.  Firstly, 
‘Our life thrust us close together; his [the CSM’s] position was in its way as solitary 
as my own’.  Both had responsibility for their men.  Both needed to strike a delicate 
balance between being part of the company ‘team’ and being slightly aloof from it.  
Secondly, the gossip allowed Griffith to find out incidents in the life of the company 
‘unknown to the least unapproachable of company commanders, unguessed at in 
spite of the close contact of life in the trenches’.  For example, ‘Had I heard what 
Delivett said when a pip-squeak blew some mud in his mess tin...?’  In short, the 
CSM provided an important link between the private and the company commander.  
In this case, and many others, the NCO and officer worked together as a harmonious 
team.  Similar relationships could exist between other grades of NCO and officer, but 
in all cases, they had to be founded upon mutual goodwill and carefully nurtured.’76  
 
This relationship is typical of association between a commander and his most senior non-
commissioned officer, providing mutual encouragement and a channel of communication.   
The nineteenth and eighteenth century first hand material presents a contrast. 
Accounts of informal relationships between officers and men in these periods are very rare, 
and this has led several authors to infer that such relationships were themselves rare.  Officers, 
who were by far in the majority of those who leave us diaries, letters, and memoirs, hardly 
seem to mention their men at all.  For example, John Mills and Giles Mills note in their 
Foreword to the letters of their ancestor John Mills, ‘A marked difference between the letters 
and diaries of officers in the two World Wars and those of JM [John Mills] from the Peninsula 
is that no guardsman, except his soldier servant, is mentioned by name.’77  They put this down 
to the organisational structure of the infantry battalion, which gave junior officers nothing 
specifically to do with their men on a regular basis.   In a similar, but more expansive vein, 
Odintz tells us of the second half of the eighteenth century,  
 
‘...one of the striking features of the correspondence of British officers at this time, is 
the almost total absence of rankers in their accounts of battles, and their lists of 
casualties. There is little evidence in their letters, or in the memoirs of officers and 
rankers, that shared danger tended to personalize officer-ranker relations.  If the 
models of class behavior of the age had not already prohibited such a change in 
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command relations, the realities of service in the field were so different from those of 
modern conflicts as to remove any possibility for increased fraternization.’78  
 
The reason which is often given for this lack of informal contact between officers and men is 
that Britain had a rigid class system, and that warm informal relationships across classes were 
socially frowned upon.  As Gilbert put it in his examination of the use of Courts Martial as 
courts of honour in the eighteenth century (to which we will return later as one of the case 
studies for further use of the model in Chapter Six) ‘familiarity with the rank and file - the 
common soldier’ was an honour crime.  ‘Indeed, the seriousness with which this breach of 
behaviour was treated shows how great the gap between officers and men really was in the 
eighteenth-century army.’79 
 It might be expected, therefore, that the relationship modelled as association would 
be missing in the data from at least the nineteenth century and earlier. Intriguingly, this is not 
the case, as these next examples show. 
Sergeant John Hopkins writes home from Sebastopol in 1857 that he had been taken 
ill and had been carried to hospital ‘... more dead than alive.  Every officer in the regiment 
came to see me ...’.  When he was discharged, one officer in particular took care of him, 
 
‘The officer, Mr Dawes, took me to his tent: he supplied me with every luxury that a 
well-filled purse could supply, and told me to make free with anything that was in his 
tent. ... what would I not face by the side of such an officer?  Would I shrink from 
death? Perish the idea!’80 
 
Whilst it might be said that the officers came to visit Hopkins in hospital out of a sense of duty, 
Dawes clearly went well beyond the mere requirements of military duty by taking a personal 
and extended interest in Hopkins and offering to give up some of his possessions for his 
welfare. 
RSM George Smith provides us with another example of warm informal relationships 
across ranks.  In 1838 he was posted as a lance-corporal within the 11th Light Dragoons to 
A Troop, making the acquaintance of Troop Sergeant-Major Ennis, of whom he wrote, 
 
‘He afterwards became adjutant and received captaincy during the Crimean 
campaign; he was always a great friend to me, doing me a good turn whenever he had 
an opportunity.  I often went to see him many years after we had both left the service, 
and followed him to his grave in December 1882.’81 
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We can see here that their relationship was always asymmetrical in rank: it began when Smith 
was a junior NCO and Ennis was a warrant officer and it continued after Ennis was 
commissioned.  Whilst the text appears to bear some of the signs of close friendship, it is 
probably best to identify it as association for the following reasons: first, Ennis is not 
mentioned very often in Smith’s account, as might be expected for a close friend; second, 
there is no evidence that they strove to meet when they were off duty; and third we can see 
from this quote that Ennis did Smith several ‘good turns’ whilst Smith dies not mention any 
favours in return, which indicates more of a patron/client relationship than the bonding on 
equal terms that is a feature of close friendship. 
This sort of relationship was also available as a normal part of regimental soldiering in 
the Napoleonic period.  In remembering the first time he was under fire, in 1801, General Sir 
Thomas Brotherton tells us that when he was an ensign he made the acquaintance of a 
sergeant with whom he kept up a life-long informal relationship, 
 
‘The sergeant behind me, called the covering sergeant, seeing me a raw youth then 
only sixteen years of age, said in a respectful but half-joking way, “How do you feel, 
sir?” to which I replied, “Pretty well, but this is not very pleasant!” for the men were 
falling fast.  The sergeant, who was a seasoned veteran, liked the reply, for he seemed 
to take me under his special protection and care ever after.  His name and 
appearance I shall never forget. It was Sergeant Stuckey - I often went to Chelsea to 
see him, where he died at the age of eighty-four, about the year 1840.’82 
 
We can see from this quotation that this relationship went beyond the superficial level that was 
needed for the professional conduct of the battle and became a continuing and close one.  
Whilst there is no evidence in Brotherton’s work that it approached the power of close 
friendship, this relationship fits the definition of association well. 
Sergeant John Cooper tells us of his warm informal relationships with the adjutant of 
his battalion,  
 
‘The French being driven into France [in 1813], we counter-marched to Pampeluna 
[modern Pamplona] to join in blockading it.  In this day’s march I was taken ill of 
fever.  After staggering on a few miles, I was obliged to fall out of the column, and sit 
down in a wood.  The adjutant with whom I was a favourite passed by and said, I 
might come on leisurely.’83  
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It is hard to see how Cooper might have become a ‘favourite’ of the adjutant without the sort 
of social mechanism provided by the relationship of association. 
As we move back in time to the eighteenth century, we continue to find relationships 
that fit the characterization in the model of association, as we will see from the following 
examples.  The first is provided by Odintz, as he writes about the relationship between an 
ensign and a sergeant in 1779, which mirrors the relationship described by Thomas 
Brotherton above: the ensign remembered ‘that he was “much too young for so important a 
situation...I acted, as many older officers no doubt had done before, and since - I obeyed the 
directions of an experienced Sergeant.”’84 
In the second example, the then Major Richard Davenport writes to his brother in 
1760 to ‘tell Atkinson his friend Walford sets out with a new tilted wagon and six good 
horses, besides two for panniers, and with money in his pocket’85.  This might appear to be 
no more than insignificant gossip had it not been for the fact that Walford had been 
quartermaster to Captain Atkinson when Atkinson had commanded a troop of the 10th 
Dragoons, as reported in Frearson’s editorial note to the letter.  This means that Walford had 
been in a substantially lower social position than Atkinson and, because of the highly stratified 
nature of British society, they could never therefore have had an informal relationship as 
equals.  The only way that Walford could have been a ‘friend’ to Atkinson was therefore by 
the sort of informal mechanisms encapsulated in the model of association. 
In a third example, Odintz gives us a glimpse of the view from below, when he writes 
of John Dorman, ‘a private in the 12th in the 1740’s, [who] described in his memoirs the kind 
treatment he received from Captain Conyngham of the regiment who enlisted him, and “he 
found such a friend with Captain Conyngham, with whom he hired as a servant, that his 
situation was very comfortable”’.86  This relationship would have been all the more strong 
because, as Odintz informs us, Conyngham enlisted Dorman.  Given the master-servant 
context and the class difference between them, it could not have fitted the category of 
friendship or close friendship, but it fits well with that of association. 
In his introduction to Captain John Peebles’s diary of the American War of 
Independence, Gruber summarises the relationship that Peebles had with his soldiers as 
follows, 
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‘Although officers held themselves apart, socially, from the rank and file in the 
eighteenth-century British army, they did feel bound to the common soldiers of their 
companies and regiments; and they and their men developed in time a valuable 
camaraderie.  At least, John Peebles’s diary conveys a greater sense of mutual 
dependence between officers and men than might seem likely in so hierarchical 
organization as the British army of the American War.  It was not just that he and his 
men shared the dangers and drudgery of war - the long marches, sudden skirmishes, 
large and exhausting battles, protracted sieges, and periods of frustrating inactivity - 
or that they celebrated the same royal, national, and military anniversaries.  It was also 
that over time he and they developed attachments to one another - genuine concern 
and sympathy for each other - that sustained them through the most difficult 
circumstances, that kept them together even when overrun in combat. ...  No wonder 
when he addressed his company for the last time, both he and they were deeply 
moved.’87 
 
Still in the eighteenth century, Corporal Todd gives us another useful insight into his 
informal relationships with a senior NCO (about to be commissioned) and an officer in his 
memoir.  In both cases, the senior individual is posted to another regiment and Todd bemoans 
their loss because he had a strong informal relationship with each of them, 
‘Serjeant Major Barnsley of our Company receiv’d an Ensign commission from Lord 
Loudoun in the 60th Regiment of foot call’d the Royal Americans, he gave me all his 
cast Cloaths, Books etc & would very gladly have had me with him as I was very 
willing to agone but this our Lieut Coll Sir Wm Boothby would not admitt me to go 
upon no Account, so we were obliged to take our Leaves of Each Other.’88 
... 
‘Capt Lieutenant Teavil Appleton receiv’d a full Captains Commission in the 65th 
Regiment of Foot & he would gladly ataken me with him.  He Offer’d my Lieutt Colle 
any Man in his Company in Exchange for me, but the Lieut Colle refused leting me go 
by telling him he would provide for me the first Vagancy himself.  These were the 
words Capt Appleton told me himself they had in the Canteen.  So the 27th Instant 
Capt. Appleton gave me a Crown & took his Leave of all our Officers etc, and set of 
to joyn his Regiment at Norwich.  This was the greatest Hardship I had ever met with 
by losing two of my best friends, Capt. Appleton and Ensign Barnsley.’89 
 
Here we see again informal relationships that were both warm and cross-rank.  However, 
Todd gives no sign that he misses them deeply after their various departures: he never 
mentions Barnsley again and Appleton only appears once more in Todd’s journal, when he 
gets Todd to run an errand for him in exchange for a generous tip of half a crown and 
‘refreshment’90 .  Whilst these relationships cannot therefore be identified as close friendship, 
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the warmth recorded by Todd implies the sort of strong asymmetrical informal relationship 
that fits into the category of association. 
As for the seventeenth century, the search for evidence of a commonplace warm 
relationship between soldiers of widely different rank yields a few instances, though the 
sample is tiny.  The first of the two examples that we will consider is provided by Sergeant 
Nehemiah Wharton, who writes in a letter to his erstwhile master in 1642,  
 
‘This morne I was exceeding sick, and the pallet of my mouth fel down; but Captain 
Beacon, my loving friend, upon our march sent a mile for a little pepper and put it up 
again.’91 
 
Whilst it is possible that Wharton had an existing relationship of friendship (or even perhaps 
close friendship) with Beacon from the time before Wharton became a soldier, it is more 
likely that the word ‘friend’ refers to a warm cross-rank relationship because it is expressed in 
the context of the unit on operational service, and because this relationship does not appear 
anywhere else in Wharton’s letters. 
In the second example, John Gwynne, then a lieutenant, describes how he and his 
men managed without supplies during the Netherlands campaign of 1658, ‘... whatsoever they 
[his men] beg’d, stoale, or made a shift for, I had my share of it, or I might have gon and do 
as they did, or not live;’92.  This short passage suggests association, in that we can see that 
the soldiers gave Gwynne some of the results of their illegal scavenging, thus indicating that 
there was an informal bond between them. 
The model of the relationship of association therefore fits material from all the 
historical periods considered, though the evidence is slight in the seventeenth century material 
because of the comparative lack of data.   
Given the conventional view outlined above that informal relationships between 
officers and other ranks were not acceptable in the eighteenth century, we must ask whether 
or not the model has distorted the facts and whether a different model is needed for this era.  
If so, this may be a point of failure for the model. 
Whilst the model appears to go against the received wisdom about informal officer-
other rank relationships in the eighteenth century in particular, it is undeniable that the first 
hand evidence produced above indicates that such informal relationships did in fact exist.  
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Moreover, this material also shows that these relationships were both routine and warm, fitting 
the model of association even in the eighteenth century and probably in the seventeenth 
century as well.  Indeed, this calls into serious question any received view that such 
relationships were frowned upon or difficult to exercise.  As in the case of secondary 
adjustments, therefore, the most logical conclusion seems to be that the model has not 
distorted the voices of the witnesses but rather has helped us to detect persistent features in 
the history of the British Army that might otherwise have been concealed from view. 
It seems therefore that this examination of association, rather than testing the model 
to the point of failure, has drawn our attention to factors that might not have been recognised 
otherwise.  We will return to this element in Chapter Six. 
 
Informal access 
 
The next relationship in the model is informal access, a cooler but recognisable relationship 
across significant rank gaps, by which individuals divided by rank can approach each other 
without going through formal procedures.  
The Second World War material shows that this relationship was a normal part of 
regimental life.  Two examples will suffice.  In the first, a soldier and his friend have arrived in 
Italy in 1943,  
 
‘That night we were driven up to a small village and joined our battalion.  My mate 
and I were posted to a platoon which had taken over a house ...  Our platoon officer 
kept paying us a visit to see how we were. Also the platoon sergeant who was really 
concerned about us.’93. 
 
The important aspect here, as far as informal relationships are concerned, is that the platoon 
commander and the platoon sergeant approach the newly arrived soldiers regularly and 
express their concern.  Furthermore, nobody appears to think that it is an exceptional thing to 
do.  This can best be accounted for by recognising that the relationship of informal access 
was assumed from the outset by the hierarchy of the infantry platoon, and that the assumption 
of such a relationship was natural and unremarkable. 
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Our second illustration is provided by another incident in Italy, in 1944.   Rifleman 
Bowlby tells us that one of the officers in his company was recommended for the MC 
[Military Cross] but the soldiers knew that he had not pulled his weight in the action in which 
he was supposed to have earned it.  To sort this out, one of the corporals, Bailey, approaches 
the company commander, Captain Kendall.  Bailey subsequently tells Bowlby and his mate 
O’Connor,  
 
‘“When I got in there ... Captain Kendall said, ‘Hullo, Corporal, what’s on your 
mind?’ ‘Well, sir,’ I said, ‘before you took over something pretty bad happened.’  I 
wasn’t sure how to go on but old Kendall smiled and said, ‘I’m listening.’  So I said, 
‘When we were up at the hill at Perugia Mr Driver just sat in his trench.  He didn’t do 
a thing, not even when chaps were wounded.’  ‘I see,’ said Captain Kendall.  ‘I’m 
very glad you told me.’”’94 
 
This incident is a clear example of informal access.  We can see that Bailey and Kendall 
were not in a close relationship because Kendall does not use Bailey’s name, or any 
nickname, and because Bailey was not sure what Kendall’s reaction would be to his tale.  We 
may rule out association between them on this evidence.  However, Bailey felt perfectly able 
to approach Kendall and Kendall welcomed him and listened, which implies that there was at 
least a certain amount of trust and familiarity between them.   
Sheffield provides us with a good summary of the existence of informal access from 
the First World War, writing of a particular young officer, 
 
‘Taylor’s sense of responsibility was mingled with sympathy for the men’s condition.  
He tried to establish an informal relationship, mingling and conversing with them, 
lending a sympathetic ear to their troubles.  One of Taylor’s contemporaries believed 
when the men ‘come to you with their private worries’, this was a sign that the officer 
had won their confidence.’95 
 
Both the mingling and conversing with the men on the part of the officer and the coming to 
their officer with their troubles on the part of the men are characteristic of the relationship of 
informal access. 
Two examples from the mid nineteenth century show that this relationship was 
available then.  In the first, a bandsman who has lost a hand in the Indian Mutiny and is 
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recovering in hospital takes the initiative and approaches the Adjutant of his battalion, who is 
visiting the hospital informally, 
 
‘[he] came to me to put in a good word for him with the Colonel, so that he might 
stay with the Regiment, in which he had been born I believe, and not pensioned.  I 
told him that it was no use, the Colonel had no power in the matter.  “You know,” I 
said, “that having lost an arm you are no longer fit for the Service, what use could you 
be?”  “Oh,” he said, “I could play the trombone, sir, I could fix a hook to my stump 
and play it first rate.”’96 
 
In this incident it is noteworthy that the bandsman initiates the conversation by speaking 
directly to the Adjutant.  There must have been some form of mutual recognition between 
them, and some form of informal relationship, for this to have been possible without the 
bandsman making his approach a formal one.  This situation therefore fits the definition of 
informal access well. 
In the second, the harassed Sergeant Gowing in the Crimean War has been refused 
stores for his men on the grounds that the paperwork is not complete, after a hard nine mile 
march from their camp to the stores depot at Balaclava, 
 
‘I at once handed my men over to another sergeant of ours (that was stationed at 
Balaclava to look after the interests of the regiment) and, with a little coaxing, 
managed to borrow a good strong mule.  Away I went back to camp, as fast as the 
poor brute could move, straight to the Colonel’s tent.  The first salute I got from one 
that had the feelings of humanity and who had frequently proved himself as brave as a 
lion (Colonel L.W. Yea), was, “What’s up, Gowing?”’ 97. 
 
Gowing did not go through the chain of command to see his Colonel, but went straight to him. 
 However, the Colonel behaved as if this was an acceptable thing to do, thus affirming the 
informal approach and implying that the relationship between them was as described in the 
model’s characterisation of informal access. 
Our Napoleonic Wars examples both come from the memoirs of infantry sergeants.  
In our first, an incident during the pursuit of the French from Oporto in 1809, an officer calls 
upon Sergeant Cooper, 
 
‘In the evening we continued our march long after dark, stumbling among rocks and 
stones; the rain still falling, and the men silent and knocked up. ... Captain Percy, who 
commanded our company, being mounted and ahead, passed the word for me to join 
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him.  With difficulty I got to his side.  “Have you any bread?” said he.  “Yes, sir,” I 
replied, and gave him a loaf.  When he had done eating he said, “Should you ever be 
in want of my help, let me know.”’98 
 
In asking a favour from Sergeant Cooper, Captain Percy was using the informal structure.  
In the absence of any evidence of association between them the relationship that best 
describes the circumstances and events in this incident is informal access. 
In our second example, Sergeant Morley remembers a soldier exercising what is 
clearly informal access with an officer in 1808, albeit with a purpose, 
 
‘At Charles’ Fort, about two miles from Kinsale, lay Captain Brodie’s company, still 
commanded by Lieutenant Simcox.  We had a bugle-man named Patrick Ganley, 
who was considered a splice of a wit.  One morning being employed about the mess 
room, he accidentally heard something about Lieutenant Simcox!  Pat quickly 
hastened to the road by which the Lieutenant had to pass, when making the military 
salute, he said, “good luck to your honor [sic] captain,” “and may you soon wear two 
epaulettes [which would signify further promotion to major].” “Thank you Ganley,” 
replied the Captain, whose promotion had not appeared in orders, “and here's 
something for you to drink.”  This was just what Pat had been contriving for.’99 
 
As we have established above, material on social relationships in the eighteenth 
century is sparse, but there is enough to show that informal access as it appears in the model 
was practised, as the following cases show. 
In the first, Peebles, then a lieutenant, approaches his commanding officer (who is also 
his brigade commander), 
 
‘Tuesday 9th. June [1778], cool last night today pleasantly warm - call’d on Col 
Stirling but he was not at home, he came up afterwards to our house & taking me out 
he asked me if I had any objections to go to the Light Infantry100.  I said none but 
hoped he wod send me to the Grs. [the grenadier company] where there was an 
opening, but he wod not promise’101  
 
We can see here that Peebles takes the initiative by calling upon his commanding officer 
without prior formal appointment, and that the commanding officer reciprocates by dropping 
in at Peebles’s billet.  Both these visits fit well with the model’s concept of informal access. 
Corporal Todd provides us with our second example, from 1758, when he describes 
how he approached his commanding officer (who was also his company commander) hoping 
to secure one of the few places for leave,  
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‘After Roll calling I went to my Lieutt Collonel, Sir William Boothbys Quarters, & 
ask’d him if his Honour would be pleas’d to grant me a furlow, as he promised me at 
Reading in Berkshire in the Spring that I should have one.  ... Numbers of our Men 
wants furlows & only two of a company is Allow’d to be absent from Muster by the 
Governments Orders, & none must go of untill there New Cloaths is Alter’d for them 
to go in’.102  
 
This incident shows that Todd, like Peebles in the first example, takes the initiative in going to 
see his superior officer without formally going through the chain of command between them.  
By doing this, he gets ahead of his rivals for the rare chance to go on leave.  However, the 
existence of the intervening chain of command is clearly brought out later when Todd has to 
go through the procedure for obtaining a leave pass, which involves him in seeing both the Pay 
Sergeant of his company and the RSM103.  Although he bypasses this chain of command in 
making his request he does not get into any sort of trouble for doing so, thus indicating that his 
behaviour was acceptable, at least to the officer concerned.  This can best be explained 
through the mechanisms involved in informal access. 
The evidence from the seventeenth century for the existence of informal access as 
part of the accepted pattern of relationships is slight, but an incident reported by Captain 
Richard Atkyns from 1643 indicates that something resembling it may have existed.   
Atkyns has raised a troop of horse which has been attached to Lord Chandos’s 
Regiment.  This troop consists of about 80 troopers, twenty of them ‘gentlemen’.   Things do 
not go well because ‘Lord Chandos ... afterwards used my troop with that hardship, that the 
gentlemen unanimously desired me to go into another regiment;’104 .  It is not possible to infer 
the means by which the gentlemen made their views known to their captain, but it is clear that 
they took the initiative in approaching him.  Although they could have used the formal 
command structure to have done so, given the comparatively loose nature of that structure 
at the time (as we saw earlier in this section) it seems more likely that they approached him 
informally.  If they did indeed do so, then it is most simply explained by the existence of a 
relationship between them and their commander of informal access. 
This case is complicated by the fact that those who approached Atkyns are called 
‘gentlemen’ and were therefore probably of similar social status to him.  The informal 
approach that they made to him may have been facilitated as much by wider social conditions 
as by structural mechanisms for communication across ranks. 
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We may conclude therefore that the model of informal access fits the cases of 
informal social interaction between officers and soldiers at least as far back as the eighteenth 
century and may have been available in the seventeenth century. 
 
Nodding acquaintance 
 
Given the unchallenging nature of the relationship of nodding acquaintance it seems the most 
likely of all to have been in existence throughout the periods under consideration.  However, 
the historical material examined did not yield a single example of what could be described 
unambiguously as nodding acquaintance.   
I do not believe that this absence in the literature is necessarily indicative of its 
absence in the soldiers’ experience because the essence of the relationship is that it is a distant 
and casual one.  It could well be argued that there would simply be little reason for any 
particular author to write about it. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the case for or against the existence of nodding 
acquaintance in the historical British Army is not proven and that its apparent absence is not 
significant in the process of testing the model. 
 
Assessment. 
 
We have seen, therefore, that the selected aspects of the model (legitimate and illegitimate 
secondary adjustments and the five-fold suite of informal relationships) provide a suitable 
means to describe British soldiers’ behaviour and social interaction in the regimental context, 
at least as far back as the eighteenth century.   Even in the seventeenth century the historical 
material does not challenge the adequacy of the model, though its slight nature should not lead 
us to conclude that the model of the informal structure may be imported unquestioningly into 
that era. 
It would seem, therefore, that either we have detected a weakness in the model, in 
that it seems to fit material from all eras, or the model has highlighted a remarkable 
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consistency in the behaviour of British soldiers at regimental duty over the past 300 years.  
We will return to this dilemma later. 
 
The loyalty/identity structure 
 
‘Merry merry men are we, 
There’s none so fair as can compare with the Royal Artilleree’105 
 
‘In the Army we’re the best, from the north, south, east and west, 
The best of boys are following the drum’106 
 
We established in Chapter Three that the model of the loyalty/identity structure consists in a 
set of ideas, assumptions and expectations centred on a concept which may be called 
‘belonging’, with the implication that a soldier tends to see himself as belonging to ‘the best’ 
group.  This concept of belonging is multi-level and highly flexible because each soldier has 
several possible organisational levels to which he belongs, as defined by the formal 
command structure.  At the start of this chapter we set out as an appropriate test of the 
model the exploration through the selected historical periods of this concept of belonging, its 
application to several organisational levels simultaneously, and the attitudes and feelings 
displayed by the individuals towards those organisational levels. 
 
The loyalty/identity structure in the selected periods 
 
Because this social structure is defined by unit organisation, the conditions for its existence can 
be expected to be found in any time period where there is a unit organisation that may define 
it.  As units have had a defined structure throughout the historical periods under consideration 
we should not be surprised to find elements consistent with the loyalty/identity structure in 
all of them.  This is indeed the case, as the following examples show. 
The first is from Gerald Kingsland’s memoir of the Korean War, in which he served in 
the rank of Gunner, 
 
‘As Einstein might easily have said, all feelings are relative.  A Troop will compete 
with a Troop but the two will combine as a Battery to compete with another Battery, 
262 
and Batteries will combine as a Regiment to compete with another Regiment, and so 
on right up to Brigade and Country of Origin level.’107 
 
The existence of unit loyalty and identity is similarly well encapsulated by David 
Fraser in his book on the British Soldier in the Second World War, 
 
‘If an armoured soldier - a tank or armoured-car crewman - a man joined the Royal 
Armoured Corps: this was, so to speak, his nation.  But within the nation were many 
tribes, called regiments - the regiment, in this case, being the fighting unit.  Each 
regiment had its own name, place in the Army List, capbadge, customs, likes and 
loathings.  A man absorbed these, and the regiment was his family, a source of 
support in a world often alien and alarming.’ 108 
 
and the levels below the unit have also been identified by Lucas in his compilation of 
memories given by soldiers and officers of the Second World War, 
 
‘The most important lesson in the Army’s education of its soldiers was that of unit 
loyalty.  Almost from his first day of service the recruit was told that he was serving in 
the finest regiment in the Army.  In time that direction was even more sharply defined 
in an endeavour to convince him that he was in the finest company/squadron/ battery 
of that regiment.’109 
 
Gunner Jock Hanbury’s letters give good examples of the flexibility of the 
loyalty/identity structure in the way that, in the natural stream of his reminiscences, he 
sometimes he refers to the excellence of his part of the Royal Artillery, sometimes to his unit, 
his battery, his troop, and his gun detachment, the level entirely depending on the appropriate 
level for the story he is telling.  For example, 
 
‘Mobile Lt. Ack/Ack [light anti-aircraft] was more of a family affair, a close-knit 
community.’ 110 (Generic level) 
 
‘Our 404 Lt Ack/Ack Battery was formed in the Fife mining area and the lads, like 
the Welsh miners, loved a good sing-song, which for the BSM [Battery Sergeant 
Major] meant his men were of good heart’111 (Battery level) 
 
‘we hit an immediate problem when receiving a new Bofor [sic] which could only fire 
one round, and was laughingly referred to by the other gunteams, as “one round 
Betsy”’.  ... [and after the fault had been finally identified and put right by the gun-
fitter, Scottie] Suddenly we were cheering, laughing and yelling with delight, and even 
hugging Scottie in his greasy denims - V.E. Day wasn’t a patch on this - we were 
back in business and Betsy was exonerated.112 (Gun level) 
263 
 
Another example is provided by Lucas, who quotes an infantry private’s account of 
operations in the Western Desert in 1942.  It is noteworthy because it shows the flexibility 
modelled in the loyalty/identity structure in that several different levels of grouping are 
mentioned close together in the first person plural (‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’)  with no apparent need to 
explain how he can identify with all of them.  In the following extract, I have inserted in square 
brackets the identification of the group referred to in the first person plural, to make this 
flexibility plain, 
 
‘We [his battalion] were relieved in those positions by a unit from the 1st Division and 
then we [his battalion] moved to a place between Medjez el Bab and Peter’s Corner. 
 The positions we [his battalion?] were now holding were called “The Basin” because 
the area was a number of low hills surrounding a low-lying piece of ground.  At ‘O’ 
Group our [his platoon] Platoon Commander told us [his platoon] that Jerry [the 
Germans] was just over two miles away to the east ... our [his section] Section 
Corporal told us [his section] that the Hermann Goerings were expected to attack us 
[the troops in the area]...’113 
 
Lucas also cites an interesting case where regimental identity of an individual was 
dysfunctional.  One of his informants, an officer who had to change from one regiment to 
another, remembered, 
 
‘When I returned to the United Kingdom in 1940, from Malta, I went to OCTU 
[Officer Cadet Training Unit] and was commissioned in the Royal Warwickshire 
Regiment.  I had, of course, applied for the Royal West Kents or the Indian Army, 
but apparently both were full up, so I had to be content with the Warwicks.  At some 
point during 1943 or 1944, I was transferred to the Shropshire Light Infantry, very 
much against my will.  Most of my platoon were transferred with me and we all 
refused to “dog trot” [march at light infantry pace]114 on parade.  We kept to our 
regulation pace of 120 to the minute - or whatever it was.  Furthermore, I refused to 
wear an SLI capbadge, keeping my Warwickshire capbadge up, despite my CO 
telling me to change it.  One day Montgomery appeared on the scene and 
congratulated me on wearing the Warwick’s badge - his old regiment - and my CO 
avoided me thereafter.’115 
 
It seems that this officer had embraced the loyalty/identity structure of the Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment in spite of originally wanting to join a different Regiment, but he had 
failed to make the transition to the Shropshire Light Infantry  (SLI) when they were formally 
transferred, and neither had the members of his platoon.  Instead, they maintained their 
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identity as a distinct group in, but not of, the SLI, thus creating a potential fault line in the 
cohesion of the unit.  They only managed to persist in this separate identity by exploiting the 
regimental identity of the Commander-in-Chief. 
The existence of a loyalty/identity structure in the First World War British Army is 
also amply indicated by its members, who reflect both their commitment to, and identification 
with, the organisational segments to which they belonged, and the multi-layered nature of their 
allegiance.  Second Lieutenant Stephen Hewett was rehearsing views held by many a young 
officer when he said in a letter to a friend in 1916, ‘I am very keen on my Battalion, and 
especially on my company and platoon’116.  
Other examples are provided by R.A. Chell, an officer of 10/Essex, writing of long 
training marches in England, saying, ‘one saw platoon pride and comradeship happily 
demonstrated: Platoon pride said “no one must be allowed to fall out”117, and Captain 
Sliepmann in his rather sheepish comments on the virtue of his soldiers’ powers to ‘acquire’ 
other people’s military stores, ‘... certainly it was a science capable of amazing development 
and, I believe, in our brigade [unit]118 we exploited it to its uttermost limits.’119   
Private Ernest Atkins provides us with a view from the bottom which reflects these 
officers’ views in all important respects and clearly fits the pattern modelled in the 
loyalty/identity structure.  Extracts from his journal120 appear in a compilation of first hand 
accounts of the First World War made by Moynihan, who begins by quoting Atkins’ wartime 
identity, ‘meticulously inscribed on the inside cover [of the journal]: ‘Ernest A. Atkins, 26699. 
B. Company. 16th Kings Royal Rifles Corps.  33rd Division.  100th Brigade. 4th Army 
Corps.’121 and he repeats with obvious pride a sergeant-major’s assessment of his platoon as, 
‘“.. the scruffiest, don’t-care lot of scroungers in the British Army.  Worst on parade - but in 
the line the pick of the regiment.”’122 123 
Evidence for Regimental pride and for the Regiment as a hot spot for loyalty and 
identity is plentiful in the mid nineteenth century material, as illustrated by an observation by 
Evelyn, a self-appointed regimental officer and diarist of the Crimean War, in his description 
of an incident in the Battle of the Alma:  
 
‘The Guards advanced in line - Grenadiers on right, Fusiliers [Scots Fusilier Guards] 
centre, Coldstreams left. ... At this time the broken regiments of the Light Division 
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[who were being forced to retreat from their attack] rushed through the ranks of the 
Fusiliers, pursued by the Russians, who bayonetted many of them.  This battalion, 
which had suffered great loss, having been opposed to the most direct fire of the 
enemy’s battery, and being then utterly broken by the retreating regiment, turned and 
retired some paces.  The fate of the battle at that moment hung on a thread.  The 
Grenadiers and the Coldstreams on the right and left called out “Shame, shame” and 
the brave Fusiliers proudly recovered from their momentary panic and resumed their 
front.’ 124 
 
The main feature in this vignette is that the disapproval of members of other Regiments 
provokes the Scots Fusilier Guards at the level of their loyalty/identity hot spot and they 
react against the insult by renewing the attack. 
Sergeant Gowing provides another instance at this level by his insistence that his 
Regiment, the Royal Fusiliers, were the first ashore on the Crimean peninsula, 
 
‘It was a toss-up between us and a boat-load of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade as to 
who should have the honour of landing first on the enemy’s shore; but, with all due 
respect, I say the Fusiliers had it.’125 
 
In spite of Gowing’s ‘all due respect’ we may infer that his judgement was probably 
influenced by his desire that his Regiment get the credit. 
Lieutenant-General Richard Barter makes much of the quality of his Regiment (75th 
Foot) in his memoir of the Indian Mutiny, encapsulated in this anecdote, 
 
‘Of the 75th, months after, General Outram, the Bayard of India, said when a Staff 
officer wished him to send another Regiment in their place to cover the front at an 
attack on the Alambagh, on the ground that they had not rifles like the other 
Regiments126 and were very few; “Never mind,” said Outram, “let the 75th bide, 
they’re few, but they’re very good!!”’127 
 
The flexibility of the groupings with which a soldier could identify, as modelled in the 
loyalty/identity structure, is also present in the mid nineteenth century material, as this 
extract from a letter written by Lieutenant Strange Jocelyn of the Scots Fusilier Guards, 
shortly after the Battle of the Alma in 1854, shows.  As in the case of the soldier in the 
Western Desert above, Jocelyn refers to several different groups in the first person plural in a 
single paragraph, indicating that he felt equal membership of them, and I have identified these 
groups in square brackets,  
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‘10 of my brother officers were down, and I lost one third of my Company [his 
company].  One of our colours [his battalion] had 24 Bullets through it, and the Staff 
of it shot away, which will give you a pretty good idea of what it was like.  The 
Guards [his brigade] had the post of honor...’128 
 
The Napoleonic period provides similar examples which could be mapped onto the 
loyalty/identity structure.  For instance, Harry Ross-Lewin, a junior officer in the 32nd 
Foot, produces a remark in his memoirs relating to the year 1809 that echoes the statement of 
Barter quoted above, 
 
‘Sir Eyre Coote expressed his high approbation of the conduct of this corps [the 
32nd Foot, Ross-Lewin’s regiment], and said that when the 32nd was at the 
advanced posts he could sleep sound.’129 
 
Sergeant James Anton remembers a drunken brawl between groups of soldiers over 
regimental honour in 1819, 
 
‘The -- regiment was quartered in Richmond Barracks, and after we had been a few 
weeks in the city, we were quartered there also. ...  One canteen received 
promiscuously the men of both corps, to regale themselves under its roof, one room 
witnessed their noisy mirth, and one table frequently floated with the overflow of their 
pots and glasses. ... It was on one of those nights of noisy mirth, that a turbulent 
drunken drum-boy of the 42d [sic], on leaving the canteen received a merited 
knock-down from one of the same rank in the other regiment. ...  the canteen (it being 
shutting-up time) poured out its reeling crew to witness the scuffle, while some 
swaggerer of the -- regiment cried out, “Down with the 42d.”  This was retorted by 
“Well done 42d,” and “Down with the --,” “Fair play,” etc. ... Presently more than a 
hundred hands were raised with hostile intention, when the timely interposition and 
decisive command of several sergeants, of both regiments, succeeded in drawing off 
the men to their respective barracks, where the rolls were called, and quietness and 
good order restored.’130  
 
It is clear from this incident that the ‘swaggerer’ set the course of the fight by making it a 
regimental matter in crying “Down with the 42d”.  It is entirely consistent with the model’s 
characterization of the loyalty hot spot that the soldiers should then align themselves along 
regimental lines and attack each other. 
This is not to say that battalion level was the only case that counted in the minds of the 
soldiers of the time.  Although the majority of remarks that could be ascribed to a 
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loyalty/identity structure seem to be at that level, a useful corrective is provided by George 
Hennell, a gentleman volunteer who had very recently joined the 94th Foot aspiring to gain a 
commission.  He has given us an account of the assault on Badajoz in 1812 written shortly 
afterwards, and this account gives us a glimpse of the loyalty/identity structure of his 
battalion, which he must have embraced in a remarkably short time.  He tells us that in the 
advance to the city he ‘got a soldier’s jacket, a firelock & 60 round of cartridges and was 
right hand man of the second company of the 94th Regiment’131 ... and that once he and his 
companions were in the defensive ditch of the citadel,  
 
‘The men were not so eager to go up the ladders as I expected they would be.  They 
were as thick as possible in the ditch and, the officers desiring them to go up, I 
stopped about two minutes likewise.  The men were asking “Where is the 74th?” 
“Where is the 94th?”  I perceived they were looking for their own regiments rather 
than the ladders.  I went up the ladder and when about half way up I called out “Here 
is the 94th!” & was glad to see the men begin to mount.  In a short time they were all 
up and formed on a road just over the wall.’132 
 
These passages show us that Hennell first identifies himself with the loyalty/identity group of 
the second company of his battalion, but later the focus shifts to the battalion level as the men 
try to sort themselves out from their colleagues in other battalions.  The soldiers’ reluctance to 
assault seem to have been caused at least partially by their wish to be in their loyalty/identity 
groups (battalion level) and they pushed on once they heard a voice telling them where their 
battalion was. 
In the eighteenth century material there is ample evidence for a special focus of 
identity and loyalty at Regimental level.  As Howard has observed, ‘[the British were] unable 
even to produce an army which was more than a congeries of stubbornly independent 
regiments for whom tradition often ranked higher than efficiency....’133, and Odintz believes 
that the concentration of attention at this level was a defining feature of the British Army in the 
eighteenth century, 
 
‘The sense of regimental loyalty and identification that permeated the attitudes and 
goals of the officers and men of the 12th on the Gibraltar parade ground, as well as 
those of the 13th in Scotland, the 35th in the South of England and the 8th in far-off 
Canada, is perhaps the most significant feature of British military life in this period.’134 
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while acknowledging that this concentration brought its own problems,  
 
‘To a considerable extent, particularly in the eighteenth century, the strengths of the 
British army, confidence and cohesion within primary groups135, were those of the 
regiment, while its faults were also those of the regiment: an excessively parochial 
administration and a narrow-minded, idiosyncratic approach to tactical doctrines.’ 136  
 
This is not to say that the company did not feature as a locus of identity and a focus 
for loyalty.  When James Wolfe wrote to give his advice to an ensign who was joining his first 
regiment, he implies that the company would be the primary milieu for the young man, ‘When 
you are posted to your company, take care that the serjeants or corporals constantly bring 
you the orders; treat them with kindness, but keep them at a distance, so will you be beloved 
and respected by them.’137 
Corporal Todd also shows that the company level was important to him.  On 30 
November 1761, he severely strained his ankle whilst on the march in bitterly cold weather, 
and dropped out.  For the next nine days he limped on in the wake of the British army, initially 
falling further and further behind but eventually catching up138.  When he describes his eventual 
reunion with his Regiment, he does not consider that he has fully caught up until he has found 
his company (the day after he first made a connection with other companies of his 
Regiment)139. 
In the seventeenth century material, there is evidence of rivalry and mistrust between 
elements within both Parliamentarian and Royalist armies.  This is consistent with the 
loyalty/identity structure, in that the members of each element believes themselves to be in 
opposition to the others, and superior to them, as the following instances show. 
In our first, Wharton, describing a complicated incident in 1642140, calls the members 
of another Parliamentary foot regiment ‘base blew coats’ [my emphasis]141, and tells us of a 
fight between his soldiers and a troop of horse due to a mutual assumption that the others 
were up to no good.  In fact, they were all on very similar missions against Royalist 
sympathisers in the area and, logically, should have cooperated rather than opposing each 
other.  It seems that none of the protagonists saw the others as part of the same team, but 
rather as quarry for pillaging, in the absence of a credible external enemy to unite them.  
In the second, Captain Richard Atkyns describes friction between the horse (of which 
he was one) and the Cornish foot in 1643, ‘these were the very best foot I ever saw, for 
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marching and fighting; but so mutinous withal, that nothing but an alarm could keep them from 
falling foul upon their officers’.142  This is in contrast to Sir Ralph Hopton’s opinion, given at 
the same time and about the same set of incidents,  
 
‘There began the disorder of the horse visibly to breake in upon all the prosperity of 
the publique proceedings. ... And the Generalls being verie fully advertized of the 
oportunity to begin a discipline in the Army, and being of themselves verie desirous of 
it, were yet never able to represse the extravagant disorder of the horse to the ruin 
and discomposure of all.’143  
 
Both Atkyns and Hopton are describing the same events at the same time, but each casts the 
other’s people (horse and foot respectively) as the disorderly parties.  The model’s 
loyalty/identity structure provides a simple and contextually relevant explanation for this 
anomaly: using the model we can say that each is likely to support his organisational segment 
that is of equal status to the one which represents the opposition, and that it is perfectly 
reasonable for each to believe that the other group is in the wrong. 
The multi-level nature of the loyalty/identity structure is interestingly reflected in a 
seventeenth century example in the notes by the horse soldier and antiquarian Richard 
Symonds when he was describing the organisation of the horse elements in Royalist army in 
1645.  He identifies his position in the army as the centre of a widening series of command 
levels, consistent with the logic of the loyalty/identity structure.  In his ‘Suma Totalis of the 
whole army of horse’ in 1645,  he lists first his own unit (the King’s Lifeguard of horse) by its 
constituent troops (the King’s Troop and the Queen’s Troop), then the regiments with which 
it is brigaded, and then the other brigades of horse in the army, giving the totals for each 
element that he describes.  These totals read, 130 (the members of the King’s Lifeguard), 
400, 100, 200 (the other units in his home brigade), and 850, 880, 1,500, 1,200 (the other 
brigades)144, thus indicating the widening nature of the spans of command to which he is 
alluding, and tracking his own position in the loyalty/identity structure.  If he were listing the 
Royalist army factually and thus without any social structural content, he would have listed a 
series of equally sized segments (units or brigades). 
The flexibility of identification within this multi-level construction also comes out of 
other first hand seventeenth century texts, such as that of Wharton who refers with equal ease 
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at various places in the same letters to his company, his regiment, and the whole force of 
which they were a part.145 
 
Discussion 
 
Although it seems from the above that the concept of the loyalty/identity structure can be 
integrated with first hand material from all the periods under discussion, the degree of 
significance of this match, and its depth, should be examined carefully. 
There can be little doubt that the first hand accounts of soldiers from the twentieth 
century can usefully be examined in the light of the model.  There are, however, several 
difficulties associated with earlier periods. 
In the mid nineteenth century material, there are much fewer references than in later 
periods to levels below the battalion or regiment.  This may indicate either that these levels 
were less significant in the lives of those authors than of those of later eras, which would imply 
that the model is not valid for the period, or simply that they were irrelevant to the story that 
the individuals were telling, which would not challenge the model’s validity.   
The first possibility is supported by the fact that unit organisation, at least in the 
infantry, was much less complex in the mid nineteenth century and earlier than it later became. 
 There were few, if any, enduring organisational segments below company level upon which 
the conventions of the loyalty/identity structure could focus.  Platoons were a temporary 
organisation for battle only, and there was no equivalent of the modern section.  
However, it is also possible that the authors felt it more appropriate to identify with 
the battalion or regimental level of the loyalty/identity structure when they were writing.  
According to the model, a loyalty/identity segment only becomes an appropriate focus for 
attention when it is compared or opposed to a similar segment.  By this argument, 
identification with levels below the unit are not appropriate to people who are telling their 
story to a general audience, as in the case of memoirs, or to a particular audience outside the 
military unit, as in the case of letters, because such audiences are organisationally external to 
the unit.  In all these cases, the concept of the residual focus of loyalty provides a good 
predictive model of the level that the authors will use. 
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The synthesis between these views, which is espoused here, is that the concept of a 
loyalty/identity structure with a residual focus of loyalty is a useful tool with which to 
examine the social workings of a unit in the British Army.  However, the nature of the 
appropriate loyalty/identity structure (and in particular its shape) is heavily influenced by the 
organisational structure of the unit in question, which is different in different historical periods.  
Specifically, the present highly stratified loyalty/identity structure that runs from very small 
groups equivalent to infantry sections up to the unit and beyond is not appropriate to the times 
examined in this thesis before the First World War. 
In the eighteenth century, there was a further organisational feature that does not fit 
with the model of the loyalty/identity structure of the twentieth century British Army.  This 
was the practice of creating enduring specialist composite battalions by brigading the 
grenadier and light companies (the ‘flank companies’) of infantry regiments.  The grenadier 
battalions were used as assault troops and the light companies for skirmishing146.  Using the 
model, these battalions could be viewed as ad hoc functional groups, perhaps analogous to 
the modern battle group that is formed from elements of several units under an infantry or 
armoured corps headquarters, and therefore more of the nature of the functional structure 
than the loyalty/identity structure.  However, this would be to distort the real case because 
once they had been formed their structure could endure far beyond that of the modern battle 
group and they could develop their own unit identity that cannot be assigned purely to the 
functional structure. 
A useful illustration is provided by John Peebles’ experience as a lieutenant, captain 
lieutenant and finally captain in the 42nd Foot in America between 1776 and 1782.  
Lieutenant Peebles was in the grenadier company of the 42nd when the Regiment arrived in 
America and was therefore deployed to one of the battalions of grenadiers (the fourth) with 
his company, being appointed adjutant of that battalion.  Later in the same year (1776) this 
battalion was broken up and he was transferred with his company to the third battalion of 
grenadiers.   He and his company were then transferred to the second battalion of grenadiers 
in February 1777.  In November of that year he was promoted to captain lieutenant and 
returned to the main body of the 42nd, but in the following summer he was promoted again 
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and went back to the grenadiers as the company commander.  He spent the rest of his active 
service in this role until he went on half pay in 1782.147 
There is a discernable thread of loyalty and identity running through Peebles’s diary, 
but this is divided between his home Regiment, the 42nd Foot, and whichever was his home 
battalion of grenadiers at the time, as these following examples show.   
We begin with a diary entry from 1776, ‘Sunday 29th. The Battalion went to Church 
inform our compy. dress’d in britches for the first time, what would Ld. E: say if he saw 
us,’148.  In this passage, the ‘Battalion’ is the fourth battalion of grenadiers, of which Peebles 
is the Adjutant.  He identifies with both the battalion and ‘our compy’ (the 42nd Grenadier 
Company), whilst in commenting on the change from the wearing of the kilt to britches he 
identifies himself with the customs of the 42nd Regiment. 
Moving on to the following year we see that ‘Cadet Potts came down from 
Brunswick to day on his way to N:York says alls well there & likewise with the Regt. our 
people had another skirmish with the Rebels lately, & killed a parcel of them’149.  Here, ‘our 
people’ refers to the 42nd, yet Peebles is a member of the fourth battalion of grenadiers, 
deployed in a different area to the 42nd. 
In our third example from Peebles, from July 1779, he identifies himself with his 
grenadier battalion when he regrets the damage done to their reputation by making the laconic 
entry, ‘maurading & desertion, for shame Grenrs’150. 
It is clear from these and other entries in his diary that the two-fold loyalty and identity 
that Peebles expresses, both to his grenadier battalion and to his Regiment, is deeply felt.  
Both the 42nd Foot and the various battalions of grenadiers to which he belonged were stable 
organisational elements, and he is loyal to both, identifies with both, and shows little sign of 
feeling that one was a more legitimate focus for identity or loyalty than the other.  Comparing 
this situation to that captured in the model, we see that there is no mechanism in the model’s 
depiction of the loyalty/identity structure of the present day to allow for such a two-fold 
strand of loyalty and identity, because the model is structured by a single series of nesting 
groups.   We cannot therefore say that the loyalty/identity structure of the model properly 
covers the situation in which Peebles, and many others in infantry flank companies, found 
themselves. 
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We may conclude, then, that the loyalty/identity structure as set out in Chapter 
Three could not be used unamended to enlighten our understanding of the mid eighteenth 
century first hand material.  It seems that although there is evidence to support the modelling 
of a kind of loyalty/identity structure for the period, and although there is a clear logical link 
between the types of attitudes and expectations portrayed in the model and those expressed 
by eighteenth century soldiers, the shape of the loyalty/identity structure for the mid 
eighteenth century infantry units would have to be different to that of the twentieth. 
Although it is sketchy, the seventeenth century material from the Royalist army also 
indicates that there may have been significant differences in the loyalty/identity structure 
compared to what the model sets out for the present day.   In particular, there are indications 
that the basic organisational module may often have been the sub unit rather the unit.  Whilst 
individuals mentioned their regiments as an important and relevant element, reorganisation of 
sub units between regiments seems to pass without particular comment.  Hodgson tells us 
baldly, for example, that in 1645 ‘Our company was appointed for Colonel Bright, to make 
up his regiment’ adding that Bright ‘had some companies came from about Sheffield before 
us’151.  If the Hodgson and his men had felt a strong identification with their current regiment, 
this transfer would almost certainly have prompted him to record some form of adverse 
feelings (as he does in other parts of his memoir152).  In the same way, we have noted 
above153 how the horse officer Richard Atkyns arranged the transfer of his troop from one 
regiment to another at his men’s request.  This implies that the loyalty/identity structure may 
have been focused at sub unit rather than at unit level, or at least that there was no consistent 
focus on the unit level as either loyalty hot spot or residual focus of loyalty.  At the very 
least such considerations should caution us against applying the model of the loyalty/identity 
structure of the British Army in the twentieth century to seventeenth century British soldiers. 
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Assessment 
 
It seems clear, therefore, that the model of the loyalty/identity structure of the units of the 
British Army today cannot be applied in any significant detail before the twentieth century 
without risk of distorting the material to fit the model.   However, the concept of a specifically 
redrawn loyalty/identity structure as a means of analysing the daily life of British soldiers at 
any period may well be useful. 
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The functional structure 
 
‘I’ve been in the saddle for hours and hours 
I’ve stuck it as long as I could. 
I’ve stuck it and stuck it and now I say “fuckit!”, 
My bollocks are not made of wood!’154 
 
‘When cannons are roaring 
And bullets are flying, 
He that should honour win 
Must not fear dying.’155 
 
In Chapter Three we described the functional structure as consisting in the ideas, rules and 
conventions of behaviour that are connected with carrying out what soldiers see as soldierly 
tasks.  We looked briefly at the nature of those soldierly tasks, the groupings which arise from 
the functional structure, and the attitudes and mental models which soldiers hold concerning 
soldierly functions. The chosen test for the model in this section is whether or not it can be 
shown that there existed a distinct set of ideas and attitudes concerning soldierly tasks during 
the selected historical periods, and whether this set of ideas and attitudes is covered by the 
model. 
In the mid and early twentieth century, the soldiers’ functional experience and 
attitudes seem to have much in common with those of today.  Accounts of functional scenes 
are readily recognisable to those with contemporary military experience.  Take, for example, 
this description of an unofficial roadside drill practised by Gunner Hanbury’s light anti-aircraft 
battery, 
 
‘When the convoy pulled into the roadside for the 10 minute check-halt, one man 
from each Bedford tractor, jumped out to join the line of road sentries across the 
road.  On the roadside, two men filled the square punctured tin with earth, sprinkling 
it with petrol, lit, to boil the dixie of water for a quick brew-up.  
Inside the cabin, bread was quickly sliced, spread with marge and jam, and 
before the order “Mount!” everyone had their share, gun-teams, road sentries, 
sergeants, and officers all doing a stint along with the Don Rs [dispatch riders].   
How the provisions were acquired was nobody’s business.’156 
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Hanbury also gives anecdotes in his letters which have as a common thread a comical 
false confidence on the part of officers in their ability to perform military tasks.  For instance, 
during a battle camp, with instruction from a First World War veteran, Captain Catchpole,  
 
‘In the late afternoon when the Captain was explaining that hedges were not 
obstacles, but dealt with by charging head on and bursting through, Captain Jameson 
of B Troop suddenly appeared on the scene and offered to demonstrate the technique 
to follow - if it was all right by Captain Catchpole.  
Captain Catchpole gave a curt nod and burly captain Jameson borrowed a 
rifle, told us to watch closely, then yelling like a Dervish charged at breakneck speed, 
unfortunately slipping and losing his momentum about 10 feet from the hedge.  
In desperation he swallow-dived into the hedge and when the threshing and 
struggling finally subdued, all that was visible were two brown boots. In the silence 
that followed, Captain Catchpole nodded to the two nearest lads to grab a boot each 
and rescue the red-faced trapped Captain who sheepishly grinned then slipped away. 
 From then on he was nicknamed Captain BB Jameson (Brown Boots).’157 
 
In the first of these two cases, Hanbury is stressing the smooth teamwork and task 
knowledge of the disparate elements in the convoy in producing food and drink for all the 
members, whether they could help in its preparation or not.  In the second, he is highlighting 
the inability of Jameson to meet the military standard that they all subscribe to, a standard of 
aggression and competence at basic infantry tasks which is still current today. 
The existence of a shared fund of ideas and attitudes to soldierly tasks can be inferred 
from a description by Lucas of feelings that he had detected in British soldiers towards the 
Germans, which can be explained by using the concept of the functional structure, as it 
presently stands, 
 
‘... the farther removed from the battle line a soldier was the more antagonistic he was 
to the Germans. ... I have met infantrymen and tankmen who had nothing but praise 
for the soldierly qualities of our former enemies against whom they had been fighting, 
in some instances, for many years.’158 
 
These views are echoed by Shipster throughout his memoir of fighting in Burma and India in 
the Second World War159.  In spite of being wounded three times and losing a great number 
of friends, he maintains an attitude of respect towards the Japanese soldiers against whom he 
fought and he is openly sympathetic to their plight on their desperate withdrawal in 1945. 
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Using the concept of the functional structure we can deduce that, immersed as they 
were in the business of soldiering, the infantrymen and tankmen’s respect for the enemy arose 
from the fact that they met the same functional standards and shared their preoccupations with 
the fine detail of soldiering.  This contrasted with those in the rear, who had little or no liability 
to engage functionally with the enemy and to make these functional comparisons. 
George Macdonald Fraser gives us another insight into the existence of a shared fund 
of ideas about the ‘right’ way to do soldierly tasks when he describes his own incompetence 
the first time he meets an enemy soldier in Burma 1945.  He has just returned to his section 
after entering two apparently deserted Japanese bunkers alone, and after giving a third a 
cursory look.  The enemy soldier appears from apparently nowhere and attempts to carry out 
a suicide bombing with a land mine.  However, this soldier is killed by another, more 
experienced, member of the infantry section (Nick) before he can get properly into position.  
Fraser, ‘Jock’, is then chided by his colleague Nick, 
 
‘“Might ha’ bin thee, Jock boy.  Ye shoulda give us a shout, man.” 
I explained why I hadn’t, and he shook his head.  “Nivver ga in on yer own, 
son.  That’s ‘ow ye finish up dyin’ Tojo’s way.  Ye wanna die yer own fookin’ way.” 
“Git fell in, you two!” It was [sergeant] Hutton again.  “Standin’ aboot 
natterin’ wid yer thumbs in yer bums an’ yer minds in neutral!...”160 
 
This passage gives us two immediate insights into the way that these soldiers addressed 
function.  First, Nick is contrasting his ability with that of Jock, and resorting to a common 
standard of conduct (‘Nivver ga in on yer own’).  Then the sergeant contrasts their casual and 
un-functional behaviour (as he sees it) with the soldierly way that they ought to be behaving.  
These features are entirely consistent with the functional structure in the model. 
First hand information from the First World War also indicates a similar 
preoccupation with functional matters, and no significant difference from the functional 
structure in the model. 
We begin with a set of observation reported by Sheffield, 
 
‘Pte. S.B. Abbot (86th M.G. Coy.) condemned one of his officers (nicknamed ‘The 
Orphan’) as a ‘thruster’, prepared to endanger his men’s lives by unnecessary 
displays of excess zeal in ‘straffing’ enemy positions, while simultaneously appearing 
to be over-concerned for his own safety.  Abbot implicitly compared The Orphan 
with another officer, referred to respectfully as Mr Street, who was ‘a splendid man’, 
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a paternalist who was mourned as ‘our brave and kind officer’ when he was killed in 
April 1917.  The essence of leadership is diverting the cohesion of the group into the 
ends desired by the military hierarchy, but this example demonstrates that if officers 
are perceived to be too eager to take risks, and thus jeopardise their troops, at the 
very least they forfeit the respect of their men.’161  
 
These feelings integrate well with those expressed in the 1970s by the soldiers about the 
ambitious subaltern, Harry Cooper, in their remarks on the walls of the ablutions in Northern 
Ireland that we looked at earlier162: they criticised Cooper’s attempt to establish a reputation 
as a functionally competent officer by taking unnecessary operational risks.  
Private Ernest Atkins provides us with another illustration that sits well with the 
functional structure in the model.  He suffered from short sight, but he was highly motivated 
to become a good soldier and so he had to adopt several coping strategies to get round the 
military requirements of his initial training in 1914.  One of these coping strategies was to claim 
that he would fire his weapon instead of engaging in bayonet fighting,  
 
‘So I must learn defence against the enemy’s bayonet and shoot him while we are 
fencing.  This does not please the sergeant, who tries all ways to get at me.  “Your 
defence is good but you don’t attack.  What’s your idea - to keep him trying to reach 
you until he drops dead from exhaustion?”  I said, “No, but to shoot him while I am 
fencing.  I have shot you many times in imagination.”163 
 
This attitude was logical, but it did not chime with the accepted functional conventions of the 
time which stressed the importance of the aggressive use of the bayonet in hand-to-hand 
fighting. 
We take an extract from Private David Jones’s poetic autobiography of the First 
World War as the third and final example from that era of the encoding of function in words 
familiar today.  As part of the description of his battalion’s departure from a training camp in 
England for France in 1915, Jones quotes a NCO’s words aimed at ensuring that they march 
in a soldierly fashion, 
 
‘Dress to the right - no - other right. 
Keep those slopes. 
Keep those sections of four. 
Pick those knees up. 
Throw those chests out. 
Hold those heads up. 
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Stop that talking. 
Keep those chins in. 
Left left lef’ - lef’ righ’ lef’ - you Private Ball it’s you I’ve got me glad-eye on.’164 
 
We can see from the first hand accounts of British soldiers of the mid nineteenth 
century that they too had a shared set of expectations and ideas about how military functions 
should be carried out, though the nature of these expectations and ideas is less congruent with 
those of today. 
In the first set of examples, Lieutenant General Richard Barter comments on the 
operations following the break-in to Delhi.   We begin with his views about an operation to 
clear part of the city on 18 September 1857, of which he says, ‘It was the most wretchedly 
managed affair: the column marched up a narrow lane towards the Enemy without even a file 
of men thrown out to feel the way;’165.  This passage shows that Barter, then a Captain, had a 
set of ideas about the right way that this function should have been carried out, a standard that 
was not achieved by the local commander.  It is also clear from the way that Barter writes 
(‘wretchedly managed ... without even a file’) that he is telling his readers that there were 
functional conventions (shared sets of ideas) that the commander was not observing. 
He is also firmly critical of the ability of the brigade commander, Colonel Edward 
Greathed, during the pursuit beyond Delhi on 28 September of the same year.  Barter writes, 
 
‘Greathed smoothed his moustache and seemed inclined to sit there for ever and let 
things go on as they were going. ... we were beginning to weary of the thing and were 
whispering one to another our wonder how long this was to last  when a voice from 
the right of our line answered the question in true Irish fashion by asking another ...  as 
he shouted out, “Arrah are we going to stop here all day?  Lit’s go and take the 
bloody battery!”  The effect was magical.  With a cheer166 the men and officers 
jumped to their feet and over the bank we tore, while we could see that the 8th too 
had caught the infection, and were on the move to our right.  Of Greathed we saw no 
more that day.’167  
 
This passage tells of a contrast which appears to be illuminated by the attitudes expectations 
belonging to the functional structure.  The brigade commander is incompetent and does 
nothing.  The unnamed Irish soldier calls upon his comrades to take action and they all join in 
(except Greathed) with enthusiastic aggression, presumably because it was obvious to them 
from their shared fund of ideas that this was the right thing to do. 
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Barter passes similarly critical comments on the ability of one of his colleagues, a few 
days later during the pursuit after the fall of Delhi, 
 
‘Captain DaCosta, 58th Native Infantry, who ...  though a very gallant man was one 
of the most thoroughly incompetent officers I have ever met; he had not gone far 
when we saw that as usual he hadn’t an idea how to set about what was required of 
him, and I was ordered to go and take command.  I jumped off my horse, and over 
the wall into the garden where the two Companies were drawn up as targets for the 
Enemy, ... [and] I  threw out a cloud of skirmishers and swept the orange groves from 
end to end without however meeting an Enemy, for the Sepoys retreated before us 
and into the town which now came in sight.’168  
 
Here the contrast is between DaCosta, gallant but functionally innocent and therefore 
incompetent, and Barter, who has the necessary functional ability to do the task properly.  
The one falls below the standards of the proper way to behave on operations, while the other 
meets them. 
Sergeant Gowing expresses the ideas current at the siege of Sebastopol when he 
remarks that ‘men will go anywhere with officers upon whom they can rely’ and describes the 
elements that make up such an officer,  
 
‘... old soldiers - men that had been well tried upon field after field from the Alma, 
and we had a few that had smelt powder on many a hard-contested field in India, 
such as Ferozeshah, Moodkee, Sobraon, and Gujurat - men that knew well how to 
do their duty and were no strangers to a musket-ball whistling past their heads, who 
understood well a live shell in the air and knew within a little where it was going to 
drop.  One feels much more comfortable with such men than with three times their 
number who have never smelt powder.’169  
 
From the same campaign, Private James Herbert of the 4th Light Dragoons writes of 
the fighting during the recovery from the Charge of the Light Brigade,  
 
‘We rushed in amongst them [the Russian counter-attack], and there was renewal of 
the cutting, slashing, pointing, and parrying of the earlier part of the fight.  There was 
no fancy work, but just hard, useful business, and it fulfilled its object, for we cut our 
way through the opposing lancers.’170  
 
Herbert draws a functional distinction between ‘fancy work’ which was not appropriate, and 
the ‘useful business’ which they employed. 
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Trumpet-Major Henry Wilkinson of the 17th Lancers gives us another glimpse of 
what was thought ‘proper’ in battle, remembering the Battle of Ulundi (1879), 
 
‘The Colours were flying and the bands were playing as we advanced, and the sun 
shone on the glittering bayonets, lances, and rifle-barrels.  That was just before we 
were actually and finally disposed in square, waiting for them to come on; and then, of 
course, we were silent enough, for we were out for business.’171  
 
We may infer from this paragraph that there was common agreement (stated or unstated) that 
music and other martial sounds were inappropriate for times when soldiers were ‘out for 
business’.  
Our final example from the mid nineteenth century comes from another cavalry 
soldier, who passes comment on the lack of importance of musketry to the cavalry in the 
1870s, writing ‘... for some years musketry, was universally hated and deemed to be a 
degradation and a bore.’172  This statement, which would be somewhat surprising if were 
expressed in any part of today’s British Army, can be explained by the fact that musketry was 
an essentially dismounted activity, and did not fit with the cavalry’s shared mental model of 
‘proper’ fighting, which was to be done on horseback with lance and sword. 
In the Napoleonic period, we can see again that function was an important area of 
preoccupation among British soldiers.  We begin with a comparison made by General Sir 
Thomas Brotherton between the soldierly business of operations in the forward area in the 
Peninsular War and the life of a civilian in Wellington’s headquarters.  The occasion for this 
comparison was the publication by Sir George Larpent of his ‘private journal’ as Wellington’s 
Judge-Advocate173.  Brotherton says of Larpent, 
 
‘His functions were confined strictly to the closet, and he had no business whatever to 
poke his nose in danger, ... I could not resist the temptation of giving this ‘quill-driver’ 
my opinion, not only as to the folly of such persons coming, ostentatiously, to the 
front, but as to the mischievous effect on the morale of the troops, by their precipitate 
retreat when they became frightened for, although the soldiers heartily laughed at 
these amateurs, yet, at such moments, anything that diverts the attention of troops 
from what ought to be their only object, viz the enemy, is hazardous.’174 
 
Here we see a contrast between what Brotherton sees as proper soldierly conduct, which is 
devoting one’s concentration to the enemy in a professional way, and the conduct of the 
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‘amateur’ who comes forward ostentatiously, and distracts the people who ought to be 
there.  It is clear that Brotherton does not claim this as a personal idiosyncratic view, but 
holds is up as the proper way that a soldier ought to think.  Such a view can only be based on 
a mental model of a shared standard of proper soldierly conduct. 
Sergeant Morley provides us with an interesting insight into his defining attitudes to 
soldiering and soldierly qualities.  He was taken prisoner by the French during the retreat to 
Corunna in 1808, and subsequently escaped and made his own way back to Portugal in a 
complex and difficult journey, showing considerable personal courage and determination.  His 
successful arrival back at British-held territory could legitimately have been a source of pride 
to him, but the thing he notes with most emphasis in his memoir is the moment when he was 
issued with arms and accoutrements ‘and thus once more had a regimental home’175.  Here 
we see that Morley uses the issue of arms and accoutrements as the symbol that he is once 
more a full member of his ‘regimental home’ and thus fully a soldier again, implying that a 
soldier is defined by his ability to fight (or in the present phrase, ‘do the business’).  This 
seems to take precedence over his escape and subsequent journey which cannot therefore 
have been as functionally important to him as his re-achievement of the status of soldier. 
To continue the theme of what constitute soldierly tasks and the exercise of soldierly 
status, Major Harry Ross-Lewin relates a source of serious discontent among the soldiers in 
garrison at Corfu in 1819, when they were used as navvies, 
 
‘... owing in part to their being substituted for horses at the government works, and 
compelled to draw stone and rubbish-carts; they had, besides, to discharge the stone, 
both by day and night, from the vessels, according as they arrived with it from Malta. 
 Such duty should never have been imposed on them .... Such treatment has a 
manifest tendency to degrade soldiers in their own estimation, and to break that spirit 
which it should be a commanding officer’s care to foster and encourage.’176  
 
It is clear that Ross-Lewin’s emphasis is first on the nature of the work rather than the effort 
required of the soldiers.  He identifies it as of a non-soldierly nature, and therefore degrading. 
 We may speculate with some confidence, however, that he would not be likely to disapprove 
in the same way of military operations that required the same degree of energy expenditure 
from the soldiers. 
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Our final example from the Napoleonic period confirms the existence of a shared 
view that soldierly performance was an important ingredient in the status of the individual 
soldier, an important element in the functional structure as we saw in Chapter Three177.  In 
his account of the Battle of Vimero in 1808, Rifleman Benjamin Harris tells a comrade, John 
Lowe, 
 
‘“... if you see any symptoms of my wishing to flinch in this business, I hope you will 
shoot me with your own hand.” 
Lowe and myself survived this battle, and after it was over we sat down with 
our comrades and rested.  Talking over various matters, Lowe told them of the 
conversation we had during the heat of day.  From that moment, the Rifles had a great 
respect for me.  A man is closely observed in the field, and it is indeed singular how, 
from his behaviour, a man loses or gains caste with his comrades.’178 
 
These words show us that prowess at military tasks was an important element in a soldier’s 
status, as Killworth has shown is the state of affairs today 179.  This can only be the case if the 
soldier and his peers all subscribe to the same shared view of what constitutes functional 
prowess. 
The evidence from the mid eighteenth century shows a similar general concern with 
military function, how the job should be done, and where the expertise could be expected to 
lie.  In our first illustration, Sub-Brigadier [the most junior commissioned rank in that 
Regiment] Richard Davenport comments on his activities as Adjutant of the Fourth Troop of 
Horse Guards, a post he has recently been appointed to, 
 
‘The morning is more than sufficient to do all my business, but an adjutant is expected 
to be always what they call “alert”, that is to say, he must always appear in a great 
hurry, or at his commanding officer's elbow, ready to execute his commands.  In all 
these things I am very cavy [alert]180, for I take care not to neglect anything of 
consequence.  My Colonel does not give me any unnecessary trouble.’181 
 
In making these amusing remarks, Davenport is playing with ideas and expectations 
concerning the functions an adjutant.  The humour lies in the fact that his declaration that he 
has embraced them is made simultaneously with the implication that he is in fact only 
pretending to do so.  However, these remarks would make no sense, and would contain only 
idiosyncratic humour if those expectations or attitudes were not generally shared by his 
fellow-soldiers. 
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Our second and third illustrations from the mid eighteenth century are from the 
perspective, respectively, of a company commander and a NCO.  The company commander, 
Captain John Peebles, draws upon his knowledge and expectation of how things should be 
done when he passes adverse comment on the quality of the work of the junior officers,  
 
‘Saturday 27th. [March 1779] ... went to the parade & look at the Companys arms 
& dress which I believe is rather neglected by the Subs. - the young Gentlemen of the 
army at present are much fonder of their pleasure than their duty’182 
 
While the NCO, Sergeant Roger Lamb, looks back at his initial training as a recruit in 1773, 
 
‘[I] was put into the hands of a drill sergeant, and taught to walk and step out like a 
soldier.  This at first was a disagreeable task to me. ... However, having at last 
rectified the most prominent appearance of my awkwardness, I received a set of 
accoutrements, and a firelock’183 
 
In both cases, the writers are expressing elements of the common set of values concerning 
military function, the first by showing how the young officers are falling below proper 
functional standards, and the second by reporting his transformation from the habitus of a 
civilian to a soldierly one, marked by the issue of warlike equipment. 
In the next example, Mattross James Wood records how engineers were put in 
charge of ad hoc parties from different foot regiments on 26 September 1746,  
 
‘... several parties of different regiments drawn up in order to work at the repairs of 
our battery, being sunk in some places two foot or more, and very much shattered 
with the French firing all day.  Our engineers settled the Foot to work on enlarging the 
trenches.’184 
 
The implication is that these engineers had the necessary expertise for the task and so it was 
natural for them to take charge of troops over whom they had no authority in the formal 
command structure. 
Finally, Hospital Assistant William Fellowes of the 37th foot gives us a glimpse of the 
pull of military soldierly activity at the Battle of Minden in 1769, 
 
‘The soldiers and others, this morning, who were not employed at the moment, began 
to strip off and wash their shirts, and I as eagerly as the rest.  But while we were in 
this state, suddenly the drums began to beat to arms: and so insistent was the 
summons that without more ado we slip’t on the wet linen and buttoned the jackets 
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over the soaking shirts, hurrying to form line lest our comrades would depart without 
us.’185 
 
Here we see Fellowes describing a swift transition from informal to functional activity.  It is 
interesting that he gives as his motivation the need to take part in the battle with his comrades, 
rather than the, presumably, serious disciplinary consequences of being absent from the 
battalion at a moment of action.  This points to a primacy in this situation of the need to carry 
out soldierly business. 
The seventeenth century material also yields evidence that soldiers had shared ideas 
about military function, and gave credit to those with expertise.  A useful illustration is 
provided by Hodgeon’s summing up of Colonel Bright, the commander of the regiment to 
which his company had been regrouped in 1645, as, ‘He was but young when he first had the 
command; but he grew very valiant and prudent, and had his officers and soldiers under good 
conduct.’186  We can see that in contrasting Bright’s initial state of less than full functional 
competence with his subsequent highly competent state, Atkyns is highlighting valour and 
prudence as important functional virtues.  We may therefore infer that these qualities formed 
an important element in general ideas about functional quality in a commander. 
Hodgson provides us with another illuminating case.  This is an incident during battle 
in 1648, when he arrives to give new orders from the general to a foot regiment (Ashton’s) 
that was still forming up, 
 
‘I met with Major Jackson, that belonged to Ashton’s regiment, and about three 
hundred men were come up;  and I ordered him to march, but he said he would not, 
till his men were come up.  A serjeant, belonging to them, asked me, where they 
should march?  I shewed him the party he was to fight; and he, like a true bred 
Englishman, marched, and I caused the soldiers to follow him; which presently fell 
upon the enemy, and, losing that wing, the whole army gave ground and fled.  Such 
valiant acts were done by contemptible instruments!’187  
 
Hodgson’s contrast of the conduct of Major Jackson and the sergeant show the sergeant as 
meeting basic functional standards more completely than the major.  However, by use of the 
word ‘contemptible’ Hodgson emphasises the junior status of the sergeant in the formal 
command structure.  In essence therefore, this passage draws a distinction between rank in 
the formal command structure and functional competence. 
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Nehemiah Wharton’s letters also give us an insight into functional elements of the 
soldier’s lives of the time.  In the first, we hear of a military review,  
 
‘Wednesday Sept. 14th [1642], our forces, both foot and horse, marched into the 
field, and the Lord General viewed us, both front, rear and flank, when the drums 
beating and the trumpets sounding made a harmony delectable to our friends, but 
terrible to our enemies.’188 
 
This passage shows that drums and trumpets were necessary elements in conducting formed 
military operations.  
In the second Wharton writes of a regimental training session,  
 
‘Friday our regiment was commanded to meet here again to be mustered, were we 
exercised in the field the whole day, and the muster master came not, whereat we 
were all much displeased.’189 
 
The displeasure of the troops is a strong and obvious indication that the muster master was 
expected to attend the muster by the functional conventions of the time. 
Finally, we have a description of an incident on operations,  
 
‘Thursday morning we marched in the front four miles towards Worcester, where we 
met one riding post from Worcester, informing us that our troops and the cavaliers 
were there in fight; ...  Upon this report our whole regiment ran shouting for two miles 
together, and crying “To Worcester, to Worcester,” and desired to march all 
night.’190 
 
We can see here that the unit of which Wharton was a member has a shared attitude of 
aggression towards the enemy and a shared convention that closing with them was the most 
appropriate thing to do. 
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Assessment. 
 
We can see from the foregoing that throughout the periods discussed there existed an 
identifiable set of mental models concerning, and attitudes to, tasks and behaviour that fit the 
category ‘soldierly’.   Military function is a strong thread that runs through the entire history of 
the British Army.  The reason is not difficult to determine, because military function has always 
been an essential element in its raison d’être, and it should come as no surprise that soldiers 
of all periods show that they hold ideas and attitudes concerning military function.  Nor is it 
surprising that these ideas and attitudes form a significant part of their daily experience and 
expectations and that they expressed opinions about their ability and that of their fellow-
soldiers to perform military functions.  We may therefore deduce that the model of the 
functional structure has passed the first element of its test, which, it will be recalled was 
whether a distinct set of mental models concerning, and attitudes to, soldierly tasks could be 
identified in the historical material. 
The second part of the test was whether or not the sets of ideas and attitudes towards 
function identified in the various historical periods are as depicted in the functional structure 
element of the model.  
On the one hand, some of the extracts quoted above seem surprisingly close to what 
might be the case today.  Davenport’s remarks on the expectation that an adjutant will appear 
to be busy, for instance, and Peebles’ critical remark about young officers both appear 
timeless, and such things might be held to argue for a commonality between the functional 
structure described in Chapter Three and the functional awareness, attitudes and mental 
models of earlier periods.  However, the same cannot be said of all the material that we have 
seen in this section concerning function.  Although the attitudes and expectations expressed in 
the  accounts quoted above are clearly to do with military function, and although they have in 
common with the model a positive and professional attitude to the military task, the nature of 
the task and its basic elements differ so markedly from those of today that they fall well 
outside the model.  Fieldcraft, for instance, was scarcely an issue for most soldiers before the 
Boer War, and the fine detail of expert use of sword and lance were no longer relevant after 
mechanization had been completed in the 1930s.  Further back in time, it need scarcely be 
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argued that the skills required of an infantry soldier of the Napoleonic era and earlier were of 
a different nature to those of today, or that the drums and trumpets which Wharton noted in 
1642 have no place in military function today. 
These considerations can be made clear if we revisit Rifleman Harris’s account of the 
Battle of Vimero quoted on page 283 above.  We noted that Harris and his peers shared a 
common set of rules about the importance of defining military prowess, and that this prowess 
consisted in the ability not to flinch, above all else.  Lack of fear was apparently rated higher 
than skill at arms or knowledge of minor tactics, which would not be the case in the light of 
today’s functional values. 
Our judgement must be therefore that the concept of a functional structure of some 
kind encapsulates many of the attitudes and actions recorded by British soldiers of earlier 
times, and can probably act as a convenient gateway through which to assess their mental 
models, but the model of the functional structure derived for soldiers of today does not 
adequately fit. 
We may conclude, then, that the model of the functional structure has clear 
weaknesses when applied to historical material, and this deficiency indicates a satisfactory 
degree of internal rigour. 
 
Result of test One:  Does the  model reflect the behaviour of British soldiers from the 
mid twentieth century back to the mid seventeenth century? 
 
This section has shown that a model of four social structures in combat arms units of the 
British Army can be constructed from the historical material in all the selected eras, but in 
many cases as soon as the current model is brought to bear in detail on the patterns of 
soldiers’ behaviour outside the present period it does not fit the material convincingly.  The 
trend, as we have seen, is for the current model to diverge progressively from the historical 
material the further back in time it is applied, and this feature can give us confidence that the 
model is sufficiently rigorous to be sensitive to time and context.  
The main exceptions to this trend are the elements of the informal structure which 
were tested, the existence of legitimate and illegitimate secondary adjustments and the 
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sub-model of informal relationships.  Both aspects appear to match the evidence of the first 
hand accounts throughout all the periods investigated.   
The existence of secondary adjustments may reasonably be assumed in any human 
system which is constrained by formal rules, and the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate secondary adjustments is a natural consequence of a rank and discipline 
structure that puts individuals in a position to decide what to permit and what rules to enforce. 
 In creating the term ‘secondary adjustments’, Goffman191 was giving a name to a common 
human activity, and in making the distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ I have 
captured an important feature in agents’ perceptions.  These terms help to explain the 
conditions under which these activities take place, and the behaviour that results from 
confusion between the categories.  To this extent, then, the concepts in question are a wider 
human phenomenon, not confined to the present-day British Army, or to Goffman’s American 
mental patients in the mid twentieth century.  Their existence in any model of British (and 
presumably other) soldiers’ behaviour in any era is therefore necessary.  Their general 
applicability is not a sign of any weakness in that part of the model. 
Of the five-fold suite of relationships which comprise the sub-model of informal 
interaction, only the most distant and insignificant, nodding acquaintance, appears to be 
absent from the historical material, and as this is the least constrained or demanding of them it 
may reasonably be assumed to exist in a recognisable, if uncelebrated, form in any era.  The 
existence of warm informal relationships between peers in any historical period should not 
concern us because they are self-evidently a common feature of human experience.  
However, the apparent general applicability of the elements in the sub-model concerned with 
cross-rank informal relationships is more problematical because it is out of step with received 
wisdom on the subject of officer-man relationships in the more distant past, as we discussed 
above.  Nevertheless, we have seen here that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the 
argument that the current framework of cross-rank informal relationships has existed for at 
least 250 years, and maybe longer.  If that is the case, as I believe it to be, then the 
persistence of this part of the model through time is a reflection of the persistence of the 
aspect that it models, and not an artificiality in the model. 
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Although this finding is a by-product of the testing of the model, and therefore off the 
main route of this chapter, it deserves further study elsewhere.  A particular focus of such a 
study could well be a comparison of the detailed elements of these relationships in different 
historical periods: the analysis of the degree of deference expected from the junior participant 
in association, for example, may well reveal specific differences in that relationship between, 
say, the mid eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
So far, we have examined historical material in the light of the model to test the 
model’s applicability to it.  In the next section we will look briefly for wider issues that are not 
captured by the model but had significant influence on the ways that British soldiers organised 
and conducted themselves towards each other. 
 
SECTION THREE - TEST QUESTION TWO: ARE THERE SIGNIFICANT 
ASPECTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH SOLDIERS OF THE PAST THAT 
ARE NOT REVEALED OR ILLUMINATED BY THE MODEL? 
 
Having applied the model directly to first hand material from British soldiers in the past, we 
are now going to examine influential aspects of the lives of those soldiers that the model does 
little or nothing to illuminate.  It will be sufficient for the purpose of this chapter - to test the 
model - simply to demonstrate that such aspects exist, without the necessity of attempting a 
comprehensive record of all of them. 
Primed by Stevens’s analysis of the importance of ‘gentlemanliness’ in the specific 
context of the nineteenth century Rifle Brigade192, we are going to consider three further 
influences from the wider British society, though on a larger scale than just one regiment.  Two 
are from the nineteenth century and earlier, and one is from the early twentieth century.  These 
are the concept of personal honour, the practice of duelling,  and some of the social effects on 
the British Army of its very rapid expansion in the First World War. 
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Honour 
 
In the earlier periods examined in this chapter, the concept of personal honour had a greater 
significance than it has today.  Individuals were very concerned with preserving it intact and 
untarnished, and it is a recurring and strong theme in the first hand material that survives to us. 
 However, it did not appear as an issue in the interview material from the current British 
Army, which indicates that it is no longer a primary concern.  It therefore is not reflected 
strongly in the model.  
A typical example of personal honour as an issue in the seventeenth century is given 
by Captain Richard Atkyns in his description of the debate as to the status of his lieutenant in 
1643.  This officer had been captured by the enemy and allowed his liberty on parole, 
according to normal practice.  However, he had been rescued by his own side whilst still on 
parole, and the debate was about whether or not his parole still applied after his rescue,  
 
‘The case was agreed to be “whether a prisoner upon his parole to render himself to 
the enemy, being afterwards redeemed by his own party, ought to keep his parole or 
not”.  His Lordship heard arguments on both sides; at last said thus, that there had 
been lately a precedent in the Council of War in a case of like nature, wherein it was 
resolved, that if the prisoner (being redeemed by a martial power without any consent 
of his own) shall afterwards refuse the command he was in before and attempt to 
render himself prisoner to the enemy, he shall be taken as an enemy, and be kept 
prisoner by his own party; the reason seems very strong because he may be prevailed 
upon by the enemy to betray his own party; and the freeing of his person, gives him as 
it were a new election; and if he choose rather to be a prisoner than a free man; it 
demonstrates his affection to be there.  But this did not satisfy my Lieutenant, for he 
would not take his place as before, but marched along with the troop as my prisoner, 
till the taking of Bristoll (the place where he promised to render himself) and then he 
thought he was fully absolved from his parole, and betook himself to his employment 
again.’193 
 
The lieutenant clearly felt that his own interpretation of the code of honour took precedence 
over the decisions of his commander, even if they were made in the light of apparently the 
same code of honour.  Atkyns himself must have had sympathy for his lieutenant’s point of 
view because he assisted him in taking him along as his ‘prisoner’. 
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Odintz deals at some length with the eighteenth-century British officer’s concept of 
personal honour, showing that it was a daily preoccupation, and a significant one in their daily 
lives, policed by their peers194, for example, 
 
‘Rough or elegant, sociable or anti-social, all officers shared a common obsession 
with the most personal element of the honor code, that of preserving one’s 
reputation.’195 
 
‘In situations where an officer was believed to have violated the honor code, rather 
than a specific Article of War, the initiative for dealing with the offender usually lay 
with his peers in the regiment rather than with the senior officers, the means chosen to 
deal with him by his fellows were usually much less formal in their initial stages, and 
the legal system was only utilized if the offender failed to respond adequately to less 
public pressures.  The most common of these informal sanctions was social and 
professional ostracism.  The officers of the regiment would refuse to serve with, “roll” 
with or dine with an officer who had violated the honor code.’196 
 
Nor was the concept of personal honour entirely an officer’s prerogative.  An other 
ranks’ perspective is provided by two further examples, from the Peninsular War.  First, there 
was a general willingness among soldiers to volunteer to be members of the ‘forlorn hope’ in 
sieges, which seems remarkable today.  It was the task of this forlorn hope to be the first 
troops in the assault, and few of them were expected to survive197.  However, forlorn hopes 
were always oversubscribed several times over with volunteers198.  In the case of the forlorn 
hope for the storming of San Sebastian in 1813, for instance, this involved the selection of the 
party from numerous volunteers by drawing lots,  
 
‘... an order was given to every regiment in our division to send one serjeant, one 
corporal, and twenty privates, to assist in storming this strong place.  I volunteered as 
soon as I heard the order read.  An old corporal, John Styles by name, stammered 
out “A-a-a- an’ I’ll g-g-g-go too.”  In a few minutes ten serjeants, and old Styles, 
volunteered as stormers.  We assembled at the colours, and drew lots.’199 
 
Second, here are Sergeant Anton’s remarks about those who fail their test of courage, 
 
‘A man may drop behind in the field, but this is a dreadful risk to his reputation, and 
even attended with immediate personal danger, while within the range of shot and 
shells: and wo [sic] to the man that does it, whether through fatigue, sudden sickness, 
or fear; let him seek death, and welcome it from the hand of a foe, rather than give 
room for any surmise respecting his courage; for when others are boasting of what 
they have seen, suffered, or performed, he must remain in silent mortification.  If he 
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chances to speak, some boaster cuts him short; and, even when he is not alluded to, 
he becomes so sensitively alive to these merited or unmerited insults, that he considers 
every word, sign, or gesture, pointed at him, and he is miserable among his 
comrades.’ 200  
 
This passage chimes well with the general attitude expressed by Rifleman Harris above as to 
the priority of unflinching courage. 
The categories in the model as it stands do not lead us to identify personal honour as 
a specifically defined and special area of concern that dominated soldiers’ attitudes and 
personal conduct.  The most that can be said, using the model of the present day alone, is that 
honour should show up as a preoccupation in the informal structure, or possibly as a feature 
in the functional structure, but there is nothing to suggest, for instance, that secondary 
adjustments in the area of honour might not be tolerated at any level.  
It seems best to view the concept of personal honour as a cultural element affecting 
the wider British society in former times to such an extent that British soldiers considered it a 
natural part of life, a view that chimes with Odintz’s statement that, 
 
‘While the outward manifestations of [the gentlemanly] ... code varied somewhat 
among the elites of the Anglo-American world, the primacy of honor as the well 
spring of gentlemanly behavior, and the right and duty of a gentleman’s peers to pass 
judgement on the honorableness [sic] and correctness of his actions, were accepted 
principles throughout British society, and indeed throughout the Western world.’201 
 
It could be said that it was imported naturally into the Army as part of the habituses of those 
who joined it.  Its lack of prominence in the model indicates therefore that the model is not 
sensitive to such general cultural elements outside the current period.  This lack of sensitivity in 
the model is an important feature that ties it to the present day and makes it fail when it is 
applied without adjustment to previous eras. 
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Duelling 
 
Duelling in the British Army was intimately bound up with the concept of personal honour 
among officers, and flourished especially in the eighteenth century.  However, it also took 
place in the seventeenth century and was still a generally persistent, if formally forbidden, 
aspect of life in Wellington’s Army, only withering away as common practice in the mid 
nineteenth century.202 
Symonds gives us three examples of duelling, between two of the King’s captains of 
horse, between the Earl of Peterborough and a Captain Willoughby, and between a lieutenant 
of horse and an unnamed trooper.203  The last case is interesting in that it appears to represent 
a duel between individuals of widely different social classes, which would not have been the 
case in the eighteenth century when duelling was confined to ‘gentlemen’, as Odintz shows us 
in his comprehensive analysis of duelling among the officers of the eighteenth century British 
Army204.   
We may conclude from Odintz’s analysis that duelling was formally forbidden in the 
mid eighteenth century but that it was also expected behaviour.  This provided a clash 
between rule and expectation that Gilbert explores in his paper on law and honour in the 
eighteenth century British Army, 
 
‘The eighteenth-century army officer was caught between two conflicting modes of 
behaviour.  To some extent he was torn between the past and the future.  Personal 
defence of one’s honour was giving way to the more dispassionate, and less bloody, 
legal resolution of disputes, but the relationship between the two was unclear.’205 
 
It might be argued that this conflict between rule and practice provides us with a 
classic case of the illegitimate secondary adjustment.  However, it was generally expected 
by the overwhelming majority, including members of the chain of command, that an officer 
would defend his honour to the extent of duelling to conserve it.  It could scarcely therefore fit 
the category of illegitimate secondary adjustment if the chain of command supported it.  
However, it could not be called a legitimate secondary adjustment either, because of the 
near certainty of formal disciplinary action if an officer seriously hurt his opponent.  Duelling 
was therefore in a special category of its own which is missing from the model and would 
have to be inserted to make it useful in describing, analysing and explaining officers’ behaviour 
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in the eighteenth century, and probably in the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries as 
well.   
The requirement for officers to defend their personal honour by duelling therefore 
represents another area where the model is not sensitive to cultural elements in the wider 
society that intruded into the social fabric of the British Army.  This lack of sensitivity would 
have to be compensated for by the insertion of specific amendments to the model for the 
periods in question. 
 
Rapid expansion 
 
The needs of the First World War in terms of military manpower dwarfed Britain’s military 
resources in 1914, and there was a consequent surge in numbers of men joining the Army.  
As Holmes points out, this rapid expansion involved over five and a half million men (slightly 
over 22 per cent of the adult male population of the United Kingdom) during the course of the 
war, from a starting regular strength in 1914 of less than 250,000 men.206  This 
unprecedented expansion drew individuals into the British Army who would have had no 
intention of joining under the pre-war conditions, men like those described by Captain Ivar 
Campbell from France in a letter written in 1915, as ‘little fellows from shops, civilians before, 
now and after ...’207.   Furthermore, in many cases the social backgrounds of officers and 
other ranks were not the traditional ones.  As Holmes has put it, 
 
‘The British regular army tended to mirror the social structure of Edwardian England, 
its officers drawn largely from traditional elites and its rank and file soldiers 
disproportionately representing the urban unemployed.  But the volunteer New 
Armies, raised in response to Kitchener’s call to arms, were a far less accurate 
reflection, and thousands of well-educated men served in the ranks. ... Conscription 
broke down even more traditional barriers, and in 1917-18 there were many middle-
class men serving in the ranks.  There is no easy correlation between rank and social 
class in the British army of the First World War.’208 
 
Because the overwhelming majority of British soldiers in the First World War thus 
came from a much wider social base than before, and because there was this novel mixture of 
classes, it seems inevitable that there must have been significant differences in the social fabric 
of the First World War army, compared to that of 1913, which would have been reflected in 
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the ways in which the soldiers behaved.  Indeed, Sheffield provides us with a specific 
illustration in the way that the supposedly global apparatus of discipline was applied in 
different units, by distinguishing between ‘regular’ and ‘auxiliary’ modes of discipline in the 
New Army battalions, 
 
‘Regular modes of officer-man relations and discipline were simply inappropriate.  A 
Regular brigadier described the discipline of 6/W. Yorks as being that of ‘good will’, 
while Hurst wrote of the ‘comradeship’ which produced an ‘easy relationship 
between officers and men...[which] was the despair of the more crusted Regular 
martinet’, a form of discipline which was maintained without requiring ‘the banishment 
of individuality and of the exercise of intellect from Regimental life’.209 
 
This distinction between different modes in the application of the apparatus of discipline was 
obviously a reflection of the different nature and origins of the types of unit in question.  
However, this distinction is not easily picked up in the model, which simply captures the 
existence and structure of a common apparatus of rank and discipline.  It does not 
discriminate between regular and auxiliary types of unit simply because it was constructed in 
an environment where there is only one type of unit, those of the regular combat arms. 
Faced with a requirement to analyse the data which Sheffield has brought forward 
here, the best that can be done, using the model exclusively, would be to say that the 
informal structure, and particularly the relationship of association, was often used in 
preference to the firm lines of the formal command structure in the New Army battalions.  
Although that may tell us something useful about how discipline was applied, and we may be 
able better to visualise the process using the model, it can tell us nothing about the reasons for, 
or background to, this different emphasis in different types of unit. 
In the same way, the model is too crude a device to give us a proper insight into the 
lives of individuals who had neither the ability nor willingness to be integrated into the military 
environment but found themselves in it because of the circumstances of war.  It would be 
possible to use the model’s category of rogue agent to describe such misfits, but this 
categorisation would not be adequate to encapsulate their behaviour or attitudes, which fall 
well outside the implicit assumption in the model that members of the Army embrace 
soldiering.  A particular case in point is that of Private Alfred Hale, a well educated and quiet 
man of private means who had achieved modest distinction as a composer.  He was 
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conscripted into the Army in 1917 at the age of 38, found not to be fully fit, and was 
employed as a batman in the Royal Flying Corps for two years.  His memoir210 is a tale of 
misery, misunderstanding and confusion, and we can see him progressively losing his dignity 
and self respect as it proceeds.  
 
Result of test two: identification of aspects of the behaviour of British soldiers of the 
past that are not revealed or illuminated by the model 
 
These three sets of examples show us, therefore, that the model has no capacity to allow for 
powerful cultural factors from outside the Army that significantly affect soldiers’ attitudes, 
assumptions and behaviour.  Nor can it distinguish the particular effects of rapid and 
significant changes in the social composition of the Army.  
 
SECTION FOUR - CONCLUSIONS 
 
I had earlier believed 211 that the model worked well in the analysis and understanding of first 
hand accounts by British soldiers of all eras since the mid seventeenth century.   However, I 
have had seriously to revise this conclusion during the research for this thesis.  There are, 
indeed, certain areas where the fit remains good for a considerable period back in time, and 
at the top level the model provides a useful set of categories for all periods as we will examine 
further in the next chapter.  However, the more detailed research reported in this chapter has 
shown that the model has significant limitations when applied in the historical context.  In the 
first place, it does not fit some of the first hand evidence, and in general the lack of fit in the 
model becomes more pronounced the further back in time it is tested.  We saw this in the 
clear differences from the selected aspects of the formal command structure in the 
seventeenth century, the differences from the loyalty/identity structure in the eighteenth 
century and earlier, and the differences in the attitudes and expectations expressed about the 
ingredients of military function in the mid nineteenth century and earlier.  Secondly, the model 
misses some important historical cultural issues which impinged on soldiers’ lives from the 
wider British society. 
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It can therefore be said with confidence that the model is not so plastic that it fits all 
cases and that it can be assumed to have sufficient rigour to be acceptable for its purpose, this 
purpose being the description, analysis, and prediction of the behaviour of current British 
Army soldiers in combat arms units.  We can say that it has passed its test. 
However, we have also seen that certain aspects of the model do indeed fit British 
soldiers behaviour and attitudes at least as far back as the eighteenth century, and possibly 
further.  Particular cases are the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate secondary 
adjustments and the five-fold sub-model of informal relationships.  Given that the model has 
been shown to have rigour in other areas, this suggests that the testing of the model has 
detected persistent cultural aspects of life in the British Army over a considerable period of 
time.  We will address this implication in the next chapter when we consider the future uses to 
which the model, or variants of it, might be put in examining contemporary and historical 
issues in the British Army at unit level. 
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CHAPTER SIX - USES OF THE MODEL TO EXAMINE  
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
 
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to ‘present a model generated using social anthropological 
techniques, which can be used with a degree of confidence to describe, analyse and predict 
the behaviour of British soldiers in regular combat arms units in the current British Army’ 
(Chapter One, page 3).  This aim has been met.  It now remains for us to look for ways in 
which this model might be used in the future, building on the work presented so far. 
Two principal areas will be explored.  First, building on the findings of the previous 
chapter, we will examine how existing elements or variants of the model might be used to gain 
a better understanding of British soldiers at regimental duty in the past.  Secondly, we will 
look at certain specific issues that are of concern to the British Army of today.  
The emphasis of this chapter is on identifying promising areas for future work, rather 
than presenting a fully-researched and argued picture of any particular area.  However, where 
possible, and where relevant, elements of the research conducted for this thesis will be 
brought forward to shed light on particular aspects. 
 
SECTION TWO - THE PAST 
 
A General Unifying Framework for Analysis  
 
We have seen in Chapter Five that the model cannot be applied uncritically to describe, 
analyse and explain British soldiers’ behaviour in all eras.  This implies that specially 
constructed, time-specific, models would be required for each historical context to take 
account of detailed features of behaviour in that context and of powerful influences from the 
wider British society that were specific to that era.  However, at no stage in Chapter Five was 
it necessary to amend the overall four-fold construction at the top level of the model, of 
formal, informal, loyalty/identity, and functional structures.  Even where significant time-
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specific aspects were found, such as in the loyalty/identity structure of the eighteenth 
century or in the functional structure before the First World War, it was apparent that the 
four basic elements of the model still provided a suitable analytical structure.  It is possible, 
therefore, to use these top level elements as a unifying framework with which to consider the 
British Army throughout his history, whilst adapting the lower levels as necessary to deal with 
particular eras or contexts. 
We also noted in the last chapter that the model’s typology of informal relationships 
provided a useful characterisation of informal interactions in British Army units well back into 
the past, and so it, too, may be used with confidence in analysing historical material. 
We will now examine the use of the top level of the model, and where appropriate the 
typology of informal relationships, to enhance our understanding of British Army issues in the 
past in four different ways.  In the first, we examine its use as a check list to guide the historian 
to examine all aspects of a military context, in the second we explore its use as a means to test 
the genuineness of what purports to be first hand material, in the third we consider it as a 
means to detect and track change and observe continuity, and finally we examine two 
apparent paradoxes. 
In all that follows, the overall use that the selected elements of the model offer is the 
improvement of our understanding of the social milieu inhabited by the soldiers whose 
experiences we are examining, and the reasons for their particular behaviour.  In essence, the 
model provides a way of penetrating what Cobbett called ‘the Secrets of the Army’ which he 
likened to ‘those of Free Masonry; it is absolutely necessary to become a brother of the blade 
before you can become at all acquainted with the arcania [sic] of the profession’1. 
 
A Check List of Factors 
 
An important element of any historical study is the need to provide a balanced and 
appropriate analysis.  When the subject is British soldiers, such an analysis would be greatly 
helped by the check list of significant areas provided by the top level of the model, the 
headings of the four social structures.  This check list provides a gateway through which to 
approach the material and to increase the likelihood that enquiry is made into all the significant 
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factors that would have influenced the behaviour and attitudes of the protagonists.  The three 
examples which follow illustrate this point. 
 
Example One: Baynes’s analysis of morale in the 2nd Scottish Rifles in 1915  
 
In Morale: a Study of Men and Courage2, Baynes analyses the motivation of the men of the 
2nd Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle in 1915.  As part of his exploration of the pre-war 
background of the soldiers concerned, when they were stationed in Malta, he sums up the 
factors motivating their behaviour as follows, 
 
‘One should think of the Privates of the 2nd Scottish Rifles in Malta, therefore, as 
men of many varied types, with numerous different facets to their characters, but held 
together by toughness of spirit, strong discipline, and most important of all, fierce 
loyalty to the Regiment.  This last quality cannot be over-emphasized - it is essential to 
realize that it was the strongest single influence on the lives of everyone in the 
battalion.’3 
 
and he restates his view of the importance of loyalty to the Regiment in his comments on the 
conduct of the battalion in battle, 
 
‘But if anyone wants to know what was the quintessence of the morale of the 
pre-1914 Army - what was the rock of its foundation - then the answer is the 
Regiment.  Everything else was important, but if the actions of the soldiers of the 
Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle are to be explained in a few words one can only 
say that they did it for the Regiment.’4 
 
Use of the top level of the model leads us to question the balance in this analysis.  In 
the first place, we may observe that Baynes has included at most only three of the four 
structures in making his case.  ‘Strong discipline’ belongs to the formal command structure, 
and ‘fierce loyalty to the Regiment’ belongs to the loyalty/identity structure.  ‘Toughness of 
spirit’ could probably be mapped onto the functional structure, but there is no mention here 
of the informal structure, and in particular the horizontal and vertical bonds of friendship, 
association and informal access which, as the model indicates, provide strong personal 
threads within a unit.  Secondly, in focusing monolithically on the Regiment as the locus of 
loyalty, Baynes here neglects the influence of the other levels in the loyalty/identity structure. 
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 These omissions are all the more surprising because Baynes clearly identifies all the missing 
elements in his text, as the following extracts show.  
Taking the informal structure first, and using the typology of relationships, we can 
see in this first extract that he is obviously aware of the importance of what is modelled as 
friendship, 
 
‘Two men who had become mates or “muckers” in the Army were closer to each 
other than most brothers, and often developed a joint identity so that no sensible 
N.C.O. would dream of telling one to do a job without detailing the other at the same 
time.’5  
 
and in this second that he is aware of rank-asymmetrical informal relationships when he gives 
a delightful portrait of an informal relationship between a platoon commander, Lieutenant 
Kennedy, and one of his soldiers,  
 
‘It is interesting to note that Kennedy had a Private Mason in his platoon, whom he 
describes as a “great gaunt Clydesider”, who had rejoined as a reservist after several 
years out of the Army working in the mines.  There he had become involved with 
some men of violent Communist opinions and at times in the trenches he would tell 
Kennedy of what he and his friends would do to the capitalists and bosses after the 
War.  It was blood-curdling stuff, in spite of which Mason was a most loyal and 
willing soldier, and went out of his way to almost mother Kennedy, and to give him 
cups of tea and extra rations at frequent intervals.  Apparently officers of his own 
Regiment were exempt from the fury of his class-hatred.’6 
 
This portrait contains some of the typical signs of association set out in Chapter Three (pages 
100 to 102).  The officer and the soldier spend a great deal of time together and speak of 
matters well outside the immediate military situation, and the soldier looks after the officer’s 
material needs whilst the officer seems to have shielded the soldier from any disciplinary 
consequences of his anti-establishment views.  Furthermore, this was no isolated case: Baynes 
subsequently lists ‘the excellent officer-other rank relationship’ as in important ingredient in the 
battalion’s morale in his overall summary towards the end of the book7. 
  He was also aware of the importance of the other levels in the loyalty/identity 
structure apart from the Regiment, and the dynamic quality of these different foci for loyalty,  
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‘Trust in the group is an essential part of the soldier’s development.  At the lowest 
levels the individual is dependent on his immediate fellows to an extraordinary degree. 
 A private soldier in action finds that his section becomes the centre of his life.  He 
find his platoon and company important as well, and as far as reputation is concerned 
he thinks occasionally about the battalion and division he is in.’8 
 
This brief critique, using the top level of the model as a check list, has therefore shown 
that Baynes’s analysis is focused too strongly on the Regiment and he has missed the 
significance of other important factors in spite of observing them. 
 
Example Two: the collapse of the 63rd Regiment in the Crimea 
 
We now turn to a unit whose morale was the very opposite of the Scottish Rifles.  Mawton 
has made available to us the letter written by the Commanding Officer of the 63rd Foot, 
Lieutenant Colonel The Honourable Robert Alexander George Dalzell, in which he attempts 
to explain why his battalion had ceased to be effective in the Crimea in January 18559.  
Dalzell had taken over command of the battalion after it had lost its commanding officer and 
many of its NCOs at the Battle of Inkerman where it did well, fighting ‘like fun’10.  There is a 
prima facie case for concluding that the new commanding officer must have been 
incompetent, in the light of the unit’s success under his predecessor and its collapse under 
him.  This case is embraced by Mawton, who says,  
 
‘The Peter Principle was not defined in an aphorism until the 1960s, but Dalzell’s 
command of the 63rd (The West Suffolk) Regiment of Foot is a superb example of a 
man being promoted to the level of his own incompetence.’11 
 
The top level of the model allows us to make a balanced adjudication of the case for 
Dalzell’s defence, put in his letter, which, taken from Mawton’s article, is reproduced in 
Appendix E with my comments inserted into the text.  All of those comments were generated 
by use of the top level of the model, and, in brief, they show that Dalzell had very real 
problems in all four social structures: 
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Formal Command Structure.  Dalzell’s position in the formal command structure 
was weak, and he did not have a strong chain of command to shore it up. 
 
- He had only recently been appointed Commanding Officer, after a popular and 
successful predecessor, and had been appointed at a time when conditions were 
difficult.  He was therefore bound to appear less capable than his predecessor. 
 
- There was inconsistency in the application of discipline by the officers.  This 
inconsistency would have lowered the expectations of the soldiers about disciplinary 
standards. 
 
- There was a shortage of experienced NCOs, especially after the battalion’s losses 
at Inkerman.  The means to instil and maintain discipline was therefore weakened. 
 
Informal Structure.  Many of the positive, bonding, elements of the informal 
structure were missing, whereas negative ones had grown up: 
 
- There was a persistent habit among the soldiers of carrying out illegitimate 
secondary adjustments, even to the extent of harming their own colleagues.  This 
behaviour would have diminished the trust between officers and men, and between 
peers. 
 
- The regiment had lost its camp kettles during the advance on Sevastopol, which led 
to the break-up of the soldiers’ informal eating groups.  This would have removed 
one of the important vehicles for friendship. 
 
- The shortage of NCOs reduced the informal channels of communication between 
the officers and their men.   
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Loyalty/Identity Structure.  Again, many of the elements that might have provided 
forces for bonding and cohesion in the loyalty/identity structure were missing. 
 
- The officers had mixed, or at best diluted, loyalty as many of them had recently 
transferred in from other regiments. 
 
- There was a lack of any feeling of competition with other regiments.  The benefits of 
the desire to be ‘the best’ or of being superior to other units were lost. 
 
Functional Structure.  There was no sense of operational purpose in the unit. 
 
- The officers had displayed a marked lack of attention to operational matters.  This 
would have lessened the importance of ‘doing the business’ in the eyes of the soldiers. 
 
- Survival had become the focus of activity rather than fighting the enemy. 
 
We may speculate as to whether a different individual would have been able to retain 
the coherence of the battalion, and we may note that in places Dalzell appears both peevish 
and miserable (neither of which properties would have been valued in a commanding officer). 
 However, the balanced and neutral view provided by use of the model leads us to conclude 
that Dalzell’s problems were both genuine and serious.  No social structure offered him any 
firm ground from which to achieve a restoration of confidence and discipline among his 
soldiers, so, whatever he tried to do it was unlikely to succeed.  It would have required a truly 
exceptional man to retain the control that he lost.  Use of the model shows us that Dalzell was 
right to claim that the situation was a special case, and there is no real indication that Mawton 
is right to say that he was especially incompetent.  The most we can say is that he was not 
truly exceptional. 
 
Example Three: the interpretation of historical texts 
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The model is also useful in a more general sense as a guide to the interpretation of historical 
texts by making us aware of the powerful influence of what are modelled as social structures 
on the attitudes and expectations of individual soldiers.  So, for example, when we are told by 
Odintz that,  
 
‘In 1776 Lady Sarah Lennox praised the collective character of her brother’s 
regiment, the 25th, to a friend by writing that “I have heard (and indeed seen in some 
degree) that all the officers are remarkable for their good conduct in every respect: 
their principles, their friendship, their generosity, manners - and many for their learning 
- and all for their military and humane turn.”’12 
 
the model would guide us to be suspicious of this insider’s view of a Regiment.  Lady Sarah 
Lennox may pass these remarks on as fact, but the model makes us aware that her brother 
was bound to say good things about his Regiment, by the conventions of the loyalty/identity 
structure.  We should be similarly suspicious when Odintz tells us in the same passage that, 
 
‘The diary of Thomas Hughes of the 53rd contains descriptions of the other regiments 
he came in contact with in Canada in the 1780’s, in which he lists the collective 
attributes of their officer corps.  The officers of the 65th were “all young men, great 
martinets, but so completely germanised both in dress and manoeuvres that it was 
some time before we could think them our brother soldiers.”’13 
 
and that Hughes’s opinion of the officers of the 34th was that they were, ‘high living wastrels, 
who “keep horses, give balls and races, and gamble”’14.  In both cases we may view these 
diary entries somewhat differently, even if we accept that they were written in good faith, if we 
accept that the influence of the loyalty/identity structure is likely to encourage Hughes to 
think of his Regiment as in some ways superior to the ones about which he is writing.   
Such considerations provide us with a useful corrective against accepting as fact the 
opinion of a soldier on the members of another unit.  Although the 53rd (Hughes’s own 
Regiment) comes out as better than the others in Hughes’s diary, we may consider it likely, 
for example, that the members of the 65th and the 34th believed that their Regiments were 
superior to the 53rd, and we would expect to see a different picture of all three units if 
members of each had left us their views. 
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Conclusion 
 
These three examples from three different centuries have demonstrated the practicality 
of using the top level of the model to produce a check list of factors for historical analysis, and 
the extra insights to be gained from doing so. 
 
Testing for Authenticity 
 
We may also use the model to explore the genuineness of what appear to be diaries or 
memoirs written by soldiers.  Letters written by soldiers to those with no military experience 
would be excluded from this test because, as we noted in Chapter Two (page 68) the authors 
might naturally exclude mention of soldierly concerns.  However, if the text of a journal or 
memoir does not have within it indications of four areas of preoccupation matching the four 
social structures then its genuineness should at least be questioned.  On the other hand, the 
presence of material consistent with the four social structures would be evidence that such a 
text is genuine. 
A particular case is the well-known anonymous memoir, A Soldier of the 71st, which 
purports to have been written by a private soldier in 1818, covering the period 1806 to 
181515.  The author is only identified by the initials ‘T.S.’, and by the name ‘Tom’ used in the 
text.  Reid has pointed out that the muster rolls of the 71st Foot show that the events 
described in the memoir could not all have been experienced by the same individual, and 
concludes that the memoir was probably written by ‘a man named Howells ... [who] did not 
himself serve in the 71st, but he may very well have ghosted and heavily “improved” T.S.’s 
genuine reminiscences’16. 
If we apply the model to this memoir, we may examine its authenticity in a novel way. 
 Scrutiny of the book reveals that many of the features that the model predicts are present.  
Orders are given and received, and there is a background of discipline and authority (formal 
command structure).  The functions of a light infantry soldier are well described (both 
skirmishing and in close order), as are the minor tactics of Napoleonic British infantry 
(functional structure), and there are several allusions to T.S.’s peers (and in particular to an 
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individual, Donald M’Donald, who may well have been a close friend) that are consistent 
with the expected behaviour from that part of the informal structure.  However, there are 
aspects missing from the memoir which the model indicates should be present.  In particular, 
most of the military activities are reported on the large scale, listing the activities of the various 
regiments and of distinguished commanders, but little is given of the activities of the constituent 
parts of the 71st itself or of its officers.  There are no allusions to any particular company, and 
only very occasional allusions to the identity or span of command of any of the officers.  
Furthermore, the only conversations reported between the officers and the men take place 
during battle, and no cross-rank informal relationships appear at all.  The activities, attitudes, 
or characters of NCOs are not featured.   
Aspects of the loyalty/identity structure and the informal structure which the 
model predicts should be present are therefore missing, and this should lead us at the very 
least to question the memoir’s authenticity.  However, its immediacy is obvious.  It is packed 
with incidents that are exciting and interesting, capturing both the heroic and the dreadful 
aspects of the Peninsular War and giving the clear impression of eye-witness accounts.  
Moreover, where they can be checked, apart from the individual career of ‘T.S.’ the events 
described all appear to be genuine, or at the least fully consistent with other contemporary 
accounts. 
These considerations point in two divergent directions: the genuine spirit of the 
eyewitness accounts of particular incidents is at variance with the lack of full compatibility with 
the model.  This is entirely consistent with Reid’s hypothesis: someone has taken some 
detailed and genuine information from at least one soldier who was on the spot and woven a 
narrative out of it.  However, because of the missing elements, we may add to Reid’s findings 
that use of the model indicates that it is unlikely that the editor was himself a soldier. 
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Detecting and Tracking Change and Continuity 
 
We noted in Chapter Five that some aspects of the lives of British soldiers in the past were so 
different from those of today that the model does not have the capacity properly to represent 
them.  Therefore, for a complete tracking of the social structures through the British Army’s 
history, several different, time-specific, versions of the model would need to be created.  
Where such models differed in specific areas, these differences would provide us with a 
means to track significant changes, and, conversely, lack of differences would indicate areas 
of continuity. 
We have already seen an example of the power of the model to throw changes into 
relief when we examined the formal command structure in the seventeenth century, in 
Chapter Five (pages 231 and 232).  Significant differences between the seventeenth century 
formal command structure and that of the eighteenth century were indications of the 
‘military revolution’ which took place over that period.   
Another example concerns the concept of personal honour, a further aspect which we 
examined in Chapter Five (pages 291 to 295).  We saw that it was a significant element in 
British soldiers’ lives of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century but has lessened in 
importance between then and now.  Therefore, a model of the social structures in the 
eighteenth century British Army would have to include a specific element to account for the 
primacy of personal honour, while the model of the social structures of the Army in the late 
twentieth century does not include such an element.  This implies that a succession of time-
specific models covering the intervening years would show us over what period of time the 
importance of personal honour diminished, what other aspects changed over the same period, 
and help us investigate how they may be linked. 
The production of a series of models capturing social structures in the British Army through 
time would enable us not only to track changes but also to recognise and identify factors that 
have remained relatively unchanged.  Again, we have already started this process in Chapter 
Five, by remarking on the continuity of the use of secondary adjustments over 350 years 
and of the appropriateness of the typology of informal relationships over at least 300 years 
(pages 233 to 239, 260, and 288 to 289).  
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A specific instance is the long history of a particular use of cross-rank informal 
relationships.  We will see from the following cases, spanning 200 years, that the same 
elements of the present model capture the situation: a subordinate by-passes an awkward 
superior using an existing informal relationship with a more senior individual.  
The first is the case from the recent past of the ‘Difficult Sub Unit Commander’ in 
Chapter Four (pages 174 to 176) in which a company sergeant-major, unable to move his 
company commander, spoke directly to the RSM, using an existing informal relationship.  It 
will be recalled that the RSM went to the Commanding Officer and shortly afterwards the 
company commander’s behaviour changed. 
  This case has remarkable similarity to others at different time periods.  One of 
them has already appeared in Chapter Five, a case in the Second World War in which a 
corporal went to his company commander to warn him that one of the company subalterns 
was not the hero that he was thought to be (page 256).  The following are further examples 
from earlier periods.  The first comes from the First World War,  
 
‘Sergeant Noble ... has told of a small incident shortly after the battalion arrived in 
France in 1914.  At this stage it was thought that spies behind the British lines might 
be sending information to the Germans by carrier pigeon.  The order therefore came 
from G.H.Q. for troops at the front to watch out for pigeons crossing their lines in the 
direction of the enemy trenches.  Noble’s story is this: 
 
Newly arrived officers sometimes seemed to treat N.C.O.s as inferior.  One 
morning I was posting a sentry, day duty in the trench, and I said “Keep a 
sharp look out for pigeons.”  The officer went “Ha, ha”, the sentry likewise.  I 
felt humiliated.  I reported to my C.S.M. (Cully) who reported to the Major, 
and through the batman I learnt that the officer received a good ticking off.’ 17 
 
The second is an incident during the Siege of Sevastopol, in 1855, 
 
‘One day in March I was one of the sergeants with a party of men that had been sent 
to Balaclava to bring up supplies in the way of biscuit and pork, or salt junk (salt 
beef).  We had a young officer with us, well mounted, who had but little compassion 
for poor fellows who were doing their best, trudging through the mud up to their 
ankles, with a heavy load upon their backs.  The party were not going fast enough to 
suit the whim of our young and inexperienced commander, who called out to the 
writer: 
“Take this man’s name, Sergeant, and make a prisoner of him when we get home.” 
 
 322 
  The unfortunate man was doing his best to keep up, and he gave our 
young officer such a contemptuous look as I shall not forget as long as I live.  
Throwing his load of biscuit down in the mud, he exclaimed: 
“Man indade! Soger indade! I’m only a poor broken-down commissariat 
mule” ... 
The poor fellow was made a prisoner of at once, for insubordination.  But 
when I explained the case to our Colonel he took quite a different view of the matter, 
forgave the man, and presented him with a pair of good warm socks and a pair of 
new boots; for the poor fellow had nothing but uppers and no soles for his old ones.  
And in order to teach our smart young officer how to respect men who were trying to 
do their duty sentenced him to three extra fatigues to Balaclava - and to walk it, the 
same as any other man.’18 
 
The third describes the smoothing out of a difficult relationship between a newly-arrived 
company commander and his pay sergeant in 1812.  The pay sergeant recalls, 
 
‘I soon found the captain to be a disciplinarian of the old school: he required books 
and returns which would have been a load for a horse.  But on speaking to the 
Adjutant, he reasoned him out of these notions.’19  
 
The ubiquitous Corporal Todd also provides indirect evidence of the existence of this 
sort of channel for communications even further back in time.  Employed against his will in 
1761 as his battalion’s Pioneer Corporal (an arduous and dangerous task that took him away 
from his friends in his company), he was confined unjustly by the Quartermaster in October 
of that year for allegedly failing to ensure that the officers’ privy was properly screened.  His 
pioneer section come to him and offered to go in a body straight to the Commanding Officer 
or the Major to set the record straight, but Todd forbade them, hoping that this incident will 
lead to his sacking as Pioneer Corporal and a subsequent return to his company.20   
The identification of similar examples of continuity would enable us to identify long-
enduring elements in the British Army’s organisational culture.  This information would not 
only provide longitudinal links between any series of time-specific models that were 
produced, but they would also be able to inform those who are planning change in the modern 
British Army.  In essence, if particular elements in the social structures that inform the lives of 
soldiers have lasted for a long time then we should be very cautious indeed in planning to 
introduce change that would significantly alter them. 
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Investigation of Paradoxes 
 
The model can also assist in addressing areas where historians disagree, or where the 
apparent facts present paradoxes.  Two examples of such areas from the eighteenth century 
will be now be explored, using, respectively, the top level only of the model and the typology 
of informal relationships. 
The first is a disagreement between Frey and Guy concerning the cohesion of infantry 
units in the eighteenth century, as identified by Brumwell21.  For Frey, Regimental pride and 
tradition served to produce a ‘brotherhood of men’22, whilst for Guy this is a ‘wistful 
characterization’, particularly in view of the poor quality of the soldiers and the constant 
recourse to drafting large numbers of men between regiments when the need arose to bring a 
battalion up to strength for operations23.    
In an attempt to reconcile these views, Brumwell points out that the situation was 
probably not quite as black as Guy paints,  
 
‘Whilst it is impossible to deny the prevalence of drafting in the British Army of the 
eighteenth century, it is also necessary to remember that for every soldier who found 
himself transferred from one unit to another in bewildering succession, there were 
others who spent all or most of their military career in a single regiment.  This was 
particularly true of those battalions which possessed sufficient seniority in the line to 
avoid disbandment at the close of hostilities.  In contrast to such ‘young’ corps as 
Bagshawe’s own 93rd Foot, which was little more than a feeder unit for other 
regiments, these were unlikely to be drafted wholesale with the coming of peace.  
Even where drafting did occur, the men selected were often those who had been 
received as drafts from other units, so leaving a rump of veterans who spent their 
entire service - from enlistment to death or discharge - in the same regiment.’24  
 
thus echoing Odintz’s view, expressed separately from this debate,  
 
‘The practice of freely drafting private soldiers from one regiment to another 
prevented the regimental orientation of the ranker from becoming too extreme, though 
soldiers were often adept at transferring their loyalties from one corps to another.  
Similarly, each regiment contained a number of officers who developed no particular 
attachment to that corps and who were willing to transfer frequently in search of 
promotion.  However, there were usually enough long-term members of the regiment, 
particularly among the officers, to ensure the maintenance of a collective identity.’25  
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Although Brumwell tries to offer us a middle way, and although Odintz’s study 
supports him, we can do even better to reconcile the extremes represented by Frey and Guy 
by using the top level of the model.  If we look for potential sources of unit cohesion from all 
four structures, then we can see that there are several other factors apart from Regimental 
pride and tradition that might have enhanced cohesion in units, even in the turbulent 
circumstances highlighted by Guy.  Such factors might be, 
 
Formal Command Structure 
 
- Fair and firm exercise of discipline, using all parts of the chain of command, over 
newcomers and long-term members alike. 
 
Informal Structure 
 
- Encouragement to form appropriate informal relationships, so that peers welcomed 
newcomers, and so that superiors and subordinates exercised association and 
informal access as widely as possible with them. 
 
- Firm and consistent application of the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate secondary adjustments by those in authority. 
 
Loyalty/Identity Structure 
 
- Encouragement of newcomers to identify with, and embrace membership of, their 
new company and their new Regiment, in the expectation that those newcomers 
would be familiar with the existence and nature of an adaptable loyalty/identity 
structure. 
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Functional Structure 
 
- The carrying out of meaningful, soldierly, group tasks at company and battalion 
level. 
 
These considerations would lead us to a better understanding of the nature of the 
problem that Frey and Guy attempt to address.  We may question both the inevitability of the 
fragmenting effects noted by Guy and the confident expectation by Frey of bonding through 
regimental factors.  We should search instead for a much wider range of variable factors, 
guided by the model, and thus understand that they will give rise to different degrees of 
cohesion or disunity in particular cases. 
The second paradox appears in the paper by Gilbert on ‘Law and Honour Among 
Eighteenth-Century British Army Officers’ which we looked at in Chapter Five (page 250).  
In this paper Gilbert tells us that cross-rank informal relationships between officers and men 
were not tolerated in the eighteenth century, drawing his evidence from a set of three Courts 
Martial in which officers are accused of familiarity with the rank and file.  Gilbert concludes 
that these cases indicate ‘how great the gap between officers and men really was in the 
eighteenth-century army’26.  However, we have seen from first hand accounts by both officers 
and soldiers that warm informal relationships between officers and other ranks, crossing this 
‘great gap’, were indeed a feature of regimental life in the eighteenth century. 
The first two Courts Martial support Gilbert’s deduction about the gulf between 
officers and common soldiers fully.  The first, in 1761, concerned three officers who failed to 
get up from dinner and leave when they discovered that one of their female guests had 
brought a common soldier with her, albeit dressed as a gentleman.  Their defence was that 
they did not treat him like a gentleman 27.  This defence appears to show that the protagonists 
knew that they were in the wrong.  Their only justification for themselves was that they 
behaved as if the individual had no status, but the fact remains that, in remaining at the table 
they were following the conventions of friendship, which would have not been an appropriate 
relationship with a common soldier.  They did not obey the conventions of the time. 
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In the second, in 1762, an officer was found seated with common soldiers in a punch 
house and was accused of drinking with common soldiers.  His defence was that he had 
simply sat down for moment to remove something from his shoe28.  This defence is clearly an 
attempt to distance himself from the soldiers concerned and to deny any informal interaction 
between them.  This, too, therefore supports Gilbert’s thesis. 
The third Court Martial, however, presents a different picture.  In 1760, Ensign Hill 
was accused of ‘drinking and lying with the private men’, following two incidents in an inn29.  
In the first, he was seen drinking with the men, and in the second he was known to have 
visited a private room at night which was occupied by a corporal.  His defence to the first 
charge was that, although he had sat with the men, he ensured that they ‘continued to 
preserve that respect which is due to an officer and look’d upon and behaved to me as such 
during the whole time of my being with them’30.   His defence to the second charge was that 
he had entered the corporal’s room only to ask him to help him off with his boots, in the 
absence of the waiters and hostlers who had gone to bed.  Gilbert observes that Hill would 
not have defended himself in this way unless he felt that such defence had a chance of 
success, and notes with some apparent puzzlement that, 
 
‘... while it was considered dishonourable to consort with private soldiers, it was not 
always clear what this meant in practice.  Under what circumstances could an officer 
sit down with common soldiers?  Could he drink with them if they treated him with 
respect?’31 
 
The typology of informal relationships provides the key to the logic of Hill’s defence, 
and thus an answer to Gilbert’s questions.  Hill’s defence to the first charge can be seen as an 
attempt to establish that the informal interaction was in the form of association, with all 
concerned preserving the superiority and inferiority and client/patron elements that are a 
feature of that relationship.  His defence to the second charge was to claim that he was 
exercising informal access, in this case going without special arrangement to a junior person 
for a necessary favour. 
If viewed in the light of the typology of informal relationships, therefore, we may go 
further than Gilbert was able to.  The first two cases amounted to officers behaving as if they 
were in the peer relationship of friendship with common soldiers (eating and drinking 
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together), while the defence in the third case tried to establish the permissible cross-rank 
informal relationships of association and informal access. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our exploration in this section has shown us that the application of parts of the existing model 
to the historical domain are likely to improve our ability to analyse first hand historical data.  
We may further speculate that considerable additional analytical benefits would arise from the 
construction of time-specific models of social structures in the British Army.  We now move 
from historical to current issues. 
 
SECTION THREE - THE PRESENT 
 
Introduction 
 
This section explores how the model might be applied to areas that are of present concern in 
the British Army, by a brief examination of its potential to provide insight and guidance in two 
areas.  These are the training of officer cadets and young officers in leadership, and the 
integration of women into combat arms units.  They were selected because leadership training 
is a subject of perennial concern to the Army, and the integration of women into the combat 
arms has been of increasing importance over the past fifteen years for both legal/sociological 
reasons (the increasing preoccupation with ‘equal opportunities’) and the growing shortage of 
male recruits32. 
The particular virtue of the model which makes it suitable for the examination of such 
issues is that it provides a valid, logical and neutral analytical framework with which to 
address military issues that have a centre of gravity at unit level.  These virtues make it 
potentially suitable as a tool with which to address aspects that are either emotive or beset by 
prejudice, or both.  Indeed, this potential has already been recognized by members of the 
Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough, insofar as aspects of the model have already been 
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included in three of their studies for the Ministry of Defence under the Corporate Research 
Programme33.  
 
Training of Officer Cadets and Young Officers in Leadership and Management 
 
Introduction 
 
The Army recognizes that there is a significant overlap between the terms ‘leadership’ and 
‘management’, and uses them together to encompass the practical skills and theoretical 
knowledge that are required to handle personnel in associated military tasks and 
environments34.  To this extent, the word ‘leadership’ incorporates a significant element of 
‘management’ when it is used alone, and this practice is followed here. 
In the Conclusion of his comprehensive review of ‘leadership training’, and its 
application in training officers in the Army in 1995, Rodley declared that ‘The Army’s 
approach to leadership training and development is limited’35.  Whereas he acknowledged 
that the foundational instruction in leadership for officer cadets at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst (RMAS) met its remit effectively, his main concern was with the effectiveness of 
leadership training thereafter, which he found inadequate.  In particular, he questioned the 
‘primary mechanism by which leadership is learned ...’ through ‘on-the-job experience and 
“osmosis” through observation and subsequent emulation of one’s superiors’.36  This section 
shows how the model can be used to identify and address particular issues raised by Rodley’s 
observations. 
 
The Current System 
 
The training in leadership and management at Sandhurst has as its core a widely accepted 
body of literature covering the associated theory.  This theoretical core is taught by the 
academic and military staff of the Academy and combined with specific practical sessions and 
discussions to meet the needs of young officers.  In all major respects it is still the same as that 
examined by Rodley37, and is not expected to change substantially in the near future.  
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However, the detailed contents and delivery of the leadership and management training 
package at Sandhurst are being reviewed and made compatible with the Joint Services 
Systems Approach to Training38 (SAT), to which we will return later.  The changes are 
expected to come into effect in the final term of 2002. 
Although, as Rodley says, this training is capable of establishing a very reasonable 
theoretical baseline for young officers, there are general difficulties with the subsequent 
process which he describes as ‘osmosis’ at regimental duty.  In particular, as he observes, 
‘this approach is not systematic and leaves much to chance’39.   Rodley’s findings are 
supported by a general feeling among officers and NCOs at regimental duty that each newly-
arrived officer still has a lot to learn about the realities of leadership and man-management, as 
the following, typical, quotations from my fieldwork show, 
 
- Interviewer: “What do you dread most in a new young officer from Sandhurst?” 
 
Infantry Senior NCO: “Full of bright ideas from Sandhurst that don’t work.”40  
 
* 
 
- Interviewer: “I have heard it said that a young officer at Sandhurst is trained to think 
that he knows it all when he arrives in the battalion.” 
 
Infantry Private Soldier: “That is a very good statement.  Because 90% of the officers 
within this battalion now wouldn’t listen to a [private soldier] at all, even if he [the 
officer] was wrong. ...  Most of them would go ‘Don’t be stupid.  That’s what I get 
paid so much a day for.’”41 
 
* 
 
- Interviewer: “Do you find that young officers are properly prepared how to behave 
to sergeants, corporals, private soldiers?” 
 
Infantry Junior NCO: “The only thing I can say to that really in my experience is that 
sometimes they’ve been very arrogant when they’ve come from Sandhurst.  Not 
willing to learn from people that are junior from them in rank.”42  
 
* 
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- [A captain describes how he learned his way round his unit immediately after his 
arrival from training, six years earlier] ‘by a bit of innate intuition and by seeing other 
people fail, rather than by what he had been taught at Sandhurst.’43 
 
* 
 
- Royal Armoured Corps Late Entry Captain, “Young officers have difficulties in 
relaxing at first when they arrive and they have to learn to relate to soldiers.”44 
 
* 
 
- Interviewer, to Infantry junior NCO: “Think of the three most recently arrived young 
officers from Sandhurst that you have had anything serious to do with.  Do you think 
they came prepared?” 
 
“No Sir.” 
 
“What did they have to learn, to be good officers?” 
 
“I think, to be prepared for battalion life.”45 
 
There is a spread of eight years between these quotations, indicating that the 
difficulties in the situation of a young officer have changed little over that period.  It is, in 
effect, a running sore at regimental duty. 
This weakness in the current leadership and management training system has been 
formally recognized by a recent review of officers’ careers46, and as a consequence a two 
week leadership and management training package for young officers in their first tour at 
regimental duty has been developed.  This, The Junior Officer Leadership Programme47, 
will be delivered by Army Education Centres to officers who have served in their units for at 
least a year but less than two years.  It largely repeats the material in which the officers were 
instructed at Sandhurst, and encourages them to set it against their experience at regimental 
duty.48 
One of the significant sources of this weakness has been the fact that the officer 
cadets do not have any contact with soldiers at regimental duty while they are at Sandhurst.  
The only soldiers that they see are highly unrepresentative of the ones whom they will 
encounter once they reach their units: there are virtually no private soldiers at Sandhurst, the 
NCO and warrant officer instructors are specially selected, and there are no junior officers49. 
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 Although, therefore, the theoretical foundation is sound, the officer cadets are given no means 
to connect it to the realities of life at regimental duty.  The Junior Officer Leadership 
Programme may or may not help them to make the connection but in any case they will not 
experience it until their second year at regimental duty. 
 
Using the Model to Search for Improvements 
 
If  this situation is to be improved, the instruction at Sandhurst should attempt to provide a 
bridge between leadership theory and the practicalities of life in a unit.  At the least, this 
should increase the likelihood of effective ‘osmosis’ subsequently, and at best give the young 
officer a clear and direct awareness of what this ‘osmosis’ is expected indirectly to achieve.  
The model allows us to build an instructional module that could be used to achieve this 
purpose.  The rest of this subsection shows how that module might built. 
At the highest level of the new draft Sandhurst leadership and management training 
package, following the usages of the Joint Services Systems Approach to Training (SAT)50, is 
the ‘Training Objective’ (TO) which encapsulates the package’s purpose.  This reads, ‘TO 8, 
Demonstrate Leadership and Management’.51 
According to SAT, an array of ‘Enabling Objectives’ (EO) is required, phrased to set 
out what the trainees can be expected to do at the end of the instruction.  Appropriate 
phrasing of an EO to overcome the problem brought out by Rodley and reflected in my 
interviewees would be ‘To understand the practical realities of life in a military unit’. 
EOs should be followed by a more detailed set of ‘teaching points ‘(TP) providing a 
sequenced framework for the development of individual lessons.  As the central purpose of 
the model is to represent the background to, and framework for, daily life in a military unit, we 
may expect it to be of considerable use in generating the teaching points for the suggested 
enabling objective, as we will now see. 
At the top level, the four social structures provide four headings to consider when 
producing teaching points, each heading indicating a separate domain in which a successful 
leader must be able to exercise his or her leadership and management.  The more detailed 
information at lower levels in the model can be used to provide more focused information for 
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the young officer to help him or her to understand the nature of life in a unit and what 
constitutes successful leadership.  For instance, at the top level, the model indicates that it is 
important that the leader should be able to function successfully in all four structures: if he or 
she were only capable of functioning as a leader in, say, three out of the four then they would 
fail to lead successfully when the fourth is the operating structure.  The more focused detail 
below the top level would provide direct information to generate personal goals in such areas 
as carrying out ‘soldierly’ tasks, using the appropriate terms of address in different 
circumstances, and understanding the importance of the different levels of loyalty/identity 
segment.   
To illustrate these points the four social structures will be used, taking the typical 
case of a young male second lieutenant, to produce short summaries of standards that he 
would have to achieve to be a successful leader, 
 
Formal Command Structure 
 
- He should be able to issue orders clearly and authoritatively, to listen to reports 
from below, and to understand and obey orders from above.  His appearance and 
behaviour should be consistent with the disciplinary customs of the unit.  He should 
understand that each soldier has a unique place in the unit with which that soldier 
identifies. 
 
Informal Structure 
 
- He should know the qualitative differences between informal relationships, and build 
 appropriate ones.  Examples would be association with the senior NCOs in his sub 
unit (and especially any under his command) informal access with his private 
soldiers, friendship with his follow-subalterns, and association or informal access 
with his sub unit commander.  He should be prepared to allow relationships of 
association to develop with his junior NCOs and private soldiers over time.   
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- On the other hand, he should not attempt to achieve, or encourage the development 
of, inappropriate relationships such as friendship with his NCOs or privates.   
- He should be aware of, and observe, appropriate terms of address for the various 
relationships, but have his personal strategy ready for the special informal 
circumstances when the conventions of terms of address may be suspended. 
 
Loyalty/Identity Structure 
 
- He should take an active part in supporting the loyalty/identity segment that he 
commands, both during events where pride and prestige are at stake (such as 
competitions) and during celebrations of his segment’s identity (such as parties).   
- Because of the loyalty/identity structure’s flexibility, he should also take an active 
part in supporting the segments above the one he commands, such as the sub unit and 
the unit, and he should acknowledge his soldiers’ membership of the segments below 
the one which he commands, and encourage them to exercise that membership.   
 
- He should also learn the details of his Regiment’s, unit’s, and sub unit’s history and 
traditions and be seen to identify with them. 
 
- He should support all sporting occasions that any of his loyalty/identity segments 
partake in, and should participate in as many as he can. 
 
Functional Structure 
 
- He should perform his own function well, showing both personal (soldierly) skills, 
special-to-arm skills, and the ability to exercise professional military command 
effectively.  He should show that he recognises good performance and congratulate 
those who show it, and give encouragement to those who fall short but in his 
judgement are trying to perform well. 
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- He should show concern for the maintenance and improvement of individual and 
collective training standards. 
 
Such short summaries give us detailed practical goals that leadership and management training 
for young officers should be seeking to achieve, and from which it would be possible for a 
course designer at Sandhurst to create the necessary teaching module.  This is demonstrated 
in greater detail Appendix F where I have constructed such a module. 
At a subsequent stage, probably at the special-to-arm young officers’ course that is 
the usual stage between Sandhurst training and deployment to a unit, a further, more focused 
degree of detail could be provided.  In particular, this new material ought to cover the 
particular areas of the loyalty/identity structure and the functional structure that are 
pertinent to the special nature of the units that they are joining.   
This analysis and the training module in Appendix F were put to the SO2 Leadership 
and the Colonel Training at Sandhurst in February 2002.  Their immediate reaction was that it 
had the potential to provide an important link that had previously been missing, and they have 
since adopted the model as a tool in their restructuring of the leadership syllabus.  A letter 
explaining the situation is in Appendix G. 
 
Integration of Women into the Combat Arms of the British Army 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the potential of the model to help us to address 
the integration of women into the combat arms units of the British Army.  
Integration of women into the regular logistic units of the British Army is well under 
way.  As at 1 January 2002, there were 1,648 adult trained women in the Royal Logistic 
Corps (RLC) (11.2% of the strength of the RLC), 218 (2.4%) in the Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers, and 1,326 (29.7%) in the Adjutant General’s Corps (Staff and 
Personnel Services), for example.  The Royal Army Medical Corps is 22.2% female 52.   
However, the research for this thesis did not include logistic units, so at this stage we cannot 
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be certain if the model is entirely appropriate to them.  In this subsection we will therefore 
concentrate entirely on regular combat arms units. 
The integration of women into armed forces is a much debated subject, especially in 
the USA53, with the combat arms a particular battleground because of the tradition and 
assumptions therein of ‘male’ attributes centred on aggression and violence54.   An overview 
of the literature indicates that this area is a fraught and complex one, encompassing many 
strands of argument.  Some, like Bracken55, stress the political pressure for the entry of 
women into all parts of the British Army against what could be seen as reactionary defensive 
measures on its part.  Some, such as Gemmell56, point out that the medical stress on women 
who are striving to meet a gender-free physical standard is greater than that on men, and 
express concern over the consequent failure of the British Army in exercising its duty of care 
towards its women.  On the other hand, others, exemplified by Kennedy-Pipe, seek to show 
that the physical nastiness of war is declining in the era of long-range stand-off engagements 
and so women’s physical limitations are becoming irrelevant57.  Some adduce arguments that 
women should be welcomed into all parts of the Army because they bring special gender-
specific capabilities whilst physical strength is not such a requirement as it used to be58.  Yet 
others are concerned at what they see as negative consequences for unit and small group 
bonding that are likely to arise from the mixing of the sexes, as Simons does59.  These 
arguments are admirably summed up in Dandeker’s entry in the Oxford Companion to 
Military History60, which concludes that, 
 
‘In the UK, it is likely that the remaining rules excluding them from the front-line 
positions will be removed, although whether this would, in fact, lead to more than a 
small minority of women with the inclination and ability to meet the standards 
demanded of infantry roles remains doubtful.  Controversial issues connected with the 
training and working relations of gender-integrated units will remain.’ 
 
Kennedy-Pipe provides a complementary review, which revisits many of these arguments but 
adds a useful summary of the political dimension to this debate, 
 
‘... the gendered nature of the military establishment is arguably significant for the 
place of women within society generally.  The feminist argument was and is a simple 
one: men have ‘captured’ the state, so women must reclaim it.  Equality for women 
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can be achieved first by gaining equal opportunities in education, in social institutions 
and in the workplace and then through the gradual achievement of parity of 
representation in the central offices of the state: within the legislature, the judiciary 
and, of course the military.  Here, as Jill Steans has pointed out, the armed services 
and military institutions are regarded as especially important to women trying to 
achieve high office.  To paraphrase Steans, the military plays a special role in the 
ideological structure of patriarchy because the notion of combat plays ‘such a central 
role in the construction of manhood and in the construction of the social order’.61 
 
The area is clouded by two further considerations.  On the one hand, of the seven 
‘combat arms’, only three currently do not in fact have women members.  These are the 
infantry, Household Cavalry and the Royal Armoured Corps, and even in the units of these 
arms it is possible for women to be present in small numbers as attached personnel (clerks, 
for example, or chefs or technicians).  Of the others, in conventional war, the Royal Artillery 
are organised to deploy women to the front line as members of forward observation parties, 
the Royal Engineers intend to deploy women on combat and assault engineering tasks that 
bring them well up into the contact zone, and female Army Air Corps air crew are expected 
to fly over territory held by the enemy.  Even in the Royal Signals, which in theory does not 
have a role at the very front, mixed-sex detachments are expected to set up and maintain 
communications in areas where direct enemy interference can be expected.  If it is expressed 
in absolutes, the argument is therefore not so much about ‘women in the front line’ as ‘women 
members of infantry and armoured Regiments’. 
On the other hand, the relative number of women in many of these ‘combat’ situations 
remains small.  There are very few women in forward observation parties, similarly few Royal 
Engineers (because currently only officers may be women and they do not form a large 
proportion of the Royal Engineer officer corps)62, and there are few Army helicopter air crew 
who are women.63 
It should also be remembered that (as at November 2002) there are no women in 
those areas of the Army where physical strength and endurance are major qualifying factors, 
the Commando Brigade, the Parachute units, and the Special Air Service, although one 
woman has now passed Commando Course and has been posted to, but not yet joined, 3 
Commando Brigade Logistic Regiment.64 
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Use of the Model 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to explore how a version of the model may be used to 
illuminate our understanding of the practicalities of life in mixed-sex combat arms units, to 
highlight particular areas of difficulty and suggest practical means to overcome those 
difficulties.  The issue is mapped on pages 337 to 345 using the model and potentially 
successful ways forward are derived from the model on pages 346 to 349.  It is stressed, 
however, that although what follows appears to be a useful way forward, and reflects 
promising strands that emerged in researching the main thrust of this thesis, further work 
would be needed to confirm the full range of its usefulness, and to gauge the significance of 
any changes since the main bulk of the interviews was conducted. 
In Chapter Three, it was made clear that the model was developed in units that were 
virtually all male (see Chapter Three, page 76).  A few female soldiers were interviewed 
however, and some male soldiers with experience in mixed units, so enough data has been 
gathered to achieve provisional position on this subject, as a starting point for more targeted 
research in the future. 
The first step is to define the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, which, in line with general 
social science practice65 are used in this subsection as precise terms: 
 
‘Sex’ is a biological category used to differentiate male and female.  It is absolute. 
 
‘Gender’ is a cultural category, encapsulating social attitudes towards the sexes and 
customary assumptions about them.  It is variable between cultures, and can change 
with time within a single culture. 
 
The next step is to examine what changes are likely to be needed to the ‘virtually all-
male’ model to account for the mixing of sexes.   The principal adjustment that seems to be 
required is to the suite of informal relationships, which currently have no element in them to 
describe or encapsulate sexual attraction.  To that end, three  additional relationships were 
identified. 
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The first is a cross-sex relationship that is asymmetrical in rank where the senior party 
assumes either a protective or dominating role towards the other.  For example, as one male 
warrant officer put it, 
 
“There’s a lot of women in the Army that can play the soft option.  They can find a 
senior rank, a junior rank or whatever, that’s a bit soft on them and they’ll [exploit 
them].”66   
 
This is not modelled as a relationship which either party expect will lead to sexual intercourse. 
 I have called it parent/child, noting that, in most cases, the initiative lies with the senior party, 
who can continue to dominate the life of the junior even if he or she rejects the relationship.  
Whilst something similar to parent/child can be found in a single sex environment, where a 
senior person favours or oppresses a junior, the cross-sex element seems to give the 
relationship considerably more power and influence in the lives of soldiers, and it seems to 
occur more often in a mixed-sex environment.  It therefore needs to be considered as a 
separate category for mixed-sex units. 
The second and third relationships are logical outcomes of sexual attraction, where 
sexual intercourse is considered by at least one of the parties as a reasonable possibility.  
They are: 
- A cross-sex relationship based on sexual attraction, referred to here as mutual 
desire. 
 
- A cross-sex relationship that is one-sided, which we may call unreciprocated 
desire. 
 
If we now apply the model, as adjusted, to soldiers’ lives in a mixed-sex unit, we may 
predict with confidence that a necessary condition for the successful integration of women into 
the unit must be their integration into all four of the social structures.  As in our consideration 
of leadership above, if integration is only partial, say into three out of the structures instead of 
four, then problems will arise when the fourth structure is the operating structure.  We will 
now examine each of the social structures in turn. 
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Formal Command Structure 
 
It would be hard to produce a convincing biological argument why women cannot be 
integrated into the formal command structure.  There seem to be no such factors that might 
preclude a woman either taking or giving orders, assuming responsibility, working under or 
enforcing discipline, or from possessing a unique place in a unit’s organisation.  There are, 
however, some cultural, gender-based, factors that might make the position of a woman in the 
chain of command difficult.  These include: 
 
- Unwillingness by men to be put in the wrong (by the discipline system) in front of 
women.  The presence of women seems to amplify the disgrace felt by the individual 
male soldier when he is being told off by a superior.  As a female major put it,  “I 
don’t think men like being disciplined by women.  As a gut reaction ...  They’re not 
used to women being in authority.  It is not a social standard.”67  This aspect may well 
fade in an increasingly gender-equal society, but in any case it need not be an obstacle 
to gender-free soldiering: used sensitively it could used by women to enhance their 
power of discipline as it would provide them with an extra dimension of command. 
 
- A second factor is dress.  Women are treated in many arenas of British culture as 
legitimate subjects for sexual desire.  Television, newspapers and films regularly 
portray women’s bodies as visually exciting objects for male entertainment.  If the 
military are to promote gender-free attitudes in the formal command structure it is 
therefore important that female military uniform should not reflect this gender attitude. 
 The model therefore suggests that neither those who give orders nor those to whom 
they are given should be dressed in a way that is particularly visually appealing to the 
opposite sex.  Interestingly, these observations, which were generated entirely through 
the model, were subsequently found to echo some of the issues in Hillman’s paper on 
the clothing of women in US military academies.68  
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Loyalty/Identity Structure 
 
There seems to be no reason why women should be incapable of full integration into the 
loyalty/identity structure.  In the same way that people of all ranks can belong equally to the 
relevant groups so can people of both sexes.  All members of the unit, regardless of sex, 
should therefore be encouraged to support all the loyalty/identity segments to which they 
belong, and exercise membership of them.  In itself, this is likely to be an organisationally 
beneficial bonding process. 
 
Functional Structure 
 
It will be recalled that one of the major aspects of the functional structure is the carrying out 
by soldiers of tasks that are seen as ‘soldierly’ according to shared mental models.  Whilst 
women may perfectly well become members of functional groups and carry out many military 
tasks, there are biological reasons why certain tasks are beyond the physical capabilities of all 
but a very few of them.  For example, the bringing into action of an AS 90 field gun may be 
accomplished by a group of soldiers regardless of sex because of the mechanical assistance 
provided by the on-board hydraulic systems, but the setting up and handling of the 
ammunition for the gun requires physical strength and stamina beyond most women.  A gun 
may fire well over 100 shells weighing over 90 lbs. in a battlefield day, and each one has to be 
lifted manually and carried over several metres. 
This important point is also supported by recent research which has indicated that 
while properly ‘conditioned’ [mentally and physically prepared] women can do as well as 
many men at physically demanding tasks, ‘women will work closer to their maximum physical 
capacity for all components of physical activity, and therefore will fatigue much faster than 
men’69.   This probably accounts for the greater proportion of women than men who are 
routinely temporarily medically downgraded due to medical problems: 6% of male officers 
compared to 10.5% of female officers and 10.4% of male non-commissioned personnel 
compared to 15.8% of non-commissioned women as at 1 January 200270.  This figure 
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excludes female personnel downgraded because of pregnancy (a further 3.1% of officers and 
5.8% of other ranks). 
The importance of soldierly credibility in the functional structure was brought out in 
an interview with an infantry Junior NCO towards the end of the research period.  He had 
explained that there were several women from the Adjutant General’s Corps in the battalion, 
mainly clerks and chefs.  Only two of them had any credibility in his eyes as soldiers, and one 
in particular was a 
 
 “...great girl.  The thing is, she’s been on the Spencer trophy [a physically taxing 
competition for the Infantry].  Now, she doesn’t look like a bloke, she acts a little bit 
like a bloke, she likes rugby, she’s into, like, physical sports and that.  She’s dinky - 
but she done the forty-two miles, done all the stands, done the river crossing, 
everything,... excellent.  The blokes really respect her for it.” 
 
On the other hand,  
 
“the rest of the women don’t [do the physical stuff].  Bad.  Because they seem to get 
this sick chit thing.  Just going down the med centre and the doctor covering their 
bum, puts the umbrella up and gives them a chit and passes [the problem] on to 
someone else.  That’s wrong.” 
 
Interviewer: “So if they do the business, you think they’re good?” 
 
“Yes. Correct Sir.”71 
 
This is mirrored in the words of a female officer, speaking of how she won the respect 
of the soldiers who worked with her in a unit headquarters, “By working hard and being good 
at what you do.  Simple as that.”72.  
Apart from biological factors, there are also gender factors which deserve attention.  
For example, it is culturally less acceptable in Britain for women to exert and receive violence 
than for men to do so.  This factor may be changing, as is illustrated by the fact that it seems 
now to be more acceptable than it used to be (say, in the 1950s) for female police officers to 
risk injury and death.  However, there is some way to go before TV pictures of British 
women in battle will be as acceptable to our society as pictures of men in battle73. 
Whatever functional policy is developed, however, care should be taken at all levels 
to ensure that all involved (women and men, senior and junior) should see it as fair and 
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reasonable, favouring neither sex.  The result of an apparently unfair policy would be the 
generation within the functional structure of barriers that might be transferred to the other 
structures and thus damage social cohesion within the unit.  The following case is a 
representative illustration, 
 
- ‘[The informant, male, senior NCO] raised the question of the forthcoming 
deployment to Northern Ireland.  Originally, the women were going on the same basis 
as the men.  Now, however, several of the women originally earmarked are not to go, 
and so they will displace men from the rear party.  They were originally to take part 
just like the men but that has been changed, and only a very few women are going - 
and in administrative posts only.  Not only that, but they [the women in the rear party] 
will do courses connected to promotion (Advanced trades courses) that the men can 
not do because they will be away.  This is seen as a bit of an unfair advantage.’74 
 
We can see here that the male soldiers’ resentment was increased by what they saw as a 
three-fold unfair advantage: access to family and social life in the home base, early 
qualification for promotion, and an easier time with normal working hours rather than the 
intense activity on operations.  And all because they were women. 
Although little specific evidence was collected on this point, it may well be that full 
integration of women into the functional structure will involve more than simple functional 
integration - ‘proving themselves’ on an individual basis.  There were hints of attitudinal 
factors in the minds of the men that led them to expect that females would be below standard 
functionally, and where appropriate these factors will have to be taken account of as well.75 
 
Informal Structure 
 
Of the four structures, the informal structure seems to be the arena for the greatest 
challenges to the integration of women into the combat arms, particularly with respect to the 
nature of informal relationships.  While there is nothing to prevent men and women forming 
relationships of friendship, association, and informal access across the sexes, our culture 
(particularly as it is expressed in the mass media) puts much more emphasis on the sexual 
aspects of cross-gender relationships than on the non-sexual ones.  As a consequence, where 
the sexes are mixed in a self-contained social group such as a military unit, sexual tension 
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seems to be an inevitable consequence. This point is illustrated by the following extract from 
an interview with a female major, 
 
Interviewer: “I have said that it is not possible for any cross-gender activity to be free 
of sexual tension.  Do you think I am right?" 
 
Major: “My gut feeling would like you not to be right, because I would like to think 
that you could be very good friends with a male officer and not have to worry about 
the sexual tension side - that’s what I’d like to think.  But my experiences over the 
last fourteen years have probably...  if I have to say, I would say that you were right.  
Unfortunately.”76 
 
Another female major, who had seen service in the ranks up to sergeant before she 
was commissioned, said about making informal relationships with male colleagues, 
 
“I think you’ve got to be careful in forming relationships on a friend basis.  I think that 
the reason why you’ve got to be careful is some people can misconstrue it and I think 
that’s where the difficulty comes.”77 
 
and a male view comes from an officer who had commanded a mixed sub unit a few years 
earlier, speaking of the way he felt when he was in the presence of female soldiers under his 
command, 
 
“... on the face of it, other people looking at it would think it was a completely sexual-
free relationship but my experience would be I don’t think I have ever had one - even 
if it’s only ‘she’s a very pretty girl’, or whatever else.”78  
 
  Apart from this generalized sexual tension, the additional, cross gender, informal 
relationships identified above (parent/child, mutual desire, and unreciprocated desire) are 
potentially highly dysfunctional within the military social structures.  For example: 
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 Parent/Child 
 
- Discipline can be affected by the parent/child relationship, in that the ‘child’ might 
be treated more leniently than other soldiers, or might be subjected to pressure 
through harassment or bullying. 
 
- The functional structure might be affected by the favouring of the ‘child’ in the 
allocation of tasks.  For instance, one servicewoman interviewed during the study told 
of the derogatory nickname given to her fellow (female) soldier of ‘Silver Platter’ 
because she was always favoured by the (male) sergeant major.  Apparently he took 
pity on her obvious distress whenever she seemed to be about to be given a difficult 
or dirty job to do.79 
 
- There may also be unwelcome effects in the informal structure.  The favoured 
‘child’ can experience envy and rejection by his or her fellows which can lead to rifts 
in the relationships of friendship.  Rejection can also happen to the bullied or 
harassed ‘child’, though in that case it is equally possible that his or her peers might 
side with the victim against the ‘parent’.  Should that occur, the relationships of 
association and informal access that they might have had with the ‘parent’ would 
become damaged. 
 
Mutual Desire 
 
- Sexual attraction is no respecter of persons or rank, and it is only to be expected 
that soldiers will feel attracted to particular individuals of the opposite sex.  
Furthermore, sexual attraction is unlikely to be confined by considerations such as 
rank and organisational structure.  However, if mutual desire exists between people 
of widely differing ranks there is a risk that it will seriously interfere with the operation 
of the systems of authority and discipline in the formal command structure.  
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Similarly, just as parent/child relationships can affect the functional structure by 
creating an easy forum for favouritism, so can relationships of mutual desire. 
 
- As we have seen, a great deal of the life of a unit depends on the operation of the 
informal structure, and in particular the informal relationships of friendship, 
association, and informal access.  The introduction of mutual desire within the 
networks built out of those relationships has potentially major consequences.  For 
instance, groups of friends can be divided or disrupted by competition for the 
establishment of such relationships, and association, which is in essence a close but 
asymmetrical relationship, would be turned into an equal partnership if it was replaced 
by mutual desire. 
 
Unreciprocated Desire 
 
- Unreciprocated desire has the potential to be highly dysfunctional.  If it exists 
between individuals who would otherwise be in positions of friendship if both were 
males (members of the same Royal Signals detachment or Royal Artillery gun crew, 
for example) then the likelihood of there being the mutual trust and cooperation that 
would normally result is small.  Equally, if it exists between people who might 
otherwise be in a relationship of association the benefits of that bond would be lost.  
In these situations, one could confidently expect the relationships to be cool at best, 
and savagely divisive at worst.  
 
In summary, as a female major put it succinctly in an interview, “Get men and women 
together and they are not sensible.  And the human factor and the sexual factor will be 
there”.80  
 
Deductions 
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Having used the model to highlight possible points of difficulty for a mixed-sex combat arms 
unit, we may now use it to look for guidance as to how successful integration of women into 
such a unit may be achieved.  The model can help us to identify how the advantages provided 
by the social structures might be exploited, and to focus on promising ways to avoid the 
dangers that we have identified. 
Provided that the hierarchy of the unit is aware of the problems caused by letting 
gender issues intrude into the formal command structure, the model suggests that the 
integration of women into that structure can be achieved simply, and we have seen that the 
loyalty/identity structure presents no obstacle to the integration of women.  The functional 
structure contains no absolute barrier to the integration of women (though it must be 
accepted that some physical tasks in the unit will be beyond most women).  The main proviso 
should be that the unit’s policy is carefully balanced to ensure that fair play is seen to be 
exercised and that unjustified assumptions of poor performance by the women are shown to 
be false.  The major pitfalls appear in the informal structure, and the question remains as to 
how they should be negotiated. 
The most fruitful avenue of approach appears to be to examine ways of ensuring that, 
when they occur, relationships of parent/child, mutual desire, and unreciprocated desire 
cause the least possible dysfunction in the system of social relations within a unit.  It would be 
sensible therefore for commanders to develop appropriate strategies to manage those 
situations.  The following are illustrations of what such a management strategy might include,  
 
Parent/child.  By the logic of the relationship, the dominant protagonist in 
parent/child seems most likely to be the senior one: if he or she (and where the 
majority of the personnel in the unit is male it is most likely to be a man) resists the 
formation of the relationship then it can not be formed; if the junior partner resists then 
the senior one has the option to increase the pressure and to make life difficult for the 
junior.  The occurrence of such relationships could be minimised therefore if 
commanders at all levels were watchful for them and insisted (through the medium of 
either the formal command or informal structures) that the senior party terminate 
them as soon as they are detected. 
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Mutual desire.  Because it is a relationship involving strong drives and emotions, it is 
self-evident that mutual desire cannot be terminated by firm action by commanders.  
Other, less direct, means must be sought if it arises between individuals for which it is 
not organisationally appropriate.  The following seem to be promising management 
strategies, 
 
- Through as many of the social structures as possible, making it known that 
sexual relationships between ranks where the gap is so wide as to preclude 
friendship are formally forbidden.  This will not prevent such relationships 
arising, but it will discourage a proportion of those potentially involved in 
them, and leave everyone in no doubt that they are inappropriate.  
 
- Minimising the occurrence of sexual relationships between individuals who 
might otherwise have been in association or informal access, and minimising 
the chances of groups of friends being broken up by competition for sexual 
access to fellow members of the group.  Because most of these non-sexual 
informal relationships are usually formed between people who are in the same 
sub unit, this may be achieved by encouraging all concerned to form 
relationships of mutual desire as far as possible in and beyond the more 
distant organisational segments: if possible outside the unit and certainly 
outside the sub unit.  In cases where this fails, consideration should be given 
to moving one of the parties out of the sub unit.  Interestingly, such minimizing 
of the occurrence of sexual relationships within the sub unit may not be as 
problematical as it first seems, because it appears to have advantages that are 
felt by those involved.  It is significant that, of the small sample of women 
interviewed who were currently serving at regimental duty (seven), all 
maintained that both they and their friends were more content if they formed 
their sexual relationships outside the immediate group, and preferably outside 
the unit itself.  This view was echoed by the majority of women officers 
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subsequently interviewed at the Royal Military College of Science, one of 
whom was distinctly forthright, “Never never never do it on your own 
doorstep, it always ends in tears”.81 
 
- Encouraging men and women to form appropriate non-sexual relationships 
(friendship, association, informal access).  A key factor in this would be 
the full integration of women into the loyalty/identity structure, which 
provides a socially stable area where all are equally members of the relevant 
groups regardless of rank and sex.  In parallel, it would seem advantageous to 
integrate male and female accommodation so that informal groups may form 
more easily and to remove the air of mystery and challenge (important 
ingredients of ‘separateness’) that inevitably seems to surround ‘female only’ 
accommodation in the minds of the men. 
 
Unreciprocated Desire.  As with mutual desire, it cannot be assumed that all 
members of the unit will have complete control over their emotions.  Unreciprocated 
desire is therefore likely to arise from time to time whatever the formal instructions 
and orders are.  Commanders should therefore make it a high priority within the 
management of their unit to identify when such relationships are arising, and 
organisationally separate the parties as soon as possible.  The model suggests, again, 
that a separation within the unit across a sub unit boundary would have a reasonable 
chance of success.  Wider separation, perhaps by posting one of the parties to 
another unit or sending them on an appropriate career course, would also have the 
same effect. 
 
Finally, the model suggests a further factor which would assist in managing any 
gender-based difficulties within a unit.  If there were a substantial female chain of command in 
place, containing significant numbers of women senior NCOs and captains, and at least one 
major, then informal channels of communication would be available to both sexes right 
through the unit chain of command via the common non-sexual informal relationships.  Issues 
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could then be detected, raised, and dealt with through informal channels that did not cross the 
sexes.  I originally made this prediction in my defence fellowship82, and it was encouraging to 
see it confirmed during an interview five years later with a male officer from a mixed corps, 
“Your predictions that things would change as those things changed, certainly is borne out by 
what I have [seen].”83 
 
Other Issues 
 
We have just seen that the model has the capacity to address the integration of women into 
combat arms units in a neutral and logical way.  However, just as in the historical domain, it 
would be a mistake to use the model in isolation from wider aspects.  Whereas in many ways 
the first of our ‘current issues, leadership training for young officers, is a self-contained one 
within the Army, the integration of women has wider implications that require a larger 
perspective. 
An obvious example of these wider implications is the attitude of soldiers’ spouses 
and other long term domestic partners to their living and working with members of the 
opposite sex, sometimes far away and in a close-knit environment.  As one major said, 
remembering her time as a subaltern in a sub unit which frequently had to work away from 
barracks, 
 
“...the only really serious hassle I got was from my OC’s [company commander’s] 
wife, who took a dislike to me.” 
 
Interviewer: “Why?” 
 
Major: “Because as she put it I was spending more time with her husband than she 
was.  And she gave me a phone call one day and told me what she thought and I told 
her in no uncertain terms that she was wrong.”84 
 
The husband or wife of a soldier is not fully part of their spouse’s unit, and is not involved in 
the military social structures.  However, spouses exert considerable influence on servicemen 
and women in the domestic arena85.  Their views and attitudes should therefore be considered 
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in the wider context of equal opportunities policies if any changes or developments are to be 
generally accepted by soldiers. 
A second example, and one that falls well beyond the borders of the model, is the 
attitude of Allies in any future conflict.  The attitudes to gender held by foreign nations to 
which our soldiers are deployed may be significant.  It is possible, for example, for Middle 
Eastern attitudes to women to affect their employability in international HQs or joint 
commands. 
 
Assessment 
 
We have seen in this section that the model can be brought to bear on issues of current 
concern in the British Army and that the results are revealing.  In such contexts, use of the 
model has two significant advantages.  First, it provides a logical, neutral, and repeatable 
analytical framework for use in areas perhaps not generally noted for logic and neutrality when 
they are debated.  Second, given that the model was constructed from social anthropological 
research within the British Army we can also be confident that the recommendations 
produced by using it are in tune with its organisational culture and therefore much more likely 
to be acceptable to its members than any which are not.  However, when the model is used in 
any analysis it is important to look out for wider issues that it does not reach. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
This short chapter identifies the major conclusions from the work and looks at its implications 
for the British Army, for Social Anthropology, and for other academic disciplines. 
 
Major Conclusions 
 
The principal conclusion is that the concept of ‘social structures’, identifiably different bodies 
of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour, each coherent in itself but only brought into 
operation in appropriate contexts, has provided the means to construct a lucid and effective 
model of the collective assumptions and shared expectations - the norms - of members of the 
regular combat arms units of the current British Army.  This model, described in Chapter 
Three and demonstrated in Chapter Four, provides a means to describe, analyse, and predict 
the behaviour of soldiers at regimental duty in those units.  One of its particular strengths is 
that it has the capacity to penetrate all the constituent parts of such a unit whilst retaining a 
view of that unit as an integrated whole.  It is novel, mature, and can be put into immediate 
use within its field. 
Being solidly based in fieldwork and drawn up by an insider, the model is in tune with 
the attitudes and expectations of the people whose behaviour and norms it claims to 
encapsulate.  Its use is therefore likely to be acceptable to them, as anecdotally confirmed 
throughout the research.   
The focus on norms is particularly appropriate for a study of the British Army because 
norms are an important ingredient of everyday life among soldiers: they are regularly thrown 
into relief in the light of daily events in units, and are regularly embraced by soldiers as part of 
their organisational culture.  However, the model should not be treated as an ethnography in 
itself, but rather an ethnographer’s tool for use in examining soldiers’ behaviour in combat 
arms units.  It successfully maps the norms and conventions under which soldiers live, but 
specific ethnographic enquiry must always examine the interaction with these norms by 
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individual agents.  
 
Uses of the model and implications for further research 
 
The British Army 
 
The tool provided by the model has the potential to be useful to the British Army in many 
parts of the personnel policy area, where that policy impacts at unit level.  We have already 
seen in Chapter Six that it can be used with advantage to provide analysis and suggest policy 
in the fields of leadership training and the integration of women into combat arms units.  
Indeed, the letters from the SO2 Training at RMAS and from MOD Personnel Services 
Branch at Appendix G specifically endorse its use in those areas.  Moreover, it has the 
potential to contribute to our understanding of wider equal opportunities issues, as the letter 
(also at Appendix G) from the Tri Service Equal Opportunities Training Centre (TSEOTC) 
shows. 
It can also provide a means to gain an overall understanding of the British army when 
time is too short to allow the individual gradually to absorb it.  For example, the Royal Army 
Chaplains Department have used a version of the model to help new Padres understand life at 
regimental duty, as part of their very brief military training package (see Appendix G).  It has 
also been suggested that the model would assist in the design of the rehabilitation package for 
soldiers who have failed to embrace Army organisational culture and have had consequent 
psychiatric illness.1  Work in all these areas is in progress. 
Furthermore, the model is of potential use in helping outsiders understand life in the 
British Army.  This is potentially important for the Army because, as the end of National 
Service recedes into the past, with the continuing decline in numbers of Service personnel 
since then, fewer and fewer people have direct or indirect experience of the Armed Forces in 
general, and the Army in particular.  This is particularly marked in the field of journalism2, 
which has potentially serious implications for the general understanding of the Army in the 
wider British society. 
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Social Anthropology 
 
This work has contributed new elements to the discipline of Social Anthropology.  In the first 
place, although this thesis is not an ethnography,  the description and demonstration of the 
model in Chapters Three and Four are rich in ethnographic detail and provide a coherent 
portrait of a significant part of the British Army in the past few years.  
We have also seen some small developments in Social Anthropological theory.  First 
is the analytical concept of ‘social structures’ as identifiably different bodies of ideas, rules 
and conventions of behaviour, each coherent in itself but only brought into action in 
appropriate contexts and dormant in others.  Whilst it has some common ground with 
Goffman’s characterisation of ‘frames’, this concept of social structures enters the area of 
social organisation which he specifically eschews and it leads to different, but complementary, 
insights.  In this area it can be expected to be of more practical use than the concept of a 
single overarching ‘social structure’, especially among groups of people where norms are 
prominent in their lives: where the observer can establish a consistent link between context 
and behaviour, then the attempt to capture the ingredients of these differences into separate 
categories - social structures - can be of considerable assistance in organising the resulting 
analysis. 
 Second is the idea that a model of social structures can be visualised as a map of 
the social terrain within which individuals work out their own practice and develop and 
exercise their own attitudes and expectations.  Such a model can act as a bridge between 
Durkheimian ideas of the compelling force of ‘society’ on its members and the more modern 
theoretical paradigms which stress the primacy of those members’ agency and practice.  It 
can thus derive advantages from both sets of ideas and help to ameliorate the tension between 
them.  Like a map, social structures provide no more than guidance and information to the 
members of a social group and the individuals can choose to follow or to reject them in any 
context or at any time.  From the lessons learned during this research, it appears that it is 
necessary to keep two ideas in mind when using this device: on the one hand, individuals are 
always free to make their own choice of route, often confirming the accuracy of the map but 
in some cases making alterations to it (the processes captured by Giddens in the concept of 
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‘structuration’); on the other hand, some terrain will be so constraining that the vast majority 
of individuals will choose a very small number of possible routes through it (the constrained 
choices representing regularities ascribed by Durkheim and others to compelling societal 
forces).  
Third, the differentiation of Goffman’s original idea of ‘secondary adjustments’ into 
legitimate and illegitimate has been shown to provide a useful means to capture a particular 
agent’s perception of a rule-bending or rule-breaking activity.  It also can be used as a vehicle 
to explain how two individuals may fundamentally disagree, sometimes to their great surprise, 
about the propriety of a particular action. 
The fourth contribution is the typology of informal relationships described in Chapter 
Three, which has been shown to be useful in historical as well as contemporary contexts. 
It is interesting that these concepts emerged out of research on a military institution, 
and we may speculate that the necessity to identify and describe them in this study has 
something to do with the nature of such institutions.  It seems to me that they were a 
necessary part of my analysis because of the highly structured lives of soldiers at regimental 
duty in regular combat arms units.  This highly structured aspect seems to have its origin in the 
special environment of military operations which brings with it the necessity for a formal body 
of rules, a rank structure, an emphasis on military function, and the necessity of belonging.  
However, whatever its origin, it provides a forum where the regular patterns of daily 
interaction are clearly observable.  It is more than likely that, now they have been articulated, 
these concepts can be imported to other areas of social anthropological inquiry where such 
structure is less obvious.     
Looking to the future, the tiny body of existing social anthropological research into the 
British Army can certainly be increased using the approaches developed for this thesis. The 
model, as it stands, could be used immediately as a tool for ethnographic study of a particular 
unit.  It could also provide an axis of research for the comparative study of life in different 
regular combat arms units.  We could compare, for example, the different approaches to the 
elements modelled in the formal command structure in line and Guards infantry units, and 
how any differences we find are expressed in the loyalty/identity structures of those units.   
It would also be an interesting exercise to compare the balance of importance placed between 
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the different social structures in different units and in different types of unit, to see if there is 
any theme that can be traced within discrete organisational areas - the different arms, for 
example, or the different divisions of infantry. 
There is considerable scope for development of parallel models for use in other areas 
of the British Army, beyond the regular units of the combat arms.  An obvious such area is the 
regular logistic units.  Whilst it seems unlikely that they differ radically from the combat arms 
units that we have been considering, it would probably be necessary to adjust the model to 
take account of such factors as a greater interaction with civilians in the context of daily work, 
a much more evenly balanced ratio between the sexes, and the integration of military practices 
with civilian ones.  Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that a single model would be 
applicable globally to ‘the logistic corps’ in the same way as a single general model captures 
the salient features of soldiers’ lives in combat arms units.  Indeed, preliminary research in the 
Army Medical Corps has revealed the likely presence of what may be modelled as a fifth 
social structure, which captures a domain within which doctors interact when they are 
practising medicine.  I have provisionally called this the professional structure, defined by 
the shared experience of clinical training within a speciality and shared expectations of clinical 
training within other specialities.  For example, two anaesthetists who have never met have a 
shared understanding of anaesthetics and a common experience of training in the speciality 
which will provide sufficient common ground for mutual understanding and speedy bonding in 
a medical functional context.3 
 A further area for social anthropological inquiry is the Territorial Army, where the 
soldiers’ military lives are very likely to be affected by their parallel experiences in civilian life, 
which implies that the model would have to be expanded to include the civilian dimension. 
The theoretical concepts and approach of this study are also of course available for 
use in other military contexts than the British Army.  My preliminary work with the US Air 
Force, for example, showed that at least the top level of the model and the typology of 
relationships was appropriate for that arena4, and I have received encouraging interest in 
informal discussions with members of the Canadian military at the Royal Military College of 
Science between 1998 and 2000 and at a recent (2002) seminar5.  However, further detailed 
work is needed to ensure that the applicability of the model is more than superficial, and to 
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construct a suitable version for the new arenas.  My brief visit to a Gurkha unit, for example, 
showed that the model was useful, but by no means sufficient, to account for the soldiers’ 
behaviour6 and other models of organising principles had to be brought forward. 
 
Other Academic Disciplines 
 
Finally, the model has obvious potential to inform research beyond Social Anthropology. 
   A field which we have already explored in Chapter Five is Military History.  We saw 
there that parts of the current model were highly applicable to the study of the British Army of 
the past, and there is certainly potential to use it, or a variant of it, as a single unifying 
framework for making comparisons between eras.  This framework would build on the 
analysis in Chapter Five which has shown us that the top level of the model, the differentiation 
of secondary adjustments into legitimate and illegitimate, and the typology of informal 
relationships can be used as they stand to contribute to our understanding of the behaviour of 
British soldiers at least as far back as the mid eighteenth century.  However, this unifying 
framework would have to capable of connecting with other issues from the wider British 
society, beyond the scope of the current model, that impacted on the soldiers’ behaviour.   
It would also be illuminating to create further, more detailed, time-specific models of 
the same type to examine in detail the British Army in particular historical contexts.  Such 
models would enable the historian to describe, analyse and explain British soldiers’ behaviour 
in a novel way that is likely to be in harmony with their actual experience, and to track and 
describe changes in the Army’s organisational culture.   
Beyond the military context, there is an obvious use for the concept of social 
structures as a model in the field of Organization Theory because this concept was created 
for the study of a particular organisation.  In pursuit of this idea, I carried out tentative 
research at the Centre for Human Sciences (initially part of the Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency and latterly QinetiQ) between mid 2001 and early 2002.  I have concluded 
from these preliminary observations that the modelling of social structures would probably 
help to encapsulate the different behaviours of the members of staff in different contexts, and 
to identify the existence of hierarchies of influence and power that are not formally established. 
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 This indicates that the concept of separate social structures may provide an axis for future 
research to describe and map the illusive area of what Likert called ‘intervening variables’ 
forty years ago and for which the search goes on, 
 
‘Much less attention is given, however, to another class of variables [other than 
productivity and output, which Likert calls ‘end-result variables’] which significantly 
influence the end results.  These variables, seriously neglected in present 
measurements, reflect the current condition of the internal state of the organization: its 
loyalty, skills, motivations, and capacity for effective interaction, communication, and 
decision-making.  For easy reference these variables will be called intervening 
variables.’ 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whatever the nature of the follow-on research, we can be sure that this thesis contains a 
portrait of the world in which the soldiers in the regular combat arms units of the British Army 
are immersed.  Although academic words such as social structures, illegitimate secondary 
adjustments, or association may leave them unimpressed, and although, as one hard-bitten 
warrant officer told me before he saw the model, “It’s bound to be crap”8, all British soldiers 
who have seen the model and heard me explain it, including this critic, have agreed that it 
describes their lives.  Perhaps the most concise view was expressed by a major who told me 
that, from his point of view, it was “articulated common sense”.9  If this is true, then I take it 
as a compliment, for that, surely, is what scholarship should be. 
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1 Conversation with Capt M. Kiernan RAMC, Military Training and Rehabilitation Unit, Dutchess of 
Kent Psychiatric Hospital, Catterick, 20 June 2002.  
2 Conversation with Professor Christopher Bellamy, former Defence Correspondent of The 
Independent, 4 November 2002. 
3 Fieldnotes, 13 June 2001. 
4 Fieldnotes, 22 June 1994, summarized in Kirke, C., op. cit.,1994, pp 6-2 to 6-4. 
5 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Kingston Ontario, 24-26 October 2002. 
6 Fieldnotes, 21 July 1994, summarized in Kirke op. cit., 1994, pp. 6-4 to 6-8. 
7 Likert, R., New Patterns in Management International Student Edition,  New York:  
McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1961, p. 61. 
8 Fieldnotes, 25 July 1994. 
9 Fieldnotes, 25 February 2002. 
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APPENDIX A: REPRODUCTION OF KIRKE, C., ‘A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS 
OF FIGHTING SPIRIT IN THE BRITISH ARMY’ 
 
Kirke, C., ‘A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit in the British Army’, in Strachan, H. (ed.) 
The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, 
2000, pp. 227-241 is attached. 
 
 
Photocopy of chapter attached in the original 
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APPENDIX B: TEXT OF WORK IN PRESS 
 
The text of Kirke, C., ‘Postmodernism to Structure: An Upstream Journey for the Military Recruit?’ 
(in press), is attached. 
 
From:  McConville, T., and Holmes, E. R., (eds.), Defence Management in Uncertain Times, 
London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp 139-155. 
 
POSTMODERNISM TO STRUCTURE: AN UPSTREAM JOURNEY FOR THE MILITARY 
RECRUIT? 
 
Introduction 
 
It is axiomatic in the British Army that recruits experience ‘culture shock’ as they make the transition 
from young civilian to trained soldier, and that they always have done.  This chapter is focused at the 
particular form of this culture shock in the early twenty-first century.  The views expressed within it 
are entirely those of the author and do not reflect official opinion or thought. 
 
As the vast bulk of recruits join the Army in their late teens or early twenties the civilian 
milieu from which they make their transition to the Army is contemporary British youth culture.  
Whilst this is not a seamless entity throughout the British Isles, there are some constant, or at least 
very common, features in British youth culture which have at their core certain ingredients first seen 
in the late twentieth century intellectual movement that has come to be called ‘Postmodernism’.  We 
will first, therefore, describe the postmodernist movement and the resultant elements of British youth 
culture.  Then we will examine the organizational culture of the British Army to assess the gap that 
recruits have to cross in their transition from one to the other.  Finally we will briefly consider the 
implications for the recruit. 
 
Postmodernism 
 
Like many intellectual movements, Postmodernism arose in reaction against existing trends in 
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thinking.  In this case, the ruling paradigm was that of ‘modernity’, the body of ideas that blossomed 
in Europe in the eighteenth century but had roots that went back to the Renaissance.  Modernity 
sought to break away from what were seen as the confusions and superstitions of the past and 
replace them with rationality and objective science.   
 
‘The postulates [in modernity] of the thinking self and the mechanistic universe opened the 
way for the explosion of knowledge under the banner of what Jurgen Habermas called the 
“Enlightenment project.”  It became the goal of the human intellectual quest to unlock the 
secrets of the universe in order to master nature for human benefit and create a better world. 
 This quest led to the modernity characteristic of the twentieth century which has sought to 
bring rational management to life in order to improve human existence through technology 
(1, p. 4). 
 
Important assumptions of modernity and the Enlightenment project were that knowledge could be 
only be acquired by reasoned rational and dispassionate inquiry, and that this knowledge gave 
access to fundamental truths that had an independent and lasting existence. 
 
Postmodernism appeared as an identifiable intellectual phenomenon in western universities in 
the 1970s, though its roots can be traced back to earlier bodies of thought exemplified by the 
‘critical theory’ movement in the 1930s.  Although it is by its very nature diffuse and fragmented into 
a mass of ‘postmodernisms’, its general tenets challenge Enlightenment assumptions, question the 
existence of fundamental or objective truth, and suggest that no aspect of life is fixed or durable.  
Instead, human perception is socially conditioned: what are interpreted as ‘truths’ are in fact 
conditioned by the attitudes and expectations prevalent in the observer’s society.  Creative 
individuals are therefore free from any assumptions rooted in the past and can express themselves in 
any way that they feel is right.  As Harvey puts it,  
 
‘Fiction, fragmentation, collage, and eclecticism, all suffused with a sense of ephemerality 
and chaos, are, perhaps, the themes that dominate in today’s practices of architecture and 
urban design.  And there is, evidently, much in common here with practices and thinking in 
many other realms such as art, literature, social theory, psychology, and philosophy.’(2, p. 
98). 
 
 
Sarup amplifies this point,  
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Among the central features associated with postmodernism in the arts are: the deletion of the 
boundary between art and everyday life; the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between 
elite and popular culture; a stylistic eclecticism and the mixing of codes.  There is parody, 
pastiche, irony and playfulness.  Many commentators stress that postmodernists espouse a 
model which emphasises not depth but surface.  … It is also said that in postmodernism 
there is: a shift of emphasis from content to form or style; a transformation of reality into 
images; the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents (3, p. 132). 
 
 
However, these freedoms also bring doubts and uncertainties which go far beyond the creative 
world of the arts and the intellectuals.  If what people see as ‘truth’ is simply a socially conditioned 
reaction to the way in which they experience the world, then many of the fundamental structures of 
people’s everyday lives are called into question.  Thus Postmodernism has escaped from the world 
of the intellectuals into popular culture, including that of Britain.  We can see its influence in everyday 
life in a number of ways.  In particular, aspects of our culture that provided frameworks and form to 
the attitudes and expectations of ordinary people before the 1980s have now been replaced with 
ephemeral free-formed elements that lack enduring structure.  We can see this effect, for instance, 
by observing the now established preference for the use of sound bites and pastiche in broadcasting 
rather than coherent in-depth analysis, the great importance in politics given to ‘image’ and 
‘message’ which concentrate on the immediate and the superficial, and, arguably, the general 
reduction in the expectation that marriage will involve a lasting exclusive commitment.  
 
 Examples of the major contrasts that exist between the Enlightenment and Postmodernism 
are given in the following table: 
 
Enlightenment Postmodernism 
Structure Chaos 
Constants Transience 
Objective Truth Experience 
System Syncretism 
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Method Inspiration 
Certainty Uncertainty 
 
Table 1: Illustrative contrasts between Enlightenment and Postmodern paradigms  
 
 In Britain, youth culture can be seen as representing the current extreme of the penetration of 
Postmodernism in popular culture.  External frameworks and order have been replaced by the 
primacy of individual experience and self-expression.  Rules are at best tolerated and questioned, 
and are often rejected.  Youth music has moved from the limited number of accepted enduring 
categories of the 1950s and 1960s (such as ‘ballad’, ‘rock and roll’, and ‘jazz’) to a multiplex and 
fragmented array of changing and in some cases transient categories (‘house’, ‘hard rock’, ‘soft 
rock’, ‘nu-metal’, ‘heavy metal’, ‘dance’, ‘hip-hop’, ‘techno’, ‘rap’, ‘reggae’, ‘garage’, and so on). 
 When it is performed or broadcast it is frequently combined with visual images that have no 
particular connection to the music and are presented in an apparently random and unconnected 
stream.  Dancing has no structure at all – or rather, it has the structure of the instant, the context, and 
the inspiration of the moment.  Drugs, the ultimate celebration of experience and illusion over the 
mundane facts of every-day life, are perceived by many young people as a legitimate form of 
recreation.  Religion, for those who practise it, often follows the New Age patterns of self-realisation 
through experience rather than worship of a constant, powerful, and loving external entity.  Sex is a 
legitimate form of recreation rather than part of a long-term bonding process.  In short, life is lived in 
the experience of the moment, with the transient structure of the moment and any idea of 
permanence or overall structure is irrelevant. 
 
 These aspects have been brought out clearly by Cray, in Postmodern Culture and Youth 
Discipleship, in which he focuses on the social and cultural forms which shape young people’s lives 
and expectations.  For him, ‘One of the many paradoxes of the postmodern world is that there is a 
great emphasis on image, appearance and style.  “Enjoy the surface” is a piece of postmodern 
wisdom. … The postmodern self tries to construct its own continuously changing centre.’  (4, pp. 17 
and 18). 
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 This then is the environment which the majority of recruits consider natural and normal when 
they join the Armed Services.  As the research which underpins this chapter was carried out almost 
exclusively in the British Army, it is to that institution and its organizational culture that we will turn 
now. 
 
Social Structure 
 
The analysis which follows is based on the concept of ‘social structure’.  The idea of ‘social 
structure’ is in essence a framework for everyday life to which all integrated members of the society 
or human group in question subscribe.  It is expressed in the regularities of the day to day activity of 
those people where, 
 
‘the events which comprise human behaviour exhibit regularities whose forms are mutually 
interdependent, over and above their interdependence in the personality-behaviour systems 
of each individual actor.’ (5, p. xviii).  
 
Giddens has put it more succinctly as ‘some kind of patterning of social behaviour’, adding that,  
 
‘As ordinarily used in the social sciences, ‘structure’ tends to be employed with the more 
enduring aspects of social systems in mind ... .  The most important aspects of structure are 
rules and resources recursively involved in institutions. (6, pp. 16, and 23-24). 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, therefore ‘social structure’ will be used in the following 
sense: a body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour which governs how groups of people or 
individuals organize and conduct themselves vis-a-vis each other.  Conceptually therefore it 
therefore provides the indispensable background to, and framework for, daily life. 
 
It is now widely accepted that the concept of ‘social structure’ provides a static image of a 
human group, which includes an implicit assumption that individuals automatically subscribe to it.  
The concept therefore needs to be balanced by a consideration of the dynamics of everyday life: 
individuals make their own decisions about how to behave.  Indeed, in their behaviour, or the 
processes of everyday life, they reproduce or develop the underlying assumptions of their lives, and 
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thus by their practice they have an effect on the social structure.  This has been captured by Giddens 
in the term ‘structuration’, which is,  
 
‘best thought of as a useful term designating the process of expression and reproduction of 
social structure (or structural systems) in the informed behaviour of agents ‘who draw upon 
rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts’. (6, p. 24). 
  
A useful analogy by which social structure may be distinguished from process is that of a 
map.  Social structure provides a cognitive map of the social terrain in which the individual finds 
himself or herself, and that individual navigates his or her own path through it in the process of living. 
 Such a concept proposes the existence of a common structured body of rules and shared 
expectations within a cultural group whilst still allowing scope for individuals to act in ways of their 
own choice, and sometimes even to amend the map.  In this sense, the model set out below 
describes the common map which is available to soldiers: each will find his or her own way through 
the terrain represented by it. 
 
The Organizational Culture of the British Army 
 
This section briefly examines the new rule-set, the new social map, which the recruit 
confronts in his or her first few weeks as a soldier.  In particular, it presents a summary of a model 
which seeks to capture the organizational culture of the British Army.  This model was first published 
in 2000 (7) and has since been developed slightly.  It has been constructed during a period of one 
year’s full time research under the MOD Defence Fellowship Scheme followed by five years 
research as a part time PhD candidate with Cranfield University (RMCS).  The principle subject for 
the research was the observed behaviour of soldiers of all ranks from private soldier to lieutenant 
colonel at regimental duty, and their experiences and attitudes expressed in 119 individual interviews 
and a small number of focus group sessions. 
 
 The main field within which the research was conducted was units of the ‘combat arms’, that 
is to say those which can be expected to be involved as formed units in the forward battle area in 
conventional operations.  These units comprise the Household Cavalry, the Royal Armoured Corps, 
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the Royal Artillery, the Infantry, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Signals, and the Army Air Corps.    
However, strong indications emerged during the research that the attitudes, expectations, and 
behaviour encountered in those units are generically similar to those of remainder of the British 
Army.  Certainly for the purposes of this chapter we may consider them representative of the overall 
organizational culture which the recruit enters when he or she joins any part of it. 
 
 Initially, the work was aimed at identifying the ‘social structure’ of life at regimental duty in 
the Army.  However, it soon became clear that no single framework could be developed to capture 
a body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour which matched the observed behaviour of 
soldiers.  Different contexts seemed to demand behaviour that was substantially different to that in 
other contexts.  Attention was therefore given to the identification of the range of possible contexts 
at regimental duty. 
 
 Four different families of contexts were identified, each with appropriate behavioural 
frameworks.  These were identified as four separate but contiguous social structures, which were 
brought together to form the top level of a model that provides a powerful means to describe, 
analyze and predict soldiers’ behaviour.  This top level is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter, 
representing as it does a generic insight into the organizational culture of the Army.  However, it 
should be born in mind that investigation of more specific areas of that culture would involve using 
greater degrees of complexity in the model.   
 
 As far as the observed behaviour of the soldiers was concerned, therefore, this model seeks 
to capture the fact that soldiers’ behaviour differs in different contexts, but these contexts can be 
described satisfactorily by a minimum of four categories, within each of which the expected patterns 
of behaviour are broadly similar.  We may call these four categories of contexts, four ‘social 
structures’. 
 
The four social structures 
 
It was found analytically convenient in constructing the model to ascribe specific meanings to  certain 
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terms. Whenever these words are used in this chapter, therefore, they are printed in italics and 
defined on first use.   
 
 The four social structures comprise: 
 
1.  The formal command structure, which is the structure through which a soldier at the 
bottom receives orders from the person at the top.  It is embedded in and expressed by the 
hierarchy of rank and the formal arrangement of the unit into layer upon layer of 
organizational elements.  It contains the mechanisms for the enforcement of discipline, for the 
downward issue of orders and instructions and for the upward issue of reports, and it 
provides the framework for official responsibility.   
 
2.  The informal structure, which consists in unwritten conventions of behaviour in the 
absence of formal constraints, including behaviour off-duty and in relaxed duty contexts.  An 
important element in this structure is the web of informal relationships within the unit.  
Individuals come into personal contact with other people within the unit, of any rank, and 
establish inter-personal relationships with them.  Although it might appear at first sight that 
the quality and intensity of such relationships are determined by free choice on the part of the 
individual (because they are informal), the network of a soldier’s informal relationships is for 
the most part constrained by his rank and position in the unit. 
 
3. The loyalty/identity structure, which is manifested most obviously in a nesting series of 
different sized groups which are defined by opposition to and contrast with other groups of 
equal status in the formal command structure.  The structure itself, the ‘body of ideas, 
rules and conventions of behaviour’, consists in the attitudes, feelings and expectations of 
soldiers towards these groups and their membership.  Thus an infantry soldier would express 
his identity as a member of his platoon and feel loyalty to it in competition with other 
platoons of the same company.  However, where his company is in competition with other 
companies, these attitudes and feelings would be transferred to the company, rather than the 
platoon, and this process is continued up to levels beyond the unit (and down to those 
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below the platoon). 
 
4. The functional structure, which consists in attitudes, feelings and expectations 
connected with the carrying out of specific tasks and military activities.  Where groups are 
formed to carry out such functions, they might exactly reflect the formal command 
structure (which provides an easy and quick means of creating any group within a unit) or 
they might be independent of it.  For example, an infantry platoon (a basic element in the 
infantry command structure) tends to carry out military functions on exercise and operations 
as a formed body.  In contrast, a ‘rear party’ which remains in barracks while the rest of the 
unit is away (perhaps on leave or on an operational tour of duty) is usually made up of 
soldiers from all over the unit, brought together into an ad hoc grouping. 
 
These four social structures are illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
 
 
Formal Command 
Structure 
 
Informal Structure 
Loyalty/Identity 
Structure 
 
Functional Structure 
 
   Figure 1: The Four Social Structures 
 
 
Other elements to the model 
 
The four social structures provide the core of the model, but to make the model practicable in use 
certain qualifying elements need to be added.   
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 First, it is explicit in the model that soldiers only exercise one social structure at a time, 
though the transition between different social structures may occur rapidly as the context changes.  
Take, for example, this typical vignette: 
 
Observation:  An officer approaches a group of soldiers who are relaxing near their vehicle 
during a break from maintaining it.  The senior member of the group brings it to attention and 
salutes the officer.  The officer returns the salute, and tells them to “carry on”.  The group 
relaxes and a few minutes later the members return to their vehicle maintenance. 
 
Analysis:  The soldiers are exercising the informal structure as they relax.  The approach 
of the officer necessitates a change to the formal command structure.  He or she returns 
them to the informal structure by telling them to “carry on”, and they subsequently move to 
the functional structure when they return to work.  
 
The structure of the moment is named in the model the ‘operating structure’. 
 
 It may be argued that it is unrealistic to insist upon the modelling of one single operating 
structure at any one instant, and it must be accepted as a possible artificiality in the model.  
However, it remains a useful device in practice.  First, it matches a very high proportion of the 
soldiers’ behaviour observed during the research: as we have just seen, their behaviour does indeed 
change with the context of the moment.  Second, this assumption encourages the observer to look 
for the moments of transition between structures, even in ambiguous and confusing situations, and 
thus detect subtle changes in context.  
 
The second qualifying element is a constant factor which exists in all the social structures, 
which is best called ‘superiority and inferiority’.  Each social structure has an embedded idea of 
hierarchy: for the formal command structure it is rank; for the informal structure there are 
informal hierarchies of power and prestige (see, (8) for example); for the functional structure there 
is the importance given to the variability between individuals in their military skills and their ability to 
carry out military tasks; and in the loyalty/identity structure each element assumes itself ‘the best’ 
in some way. 
 
Third, it should be borne in mind that although the four social structures in the model have 
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been described separately, they do not exist in isolation from each other. They inform each other in 
matters of detail and are intertwined and overlaid in an intricate and complex pattern.  The resulting 
interconnections, which are experienced in the soldiers’ daily lives, engender a flexibility and 
suppleness in the social system that under normal circumstances prevents insurmountable structural 
barriers arising between individuals or groups within a unit. 
 
Informal relationships 
 
The informal structure seemed to be the most chaotic and complex of the four because its rules 
and conventions of behaviour are generated and reproduced entirely by the mutual consent and 
cooperation of those operating within it.   However, the patterns of informal relationships that 
emerged during the research were so clear that it was possible to construct the following typology, 
which represents a sub-model in its own right. 
 
 Five identifiably different types of informal relationship were identified, as follows: 
  
1.  Close Friendship.  As defined in the model, ‘close friendship’ consists in a durable 
relationship that transcends the military environment, where there is a large measure of trust 
and respect between the parties and few barriers to discussion of highly personal matters.  
In interviews with soldiers of all ranks it was established that, for virtually every one, a useful 
test to identify close friendship would be to determine whether the relationship would 
survive unchanged if one of the parties was prepared to shed tears in the presence of the 
other.  It is a rare and special relationship.  In the words of a warrant officer in an Infantry 
battalion “I’ve maybe made only two or three close friends in my career, though I’ve had 
plenty of military friends.”  This rarity is an important feature.  It is sufficient to recognize 
existence of the relationship, but we must also acknowledge that it is sufficiently scarce that it 
is not a regular feature of regimental life for many individuals. 
 
2.  Friendship.  The term ‘friendship’ is used specifically in the model to refer to a less 
intense relationship which is frequently found to exist between soldiers within the informal 
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structure.  It can have all the appearance of close friendship, in that individuals constantly 
seek each other's company, will help each other if they are in trouble, and will be prepared 
to share almost anything if the need arises, but it falls short of the depth and intensity of the 
other relationship.  Thus, during an interview one soldier said of his particular circle of mates 
that he would be more than prepared to help any one of them: if a bloke was feeling 
unhappy then his friends would naturally take him out drinking to cheer him up.  However, if 
a mate wanted to discuss deeply personal matters then he “would not want to know!”.  
Bonds of friendship are usually formed within narrow bands of rank.  For example, private 
soldiers may form friendships with lance corporals, but a friendship with a full corporal 
may attract disapproval.  Similarly, warrant officers may form friendships with sergeants 
that they have known for some time, but there will always be a certain distance in the 
relationship (particularly if they are in the same sub unit).  Senior lieutenants may form 
friendships with captains, but junior second lieutenants are unlikely to do so.  Although 
there are no formally stated regulations which proscribe friendships growing up between 
people of widely diverse rank, such relationships are frowned upon because they are held to 
be potentially compromising for discipline.  
 
3.  Association.  It is often found that two soldiers separated by rank distance wide enough 
to exclude friendship between them will come into regular contact and will form an informal 
bond of mutual trust and respect that falls short of friendship as defined above, but is 
nevertheless an important bonding feature.  Such a relationship will probably arise, for 
example, between an Infantry platoon sergeant and his platoon commander, and adjutant 
and his or her chief clerk or between an Artillery battery sergeant major and his or her 
battery commander.  This relationship was given the name ‘association’ in the study. 
 
4.  Informal Access.  It is recognized, though not officially laid down, that each individual 
has a right to speak informally and without a formal appointment with certain other people 
who are at a certain degree of structural distance (superiors in his chain of command for 
instance), even though a link of association does not exist between them.  Thus a junior 
officer can expect to be able to have ‘informal access’ to his sub-unit commander, as a 
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private soldier can to his platoon or troop commander.  Similarly, any member of a 
Sergeants’ Mess can expect to have opportunities informally to approach the Regimental 
Sergeant Major. 
 
5.  Nodding Acquaintance. The term ‘nodding acquaintance’ encompasses all the 
informal relationships which are not encompassed by the other terms.  In essence, it is a 
relationship where the parties know each other by sight, but not necessarily by name, and 
they acknowledge each other’s existence and common participation in the same segment of 
the formal command structure.  The relationship may remain as it is, or it may grow into 
any one of the others listed above. 
 
 A diagram illustrating these relationships is at Figure 2.  ‘Ego’ represents an individual who is 
somewhere in the middle of the rank structure (somewhere between sergeant and captain) and who 
therefore has informal relationships with those senior and junior to himself or herself. 
 
 
 
 401 
Relative
Seniority
Junior
Close Distant
Senior association
association
informal 
access
informal 
access
friendship nodding acquaintance
close
friendship
EGO
Closeness of Relationship
Figure 2: Informal Relationships
 
 
In reading this diagram it is important to note that the spaces between the boxes are voids.  
They show either areas where potential relationships do not exist (as, for example, a rank-based 
relationship – association or informal access - between peers) or they are there simply to 
differentiate between the boxes (as in the gaps between informal access and association).   
 
In the horizontal axes of the boxes, the diagram allows for different degrees of closeness 
within each box: the further to the left the stronger.  This reflects the fact that, apart from close 
friendship, which is by definition a strong mutual bond, and nodding acquaintance, which is 
essentially weak, a significant variable in any particular case is the strength of the relationship. 
 
The Nature of the Model 
 
 During the research it became clear that the organizational culture of the British Army is 
particularly amenable to analysis by the identification of rule sets, and that these rule sets fell into only 
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four separate definable categories.  There was some concern that this was an artifact of the 
research, but it was eventually concluded that it actually reflected the fact that the existence of such 
rule sets was indeed accepted as part of the organizational culture by its participants.  It was also 
observed that there is an inherent tendency for soldiers to want to know what is ‘appropriate’ and 
what is ‘right’ and to expect such behaviour from their fellow-soldiers.  Individually and corporately 
they find themselves articulating this tendency in the course of their daily lives.  Examples are easy to 
find.  The formal command structure encompasses unambiguous rank structures, publicly 
displayed in such things as badges of rank, and written codes of behaviour – Queen’s Regulations 
(9), the Manual of Military Law (10), the Drill Manual (11), and unit-authored Daily Routine 
Orders.  The informal structure includes a significant level of pressure to ‘fit in’ with one’s peers, 
subordinates and superiors, in an appropriate part of a rank-dependent array of informal 
relationships as captured in the Figure 2.  Functional prowess is an important feature in the 
functional structure and soldiers openly judge each other’s value by their functional attitudes and 
standards of achievement, and units lay down the way that many operational and peacetime tasks 
should be carried out in Standing Operating Procedures.  The loyalty/identity structure appears 
clearly delineated in the organizational structure of the unit and, above the unit, in distinctions of 
dress and in unique unit customs and artifacts, and the soldiers articulate loyalty/identity values in 
their actions and conversation. 
 
Although model was derived entirely from participant observation in the British Army and 
from interviews with soldiers, as the investigation evolved, it was found to have something in 
common with other concepts in social science.  In the first place, the rules sets identified had 
something in common with Giddens’ use of Goffman’s concept of ‘frames’, 
 
‘Frames are clusters of rules which help to constitute and regulate activities, defining them as 
activities of a certain sort and as subject to a given range of sanctions.  Whenever individuals 
come together in a specific context they confront (but, in the vast majority of circumstances, 
answer without any difficulty whatsoever) the question, ‘What is going on here?’[.]   ‘What 
is going on?’ is unlikely to admit of a simple answer because in all social situations there may 
be many things ‘going on’ simultaneously.  But participants in interaction address this 
question characteristically on the level of practice, gearing their conduct to that of others. ... 
Framing as constitutive of, and constricted by, encounters ‘makes sense’ of the activities in 
which participants engage, both for themselves and for others.’(6, p. 87). 
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Secondly, the idea of a limited number of such rule sets that interacted in a complex system had 
common ground with Geertz’s concept of ‘planes of social organization’ in Bali.  These ‘planes’ 
consisted in a set of seven interacting and intersecting organizational components which between 
them could be used to account for form and variation in Balinese village social life (12).   
 
Whilst the model’s construction and application to the British Army are novel, therefore, it 
remains within the broad main stream of social scientific thought. 
 
Implications for the Recruit 
 
It will by now be fully apparent that the organizational culture of the British Army is entirely alien to 
the youth culture described earlier.  Where this youth culture lacks any idea of solid structure, 
contains an assumption that all aspects are ephemeral, and values feelings and experience over 
external standards, British Army organizational culture is highly structured, based on clear shared 
rules (both written and unwritten), and contains a constant assumption of hierarchy.  In essence, 
where youth culture is postmodern, British Army organizational structure is anything but. 
 
 This, then, is a key element of the ‘culture shock’ experienced by recruits to the British Army. 
 They have to make a considerable cultural leap, greater than their forebears who came from the 
more structured youth culture of the past (4, pp. 3-4) and this leap concerns their basic expectations 
of life and their deeply held assumptions and attitudes.  To make matters more difficult for them, 
they have to do this in an environment, the Army Training Regiment, which is controlled by staff who 
tend to be highly socialised into the culture that the recruits are trying to join. 
  
 Currently, no allowance appears to be made for the difficulties which many recruits must 
experience in making this cultural transition, and it is entirely possible that a proportion of the 
numbers currently lost during recruit training are lost primarily because of it.  It would seem sensible 
therefore to consider incorporating this factor in the structure of the recruit training programme.  
Instead of demanding that individuals leap directly from their familiar cultural milieu into the alien 
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culture of the Army, there may be considerable benefit in deliberately creating a bridge between the 
two and helping them to cross it in the early weeks of their training.   
 
 No quick answer can be offered here as to how such a bridge might be constructed.  Its 
design would be a matter for future work, but however it is done, it will be important for the 
designer to have a good appreciation of both contemporary youth culture and Army organizational 
culture, the two ends of the bridge.  It is hoped that this chapter has contributed to the process. 
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
In most cases, I began the interviews by asking the interviewee to tell me when he or she joined the 
Army and to tell me about his or her service so far.  In some cases, this provided a sufficient 
framework, with supplementary questions from me, for the whole interview.  In others, I asked 
questions aimed at getting them to speak about the details of daily life in their experience and thus to 
explore with them the structural elements of their relationships with other soldiers.  Examples of 
these questions are: 
 
To Privates, NCOs and Warrant Officers  
 
When you arrived in your unit, how did you become accepted by the people who were there 
already? 
 
Were some of your fellow soldiers obviously more powerful and influential than others?  What made 
the difference between those who had power and those who had not? 
 
What makes somebody have an easy time settling in, and what makes them have a hard time? 
 
When people eat together, is there a pattern as to who sits with whom? 
 
When people go out together, is there a pattern as to who goes out with whom? 
 
Are there any groups of soldiers in your [company/squadron/battery] who are always together?  
Why do you think that they stick together? 
 
What makes soldiers stick together? 
 
Which parts of the regiment/battalion do your friends come from? 
 
Does anything change between a group of friends if one of them gets married? 
 
What do you call the Junior NCOs?  Is there a difference on and off duty? 
 
Could a private/NCO be friendly with a Senior NCO/Officer?  Where, in your opinion, are the 
limits? 
 
What do you call the Senior NCOs?  Is there a difference in different circumstances? 
 
What difference does it make to a soldier when they are promoted to Junior NCO/Senior NCO? 
 
How do you get on with people senior/junior to you?  How do you relate to them?  What sort of 
conversations would you have with them? 
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Are soldiers joining today different to how you were when you joined? 
 
Who organises the cleaning routine in your barrack block?  On what basis are the jobs handed out? 
 
What sort of things divides people who have been friends? 
 
What, in your opinion, makes a good officer/NCO? 
 
What, in your opinion, makes a bad officer/NCO? 
 
When you are off duty, what do you wear? 
 
What do you expect an officer/soldier to wear off duty? 
 
What do people do when they get angry with one of the hierarchy? 
 
What happens if someone in authority gets things wrong?  How are they corrected? 
 
Is there any characteristic that stands out in your battalion/regiment? 
 
What are the common experiences of people in your battalion/regiment/battery/squadron/company? 
 
Which is the best sub unit in your regiment/battalion? 
 
Can you describe the daily routine of your company/squadron/battery? 
 
To Officers 
 
I asked many of the same questions in the previous list, suitably modified for the new context.  In 
addition, I also asked questions like those which follow more often of officers than soldiers: 
 
How well do you get on with your platoon sergeant/company sergeant major/etc? 
 
What happens in all-ranks parties/smokers etc? 
 
How important is the history of your regiment/battalion/squadron etc? 
 
How well do you get on with [a senior officer]? 
 
What makes for good and bad morale in your regiment/battalion? 
 
Do officers share personal difficulties with each other? 
 
What do you think of the regimental system? 
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What are the main differences between [x unit and y unit] in which you have served? 
How well do you know the details of your soldiers= everyday lives? 
 
How is discipline in your battalion/regiment actually controlled? 
 
If there was a really incompetent OC, how would he be sorted out? 
 
Do the soldiers laugh at the officers? 
 
When, if ever, would you address a junior soldier by a nickname? 
 
What role do the senior private soldiers play in your battalion/regiment? 
 
How can soldiers communicate informally with their superiors? 
 
Description of the Model 
 
From time to time I described the model to some of the interviewees, choosing a cross section of 
ranks and cap badges.  Without exception these interviewees agreed about the value of considering 
the four separate social structures.  The more detailed part, breaking down the informal structure 
into different types of relationship, was considered to need improvement at the start of the study.  
However, after it reached the form it is presented in this thesis it was accepted as readily as the four-
structure model.  There was general agreement wherever I went that these two models described 
the interviewees= lives well. 
 
 
 409 
APPENDIX D BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT ARMS UNITS IN THE BRITISH 
ARMY 
 
 
This appendix is for those who are not familiar with the organization of the British Army combat arms units.  It provides a sufficient (though highly simplified) description 
of the rank structure found at unit level and basic elements of unit organization. 
 
The Rank Structure of the Units in the British Army 
 
A >unit= is a formally organized body of soldiers between approximately 400 and 600 strong commanded by a lieutenant colonel.  It is the largest military group within 
the terms of reference of the study, and is generally considered within the Services as the basic group out of which operational military forces are built.  Each individual 
in the unit has his seniority and responsibilities encoded in a military rank, and it is this structure of rank that this appendix describes. 
 
The structure of the system of rank throughout the units of British Army is identical, so that soldiers of the same rank are given similar responsibilities and are 
paid the same.  However, the details of the nomenclature varies between types of unit - and indeed between units of the same type with different history and traditions. 
 This appendix provides a sufficient summary of the rank structure to enable the non-military reader to understand the thesis, but it is not a complete guide. 
 
The main categories of rank and their sub-divisions are as follows, starting from the most junior: 
 
Other Ranks 
 
Private Soldiers 
 
Junior NCOs 
 
Senior NCOs 
 
Sergeants 
 
Warrant Officers 
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Commissioned Officers 
 
Junior Officers 
 
Field Officers 
 
Senior Officers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 411 
Table 1   
 
The nomenclature of rank in the combat arms units is shown in the following table.  The seniority of the rank increases down the table. 
 
 
Rank Category 
 
Royal Armoured 
Corps 
 
Royal Artillery 
 
Royal Engineers 
 
Infantry 
 
Royal Signals 
 
Army Air Corps 
 
Private Soldier 
 
Trooper 
 
Gunner 
 
Sapper 
 
Depends on 
regiment.  Examples 
are: Private, Fusilier, 
Rifleman 
 
Signaller 
 
Airtrooper 
 
Junior NCO 
 
Lance Corporal 
 
Lance 
Bombardier 
 
Lance Corporal 
 
Lance Corporal 
 
Lance Corporal 
 
Lance Corporal 
 
Junior NCO 
 
Corporal 
 
Bombardier 
 
Corporal 
 
Corporal 
 
Corporal 
 
Corporal 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Sergeant 
 
Staff Sergeant 
 
Staff Sergeant 
 
Staff Sergeant 
 
Colour Sergeant
  
  
 
Staff Sergeant 
 
Staff Sergeant 
 
Warrant 
Officer 
 
Warrant Officer 
Class 21 
 
Warrant Officer 
Class 21 
 
Warrant Officer Class 
21 
 
Warrant Officer 
Class 21 
 
Warrant Officer Class 
21 
 
Warrant Officer Class 21 
       
                                                 
NOTES  
 
1.  Written >WO2=, but never called AWO2@.  Always formally addressed as ASergeant Major@, or by  his appointment, such as ACSM@ which stands for 
>Company Sergeant Major=. 
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Rank Category 
 
Royal Armoured 
Corps 
 
Royal Artillery 
 
Royal Engineers 
 
Infantry 
 
Royal Signals 
 
Army Air Corps 
Warrant 
Officer 
Warrant Officer 
Class 12  
Warrant Officer 
Class 12  
Warrant Officer Class 
12  
Warrant Officer 
Class 12 
Warrant Officer Class 
12  
Warrant Officer Class 12  
 
Junior Officer 
 
Second 
Lieutenant3 
 
Second 
Lieutenant3 
 
Second Lieutenant3 
 
Second Lieutenant3 
 
Second Lieutenant3 
 
Second Lieutenant3 
 
Junior Officer 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Lieutenant3 
 
Junior Officer 
 
Captain 
 
Captain 
 
Captain 
 
Captain 
 
Captain 
 
Captain 
 
Field Officer 
 
Major 
 
Major 
 
Major 
 
Major 
 
Major 
 
Major 
 
Senior Officer 
 
Lieutenant 
Colonel 
 
Lieutenant 
Colonel 
 
Lieutenant Colonel 
 
Lieutenant Colonel 
 
Lieutenant Colonel 
 
Lieutenant Colonel 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
3.   Together Second Lieutenants and Lieutenants are known as Asubalterns@, sometimes shortened in speech to Asubbies@.  They are formally addressed as 
AMister@ plus surname. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2.  Written >WO1=, but, like the WO2, never called AWO1@.  A WO1 is usually formally addressed either as AMister@ plus surname, or by appointment, such 
as ARSM@ which stands for >Regimental Sergeant Major=. 
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The Organizational Structure of the Combat Arms Units of the British Army 
 
The combat arms units of the British Army are all divided on broadly the same pattern, but the nomenclature varies between types.  The basic principles are: 
 
- All units are divided up into a structure of ever greater numbers of smaller sets of groups, so that the pattern resembles a pyramid. 
 
- There is a prescribed level of rank to command each size of group, and the smaller the group the more junior the rank of its commander. 
 
- Every commander has a second in command, who is junior to him. 
 
- In every officer=s command there is a senior NCO, with whom the officer works closely. 
 
- A subaltern=s command may be commanded by a warrant officer or senior NCO.  Otherwise, all commands are tied to the prescribed rank. 
 
Table 2 on the next page gives the names of the various sets of groups, listed under the headings of the combat arms that they are typical of. 
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Table 2 
 
The categories of groups to be commanded are as follows, in decreasing order of size going down the table: 
 
 
Royal 
Armoured 
Corps 
 
Royal 
Artillery 
 
Royal 
Engineers 
 
Infantry 
 
Royal Signals 
 
Army Air Corps 
 
Quantity (approximate) 
per previous level 
 
Commander's Rank 
 
Regiment 
 
Regiment 
 
Regiment 
 
Battalion 
 
Regiment 
 
Regiment 
 
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel 
 
Squadron 
 
Battery 
 
Squadron 
 
Company 
 
Squadron 
 
Squadron 
 
Four 
 
Major 
 
Troop 
 
Troop 
 
Troop 
 
Platoon 
 
Troop 
 
Flight 
 
Three 
 
Captain or Lieutenant, 
depending on type 
 
Tank 
 
Section 
 
Section 
 
Section 
 
Section 
 
 
 
Two or three, depending 
on type 
 
Sergeant or Corporal, 
depending on type 
 
 
The details of the organization of a particular unit can change with the role to which it is assigned, and to a certain extent with the ideas of different commanding 
officers.  However, for the purposes of the thesis the basic principles of unit organization should be seen as unchanging - or at least as changing so slowly as to appear 
stable. 
 
The following two pages give (very simplified) examples of the structure of an artillery regiment and an infantry battalion. 
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Illustrations  
 
As an illustration, here is what is known in the Army as a >wiring diagram=, or >family tree= of an artillery regiment: 
 
27 Field Regiment, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with a major as second in command 
 
(Approximate numbers, 450) 
 
 
6 Field Battery  23 Field Battery  49 Field Battery  Headquarters Battery 
 
(All commanded by majors, with captains as second in command) 
(Each battery about 100 men) 
 
 
 
A Troop and B Troop  C Tr oop and D Troop  E Troop and F Troop  Signals Troop 
Quartermasters= Departments 
Office 
Regimental Headquarters Staff 
 
(All troops commanded by captains, with either a subaltern or a senior NCO as second in command) 
 
 
(Each field battery) 
 
 
 
Gun Gun Gun Gun  Gun Gun Gun Gun 
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Note that this simplified organization chart omits other components of the battery, such as the administrative and command elements. 
 
First Battalion, the Royal Highland Fusiliers, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with a major as second in command 
 
(Approximate numbers 550 men)  
 
 
 
 
 
A Company   B Company   C Company   Support Company  Headquarters Company 
 
(All commanded by majors, with captains as second in command) 
 
(Each company approximately 100 men) 
 
 
 
1 Platoon 2 Platoon  3 Platoon    Anti-Tank Platoon Mortar Platoon       Reconnaissance Platoon 
 
(Three platoons per company,  (30+ men each) all   (Each commanded by a captain, with a colour sergeant as second in  
numbered in sequence and each commanded   command) 
either by a subaltern or a colour 
sergeant with a sergeant as his  
second in command) 
Section Section Section 
 
4 Section 5 Section 6 Section   (Divided into sections according to type of platoon,  
each commanded by a sergeant with a corporal as second 
in command) 
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(Three sections (8+men each), all numbered in sequence,   [Note: infantry platoons are usually reorganised for Northern Ireland into  
per platoon each commanded by a corporal    two >multiples= of 4 x four-man patrols.  The platoon commander commands 
with a lance corporal as his second in command)   one multiple, the platoon sergeant the other.] 
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APPENDIX E: LIEUTENANT COLONEL DALZELL’S LETTER 24 JANUARY 1855 
 
This appendix contains the text of a letter by Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Robert Alexander 
George Dalzell, written after his regiment, 63rd Foot had ceased to be effective in January 1855, 
reproduced from Mawton, M. H., ‘“Not a Very Nice Regiment”: Her Majesty’s 63rd (The West 
Suffolk) Regiment of Foot’ Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research LXXVI,1998, 
pp. 73-87. 
 
The letter is addressed to Major-General Sir John Campbell, Bt. General Officer Commanding the 
4th Division, to which the 63rd belonged.  Mawton has retained ‘all idiosyncrasies of grammar, 
spelling and punctuation ...  except where they obscure the author’s meaning (p. 76)’. 
 
It is used as an illustration of analysis using the model.  Analytical observations are inserted into the 
text in bold, preceded by the word ‘Comment’. 
 
Balaklava Janry 24th 1855 
Sir, 
 
I had the honor of receiving last evening your letter of the 21st inst., transmitting ‘the Report of the 
Adjutant-General of the Army after he had inspected the Regiment under my Command (on the 
15th inst.) and calling upon me for a full explanation of the causes which may, in my opinion, have 
led to its present inefficient state, as well as of those irregularities to which the Report refers, and for 
which I must be held to be more immediately responsible’. 
 
I shall not trouble Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, or yourself, with many introductory observations or 
assurances of the deep regret I feel that such a report should have been made of a Regiment with 
which I have any connection, or to pourtray the distress and anxiety of mind I have been undergoing 
for weeks past whilst observing the rapidly increasing inefficiency of the Corps, and awaiting the 
moment which I foresaw must arrive when I should have to render an account of my charge. 
 
Both His Lordship and your self will, I am sure, sympathize in my position, (to render which most 
thoroughly painful there is but one item wanting - the disapproval of my own conscience!) 
especially when I state that I am reduced to the alternative of either lamely surrendering the 
professional character, which, for twenty years, I have been endeavouring to establish for myself, or, 
in defence of it, to impute blame, if not directly, at least by implication, to other Officers, whom the 
robbery of reputation would probably leave, like myself, poor indeed! 
 
Of these two courses, I am compelled to prefer the latter. 
 
I have served nineteen months with the 63rd Regiment, but have only been responsible for its 
efficiency since 5th November, having early in the day at the Battle of Inkerman succeeded to the 
command on the death of the late lamented Lieut. Coll. Swyny. 
 
I cannot suppose therefore that F.M. Lord Raglan, or yourself, will be of a different opinion from the 
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several Officers of Rank who have soothed me with their conviction that I cannot fairly be held 
blameable for much of what may be unsatisfactory in the state of the Corps, or that, as a new 
Commanding Officer - I could be expected during a period of unmitigated suffering and downward 
career of nearly, (if not) every Regiment in the Crimea to put an indifferent Corps to rights, or even 
to maintain things as they were.  Had I any doubt on this subject, I could not in justice to myself 
abstain from preferring a request that the case should be thoroughly investigated by a Court of 
Enquiry, - and indeed should I fail in now submitting such a statement as may exculpate me to that 
extent, and secure me from the additional anxiety of a further enquiry by a long correspondence or 
otherwise, I trust His Lordship will be pleased to place that method of self-justification at my 
disposal at his earliest convenience. 
 
The causes that have led to the present lamentably inefficient state of the 63rd Regt have, in my 
opinion, been 
 
1st Its want of good system. 
 
In this view I am borne out by the remark of the Officer Commanding the Brigade, with which it has 
just ceased to serve.  Colonel Garrett ‘I was sure you would have a great deal of trouble with the 
63rd the result of indiscipline for years past.’ 
 
2nd The badness of its material. 
 
3rd Singularly adverse circumstances. 
 
With reference to the first, my earliest insight into the interior economy of the Regiment convinced 
me that it was below par. 
 
"To all intents and purposes it was an ‘easy going’ Regiment and a system of rule, hot and cold 
alternately, had produced the usual effect.   
 
[Comment:  Formal command structure not working as it should - not setting unambiguous 
limits and prescribing behaviour.] 
 
The body of Officers was composed, in an unusual proportion, of those who for private 
convenience had exchanged into it, - (of the Captains seven have done so).  The absence of any 
sentiment akin to ‘esprit de corps’ was very palpable,  
 
[Comment:  No evidence of loyalty/identity structure among the officers.] 
 
and for a long time I was really unable to discern, what is generally easily discovered, whether there 
were any, and what, Officers zealously and heartily attached to the Service, and eager for 
advancement.  Two Comps were certainly in better order than the rest, and I gladly adopted the 
belief that their Captains were of the stamp I wished to find.  In lieu of such stimulants to exertion 
and the correct performance of duty, I found a general indifference, indolence, and carelessness, 
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such as I had never seen equalled during my intercourse with many Regiments which I had known 
more or less intimately in Garrisons, and elsewhere -  
[Comment:  Functional structure: officers not stressing the  importance of 'doing the job' 
and not demanding that the soldiers were functionally proficient.  This would have tended 
to undermine the raison d’être of a unit on operations.] 
 
such an idea as a prevalent desire and effort to establish and maintain their own particular Regiment 
on a footing, equal if not superior, to other Corps, never once betrayed its existence - and this living 
almost exclusively for self from day to day, and the total absence of ‘esprit de corps’ is one of the 
greatest obstacles in the path of its Commanding Officer at this moment.   
 
[Comment:  No feeling of competition with other units - loyalty/identity structure 
deficient.] 
 
I am bound, on the other hand to remark that the utmost cordiality in social intercourse has been 
characteristic of the Officers of this Regiment, that their errors have been rather those of omission 
rather than commission, professionally, and that I dare say several Officers of fair promise would 
have come to light had military predilections been fostered from the earliest period of their career, 
and the conviction forced home amongst them, that to continue receiving pay whilst performing duty 
at best luke-warmly is not proof of spirit.  Such having been neglected, they have habitually 
performed their duties loosely and carelessly, (I speak, not without an exception, but of the great 
majority.) - The Non Commd Officers observing this as they could not fail to do, imitating a bad 
example, fell into similar ways, and allowed irregularities to pass unnoticed for the sake of an easy 
life - and became convinced that the Regiment did not honestly deserve what alone I had ever heard 
mentioned in its praise, viz, ‘that it was very well behaved’. 
 
[Comment:  Informal structure acting as a channel for the message from the officers 
downwards that formal command and functional standards need not be enforced.]  
 
Crime was screened not suppressed.  Habits of respectful alacrity and implicit and ready obedience 
could not be expected among the Privates, not of extreme cleanliness and regularity.  On such a 
defective basis, as this, the Regiment was thrice augmented from the very scum of Dublin. 
 
[Comment:  Formal Command structure not being exercised.  Too many legitimate 
secondary adjustments.] 
 
Decay is often insidiously at work within whilst the outside for a while looks fair enough - so it was 
with this Regiment, but only to make its annihilation more complete.  It managed however to hold 
together, and to escape downright disgrace until it became my unenviable lot to be at its head, 
though it assuredly bore no high place in the estimation of Major-General Cochrane, in whose 
district in Ireland it was when I first joined it.  In February we gave away Volunteers to Regiments 
destined for Turkey.  The number was not large, but the men were of the best, - formed soldiers, 
who would be valuable on active service, - Lieut. Cl. Swyny, an Officer  of the most scrupulous 
honor, making it a sine qua non that none of indifferent character should be offered as transfers.  In 
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the same month the 63rd itself was ordered to augment and twice more in April and May first to 
1000, then to 1200 and lastly to 1400.  Of these mostly recruits, 148 were under 18 years of age, 
and nearly all our recruits were gathered from the riff raff of the Irish Metropolis, morally and 
physically the least desirable kind of Recruits a Regiment could be liable to enlist.  Petty theft 
became most prevalent amongst us from that time, and much of the after confusion in the Corps was 
caused by the pilferring of these young soldiers, and their incorrigible propensity to use, if not to 
steal, their Comrades Arms, necessaries, Rations etc. whilst such practices were feasible, these 
Recruits managed, though always lazily, to turn out for duty, but when, as became the case, honest 
individual exertion was requisite to maintain not only appearances on Parade, but actual existence 
such as the labor of wood and water carrying etc. etc. these helpless, ignorant and indolent fellows 
rapidly became noneffective.  It may be inferred what these men physically were from the Adjutant 
Generals Report that the men whom he inspected on Parade, and who had outlasted the others 
were ‘undersized and not fit for the Service at all’. 
 
The augmentations were doubtless conducted injudiciously fast, - but the desire to complete to the 
War Establishment was predominant, - and the how was not sufficiently attended to. 
 
[Comment:  The removal of experienced and regimental-minded soldiers removed a 
steadying influence from those who remained.  This influence would have been exercised 
through the informal and functional structures.]   
 
[Comment: The regiment was too full of those who preferred secondary adjustments to 
functional proficiency.  This indicates faults in the functional structure, and an imbalance 
in favour of the informal structure.] 
 
We happened to be stationed in the Linen Hall Barracks, avowedly the least respectably situated in 
Dublin, as also the least favorable for converting Recruits into useful Soldiers.  Their old haunts and 
associates remained within easy access whilst the only Drill ground was remote and the Barrack 
itself not such a school as was most likely to impress on a Recruit how clean and regular a Regiment, 
and each individual member of it, could, and ought to be. 
 
[Comment:  The soldiers were open to influences outside the military structures that acted 
contrary to the establishment of a positive unit identity.] 
 
After fruitless efforts to get our station changed to the Royal Barracks where the 63rd would have 
been under the eye of the General Officer, one wing was dissevered from Head Quarters by being 
sent to Cork.  The other ere long followed, and thus concentrated under very favourable local 
circumstances, had the Corps been allowed a month or two for training, its claim to discipline and 
efficiency might in a degree have been established, but unfortunately in ten days it embarked for 
Turkey.  This embarkation was such a failure, as can never be forgotten by those who witnessed it!  
The Ship Avon was not calculated to hold the 1200 men (200 of the 46th Regiment included) who 
were ordered into her, but the confusion of our Embarkation which displeased Major-General 
Maunsell and the Asst Quarter Master General extremely was unquestionably attributable less to 
that than to the deficiencies of the Regiment, as a Regiment.  Officers, and NonCommd Officers 
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careless, inattentive, and not professing authority over their men, and the men themselves in great 
part raw, ignorant, brutish towards each other, headstrong and unmindful of the orders of their 
superiors. 
 
 
[Comment: Faults in the formal command structure at both officer and NCO level, left the 
men in an undisciplined atmosphere.] 
 
To get such Soldiers into their proper places, as also their Arms, Accoutrements, etc. was not to be 
accomplished even after disembarking, and marching on board a second time.  I was so impressed 
with the unhandiness of the Regiment, that I stated to the Asst Quarter Master General and the 
present Asst Adjutant General in Edinburgh, who accompanied us down the river, that in my 
opinion, the Regt was quite unfit for active service. 
 
[Comment: Faults in the functional structure were making themselves apparent.  It seems 
that not only were the soldiers badly trained, but that they had no mature mental model of 
what constituted soldierly behaviour.] 
 
Despite the vast quantity of Gunpowder on Board, the crowded state of the decks, especially at 
night, and the inevitable confusion, dirt and irregularity that prevailed during our Voyage, 
notwithstanding daily Parades and most uphill endeavours to being men and things into shape, we 
reached the Bosphorus without an accident, and some days afterwards encamped in the Sultans 
Valley near Beycos.  There an improvement was progressing, and something was being learnt, but 
our sojourn was very brief, and we re-embarked without effecting much towards efficiency, and 
landed in the Crimea on the 14th Septr.  From that moment hardships and privations commenced 
and rapidly increased to their present extent, and the powers of a Regiment, constituted as this has 
been, composed in a great measure of the rawest, most helpless, most improvident, most indolent, 
and most undisciplined materials have been thoroughly overtaxed.  Instead of being able to use, and 
profit by, and render available, resources already existing in the Regiment, those resources have had 
to be created at the very period when they were most needed in their utmost perfection.  Whilst a 
childlike helplessness, and want of physical stamina amongst the men hung like a log round the neck 
of their Commanding Officer, no Childlike freedom from crime made amends for them morally!  A 
hard days work under a broiling sun on the beach near Lake Touzla, w[h]ere the 63rd was left in 
rear of the Army collecting scattered stores etc. ready for reshipment, was the precursor on the 19th 
Septr of a first days march through an enemys country, which did not terminate till late at night.  
Next day when we were expecting every minute to reach our final halting place, an inspiriting 
address from Brigr Genl Torrens led the Regiment on for miles with the object of participating in the 
Battle of the Alma - but this most severe march before so many young soldiers had recovered from 
the first day, which is avowedly the most trying of a march on all Troops,  
 
[Comment: Dalzell is calling on a shared model from the functional structure.] 
 
was quite too much for them, and combined with copious draughts of cold river water from which 
neither persuasion nor force could turn them when heated caused Cholera to break out amongst us 
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next day.  Its ravages led to our removal to the heights and when the Army moved forward, the 
63rd was still the Rearmost Regiment of the column which was not in favor of inexperienced 
marchers. 
 
During the fortnight of comparative inactivity after the 4th Division took post before Sebastopol, 
there was not that improvement in the appearance of the 63rd Soldiers that we had hoped for.  
Naturally deficient in Stamina and unacquainted with those means of husbanding their strength and 
‘saving themselves’ that older Soldiers acquire, there was an exhausted look about our many young 
Soldiers - and this had not disappeared when the Duty of the Trenches commenced.  It was not 
likely to do so from that time.  During the fatigue of the march, most of the Camp Kettles had been 
thrown away, indeed rather than be late for a share in the Battle of the Alma, the Soldiers had been 
directed to discard anything that they could not carry, and the Camp Kettles, from their unwieldiness 
and, as compared to great Coats and Blankets, valuelessness, had gone first.  This has ever since 
been a mis-fortune.  For long after our arrival before Sebastopol, fresh ones were not forthcoming, - 
the regular system of cooking by messes was interrupted, and when each man had to look out for 
his own meals, the many indolent men mostly went without more nutritious fare than biscuit.  Soon 
after fresh Camp kettles had been issued, fuel became scarce, - at least dry fuel, and latterly fuel of 
any kind. 
 
[Comment:  The absence of stable eating/messing groups would have adversely affected 
informal bonding in the  informal structure.  If the soldiers were each on his own in looking 
for food, it was a bad sign as far as the informal structure was concerned.] 
 
On the 5th November was fought the Battle of Inkerman.  In my return to Camp that Evening as 
Commanding Officer of the 63rd, I had no reason to congratulate myself under the auspicious 
circumstances under which I commenced my responsibility.  I was the only Field Officer present.  
All the Captains were wounded or absent sick, except three, (one of whom left for Scutari sick in 
ten days and has never since rejoined) the Adjutant was wounded, and left immediately with the 
other wounded officers, and I had to look (where zeal, as I have already asserted did not abound) 
for a Subaltern to act in his stead, who, when found, was quite ignorant of his new duties.  The 
Regiment had been without a Sergeant-Major since our landing at Lake Touzla, - of Pay and Colour 
Sergeants, on whom so much depends whether the Captains are zealous or not, there were only 
three not wounded or sick, and one of these having to act as Sergeant-Major was thenceforth but 
little with his company. 
 
[Comment:  We do not know how many of the Senior NCOs were non-effective before 
Inkerman, but this implies that there were enough of them up to the battle.] 
 
[Comment:  The absence of senior NCOs after Inkerman could well have contributed to 
the subsequence collapse of the battalion.  Their influence would have been missed in all 
four structures.] 
 
[Comment:  So far, it is clear that the lattice of informal relationships that might have been 
expected to be operating was much less effective in supporting military performance than 
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in a 'typical' regiment: the old soldiers who might have acted as role models for the new 
men had been reduced in numbers, the largest peer group consisted of the new locally-
recruited (Irish) men, group bonding round eating arrangements was not taking place and, 
according to the CO, the NCO's were not setting an example of behaviour - and by not 
doing so were sending an informal message that 'soldierly' behaviour was not required.] 
 
The Paymaster had been left on board ship, sick, with his clerk.  The first I have never seen since, 
the last has only recently rejoined and has again left sick.  Their Books papers etc., and indeed all 
the Regimental Documents passing through their Department were accidentally (as appeared before 
a Court of Enquiry which I assembled,) burnt on the 5th Decr when they had just been transferred 
by the Paymaster at Balaklava on his way to England, to the Committee of Paymastership, whereby 
the Regimental Pay Lists are six months in arrear! 
 
Whilst there was this paucity of auxiliaries to assist me in conducting the business of the Regiment, 
there were men enough left, and of the class to require much supervision and correction. 
 
On the 14th Novr the terrific Gale blew down all the Tents of the 63rd which were on the very 
exposed top of the Hill.  Many were greatly damaged and had to be used in a very tattered state, 
the requisite number of new Tents not being immediately issuable.  The General impression then was 
that this was but the first of a series of Gales to which we should be subjected, and as there was no 
likelihood (from enquiries that I made of the Asst Quarter Master General) of the troops being soon 
hutted, I caused holes to be dug wherein to sink the Tents which thus became much less exposed to 
the winds, and these same holes, by throwing a wall of stones or earth across, could be readily 
roofed over should wood be forthcoming. 
 
The wet weather, however, overtook us before the original plan of drainage could be effected, and it 
was necessary to shift the Tents on to the high ground again.  The exposure of that night sent many 
men to Hospital, and laid the seeds of much sickness besides, combined with other after causes such 
as the frequency and severity of duties, not only in the Trenches but on Fatigues to Balaklava, 
conveying back to Camp Clothing Wood Food etc. etc. for which Beasts and Carts were not to be 
had.  The Sick List of the 63rd at once ran up to a high figure, and my means of carrying on the 
duties of the Regiment became fewer and fewer, and my difficulties greater and greater, as the 
weather grew worse and the Sick List increased, whilst Rations at times were insufficient and 
irregularly issued and duty painfully severe.  (In six days I have myself had three tours of duty in the 
Trenches and after passing a night (when not sliding or staggering my Rounds over the slushy and 
slippery ground) sitting or lying in a pool of mud to which a ditch in England would be a paradise in 
comparison, I have returned to my Tent, not to rest for even a few hours but to resume my Orderly 
Room and other Regimental Duties, and to note that my cases were not diminishing nor my 
prospects improving, but that during every absence some more men had gone sick, if not died, and 
my Dutymen consequently become fewer). 
 
[Comment: Under these testing conditions, all the social structures would need to be 
operating strongly in the lives of the soldiers to retain their regimental solidarity and their 
application to military duty.  The other battalions in the area were under the same physical 
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pressure but presumably they had stronger social structures that brought them through in 
a better state.] 
 
The great majority of the men of the 63rd were Irish, and the same natural indolence, dirty habits, 
want of forethought and defects of character that have had so much to say to Ireland’s 
backwardness as a Nation, have produced their effect in the smaller compass of a Regiment. 
 
[Comment: Dalzell is invoking a cultural stereotype here, but it may be that the national 
culture from which these soldiers came made it necessary to change their habituses to 
make them value and aspire to soldierly qualities.  Such a change would normally have 
been brought about through recruit training, which he has already pointed out was too short 
to be successful.] 
 
 
To awaken the younger soldiers to smartness and other soldier-like qualifications some months ago 
was a most difficult task though they were in health, - when unaided by the example of a fair 
proportion of pattern men, which, as already stated, did not exist in the 63rd - to arouse them to any 
effort or exertion whilst under the influence of incipient sickness became really impossible at last 
despondency took hold on the men - and it appeared their determination to die - rather than struggle 
to live - and so fast did they die that the Surgeon (from whose Medical skill alone I could expect 
much owing to the (sole present) Asst. Surgeon’s being less than a year in the service) became 
mentally prostrate and was ordered away by a Medical Board. 
 
Since then two Surgeons from the Staff have successfully been attached to take charge of the 
Hospital, which was cleared by their sick being sent to Scutari before we moved to Balaklava on the 
20th inst. 
 
I have omitted to mention as unquestionably bearing on the subject of causes of the present 
inefficiency of this Regiment, that the practice of Non Commd Officers and other obeying orders 
implicitly and with the utmost despatch if it ever existed in the Corps, had fallen into desuetude 
before I became acquainted with it.  I need not enlarge upon the train of evil consequences that must 
result from a disregard of the maxim that ‘obedience is the first duty of a Soldier’. 
 
[Comment:  Formal Command Structure not working.] 
 
When an officer in any position of authority such as mine cannot rely on the punctual fulfillment of his 
orders, the contretemps and irregularities and neglects that constantly come to light involve him in 
almost inextricable difficulties and the wear and tear of mind and body is doubled and is enough to 
break down not only the best intentioned, but most able man.  It can hardly I presume be supposed 
that whilst this decay of the 63rd Regt has been going on with equal rapidity and certainty, of late, I , 
its Lieut Colonel could only look on unconcernedly absorbed in my own private affairs, or be 
otherwise than deeply affected not only at its progress, but by my inability to stay it in any degree! 
 
And surely, Sir, it can no longer, if you credit my statement, be matter of surprize to F.M. Lord 
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Raglan or yourself that an Inspecting General should have been unable to represent what remains of 
the Regiment under my Command in the Crimea in a more satisfactory light, or that some traces 
even should betray that I may myself have succumbed to the force of adverse circumstances, and 
have not been able to display uninterruptedly, energy - almost superhuman!  That I have at least 
stuck to the post of Duty and considered my Regiment as of paramount importance has been 
proved by my having only twice quitted the Camp since the 5th November - once to ride to 
Balaklava on business, and once for a couple of hours walk to dissipate my isolated wretchedness at 
the continued downward course of the Corps - notwithstanding my earnest, zealous and best 
intentioned efforts and designs for its benefit!  I appeal to His Lordship’s and your sense of justice to 
decide whether because some irregularities may have attracted the notice of the Adjt General of the 
Army, it is any proof that I have been guilty of general neglect of duty, to Her Majesty, my 
Regiment, and yourselves, or whether I can fairly be blamed for the inefficiency of a Regiment, the 
seeds of whose decay were sown before I became its  responsible head! 
 
With reference to ‘those irregularities for which I must be held more immediately responsible’ I beg 
to offer the following remarks in addition to what has gone before explanatory of them in some 
measure. 
 
The Arms and Accoutremts of some of the few men under Arms for the Adjutant Generals 
inspection had not been long in their possession.  The History of our Arms and Accoutrements is 
complicated.  During the march on Sebastopol men at various times fell sick and with their Arms and 
Accoutremts went on board Ship - When they rejoined the Regiment some had Arms etc. of one 
Regt, some of another, and some were no more wrong than that they had arms belonging to other 
Companies of their own Regiment, and on being taxed with carelessness in receiving other than their 
own proper Arms etc. they asserted that they had remonstrated without success.  Some men being 
constantly absent on Duty it was no easy matter to effect even the exchanges between Companies 
especially as no Memd. [Memoranda, i.e. the Regimental Documents which had been accidentally 
burnt] were forthcoming of the number of each mans proper Arms and Accoutrements.  Further 
confusion arose in the Trenches and indeed elsewhere from men snatching up A (and A) that were 
not their own - which was no more than one would expect from such imperfectly trained Soldiers as 
abounded in the Regiment who were prone to adopt the readiest means, right or wrong. 
 
[Comment: The soldiers had not fully acquired the soldierly instinct to keep their own 
weapons and equipment close to them and treat them as vital personal property.  
Functional structure.] 
 
Again when after the Battle of Inkerman, I sent a party under an Officer to recover from the field 
whatever Arms etc. might be lying there belonging to the 63rd, instead of strictly confining 
themselves to what it was our especial duty not to be lost, they brought back property of other 
Regiments in may cases - not in addition to, but chiefly in lieu of what there was reason to believe 
they might have found! 
 
Such were some of the causes of scarcely a single man having either the Arms and Accouts that 
were originally served out to him, or having even sets similarly marked which I wished for a long 
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time in vain to rectify.  At last I succeeded in parading all the Arms and Accoutrements at once, and 
a re-issue in complete sets took place very shortly before the General Inspection. 
 
The Arms and Accts had however been standing out for some days before the task could be 
completed, and had unquestionably got into a very bad state.  I reckoned, notwithstanding the small 
number of men at my disposal, that by degrees I should get all well cleaned and regular.  It was not 
however to be accomplished in a few days and the Armourer Sergeant falling sick, as everyone else 
did, exactly when I most wanted him, did not hasten the work.  I had in truth detained the A and A 
for a wile, after I became aware indirectly that surplus A and A were to be sent to Balaklava, feeling 
thoroughly ashamed to give them into Store in such a state!  No order ever reached the Regiment to 
do so, and they had accumulated in such numbers owing to the Non Effective List swelling so fast, 
that I had not the means, for want of men of sending them to the Ordnance Stores afterwards.  I 
was not present when the Adjutant Genl saw the Regiment and visited the Tents, but I believe that A 
and A in one of the unoccupied Tents to have belonged to men who that very day were sent away 
to Scutari without having been in Hospital at all for want of sufficient accommodation.  This was an 
instance of so many Arms and Accouts being thrown on my hands simultaneously, that I had not 
enough Effective men left to convey them to Balaklava, even exclusive of previous accumulations.  
With regard to the Ammunition, it had been our practice to fill up such pouches of Effective men as 
required renewing from the pouches of Non Effectives, and the loose rounds were for obvious 
reasons taken first, at once destroying uniformity, but at no other cost in times when many loose 
rounds are soon fired away. 
 
One of my earliest orders after assuming command of the Regt was as to the regulation of the Tents, 
- it was most specific, and I so far insisted on the Drainage in particular being secured that I would 
not allow the men to occupy the Tents on our new ground until a drain had been formed round each 
and such existed when the Adjutant General visited the Camp.  The snow, however, had blocked 
them up I am well aware and had formed obstructions at the doorways by drifting, but besides the 
unfavourableness of the weather, the Regiment was so reduced in number and is dejected and worn 
out physically that that was not the first day when it had been found impracticable to maintain any 
semblance even of order and regularity in the Tents.  To frustrate the endeavours that had been 
made to secure to the Regiment better health and more comfort, extreme indolence and obstinacy 
had been constantly at work.  The spades and pick axes were wantonly but cunningly broken and 
secreted for fuel - and neither leniency nor punishment had effected much in improving the 
disposition of some of these ill conditioned fellows when they passed from my hands into the 
Hospital. 
 
[Comment: The soldiers had placed their own physical needs above the military task.  This 
indicates that the functional structure had collapsed.] 
 
Were this a reply to charges of mis-rule distinctly brought against me, I should record how that I had 
remonstrated with, reprimanded and appealed to Officers, - reduced Non Comd Officers and 
flogged Privates until the Surgeon interfered, and left me too much at their mercy considering how 
few means of improving discipline are at the hands of a Regiml Commanding Officer on Active 
Service - which I beg to add to the list of adverse circumstances that have conduced to the present 
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inefficiency of the 63rd Regiment. 
 
[Comment: Here Dalzell shows that he had tried several management techniques, some 
informal and some formal.  The fact that none of them worked confirms that the formal 
command structure was not acting as a means to direct the men’s behaviour and that he 
did not have sufficient links in the informal structure to improve things by that means.  
This may well have been through the loss of informal bonds because of the casualties.] 
 
 
 
I have the honour to be 
 
Sir 
 
Your obedient humble Servant 
 
Robt. A. G. Dalzell 
Lt Col Comg 63rd Regt. 
 
[Comment:  The fact that he had to use several leadership techniques - and that this 
included 'remonstrating' and 'appealing' implies that his leadership and management 
techniques were not suited to the situation - but it was a very difficult situation for 
everybody concerned.] 
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APPENDIX F: A LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING MODULE FOR 
OFFICER CADETS BASED ON THE MODEL 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide an illustration of how one of the leadership and 
management training modules for officer cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) 
might be constructed using the model. 
 
The master format for all training in the Services is given by a Defence Council Instruction 
setting out the ‘Joint Service Systems Approach to Training’ (SAT)1.   Accordingly, the module 
generated in this appendix conforms to its provisions. 
 
At the highest level within any SAT-compliant teaching module, there is a general ‘training 
objective’ (TO), defined as a statement that defines what the trainee should be able to do at the end 
of training.  The current Leadership and Management Module TO reads, 
 
‘Demonstrate Leadership and Management’ 
 
Below the TOs comes the Instructional Specifications (ISpec), defining the ‘content, 
structure and sequence of instruction’, and providing ‘instructors with the minimum information 
needed to deliver the training’.  An important element in the ISpec is  a suite of ‘enabling objectives’ 
(EO), which ‘specify what trainees can do at the end of instruction that they could not do at the 
start’, below each of which come ‘teaching points’ (TP) which ‘are  key points contained within the 
development of the section of the ISpec.  In essence, TPs are  short summaries of the contents of 
the teaching periods. 
 
The area for leadership and management instruction which the model is best suited to inform 
is the realities of exercising leadership and management at regimental duty, which, according to 
Rodley’s analysis2 is an important missing area in the RMAS syllabus.  Whilst he finds the theoretical 
instruction on leadership and management at RMAS is effective, he doubts the effectiveness of the 
current policy whereby the young officer is expected to acquire his or her leadership and 
management skills though ‘on-the-job experience and Aosmosis@ through observation and 
subsequent emulation of one’s superiors’.3    
 
An EO to achieve the purpose of filling this gap might read: 
 
 ‘To understand the practical realities of life in a military unit.’ 
 
An important element in the construction of a teaching point is the length of the teaching 
period in the timetable.  In the case of RMAS it is 45 minutes, which includes a time for questions 
during, and at the end of, the period4. 
 
It is now possible to derive the individual teaching points to fulfil the EO, using the model to 
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construct instructional periods of 45 minutes.  Making the reasonable assumption that up to seven 
periods could be made available to cover this enabling objective, the contents of these periods 
would cover: 
 
Period One: Introduction.  The context-dependent nature of life in a unit.  The four-structure 
model, the concept of the operating structure.  The importance of functioning successfully 
as a leader in all four structures so that whatever the context the leader is still dominant. 
 
Period Two: The formal command structure.  The need for an officer to issue orders 
clearly and authoritatively, to listen to reports from below, and to understand and obey 
orders from above.  The importance of appearance and behaviour that is consistent with 
disciplinary customs of the unit.  The importance to each soldier of his/her unique place in 
the unit with which that soldier identifies. 
 
Period Three: The structure of the informal structure.  The nature of the five-fold suite of 
informal relationships and their qualitative differences.  Appropriate and inappropriate terms 
of address in different informal contexts.  The nature of legitimate and illegitimate 
secondary adjustments, the importance of the individual’s perspective on them, and who 
sets the standards. 
 
Period Four: Appropriate behaviour for the informal structure.  Building appropriate 
informal relationships.  Examples: association with the senior NCOs in his sub-unit (and 
especially any under his/her command) informal access with his/her private soldiers, 
friendship with his/her follow-subalterns, and association or informal access with his./her 
sub-unit commander.  Association to develop with his/her junior NCOs and private soldiers 
over time.  The importance of not attempting to achieve, or encouraging the development of, 
inappropriate relationships such as friendship with NCOs or privates.  Whose advice to 
take on the subject of secondary adjustments, and the establishment of a consistent 
personal policy for secondary adjustments and the special informal circumstances when 
the conventions of terms of address may be suspended. 
 
Period Five: The loyalty/identity structure. Taking an active part in supporting the 
loyalty/identity segment that he/she commands, both during events where pride and 
prestige are at stake (such as competitions) and during celebrations of his segment’s identity 
(such as parties).  Taking an active part in supporting the segments above the one he/she 
commands, and acknowledging the soldiers’ membership of the segments below the one 
which he/she commands and encouraging them in exercising their membership of them. The 
importance of the Regiment’s/Corps’, unit’s, and sub-unit’s history and traditions and of 
being seen to identify with them.  The necessity of supporting all sporting occasions that any 
of his/her loyalty/identity segments partake in, and of participating in as many as he/she 
can. 
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Period Six: The Functional Structure.  The importance of an officer performing his/her 
own function well, showing both personal (soldierly) skills, special-to-arm skills, and the 
ability to exercise professional military command effectively.  The importance of an officer 
appearing soldierly.  The importance of recognizing good performance and congratulating 
those who show it, and giving encouragement to those who fall short but in his/her 
judgement are trying to perform well.  The need show concern for the maintenance and 
improvement of individual and collective training standards. 
 
Period Seven: Discussion of issues with officers and NCOs with experience at regimental 
duty, to enable students to ask questions and test out the theory that they have been taught 
with practitioners in an informal atmosphere. 
 
It will be seen that the contents of these teaching periods were generated entirely from the 
model, with the four social structures providing four useful main headings.  The greater degree of 
detail provided by the lower levels in the model provides more focused information for the young 
officer to help him or her to understand the nature of life in a unit and what constitutes successful 
leadership and management.  For instance, at the top level, the model indicates that it is important 
that the officer should be able to function successfully in all four structures: if he or she were not 
capable of functioning as a leader in some of the social structures then they would fail to lead 
successfully when any of them formed the operating structure.  At a lower level, the more focused 
detail in the four structures would provide direct information and personal goals to do with elements 
such as what constitutes ‘soldierly’ tasks, the appropriate terms of address in different 
circumstances, and the importance of the different levels of loyalty/identity segment.   
 
It remains to generate the seven ‘teaching points’.  The first consideration is that the contents 
of the seven periods laid out above needs to be summarised in short phrases.  Secondly, as the 
enabling objective is couched in practical terms, it would be better if the academic language in the 
model were modified to give a more practical feel to the instruction.  For this module, therefore, it is 
suggested that the four social structures are re-expressed in terms of simple verbal nouns which 
carry the message of what actions the leader has to take in each social structure to exercise their 
leadership skills, as follows: 
 
Formal Command Structure:  Commanding and Obeying 
 
Informal Structure:   Relaxing 
 
Loyalty/Identity Structure:  Belonging 
 
Functional Structure:   Doing the Business 
 
and that secondary adjustments are treated as ‘rule-bending’. 
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The finished suggested set of EOs and TPs is therefore as follows: 
 
EO 8.*5:   To understand the practical realities of life in a military unit. 
 
TP 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of context.  The four types of context.  The 
concept of the dominant context (operating structure).  The 
importance of functioning successfully as a leader in all types of 
context.  
 
2 
 
Commanding and 
Obeying 
 
 The flow of commanding and reporting.  The duty of 
obedience.  The importance of appearance and behaviour.  The 
unique position of each soldier. 
 
3 
 
Relaxing (1): the 
system. 
 
The structure of the informal activity.  The five-fold suite of 
informal relationships and their qualitative differences.  
Appropriate and inappropriate terms of address.  ‘Legitimate’ 
and ‘illegitimate’ rule-bending; who sets the standards. 
 
4 
 
Relaxing (2): how 
should the leader 
behave? 
 
Building appropriate informal relationships.  Whose advice to 
take about rule-bending.  Establishing a consistent personal 
policy about rule-bending,  and the special occasions when the 
conventions of terms of address may be suspended. 
 
5 
 
Belonging 
 
Supporting the team that the leader commands in all types of 
context.  Supporting the larger and smaller teams.  The 
soldier’s perspective. The importance of the 
Regiment’s/Corps’, unit’s, and sub-unit’s history and traditions. 
 Supporting and taking part in sport. 
 
6 
 
Doing the Business 
 
The importance of an officer performing his/her own function 
well and looking the part.  Attitudes to the soldiers’ and 
NCOs’ performance.  The need show concern for the 
maintenance and improvement of individual and collective 
training standards. 
 
7 
 
Discussion 
 
Small group discussion with experienced officer and NCO 
about the practicalities of leadership and management at 
regimental duty. 
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Notes to Appendix F: 
 
                                                 
1. MOD, AThe Joint Service Systems Approach to Training (JS SAT) Quality Standard@, Defence 
Council Instructions, Joint Service, 85 (1 June 2001),2001.  The definitions which follow are all 
taken from page 9 of that publication. 
2. Rodley, I. J., Leadership Training and Development, a Thesis for the Degree of M.Phil, 
Lancaster, Lancaster University, 1995. 
3. These Conclusions appear in ibid. 185-191. 
4. Conversation with SO2 Leadership RMAS, 5 March 2002. 
5. The number to be added later by the person constructing the ISpec. 
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APPENDIX G: LETTERS SHOWING ACCEPTANCE OF THE MODEL BY MOD 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
The attached letters show how the model has been received by the following MOD institutions: 
 
The Tri-Service Equal Opportunities Training Centre, Shrivenham, dated 12 July 2002 
 
Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Service Personnel Policy, dated 15 July 2002 
 
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, dated 26 July 2002 
 
Assistant Chaplain General, 4 Division, dated 26 July 2002 
 
 
Photocopies of letters attached in the original 
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